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Examining the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction, the research 
challenges the appropriateness of the uniform application of general policies and 
practices to any particular environment. As a context- and conflict-dependant 
practice, a post-conflict reconstruction that aims at achieving lasting peace and 
sustainable development should address specific needs through relevant 
mechanisms. This is especially relevant for post-ethnic-conflict cases.  
 
The thesis argues that post-conflict reconstruction after an ethnic conflict should 
address as a matter of priority the problems related to the recovery or construction 
of societal micro-frameworks with respect to the macro-unit in focus. Based on 
the explored concepts of social capital, a model outlining its specific 
fragmentation after an ethnic conflict is elaborated and the research discusses the 
mechanisms that have the potential to contribute to the achievement of planned 
and desired reconstruction outcomes and levels of success.  
 
To test the theory against empirical findings, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is examined, as it provides good examples for the negative impact of ethnic 
conflict on macro and micro socio-political levels and for the discrepancies 
between expected and achieved results. The reconstruction practice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is considered in the context of policies and programmes designed 
and implemented by representatives of the international and local community, 






The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War melted globally the 
frozen peace, but also heated up a number of suppressed local tensions in various 
spots of the world. Violence in particularly extreme forms spurred within and 
across state borders. In 1995, prolonged combats between the military forces of 
two or more governments, or between one government and at least one organised 
armed group with high number of battle-related deaths occurred within rather than 
between states (SIPRI 1996:16).  
 
In the context of the raising awareness about the global economic, socio-political, 
and technological interdependence, the transition into the dynamics of the 
‘unbalanced’ world emphasised the need for new framework of international 
relations and policies. The direct involvement in local affairs became regarded as 
a security measure with an important peace-building and peace-preventing role.   
 
Promoted as defending the values of democracy, human rights, and socio-
economic development, the new agenda appeared to contradict the key principles 
of the United Nations philosophy laid out by the United Nations (UN) Charter. 
The various perspectives, justifying the international interference with domestic 
issues, were still challenging the founding principles of the international order – 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states (UN 1945, Chapter 1/articles 1(2) and 
2(7) respectively). Nevertheless, following the leading example of the 1947 
Marshal plan, the international post-conflict reconstruction agenda gained 
popularity in the Post-Cold War settings opening the floor for debates over the 
humanistic/humanitarian causes and the political-economic interests underlying 
the international engagement with local issues.  
 
The assumption stemming from the late 18th century project of philosophy of 
history “that the economic progress will in some way secure social and moral 
progress, and thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy" 
established the axiom for the development programmes in the 20th century 
(Bernasconi 1997:189). Nevertheless, as early as in 1979, Willy Brandt criticised 
the uniform application of the Western model of development. People “must not 
surrender to the idea that the whole world should copy the models of highly 
industrialised countries", because the imposition of alien values, regardless of 
their merit, might have a very destabilising effect on a culture (Brandt 1980:23). 
Without a common pattern for measuring and estimating development on the 
other hand, the whole concept dissolves (Bernasconi 1997:187).  
 
Surely, the moral grounds of the post-conflict reconstruction practices as 
mechanisms for promoting peace and development in war-affected areas can be 
challenged; but the phenomenon cannot be ignored as playing a key role for 
shaping the world today. With a potential to change direction of events and 
developments in general, international intervention in local affairs goes beyond an 
isolated act of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, a set of well-planned and 
dutifully implemented programmes and activities are needed to meet the specific 
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demands of any post-war environment and to overcome the negative effects of an 
experienced conflict. In this light, reconstruction agents are accountable for both 
the local and the global future.  
 
The intensified ethnic violence after the end of the Cold War pushed ahead the 
peace-development-democracy paradigm onto the international agenda and 
justified post-conflict reconstruction as the mechanism to ensure peace and 
stability. This point of intersection between the two phenomena – ethnic conflicts 
and post-conflict reconstruction process - provoked the interest in examining the 
specific reconstruction needs of societies fragmented along ethnic lines. With 
their high levels of violence, transformation of neighbours into enemies and 
relapse from civility into community membership, the intra-state wars have 
established particular conflict configurations and respectively, specific post-
conflict conditions. Thus, focusing on post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction, the 
current research questions the implementation of ready-made successful models 
of policies and practices and their appropriateness with respect to the goals of 
achieving lasting peace and sustainable development. 
 
Repairing destroyed infrastructures, damaged natural, physical, and human capital 
requires not only time and resources, but also consistent and dedicated efforts. 
When intensified hostile attitudes and societal tensions accompany the general 
devastation, the reconstruction process faces challenges that demand particular 
attention and measures. Will for co-operation and/or visions for common future 
are hardly attributes of a society, where innate identity markers have been 
affirmed as lines of us vs. them differentiation during a period of violence. 
Ceasefire could hardly appease former combatants, especially if there have been 
groups driven by unrealised secessionist ideas. Violent civil conflict destroys 
social capital, institutions of governance and civil society and such basic attitudes 
and behaviours as trust and participation (WB 1998:30). Cultural differences 
established or perceived as politically important challenge any civil foundations of 
a society. The relationships based on formal and overarching connections between 
people disappear, replaced by ethnic-membership affiliation.  
 
To achieve its ‘universal’ goals, it is necessary that post-conflict reconstruction 
address particular problems through adequate mechanisms. Based on this 
conviction, the research starts with clarifying the concept of ‘ethnic’ conflict 
considering various theories and definitions in Chapter 1. In fact, the large 
number of approaches to the concept does not contribute to its clarification. 
Combining theory and empirical data (conflict statistics), the suggested ‘map’ for 
distinguishing ethnic conflicts attempts to outline better the field of interest. 
Considering the various conflict parameters in their interaction, it appears that the 
most prominent characteristic, upon which the conflict type can be distinguished 
as such, is ‘conflict consequences’ – namely, the fragmentation of societal fabric 
into closed and mutually hostile ethnically defined elements (communities).  
 
Ethnic belonging is part of everybody’s personal identity. Whereas in a civil 
society it is subjected to inclusive civic affiliations, in societies undergoing 
transition, certain socio-economic and historical circumstances can contribute to 
its politicising and hence becoming a conflict factor (Rothschild 1981:1-2). The 
chapter reaches the conclusion that the destruction of civil bridging ties and the 
re-establishment of ethnic bonds is a specific feature of a post-ethnic conflict 
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situation, which requires particular attention when designing and implementing 
post-conflict reconstruction programmes.  
 
To outline why post-conflict reconstruction should take into account the type of 
experienced conflict already in the policy-designing and activities-planning stage, 
Chapter 2 examines the concept of post-conflict reconstruction as a point of 
intersection between universal values and local realities. As part of the conflict 
management cycle and a mechanism for conflict prevention, the ultimate goal of 
the process appears as achieving normalisation of life, enabling development, and 
introducing and promoting democratic principles and values. This stems from the 
underlying peace-development-democracy paradigm, which gained power during 
the Cold War period, but attracted even more attention after the collapse of the 
communist system in the late 1980s.   
 
Without challenging the validity of any uniform and unquestionable application of 
a single perspective, the research points out that restoring life after an ethnic 
conflict cannot be limited to investments in physical recovery, or to establishment 
of principles and mechanisms of democratic governance and civil institutions, free 
market, civil society and human rights. As discussed in Chapter 1, an ethnic 
conflict destroys the very fabric of society. It damages the micro-level of the unit 
of reconstruction, affects negatively societal relationships, civil networks and trust 
among stakeholders. Under such circumstances, when a vivid constitutive micro-
level is missing building a macro-framework equals to constructing a building 
with no foundations. Therefore, in order to achieve any sustainable positive 
results, post-conflict reconstruction after an ethnic conflict should address the 
problems related to the recovery or construction of respective micro-frameworks 
at a very early stage of the process – at least as a part of the strategic planning.  
 
Rebuilding social capital at the level of the macro-unit of reconstruction and 
matching the elements of the other levels is of primary importance for the overall 
success1 of any post-ethnic-conflict recovery process. Without (re-)establishing 
integrative climate and enabling conditions for creating a coherent and stable civil 
structure of corresponding elements and levels, it is doubtful that activities aiming 
at achieving general change would be successful. With collapsed or weakened 
institutions of state that cannot provide minimum levels of security, civic loyalties 
replaced by ethnic-community loyalties and society fragmented into mutually 
hostile units, a post-ethnic-conflict situation requires the restoration of basic 
principles of citizenship, trust and co-operation among people as an inseparable 
part of the developmental efforts.   
 
Before addressing the issues related to the mechanisms for reconstructing 
citizenship and social capital after an ethnic conflict, Chapter 3 attempts to 
clarify the notion of social capital. Looking at the various approaches presented in 
the theoretical literature, the text explores the notion and develops further the 
model introduced by Christian Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer (1998). The 
research defines social capital as a totality of horizontal and vertical, formal and 
informal relationships and networks within a given social unit (macro-framework) 
that: 1) determines the cost-benefit pattern of the achievement of common goals; 
                                                 
1 In the context of the problems discussed, the current research defines ‘success’ as ‘achievement 
of planned objectives’.  
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2) re-constitutes, updates and develops in the process of pursuing common goals. 
It is a dynamic system of all the four dimensions of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer 
model. Social capital can be positive or negative but it always exists within a 
particular macro-framework, which determines its elements, the type of 
relationship between its members and constitutes the basis for co-operation (i.e. 
investment-output). The research has accepted that the macro-framework, within 
which the rebuilding of post-ethnic-conflict social capital should be examined, is 
‘the state’. Although it has undergone a serious transformation in the context of 
the globalisation, ‘the state’ is still a basic political unit in the international 
relations today. It determines the actors in the international processes and delimits 
the space, within which activities and initiatives have been developed, performed, 
and coordinated.  
 
To discuss post-conflict reconstruction practices and mechanisms connected to the 
accumulation of social capital, the terms ‘(re-)construction’ and ‘(re-)building’ are 
used throughout the research. Putting the (re-) in brackets has its particular reason. 
Reconstruction viewed as efforts towards ‘normalisation of life’, implies a 
restoration of previous status-quo. When a conflict transforms or even eradicates 
pre-conflict conditions (especially those enabling social co-operation, 
participation, and trust among society members), restoration of previously 
existing forms might not be possible at all. Thus the establishment of a new 
’normal’ environment over the ruins of the old one is in fact a ‘construction’. The 
term ‘(re-)construction’ is therefore used to denote this dual possibility of 1) 
’construction’ -  building a new environment that would enable positive socio-
economic and political development over the ruins of the old one - preserving 
some or none of the previously existing systems; 2) ‘re-’ as the building-up 
process is to take place within a previously existing political unit.  
 
While the international community has some positive experience in (re-)building 
macro-level structures, institutions, and capacities with successful strategies and 
mechanisms developed throughout the years, the (re-)construction of a war-
affected micro-level challenges the peace-building and developmental efforts after 
an ethic conflict. The analysis of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model reveals that a 
positive (functioning) social capital needs mutually reinforcing and sustaining 
elements of a macro- and micro- levels of corresponding scope. Affecting 
dramatically the social structures and institutions at micro-level, ethnic conflict in 
fact destroys the balance between the components of social capital replacing the 
wider and encompassing macro-frameworks of the state with such of a smaller 
and ethnically determined unit. The bridging and linking social cohesion 
mechanisms (in Putnam’s terms) within state and between groups dissolve, while 
at the same time the bonding ties of the ethnically constituted communities get 
reinforced.  
 
A specific consequence of an ethnic conflict is the eradication of any supra-ethnic 
integrative mechanisms. Instead of a ‘state-level-society’, closed ethnic groups 
with no or little overarching social capital emerge and social cohesion remains 
confined within their boundaries. Thus, Chapter 3 underlines that civil society 
building, reconstruction or strengthening would hardly be successful if in a post-
ethnic-conflict environment there is no minimum level of positive social capital at 
the level of state and functioning bridging ties. The text emphasises that civil 
society is unfeasible without a minimum level of positive social capital, because it 
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is a configuration of elements of the latter, and without bridging ties, because they 
enable the interaction and interdependence between people, constituting a single 
yet heterogeneous community.  
 
Examining the possibilities of transforming negative social capital into positive, 
Chapter 3 discusses mechanisms that can establish and/or rehabilitate inter-
communal communication and integration at a state-level. The research 
emphasises that in order to enable the establishment of an integrative climate, the 
rehabilitation of inter-community communication and integration within the 
macro- socio-political framework of the state, (re-)construction after an ethnic 
conflict must address social cohesion issues as early in the process as possible.   
 
To test the outlined theory, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine the case of the 
post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The selection of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for a case study is because it presents a good example 
both of a Post-Cold War ethnic conflict – having profound negative effects on 
macro- and micro- socio-political levels – and of a focal point for international 
reconstruction efforts with large amounts of material and non-material 
investments. The fact that post-conflict reconstruction in the country has been 
running for a number of years, enables it to be considered in a time perspective.  
 
In December 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from an extremely violent 
war with ruined infrastructures, collapsed economy, serious security challenges, 
continuous ethnic violence, human rights abuses, and sensitive social issues. The 
Dayton Agreement established a state of a very complex structure reflecting the 
fragmentation of the traumatised society along ethnic and religious lines of 
separation. Despite the heavy destructions and the overall devastation, the 
expectations of the international community were that the intensive assistance 
would contribute to the fast and efficient recovery of the new country. More than 
14 years of international involvement and multi-sector support and 8 billions of 
US dollars of financial and non-financial aid, it is still debatable whether the 
country could survive without the foreign military and administrative presence, 
and the international financial and institutional help. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
appears as a ‘black hole’ (Derens 2008). 
 
Following the theoretical model introduced in the first chapter, Chapter 4 
identifies the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina2 as ethnic. Apart 
from the damaged economy and physical infrastructure, the country emerged with 
no citizens loyal to the state, with no trust among people from different 
ethnicities, and destroyed cross-ethnic relations. Two ethnically based social 
capital structures replaced the single political unit of the ex-Yugoslav republic 
with its (engineered) national level social capital. Dayton has institutionalised this 
division and the poor investment in cross-cutting horizontal initiatives has 
contributed to the further ‘ethnicisation’ of the society rather than to its 
integration. The subsequent fieldwork findings supported the conclusions reached 
through the analysis of the conflict-related data.  
 
                                                 
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina occasionally has been referred to as ‘BiH’ throughout the text. The 
name ‘Bosnia’ has been used for accurate referencing.  
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The fieldwork performed in Bosnia and Herzegovina also revealed that it is very 
difficult if not impossible to assess post-conflict reconstruction practices from 
within the field. The interviews indicated the existing perception about the overall 
failure of the international reconstruction efforts, at least as far as the reintegration 
of people from different ethnic communities was concerned. The personal 
observations of local and international respondents however could not offer an 
overall framework for evaluating the appropriateness of policies and practices 
with respect to the needs of the particular post-conflict environment. The fact, 
revealed by respondents from the NGO sector, that local organisations were 
largely dependent on donors, indicated the need for shifting the analysis to the 
policy platforms and approaches, implemented by key actors with a direct impact 
on the reconstruction process in general.  
 
As suggested in Chapter 5, official information about the involvement and the 
support received by international agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina differs 
depending on the sources – both as figures and ranking. Therefore, the interest 
shifted to the examination of policies and activities carried out by representative 
organisations for the international community. The focus thus fell on the World 
Bank and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  
 
The World Bank was selected because of the fact that in all of the analysed 
databases, presenting information about the financial assistance received by the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the organisation was among the top donors. 
Furthermore, the Bank has established structures focused exclusively on post-
conflict reconstruction work. The World Bank appeared as an important and 
active agent in the field of post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and it is among the leading donors supporting local initiatives and 
organisations3. It was deemed important to check whether the supported initiatives 
have had an impact upon the reconstruction policy and practice of the organisation 
in general. 
 
As an official representative of the international community and the institution 
established to guide the state through the reconstruction process, the Office of the 
High Representative is by definition the organisation that guarantees that the 
country follows the international development prescriptions. Thanks to its power 
to regulate local politics by imposing political and policy decisions, the OHR is 
the organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that has a direct impact upon the 
future of the country.  
 
The analysis of the particular efforts of the representatives of the international 
community - the OHR and the World Bank - directed towards establishing 
stability and ensuring sustainable progress, revealed that limited attention had 
been placed on inter-ethnic integration and social capital reconstruction. The 
international development efforts have focused primarily on the recovery of the 
macro-structure and its institutions.  
 
The lack of programmes focused on establishing and developing of relations and 
initiatives to crosscut the ethnic boundaries and in this way to enable the (re-) 
                                                 
3 The World Bank is also a leading donor for Mozaik Foundation, the Bosnian NGO, which has 
been an object of examination in the current research.  
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building of the state micro-level has resulted in large amounts of money being 
spent without achieving the expected positive results. The analysis of programmes 
and activities developed and implemented by the two representative organisations 
revealed that although recognised as an important issue, almost nothing has been 
done in the direction of the (re-)construction of social capital at the level of state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
During the fieldwork a local NGO - Mozaik Foundation (formerly known as NGO 
Development Foundation) was identified as an organisation that had adopted and 
applied a social capital approach to its reconstruction work with smaller 
communities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Targeting social cohesion and 
promoting re-integration, the Foundation has a record of successfully 
implemented programmes. Nevertheless, working on a smaller, community-scale, 
the NGO appears as a positive example of existing local energies rather than as an 
organisation with potential to influence national policy-making or international 
donors. 
 
By analysing the theoretical literature and testing the models upon the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study highlights the importance of the early 
addressing of societal reconstruction in a post-ethnic-conflict situation. To avoid 
wasting of foreign assistance and resources, transfer of ownership over the 
institutions and processes need to be strategically enabled, launched, and 
supported in the very early stages of the process. Success appears impossible if 
there are no local agents motivated to undertake and develop activities and 
initiatives promoting the establishment of lasting peace and sustainable 
development. The research established that a particular problem with the 
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ignoring or at least not taking 
into account societal development as an issue of primary importance. Elaborating 
upon these ideas, the text concludes with some key points for strategic planning of 
programmes and actions that could contribute to the processes of reconstruction or 
building of ethnically non-homogeneous societies.  
 
If sustainable peace, political stability, and socio-economic progress are goals of 
any reconstruction efforts, then understanding the character of a conflict and its 
destructive impact on various aspects of life and society is a requirement for a 
strategic and demand-driven planning of projects and activities. Therefore, a 
uniform model of post-conflict intervention or developmental support by 
definition cannot be viable. Addressing the particular needs of the war-affected 
area and society is hence a precondition for a successful post-conflict 
reconstruction. When there is an ethnic conflict, the issues of primary importance 
appear the destruction of social capital and the fragmentation of society along 
ethnic lines of separation. These problems demand attention in the very early 
stage of the process, even if only as a part of the strategic planning.  
 
Looking back at the international practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
comparing them against the suggested model for strategic planning, significant 
gaps appear. Among the identified problems is the lack of a coherent strategy, 
limited focus of interest, waste of essential resources, ownership issues. By 
contrast, positive examples emerge within the local third sector. Proof for the 
existence of such energies is the above-mentioned Mozaik Foundation, which 
works on a limited local scale, but by addressing key issues and applying 
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appropriate mechanisms, comparatively has obtained greater success in the 
rebuilding of communities. 
 
Finally, post-conflict reconstruction can benefit from taking into account not only  
local needs, but also local expertise and experience, yet the international 
community tends not to adopt and implement on a larger scale local initiatives, 
even those recognised as positive. Meeting local needs and channelling local 
energies in the ‘right’ direction in fact is the key to introducing desired changes 
and foster community (re-)building. An integrated society with a high degree of 
social cohesion is a pre-condition for the success of any development programmes 
and processes, for maintaining the sustainability of the progress, preserving 





The increased interest in conflict prevention in the end of the 20th century has 
recognised post-conflict reconstruction as an essential part of the conflict 
management cycle with a key role for enabling peace and development. The large 
amounts of material and non-material resources, technical and financial assistance 
allocated for the recovery of different areas all over the world has established 
these processes as an important element of the international agenda and 
operations. Therefore, the fact that such complex (and to a certain extent 
controlled) processes with a direct impact upon millions of lives have been 
running at their own pace and not as a part of a strategically planned programme, 
is at least concerning.   
 
The general purpose of this research is not to criticise intentions and achievements 
but to indicate issues and measures that can possibly contribute to better 
advancing towards desired objectives. When the goals of achieving lasting peace 
and establishing normal living conditions and prospect for future interfere with 
processes and genuine developments, failures should be reduced to a minimum. 
 
By adopting a realist approach and exploratory perspective, the research focus on 
post-conflict reconstruction issues and on the need for advancing the studies 
within this field, not least because of the direct impact of international 
intervention upon human lives. It addresses the following initially defined aims: 
 
 Further development of the theoretical perspective about of post-conflict-
reconstruction, with a particular focus on the post-ethnic conflict situation  
 Analysis of the features of ethic conflicts in order to establish whether they 
require implementation of particular post-conflict approaches and 
mechanisms 
 Identification of conflicts that result in a deep societal fragmentation along 
particular religious/ethnic/cultural lines of separation (referred to as 
‘destruction of social capital’) as a particular sub-type 
 Development of a model of destroyed state-social capital as a result of an 
experienced ethnic conflict 
 Identification of a set of possible measures for reconstruction of social 
capital in a deeply fragmented society  
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 Development of a model of the destroyed state-social capital of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina  
 Development of a model of the state-structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Analysis of the involvement of the key international reconstruction players 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on the financial contribution data) 
 Presentation and analysis of the contribution of the local NGO “Mozaik 
Foundation” 
 Overall evaluation of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
 
Pointing at the importance of addressing the social capital (re-)construction issues 
as key components of any post-ethnic conflict development strategy, the text also 
attempts to identify mechanisms with potential to contribute for achieving of 
desired outcomes, as defined. Finally, the overall objective of the research is to 
provide insights for policies and practices that can be used when planning and 
implementing programmes at national, regional, or organisational levels. 
 
 
Research design  
 
The research design, the formulation of the research questions and the 
identification of appropriate mechanisms for collecting and analysing data were 
performed with reference to the appropriate theoretical literature. Among the 
works on research design and qualitative research used were those of Creswell 
(2003), Gschwend, Marshall & Rossman (2006), Schimmelfennig (2007), and 
Denscombe (2007); Olsen (2003 and 2004) was referred to on the topic of 
triangulation in social research and Yin (2002) on the applications of the case 
study research.  
 
The thesis consists of two parts – a theoretical section and a case study. 
Acknowledging that post-conflicts reconstruction is a context-dependent concept 
(as are its results, respectively) the first section develops a theoretical framework 
encompassing the three most relevant approaches: ethnic conflicts, post-conflict 
reconstruction and social capital. In order to test the validity of the conclusions 
reached and to explore the problems in their specific context, the second part 
examines the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Interested in the conditions that can predetermine success or failure of a 
reconstruction process and acknowledging that in order to achieve positive results 
post-conflict reconstruction should meet the particular needs of a post-conflict 
environment, the research focused on outlining the specific features of Post-Cold 
War ethnic conflicts. In light of the above, the main research question was defined 
as: ‘Are there specific post-ethnic-conflict conditions that can be considered 
factors underlying the success or failure of a reconstruction process in general?’  
 
Two separate areas emerged within the identified macro-framework of 
observation, namely 1) the post-(ethnic-)conflict reconstruction practice, and 2) 
the reconstruction of macro and micro levels of social capital. Approaching the 
issues first theoretically and thereafter in the context of the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina allowed the establishment of a clearer and wider perspective on 
these same issues.  
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Preliminary research was structured around the key concepts common to the 
specified areas: post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts and social capital. 
The established differences both in terms of quality and quantity of the available 
theoretical literature and empirical data related to each concept indicated that 
applying a uniform method for assessing and analysing events and processes 
within the areas of observation would not result in achieving accurate and valid 
results. Therefore a particular approach was developed for  
 Assessing and evaluating post-conflict-reconstruction as a type of policy 
and international practice 
 Clarifying the concept of ethnic conflicts and identifying the specific 
features that would determine the post-conflict-reconstruction approach  
 Assessing the role of social capital for the reconstruction of a society 
deeply fragmented along ethnic lines of separation  
 
The lack of comprehensive critical studies on post-conflict reconstruction and of 
sufficient statistical data to show the interrelation between problems, selection and 
implementation of measures and levels of success achieved, indicated that a 
qualitative approach should be preferred when addressing the identified problems. 
The examination of the few theoretical studies and the number of field and 
mission reports led to the conclusion that the ultimate goal (at least the nominal 
one) of the reconstruction process in general is the normalisation of the 
environment and the prevention of future conflicts through the introduction of 
peace, democracy and development into the conflict-affected region. Reaching 
these conclusions at the first stage of the research was of particular importance, 
not only because the triad (peace-democracy-development) marked the limits of 
the macro-framework of observation, but also because it could be used as a ‘point-
of-reference’ for the evaluation of the suitability of examined mechanisms and the 
levels of success of analysed activities and processes.  
 
Comparing and analysing qualitative and quantitative data enabled the 
clarification of the concept of ethnic conflicts in the light of the numerous 
theoretical approaches and definitions. The need for determining precisely the 
focus of the study became clearly visible. The selected approach allowed a 
process of conflict mapping that was used to outline a particular sub-type of 
ethnic conflicts. According to the developed mechanism, an ethnic conflict (or at 
least a particular sub-type) could be assessed as such on the basis of the specific 
conflict consequences - the fragmentation of a society along powerful lines of 
separation. This conflict (sub-) type has been selected as the unit of analysis.  
 
The assessment of the post-conflict reconstruction and ethnic conflicts relied on 
both theory and empirical data in a comparative and combined approach. The role 
of social capital in the outlined context (rather an unexploited area) had to be 
addressed in a more reflective and analytical manner.  Existing literature and data 
were analysed in light of the empirical findings from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which enabled the development of some theoretical models. Elaborating upon the 
social capital model of Grootaert and van Bastelaer, the research established that 
ethnic conflict destroys the balance of the social capital components eradicating 
the level overarching divides. Formal social contract (the basis of civicness) 
becomes replaced by ethnic affiliation; in other words, social cohesion at micro 
level dominates (or suppresses) the social cohesion at macro (state) level.  
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Referring to the empirical evidences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the initial 
hypothesis was formulated as follows: ‘An ethnic conflict destroys social capital 
at a supra-ethnic level, which results in loss of the basic grounds of civility and 
civicness4.Aiming at ensuring peace by introducing democracy and development, 
the reconstruction practice needs to build over these civil foundations. Therefore, 
a post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction must address promptly the issue of social 
capital rebuilding in order to ensure emergence of success-enabling conditions.’ 
At a later stage, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also used to validate the 
theoretical conclusions and findings.  
 
Based on the above, the unit of analysis was defined as the systematic efforts for 
overcoming existing (ethnic) divides. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina these 
were identified more precisely as the mechanisms that could enable the 
establishment or/and rehabilitation of inter-communal communication and 
integration (cohesion) within the macro socio-political framework of the state. 
 
Acknowledging that a qualitative approach is more appropriate for addressing the 
research question and its key parts5, among the primary techniques employed 
were: 
 
 Literature reviews on the three main topics (ethnic conflicts, post-conflict 
reconstruction and social capital), and about the case study of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 Analysis and evaluation of primary and secondary sources of information 
(both publicly available and gathered during the fieldwork) – about Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, project and program documents, reports and 
assessments, political statements, news and media materials 
 Theoretical modelling with respect to mapping of ethnic conflicts, 
identifying the ethnic conflicts mobilisation levels, structure of social 
capital, social capital in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and state-
power structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A model for assessing the 
post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was also 
outlined 
 Analysis of databases and statistical information about ethnic conflicts, 
post-conflict reconstruction programs, and  international assistance 
provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2008) 
 Fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which enabled (among others) 
inclusive (participatory) observation and gathering of personal testimonies 
and comments from locals 
 Formal and informal interviews with representatives from international 
organisations, local (BiH) public and NGO sector, academia, media, 
common public 
                                                 
4 The two intervened concepts that underlie the notion of civil society are examined in details by 
Evers (2009) 
5 The mutually contradictory databases about the post-conflict reconstruction programs, agents, 
their activities and financial and non-financial assistance, on one hand and the lack of a single 
official source of information, on the other, indicated again that quantitative data should be used as 
indicative point of reference to support the qualitative analysis, as well as for cross-verification of 
data, findings and conclusions.  
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 Long-term monitoring of processes and developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2003 - 2009), which enabled the  
 Critical analysis based on the comparison between initial planning, 
experienced processes (in 2003), and achieved results (by  2009) 
 Testing and verification of findings and theoretical modelling against the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 Case-study on social capital reconstruction in a comparative perspective 
(analysis of the social capital related activities of the World Bank, the 




Literature review, key concepts 
 
Accepting that any process of reconstruction can achieve positive results only if it 
meets the particular needs of a post-conflict environment, the research focused on 
exploring theoretical literature concerning: ethnic conflicts, post-conflict 
reconstruction and social capital. 
 
The literature review established that: 
 
¾ The numerous studies on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts have produced a 
number of definitions and actually contributed to a lack of clarity in the 
concepts. In the same time, a small number of statistical studies explore the 
impact of ethnicity on intrastate war (Carlsnaes, Simmons & Risse 2005:415). 
 
¾ There is little theoretical literature on post-conflict reconstruction, and it 
appears mostly in the form of conclusions and analyses included in field-
operations reports or case studies. 
 
¾ The scope and application of the social capital concept and related issues are 
unclear. Often, under the title of ‘social capital’, problems related to social 
services, social safety nets or other social agendas are discussed.  
 
The review of literature on post-conflict reconstruction revealed a lack of 
systematic theoretical studies and a prevalence of operations-based analyses and 
conclusions. Therefore, the focus was placed on establishing a theoretical 
framework though analysing field reports, programme documents, policy 
statements, and platforms of leading reconstruction agents.  
 
The lack of differentiated approaches towards conflicts in the context of designing 
and implementing reconstruction policies and programmes, revealed a significant 
gap in the conflict studies. The limited in number and scope theoretical works and 
analyses provoked the interest in opening a discussion about the importance of 
developing specific instruments to meet particular post-ethnic-conflict demands.  
 
The literature review showed that the numerous ethnicity-related theories have in 
fact obscured the concept. A reference to the quantitative data concerning the 
ethnic conflicts revealed that these various approaches have also resulted in 
different interpretations of quantitative data and respectively to mismatches in 
classification of conflicts. To outline the frameworks of the type of conflict, in 
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focus, an assessment matrix was developed. This enabled the identification of 
certain specific conflict-related features as type-markers. Fragmentation of social 
structure and relapse to closed ethnic communities appeared among the most 
distinctive markers for the conflict type selected as object of analysis for the 
research.  
 
Approaching critically the wide range of studies on social capital concept and 
related issues, the research identified two comprehensive theoretical models. 
Analysed in the light of the post-conflict reconstruction agenda and the particular 
needs of the post-ethnic-conflict environment, these models were adapted and 
developed further for achieving better understanding of the problems. The 
visualisation of the complex structure of social capital was further developed to 
present a model of the fragmentation that an ethnic conflict is likely to bring 
about. This fragmentation represents the specific conditions before the post-
ethnic-conflict reconstruction.  
 
The study and analysis of theoretical literature and the relevant additional sources 
of information enabled the research to adopt the following definitions of the key 
concepts in use: 
 
 Post-conflict reconstruction is the process that starts with the signing of a 
formal peace agreement; and ends with the ‘normalisation of life’ within the 
conflict region. The goal of post-conflict reconstruction consists in achieving 
or at least enabling peace, democracy & development 
 ‘Normalisation of life’ implies a restoration of previous status-quo. When a 
conflict transforms/eradicates pre-conflict conditions, then the normalisation 
of life is in fact a process of construction of new conditions/environment. 
 (Re-)construction has been introduced as a term to denote this dual possibility 
of (1) ’construction’ of a new environment that would enable positive socio-
economic and political development over the ruins of the old one and (2) ‘re-‘ 
when the process builds over/restores any previously existing structures 
 Ethnic conflict has been addressed as a conflict, where violence is performed 
along ethnic lines and which establishes ethnic membership as a factor 
determining affiliations, relationships or other aspects of political, economic 
and social life. The most distinctive feature of the dynamic complex are ‘the 
consequences’: the fragmentation of a society into a puzzle of ethnically 
determined, closed, and hostile units. This has been selected as a basis for 
outlining of a distinct sub-category.  
 Social capital has been understood as a totality of horizontal and vertical, 
formal and informal relationships and networks within a given social unit 
(macro-framework) that 1) determines the cost-benefit pattern of the 
achievement of common goals, and 2) re-constitutes, updates and develops in 
the process of pursuing common goals 
 International community: According to the European Stability Initiative 
study of the international power in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ESI 2000), the 
key concept of ‘international community’ denotes the moral and legal 
foundations for foreign involvement in the peace process and thus it falsely 
implies a single actor. Nevertheless, under the term ‘international community’ 
the research refers to the foreign for the country actors that share the values 
and have legitimise their intervention goals in terms of peace, democracy & 
development.  
 20
Analysis of databases 
 
Quantitative data was used throughout the research as a supplementary tool for the 
purposes of clarification of concepts and verification of the conclusions reached. 
Databases were analysed in the section discussing the ethnic conflict concept in an 
attempt to reach a more precise definition of the type. To avoid falling into the 
subjectivity of the particular conflict assessment and terminological classification, 
information from several sources was compared in a critical perspective. The 
detailed databases selected for analysis were indicated as reliable sources of 
information by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (Eck 2005); furthermore the 
research analysed the information considering the entries over a longer period of 
time (from 1945 until the present) and attempted to outline the different conflict 
features by paying attention to the points of intersection in the databases. Thus, 
comparing the information from different sources and analysing them in the light 
of the theoretical approaches to ethnic conflicts, a ‘map’-model was developed for 
assessment of ethnic conflicts as a totality of interrelated factors.  
 
In the second part of the research – within the frameworks of the case study – 
another set of databases was examined. The initial assumption was that the 
quantitative data would allow the objective identification of the most active post-
conflict reconstruction agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the amounts of 
aid allocated to the country, the types of programmes developed and the number 
of projects addressing directly or indirectly social capital (re-)construction. It was 
expected that by measuring variables such as number of programmes targeting 
social capital (re-)construction, levels and amounts of financial and non-financial 
assistance allocated for theses purposes, local involvement in these projects, etc., 
it will be possible to obtain objective quantitative data to check the validity of the 
theoretical findings.  
 
The comparison between entries of several official databases of foreign assistance 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed many discrepancies between the indicated 
amounts of contributions. This in turn resulted in different ranking of the most 
influential agents according to the sources used. The different databases held 
information about different periods, which also was an obstacle to an objective 
comparison. Furthermore, the information about the activities of the 
reconstruction agents in the general databases was only indicative of their field of 
involvement and support without presenting detailed information about different 
projects. This also obstructed the quantitative analysis of efforts directed towards 
the reconstruction of the state-level social capital in the country. 
 
Under these circumstances, challenging the objectivity of the possible conclusions 
based upon the quantitative data, a qualitative approach was preferred. Through a 
judgment sampling, two key reconstruction players were selected for qualitative 




Case study and fieldwork experience  
 
The hypothesis formulated in the theoretical section constituted a field where the 
three core concepts – post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts, and social 
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capital – intersect. The first part of the research established that among the most 
serious consequences of an ethnic conflict from a reconstruction point of view is 
the destruction of social capital at the level of a supra-ethnic political unit. To test 
the theoretical conclusions reached and validate the elaborated modules, the case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was examined in the second part.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was selected as a case study because it represented a 
good ‘platform’ for exploring a wide range of post-conflict reconstruction issues. 
Within the context of the Post-Cold War dynamics the newly established country 
emerged from war as a ‘product’ of the late 20th century international politics. 
Despite being recognised as independent political unit, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
could be viewed as an international project of forced coexistence. Projecting the 
Western model over the Balkan realities, the Dayton Agreement framed a melting 
pot of ethnic tensions, religious confrontations, and territorial separation of the 
ethnically fragmented population. Apart from the collapse of the political, 
economic and societal infrastructures, the post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has been challenged by the war-trauma resulting from the 
experienced severe violence and crimes.  
 
The case was also relevant because of the fact that the protracted intensive 
reconstruction work (not only in terms of years but also with respect to the 
allocated resources and the scale of international involvement) did not manage to 
achieve a stable and properly functioning multi-ethnic state structure. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has been widely recognised as a ‘black hole’.  
 
The existence of several, mutually contradictory, databases presenting information 
about the post-conflict reconstruction programmes, agents, their activities and 
financial and non-financial assistance, as well as the lack of a trusted source of 
information, indicated that qualitative methods are more appropriate for 
addressing the unit of analysis defined as ‘systematic efforts for overcoming 
existing ethnic divides’. To overcome the possible subjectivity of the data 
collected only from a single channel, the principle of triangulation was used. The 
case study was justified as belonging to the type of ‘ethnic conflicts’ (as defined 
in the theoretical chapters of the research). Then, the existence of ethnic divide, 
and the measures (needed and implemented) for overcoming this divide were 
assessed through several perspectives. 
 
Various sources were used for building up a comprehensive picture of the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Yin 2002:114). Information was gathered 
both during the period of theoretical study, during the in-country fieldwork in 
2003 and subsequently during the period of monitoring and close cooperation 
with established local and international contacts. This provided the possibility to 
observe events and dynamics in their development and to legitimate the 
evaluation of measures against three markers: initial plans, experienced processes, 
achieved results (as of 2008/2009). The findings from the participatory 
observation, the interviews and the regular updates provided by the contacts were 
used alongside the analysis of documents, data, records and other materials. 
Adding the personal perspective of experienced reconstruction to the analysis of 
planed vs. achieved results was used as a supplementary method for evaluation of 
the success of processes. In summary, the fact that the data coming from primary 
sources of information (such as official documents and materials, journals and 
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newspapers, media releases, broadcast materials, statistical information and 
research) were supportive to the conclusions reached after the examination of 




Figure 1: Triangulation 








  ‘Systematic efforts for overcoming 







Another important reason underlying the selection of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a case study was its general ‘accessibility’ – not only in terms of physical access 
to the field, but also in terms of language and cultural particularities. The ability to 
communicate with locals and the understanding of attitudes, perceptions, and 
mentality in general ensured the fieldwork productivity despite the limited number 
of visits to the field due to the formerly existing visa restrictions.   
 
The advantage of being able to understand the local language and to communicate 
back, allowed me not only to gather information from common people, who did 
not speak any foreign language, but also to immerse myself in the field and to 
obtain better understanding of the situation. As a Bulgarian I had the advantage of 
being recognised by the members of the local community as a ‘fellow’ and not as 
‘one of the others’ (i.e. the international community), which made the respondents 
feel sufficiently comfortable to share openly their thoughts and experience. This 
added a particular value to the research since the official information and 
statements could be counterpoised with the subjective experience and views on 
the effects of the reconstruction activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in this 
way a more detailed picture of the situation could be elaborated.  
 
While travelling around Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, it was interesting to 
note and experience the existing division along ethnic lines and to feel the feelings 
of animosity against ‘the others’. The calm surface might delude a foreigner that 
stability has been achieved. However, for a researcher from the Balkans, it was 
striking to see signs of war such as buildings in fire arms holes all around the 
country, to visit the empty Orthodox church in the centre of Sarajevo and to hear 
comments that before the war every other day there was a wedding there; or to 
note the vast majority of girls and women in the University premises with scarves 
around their heads and long sleeves despite the heat. A foreigner might not be 
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able to recognise that people travelling on the bus from Belgrade to Sarajevo cross 
the border between the two countries only by showing their local ID card, while 
Bosnian Serbs travelling from Banja Luka to Sarajevo had to show their 
international passports to be allowed to cross the border between Republica 
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And even very indicative 
was the sigh of relief of an approached person when they would hear that I was 
not a Serb/Bosniak but Bulgarian; and the change of attitude could be recognised 
only by looking at the person’s face. Being affiliated to the region and at the same 
time not affected directly or indirectly by the war, I could address the problems 
using my regional knowledge and experience but remaining critically distant in 
my analyses.  
 
Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina was identified as a case of a destroyed 
social capital at supra-ethnic state level. It needs acknowledging however that 
these were rather analytical conclusions since there can be found limited, if any, 
information and data about the inter-communal interactions at micro-level before 
1992. References to the ‘common living in the past’ usually cover Sarajevo and 
some other larger urban area, while little work has been done on the topic with 
regard to the small villages in the country. These circumstances pushed the 
research in a direction not to focus too much on the past, but to analyse the 
processes with respect to the reconstruction objectives set. 
 
After examining the constitutional structure of the country and its potential for 
negative impact on social re-integration, the interviews aimed at establishing 
whether these issues were recognised as an obstacle to reconstruction and whether 
there were any systematic efforts towards overcoming ethnic disintegration and 
fragmentation. Therefore, the interviews carried out during the fieldwork aimed at 
gathering various points of view from ordinary members of local society, 
intellectuals, representatives of local and international public sectors, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, donors, and recipients of 
reconstruction assistance and financial aid. The primary criterion for selection of 
interview respondents was their direct or indirect involvement in the post-conflict 
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, snowball sampling was used. 
Nevertheless, comments and testimonies gathered through participatory 
observation during the fieldwork from ordinary members of the public were also 
used since this provided genuine information about grass-root perceptions and 
experience of policies in place and their effects. Thanks to the support received by 
the members of Mozaik Foundation, the research was able to analyse the work of 
the Foundation over a period of several years and to identify it as a positive 






The purpose of the interviews was to gather first-hand evidences about the 
reconstruction practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to test the 
conclusions reached during the first stage of the research process. During the 
interviews two areas were in focus. The first topic covered the problems of inter-
ethnic divides and relations, their importance (as evaluated by the respondents), as 
well as the experience of reconstruction and the personal assessment of its 
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achievements or failures. The second topic focused on social capital - whether  
social capital related issues were considered / recognised as important for 
achieving ‘normalisation’ of life. Apart from collecting personal views and 
information about subjective experience of processes, another goal of the 
interviews was to establish whether there were any systematic efforts towards 
overcoming ethnic disintegration and fragmentation, which might not be reported 
in the literature.  
 
Being a ‘field for research’ for years, Bosnia and Herzegovina gradually has 
limited its openness to newcomers. Indicators for such a process in 2003 were not 
only the lack of interest both of the local and international representatives to reply 
to invitations for interviews, but also the annoyance that could be felt even when 
people were giving their consent for a personal meeting. Sending a number of 
emails to representatives from various organisations in the country prior to the 
fieldwork (identified as leading structures based on their activities and on the 
published directory ICVA 2002), resulted only in several replies of kind refusal.  
 
The identification of the institutions and organisations of interest at the same time, 
allowed to determine the target respondents and to attempt to reach them by 
activating personal informal contacts. Using the professional and personal 
network of a previously established contact, Ms Alida Vracić who kindly offered 
her assistance in favour for the purposes of the research, some of the targeted 
interviews were performed. Using the snowballing sampling approach thereafter 
the circle of contacts was widened to cover a range of organisations of interest. As 
a result, a total of 31 interviews were taken, of which: 11 with people from 
international organisations, 10 with representatives of the NGO sector in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, five with people form the public state-level sector, and five with 
local intellectuals (people from the academia, media, and young activists).  
 
Despite the snowballing sampling, the selection of respondents was performed in 
a way to enable the gathering of various points of views with a possibly critical 
perspective to the processes and the situation in the country. The primary criterion 
for selection of respondents however was their direct or indirect involvement in 
the post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
As it was mentioned earlier, the initial intention of the research was to examine 
the reconstruction policies and programmes of key international players in order 
to establish whether the rebuilding of social capital at state level has been 
recognised and addressed as an issue of primary importance. This intention was 
challenged by the fact that the databases indicating the financial contribution of 
different donors were mutually contradictory. The impossibility of applying 
objective criteria (based on statistical data) in order to identify the key agents of 
the reconstruction process, shifted the approach towards adopting judgment 
sampling and assessing two organisations, representative of the international 
community and its active involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the World 
Bank and the OHR. The evaluation of their programme documents and official 
data was supported by interviews carried out with high-ranking representatives 
from both organisations. Stratified sampling was used for the selection of 
interview respondents - officials were seen as possible sources of information not 
available for the general public. High-ranked representatives of the World Bank 
and the Office of the High Representative were identified as appropriate 
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respondents. The fact that the interviewed senior staff confirmed both explicitly 
and implicitly the conclusions made upon the analyses of the official documents, 
justified the validity of the findings and thus no further contacts were sought.  
 
Nevertheless, there was awareness that people involved in these sectors in general 
have subjective views about the necessity and efficiency of the reconstruction 
activities. To introduce a more objective perspective, the information gathered 
through the interviews was compared with the analyses performed on documents, 
statistical information, or comments from random people from the local public. 
Ordinary members of society were addressed because they were considered 
valuable subjective indicators for the success of the official policies and practices. 
Comments and testimonies gathered on a random basis from ordinary members of 
the public were also used and included in the text since they provided genuine 
information about grass-root perceptions and experience of policies in place and 
their effects. 
 
The list of the categories of respondents thus emerged as:  
1. With respect to the financial aspects of reconstruction 
 Donors (or re-granting organisations) of reconstruction assistance and 
financial aid 
 Recipients of reconstruction assistance and financial aid 
2. With respect to type of organisational affiliation  
 representatives of international organisations 
 local public officials  
 representatives from the local and international NGO sector 
 intellectuals 
 ordinary members of local society 
 
Representatives of both international and local organisations were rather reluctant 
to participate in interviews. Due to the raising criticism about the involvement of 
the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efficiency of the 
work of different structures, international staff was not very approachable and 
open to unknown researchers. In the same time, realising the zero-effect of talking 
about problems, locals were already rather annoyed of meeting foreign journalists, 
observers, experts, students, etcetera. Approaching the respondents through the 
activated network of personal contacts, it was not appropriate to ask people to fill 
in ‘questionnaires’ in order to perform a number of structured interviews. 
Discussing the problems of interest for the research in a more informal 
conversation, ‘semi-structured’ interviews were carried out. Depending on the 
institutional affiliation of the person approached, a number of initially defined 
questions would be addressed in the friendly conversation, such as: 
 
 With official representatives of international organisations, public and the 
NGO sectors: ‘What are the goals/focus of activities of the particular 
organisation?’, ‘Are you successful in pursuing the goals?’, ‘How do you 
measure success?’, ‘What are the main problems encountered?’ 
 
 With representatives from academia, media, youth: ‘Are things different 
now (- from before the war? - from right after the end of the war?’, ‘Does 
the international community help? How?’, ‘Are there any efforts to bring 
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back people together?’, ‘Is it important to bring back people together? 
Why?’  
 
 With community representatives: gathering information through the 
personal testimonies was rather sensitive area. During the friendly 
conversations my goal was to guide the person into the desired direction of 
critical reflections and opinion sharing. Presenting the purpose of my visit 
to the country and the issues I was interested in: reconstruction, role of 
international community, integration, attitudes, was usually a good start 
since the people did not feel interrogated but they would start commenting 





It was already mentioned that in many aspects the research was examining 
problems not sufficiently covered by theoretical literature. Therefore, the goal of 
the study was not to measure degrees or intensity of processes and phenomena, 
but to establish whether they existed or not.  
 
As the research hypothesis suggested, two main units required examination. The 
above presented principles were applied when measuring the ‘destroyed social 
capital at supra-ethnic level and loss of basic grounds of civility and civicness’. 
The research was not interested in the degree of destruction, but to establish 
whether it existed or not. Therefore, the analysis was based on the qualitative data 
and information obtained about instances of inter-ethnic issues in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, reported tensions between the ethnically defined Entities and other 
institutions and structures, individual perceptions of respondents. All of these 
confirmed that ethnic divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been and still is a 
crucial issue. 
 
To outline measures for reconstruction of social capital in a deeply fragmented 
society (still an under-explored area), indicators for measuring social capital were 
used as points of reference and some possible mechanisms were suggested on 
their basis. The assumption was that these elements could be viewed as 
projections of the possible goals set by a social capital reconstruction programme. 
 
The success of the conflict- and context-dependent post-conflict reconstruction is 
also a relative concept. Evidence suggests that regardless of specific local 
conditions, post-conflict reconstruction processes are quite often in pursue of the 
same goals – to introduce democracy, free market, western-style development and 
ultimately peace. Achieving ‘normalisation’ however implies that a particular 
society requires particular settings. In this respect, measuring success of a post-
conflict reconstruction is also context-dependent and largely subjective. Objective 
measuring of success is possible if achievements are evaluated against the 
objectives, timeframes, resources, etc., planned at the onset of the reconstruction 
process. Investigating individual and group perceptions, existing tendencies and 
trends can also address success qualitatively. Both of these approaches were used 
in the assessment of the reconstruction process of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
reported developments, conditions, and problems in the different sectors in the 
country, the fact that mandates of international structures and programmes were 
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prolonged beyond their initially envisaged end, and the estimations of 
reconstruction costs as exceeding the preliminary expected levels, were used as 




Encountered obstacles and possible limitations of the methods used 
 
The complexity of the approach combining the critical reflection of the three 
central topics: post-conflict reconstruction, ethnic conflicts and social capital, with 
gathering and analysis of empirical data determined the character of the problems 
encountered throughout the research process.  
 
The lack of sufficient theoretical literature or lack of clear definitions due to 
numerous theoretical interpretations, lack of uniform approach to classification of 
data or discrepancies between databases in terms of information related to similar 
entries were among the common challenges for all the three areas of study. 
Analysis of databases revealed that there is a lack of accurate data about post-
conflict reconstruction activities and resources, that databases present different but 
sometimes matching entries and that it is rather challenging to identify a valid 
(single) point of reference. Combining qualitative methods with analyses of 
quantitative data and verification of findings through the case study allowed 
overcoming the limitations of either predominantly theoretical or predominantly 
empirical approach.  
 
Some other issues challenged the gathering of empirical evidences and the 
fieldwork. Visa restrictions (removed only in 2008) prevented the possibility for 
regular visits to the field. Therefore, among the priority goals during the initial 
and prolonged stay in 2003 was the establishment of local contacts through 
intensive networking. Throughout the following years, the information about 
developments in the field has been updated thanks to the regular communication 
with some of the established contacts.  
 
The attempts to reach the respondents identified as key figures during the 
preliminary study of the fields and sectors of interest were not as successful as 
expected. It was already mentioned that despite a high number of requests for 
interviews, only a few people responded. Especially difficult was to establish 
contacts with official representatives from the two organisations examined – the 
OHR and the World Bank. An additional problem was to convince both local and 
international experts to give interviews, because of the fact that the field has been 
‘overexploited’ throughout the years. The reluctance of locals to discuss the issues 
of interest to the research stemmed from the annoyance of people from being 
explored as ‘objects’ by different researchers and the lack of any results from 
talking about their problems. On the other hand, international experts were 
apparently also displeased with researchers and as a result requests for interviews 
were largely ignored. To overcome this problem, some informal networking 
channels were activated, and adopting the snowball sampling approach the circle 
of contacts was widened and the information sought was gathered.  
 
Acknowledging the limitations that this approach posed on gathering structured 
first-hand information about the field, and the probability of higher-level 
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subjectivity of respondents, findings reached on the basis of the interviews were 
subsequently compared against the analyses performed on documents, statistical 
information, or comments from random people from the local public. A very 
essential limitation that the field posed was the levels of still-existing but not 
communicated tensions within and across local communities. The war experience 
and the process of ethnic identification was a sensitive area, which constituted 
questions about the self-identification of respondents as “not particularly 
appropriate”. Nevertheless, it was relatively easy to establish the ethnic affiliation 
by noticing whom a person would refer to as ‘the others’6.  
 
With awareness of the high-probability of subjectivity of some of the employed 
methods, the research aimed at providing a variety of cross-references and at 
building up conclusions based on findings being points of intersection of several 










                                                 
6 Very interesting was also the fact that discussing the current ethnic disintegration few of the 
respondents expressed their ‘nostalgia’ about the lost Yugoslav citizenship. 
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The collapse of Communism and the moral victory of the developed Western 
democracies over the rivalling block did not bring automatically peace; local 
conflicts7, previously suppressed by the system, challenged the perspectives for 
the future. The fact that violence occurred within underdeveloped states 
undergoing political and economic transition revoked ideas, drawn upon the 
successful Marshall plan of 1947, about providing international support for 
establishing and preserving peace. Within this contradictory and dynamic context 
the concept and practice of post-conflict reconstruction has been established and 
developed, grounded on an increasing awareness of the interdependency between 
processes and events regardless of the geographical distance. 
 
Closely connected both with conflict related issues and with the peace practices 
and agendas, post-conflict reconstruction manifested itself as the transitional link 
from war to peace with potential to secure the future, prevent the spread of 
negative effects, and minimise the risks of new outbursts of violence. Despite the 
large amounts of financial and non-financial resources invested by national and 
international players, this peace-enabling mechanism did not prove as successful 
as expected8. The discrepancy between initial assumptions and achieved results 
became clearly visible in the cases of reconstruction following Post-Cold War 
ethnic conflicts, which became a kind of ‘markers’ of the period and in fact 
brought the ideas of aided peace and development back into the international 
agenda.   
 
The lack of systematic studies on post-conflict reconstruction as a concept and 
practice obstacles a critical analysis of its role in the peace-management cycle as 
well as of the factors underlying its success or failure. Critical evaluations and 
conclusions drawn upon case studies and reports from the field could not 
compensate for the missing theoretical and analytical research. The post-conflict 
reconstruction practice has established an action-oriented environment with more 
or less no unified platform or mechanisms for assessment and evaluation of the 
need for international involvement and its appropriate models and mechanisms. 
No proper theoretical debate has addressed the goals of the overall process either.  
 
Therefore, aiming at addressing critically the concept and the phenomenon of 
post-conflict reconstruction, the research will outline its key features and will 
focus on the identification of factors that play an essential role for the success or 
failure of the reconstruction processes. The increased level of violence and 
numerous cases of intrastate conflicts at the end of the 20th century pushed the 
                                                 
7 Conflict, as it will be regarded further in the research, occurs when actual and/or perceived 
incompatibilities result in hostile violent actions (ref. SAIS Conflict Management Toolkit) 
8 Paris (1997) gives an example with eight peace-building cases: Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 30
international community towards more active involvement in local affairs, , in 
recognition of the interdependence of processes and events. In the light of this 
intersection, ethnic conflicts present a particular perspective for assessing post-
conflict reconstruction approaches and for opening a discussion about the need for 
targeted and context-specific measures when aiming at enabling lasting peace and 
stability. The goal of the current chapter is to emphasise that post-ethnic-conflict 
reconstruction cannot apply solely ‘traditional’ measures. Any environment has 
specific problems and demands, which must be met in order to enable the 
achievement of positive results.  
 
Defined as a ‘transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the 
rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of the society’ (WB 1998:14), the 
concept of post-conflict reconstruction appears both dynamic and context-
dependent. The general timeframes embrace the period starting with the 
termination of conflict and finishing with the establishment of peace. The 
direction of efforts during that period is towards overcoming the respective 
negative effects and consequences of the experienced conflict. These two 
parameters delimit content, which is dependent upon variables such as type of 
experienced conflict, underlying reasons and outcomes, conflict agents, time-
frame and scope, global socio-political and economic environment, external 
interests and agendas, etc. In theory, this can impede the development of a 
common platform for approaching and understanding post-conflict reconstruction. 
In practice, post-conflict reconstruction actors apply a general approach to 
situations often without paying much attention to the particularities As it will be 
discussed further, this discrepancy becomes a factor for the lack of expected 
levels of success of reconstruction programmes.  
 
The current chapter will attempt to highlight the specific features distinguishing 
the 20th century ‘ethnic’ conflicts in order to show that they require particular 
post-conflict reconstruction measures. The theory of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts 
will outline the need for establishing clear frameworks. To delineate the scope of 
the problem however several conflict databases produced and designed to enable 
quantitative analyses will be considered below. Based on the period they cover 
and on the wide range of variables they take into account, the following databases 
were selected:  
 
1. War List (1946-2008); Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2008) –
compiled by M. G. Marshall, Director of the  Centre for Systemic Peace  
 
2. SFTFR Database; State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings 
(2003), M.G. Marshall, T.R. Gurr, B. Harff ; Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management  
 
3. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (1946–2007) - collaborative project; 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University & Centre for the Study of Civil War, 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)  
 
4. VINC Database; The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts project database 
(2004), W.Ayres, University of Indianapolis  
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5. ICB Dataset (1918 – 2006); International Crisis Behaviour Datasets (Version 
9, released January 2009)  
 
It is necessary to note that the two databases released in 2003-2004 (namely the 
SFTFR and the VINC one) have been examined, because they cover the years of 
interest for the research and contain different details. Since the goal of the current 
chapter is to reveal the problems with classification of the late 20th century 
conflicts by comparing different studies, these earlier volumes were considered 
relevant. The data tables were adapted for the purposes of the research. The 
original databases are accessible through the provided links.  
 
The Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2008) table, further referred to 
as ‘Warlist’, presents 302 episodes of armed conflict (including 27 ongoing cases) 
that according to its authors ‘comprise a comprehensive accounting of all forms of 
major armed conflicts in the world over the contemporary period 1946-2008’. 
Apart from the years of the conflict, the study takes into account 1) Episode type - 
distinguished as a) civil, ethnic or international and b) violence, war or struggle 
for independence; 2) Magnitude of societal-systemic impact; 3) States directly 
involved; 4) ‘Directly-related’ deaths; and 5) Reference (sources providing 
information on major episodes of armed conflict).  
 
The distinction that the codebook establishes between civil, ethnic, and 
international conflicts is interesting. ‘Civil’ are the intrastate conflicts involving 
rival political groups. ‘Ethnic-intrastate’ conflicts are those between a state-agent 
and a distinct ethnic group. When two or more states are in confrontation or a 
distinct polity resists foreign domination, the struggles are considered 
international events and marked as ‘interstate conflicts’. In the cases where the 
sovereignty of a territory is ambiguous and contested by the parties in conflict, the 
episode is coded also as an international conflict until authority has either been 
successfully imposed or resisted, after which subsequent episodes are coded 
according to the established sovereignty9. Further, a distinction is made between 
violence (use of instrumental violence without necessarily exclusive goals), war 
(violence between distinct, exclusive groups with the intent to impose a unilateral 
result to the contention), and independence attempts (removal of existing foreign 
domination).  
 
The Warlist identifies 78 conflicts as civil violence, 52 as civil war, 55 as ethnic 
violence, and 47 as ethnic war, 39 as international violence, 27 as international 
war, and 13 as independence struggle.  Since the aim of the text is to address the 
issue of defining the ethnic conflict as a specific type, the analysis will focus 
particularly on the table entries identified as ‘ethnic’ violence or war.  
 
                                                 
9 The ‘evolvement’ of the conflict classification can be noticed in the Peace and Conflict series 
(2001, 2003, 2005 and 2008 editions). In the 2001 edition the listed ‘major armed societal 
conflicts’ are classified under the categorised of ethnic, political, and/or international. In the 2003 
edition however the category of ‘communal conflicts’ appears to denote armed conflicts that 
involve fighting between militants from local, often ethnic, communities without the direct 
involvement of the central state. In the other three categories the state emerges as a key-actor. 
Ethnic conflicts are considered clashes between a group(s) and the state (Gurr & Marshall 
2003:51) 
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The State Failure Task Force Project (known also as the Task Force on Political 
Instability - Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003; and further referred to as the SFTFP 
Database), was established in 1994 at the request of the US Government. Its task 
was to collect and compile open source information, developing data-driven 
models to anticipate the outbreak, and facilitate the prevention and resolution, of 
‘problem events’ in all countries of the world with populations greater than 
500,000 in 2002. Thus, the studies examined a range of severe political conflicts 
and regime crises exemplified by macro-societal events such as those that 
occurred in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Zaire) in the 1990s. 
 
Among the types of conflicts related to the cases of state failure, the ethnic type 
has a particular place. Ethnic wars are seen as ‘episodes of violent conflict 
between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal 
minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in 
their status’ (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003:6). As stated further in the CIDCM 
State Failure Problem Set, ‘most ethnic wars since 1955 have been guerrilla or 
civil wars in which the challengers have sought independence or regional 
autonomy… Rioting and warfare between rival communal groups is NOT coded 
as ethnic warfare unless it involves conflict over political power or government 
policy’ (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003:6). 
 
The concept of ‘wars’ covers political events characterised by the concerted 
tactical and strategic use of organised violence in an attempt by political and/or 
military leaders to gain a favourable outcome. ‘Ethnic wars’ are seen as civil, 
intrastate, or ‘societal’ wars, although they are often ‘internationalised’ to some 
extent. The concept of ‘societal wars’ is defined as paralleled to other types of 
clashes. The use of organised, lethal violence distinguishes it from the ‘normal 
conflict processes’. It differs from the ‘terrorist campaigns’ by the magnitude, 
intensity, and nature of the use of violence, and from ‘inter-communal violence’ 
by the active involvement of state authorities and the professed (or perceived) 
goal of the contending non-state group to change the established political structure 
or status quo. As major armed conflicts between state authorities and mobilised 
oppositional groups, societal and ethnic wars are hence synonyms according to the 
terminology established.   
 
When examining the State Failure Project data (Marshall, Gurr & Harff 2003) it 
appears that out of the 135 examples of Historical State Conflicts, Crises and 
Transitions for the period 1955 – 1998 only 18 cases can be identified as ethnic. A 
further 46, where the ethnic elements characterise one or more episodes but are 
considered only an aspect of the multifaceted structure of the conflict, are 
presented as complex. Another 18 complex conflicts listed in the table cannot be 
related to ethnic issues at all.  
 
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 1946–2007 is the output of a 
collaborative project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) at 
the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the 
Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute 
(PRIO), Oslo. It was first published in 2002 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and has been 
regularly updated since. Designed for academic use in statistical and macro-level 
 33
research, the database covers internal and external armed conflicts between 1946 
and the present.  
 
According to the UCDP/PRIO Codebook, an armed conflict is ‘a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’ (UCDP/PRIO 
Codebook 2008:1). In comparison with the other two databases, this one includes 
most of the entries, but applies a different classification of the types of conflicts. 
UCDP/PRIO Dataset distinguishes between: 1) extra-state armed conflict; 2) 
internationalised internal armed conflict; 3) internal armed conflict; and 4) 
internationalised internal armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO Codebook 2008:7)10. As it 
becomes obvious, the dataset does not apply the concept of ‘ethnic’ in respect to 
the conflicts at all. Instead of ‘ethnic’ or ‘communal’ here, the conflicts are 
viewed as ‘internal’ and ‘internationalised internal’ wars. 
 
The VINC project of William Ayres (2004) is a research programme studying the 
processes, outcomes, and resolutions of Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts 
between 1945 and 2003. The stated aim of the project was to produce both a solid 
empirical base of observations about this class of conflicts, and a theoretical 
framework that can explain the occurrence, timing, and success or failure of 
conflict resolution. Apart from the basic data (region, groups involved, first and 
end year of conflict), a range of variable characteristic and independent 
invariables were included (Appendix 1: Table 111). Some variables outline the 
relationship of the conflicts to the Cold War period and its end. Others consider 
the stage of conflict, the number of deaths and the level of violence, ranging from 
0 (no violence reported) to 7 (protracted civil war), whether the conflict ended and 
what agreement was reached. Among the independent variables considered are the 
highest estimate of population for the actors involved, highest estimate of men 
under arms, existence of allies as well as the proportion of population directly 
affected by conflict area. The comparison between the initial demands of the 
opposing actors at the start of a conflict episode is of a particular interest for the 
current research since this will clarify the appropriate perspective for identifying 
and considering the goals of the involved parties.  
 
The table as suggested by the name of the project itself considers the violent 
intrastate nationalist conflicts. There is no indication as to whether the conflicts 
are to be addressed as political, ethnic, or international. It is also not clear whether 
these conflicts are examples of violence or war, and what exactly the difference 
between the two concepts is. The obvious emphasis however is on the self-
determination nature of the conflicts and their occurrence within a particular state.  
                                                 
10 According to the typology used, extra-state armed conflict is between a state and a non-state 
group outside its own territory. The internationalised internal armed conflict occurs between the 
government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states. Internal 
armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without 
intervention from other states, and internationalised internal armed conflict - between the 
government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other 
states (secondary parties) on one or both sides (UCDP/PRIO Codebook 2008:7). 
11 In a recent attempt to consult the table, it occurred that it is no longer available online. Being a 
well developed and very informative product that enables the clear overview of the conflict cases, , 
a copy of the table was provided in the Appendix 1.  
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The 2009 edition of the ICB Dataset (1918-2006) is the updated version of the 
data originally published as part of A Study of Crisis by Michael Brecher and 
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, University of Michigan Press, 1997, 2000. The dataset 
covers all international and foreign policy crises for the period 1918-2006 and 
presents interactive data about 452 crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 994 state 
actors. 
 
The interesting distinction that this dataset introduces is between ethnicity related 
crises (ERC) and ethnicity driven conflicts (EDC). As the codebook clarifies, the 
first variable assesses ethnicity in terms of presence or absence of an ethnic 
component in a crisis, while the second identifies those where ethnicity was the 
dominant factor in causing or exacerbating a crisis. Both variables are divided 
further into: 1) Secessionist conflict – when ethnic group/s seek a reduction of 
control or autonomy from a central authority; 2) Irredentist conflict - a claim to 
the territory of an entity (state), wherein an ethnic in-group is in a numerical 
minority; 3) Non-ethnic conflict and under the second variable there is the fourth 
category;  (4) Others. This emphasis on the level of the ethnic character of the 
conflict can be contested as not functional since when applied the two filters 
produce uneven results, some of which are unique, and some common. For 
example, four conflicts appear as both ‘ERC Secessionist and EDC Secessionist’, 
namely Nagornyy-Karabakh (1991), Yugoslavia II: Bosnia (1992), Georgia-
Abkhazia (1992), and Desert Strike (1996); while there are four other unique 
entries under both categories. Considering the groups of 87 EDC (both irredentist 
and secessionist) vs. the respective group of the 142 ERC cases, the number of the 
matching and unique entries suggests that this is not a functional classification.  
 
The first question that emerges when comparing the conflict databases is why are 
there such differences? Are they methodological or terminological? If we accept 
that variations in categories and classification stem from the application of 
different methodologies, a question strikes: if we can ignore the ethnic component 
when examining a conflict (as the UCDP/PRIO Database does for example), then 
do we really need to address ethnicity to analyse it? Furthermore, if used, would 
this category enable a better understanding of a conflict? In attempt to outline 
clearer frameworks for identification of any particular post-conflict reconstruction 
needs, theories of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts will be addressed below.   
 
 
1. DEFINING ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS  
1.1 Defining ‘ethnicity’  
 
The above presented databases revealed that since 1945 civil/internal conflicts 
have been more common than international wars. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
literature before 1990 was predominantly concerned with studying international 
armed clashes (Smith, D. 2000:5). It was only with the end of the Cold War that 
their importance was recognised, provoking interest in detailed studies. 
Understanding ethnicity is a challenge for contemporary social and political 
studies. There are various interpretations of this ‘social construct’ (Hamilton 
1964) but as yet no all-encompassing definition has been coined.  
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Deriving from the Greek word ethnos (ethnikos) meaning ‘race’, but also having 
implications of heathen or pagan (Williams, R. 1976:119), in the mid-19th century 
the notion began to refer to racial characteristics. According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary of 1972, the American sociologist David Riesman (1953) first 
used the term 'ethnicity' arguing that regional and religious pluralism was the 
factor that guaranteed the continued existence of liberty in America. In ‘Ethnicity 
in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance’ Andrew Greeley (1974) 
discussed that since ‘ethnicity’ refers to any differentiation based on nationality, 
race, religion, or language, there is not a clear conception of it. Part of the 
problem in his opinion was that some ‘ethnic’ groups are constituted by religion 
(Jews), some by nationality (Poles), some by religion and nationality (Irish 
Catholics), some by race (blacks)…some by language…and some by region. 
(Greeley 1974:291)  
 
The term has also been used to describe the contradiction between modern and 
urbanised societies (and social groups) on one hand and parochial and regional 
identity on the other (Hacker 1976:17). While in everyday language today, the 
word ethnicity is rather connected with the ideas of ‘minority issues’ and ‘race 
relations’, in the social sciences it refers to aspects of relationships between 
groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally 
distinctive. Although the modern ethnic discourse tends to focus on sub-national 
units of different types it is also relevant when describing the roots of origins of 
majorities and dominant peoples (A.D. Smith 1989). According to Novak, ethnic 
affiliation is a fundamental part of the contemporary personal identity, which is in 
part involuntary, in part by choice (Novak 1972:56). 
 
The contemporary implications of the concept ‘ethnicity’ reflect social structures 
in terms of psychosocial networks, within which individuals are born and which 
largely determines their values, beliefs, and behaviour. While the term ‘race’ 
refers to physical/biological differences between people and communities, ‘ethnic 
group’ is primarily used to denote cultural differences associated with actual or 
perceived shared past, language and regional or national origin (Fenton 1999:4).  
 
Even though widely discussed, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ still remains vague and 
burdened with divergent definitions and meanings. Problematic is the question 
regarding the criteria that constitute ethnicity. As the lowest common 
denomination, Manning Nash (1988) has proposed the metaphor of ‘bed, blood 
and cult’, implicating an ideology of endogamy, common origin and religion. 
However, some ethnic groups use the criteria of cultural competence rather than 
race or blood, while others allow inclusion of new members through assimilation. 
Although shared cultural traits do not always present a stable basis12, the idea of a 
common culture is the one that is always present in the ethnic ideology13 and that 
distinguishes these social groupings from classes (Eriksen 1993:35). Cultural 
                                                 
12 There is much empirical evidence that different ethnic groups share various cultural features. 
This problem is discussed in details in Eriksen 1993 
13 The difficulties in identifying the implications that the concept of ethnicity bears arise also from 
the fact that first, the notion of culture has about three hundred different meanings (as discovered 
by A.L.Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) and second, that while there is a large number of 
definitions of the concept of ethnicity (Williams, B. 1989) many people who write about it use the 
notion without terminological clarification (Cohen, R. 1978). 
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traits often become strategies or weapons in competitions between groups over 
scarce social goods (Worsley 1984:249).  
 
The primordialist approach (represented by authors like Harold Isaacs and Pierre 
van der Berghe) looks at the social network that individuals enter at birth as given 
and unaccountable. A powerful integrative mechanism, it provides an 
epistemological, cultural, and emotional base. Social relations that arise from 
kinship, neighbourhood, shared language, religion, and culture are contrasted to 
those based upon personal attraction, common interest, or moral obligation 
(Geertz 1963). The ethnic boundaries based on the primordial social unit of the 
kin have therefore a permanent significance and the tendency of favouring kin 
over non-kin is natural (referred to as ‘ethnic nepotism’) and can be extended to 
include large linguistic, national, racial, religious, and culturally defined groups.  
 
The genetic similarity theory (Rushton 1995) complements the theories of kin 
selection and ethnic nepotism emphasising that ‘genetically similar people tend to 
seek one another out and to provide mutually supportive environments such as 
marriage, friendship, and social groups. This may represent a biological factor 
underlying ethnocentrism and group selection.’ (Rushton 1995:69) Another 
formative energy among all peoples that could function as a consolidating factor 
for larger groupings transcending elementary family structures is religion 
(McLean 1997), but in contrast to the myths of kinship and common origin, it is 
not inseparable from ethnic belonging. According to the primordialists, the strong 
semiotic connection with the concepts of land, youth, blood, and sacrifice is the 
basis for the establishment of a group identity and for the development of 
commonly accepted stereotypes and beliefs that bond the members of large-scale 
communities together (Connor 1994). 
 
From a primordialist perspective ethnicities are organisational structures that 
might have various forms of content in different socio-cultural systems, implying 
that the ethnic categories are constant and might be called upon when the need 
arises (Barth 1969:14). Nationalist ideas, developed upon the primordial character 
of ethnicities, are ‘illiberal’ because the model of political citizenship fails when 
the state becomes the idealised embodiment of a ‘naturally formed community’.  
 
Theorists, among whom Clifford Geertz, Edward Shils and Pierre Van den 
Berghe, have been criticised for defending the existence of clear-cut and 
sustainable boundaries between ethnic groups (based on culture, language, 
religion, physical traits) and for emphasising the overriding importance of identity 
when analysing ethnic conflicts. Problematic points in this approach are that there 
are many levels at which people can relate to each other and that identity 
formation can also involve personal choice (in the cases of mixed marriages or 
socialisation at birth within a non-native community for example). Ethnic groups 
are therefore never absolutely distinct and exclusive by definition. It depends on 
the situation as to which of the levels of ethnic nepotism would be politically 
relevant and thus activated.  
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The idea that the boundaries of ethnic groups are socially constructed is central 
for the modernist14 approaches to ethnicity. Sharing the primordialist view that 
group identities tend to be stable once created, modernists see ethnicity as a tool 
used by individuals, groups or elites to obtain some larger and in most of the cases 
material ends (Lake & Rothschild 1998:5). The role of the elites in creating or 
activating ethnic identity is emphasised - driven by pragmatic interests, the elites 
can manipulate symbols for gaining support of masses, for influencing the state or 
pushing towards secession. As a label or as a set of symbolic ties activated and 
used for political purposes, it is very difficult to distinguish ethnicity from other 
political affiliations. According to Abner Cohen (1974b), ethnicity is an 
organisational form that exploits the ethnic ideology in both its aspects of utility 
and meaning for particular ends15. The agents themselves might even not 
acknowledge these ends; but in order to be viable an ethnicity must have a 
practical function. Since ethnicity is sensitive to changes in the social interactions 
patterns, and community formation results from developments in the socio-
political environment (Barth, Yong and Brubaker, Anderson), then ethnic 
conflicts should be regarded as a part of a broader set of social relationships.  
 
Instrumentalists and constructivists are generally criticised for neglecting the 
wider cultural environment in which the elites compete and for underplaying the 
affective dimensions of ethnicity. Defining interests in material terms and 
emphasising the role of the elites in the identity formation process, they fail to 
explain the strong bonds and the perceptions of a common past and future among 
the individuals within the group. The sociological discourse regards ethnicity as a 
social classification within relationships of identification with and differentiation 
from others (Fenton 1999:6). Language, culture, and ideas for common ancestry, 
are the ‘centres of gravity’ around which group identities form and are mobilised 
in social transactions. Subject to change, redefinition, and contestation, the 
elements that serve as a basis for articulation of identity suggest that ethnic groups 
are not fixed-entities. Fenton argues that ethnicity is a social process and that the 
context can activate one or another aspect of it. Hence, a basic mistake is to take 
ethnicity out of a context and examining it sui generis (Fenton 1999).  
 
Apart from these two main theoretical conceptions, there are also other 
‘alternative’ approaches to ethnicity. Combining primordialist and constructivist 
views the perennialists, as called by Brass (1991), recognise that a better 
understanding of ethnicity requires taking into consideration both its social and 
cultural aspects (F.Barth, D.Horowitz; J.Armstrong, A.D. Smith, S. Kaufman). 
Adopting the transactionalist approach, Frederik Barth (1969) argues against the 
idea that the cultural content enclosed within the ethnic boundaries establishes a 
community. In his view, the formative factors are the boundaries supported by the 
                                                 
14 In the theoretical literature modernists are sometimes divided into different sub-categories such 
as instrumentalists/constructivists or structuralists/deconstructionists. A distinction between 
instrumentalists and constructivists or between structuralists and deconstructionists is very difficult 
to make since to some extend it depends on the language used by the classification and on the 
particular approach.  
15 Ethnicity could well be activated as an instrument for competition over scarce resources (A. 
Cohen 1969, 1981). It is a particular form of informal political organisation where cultural 
boundaries are invoked to secure the group resources of ‘symbolic capital’; identities hence 
develop in response to functional organisational requirements. According to Roosens (1989:13), 
many people change their ethnic identity if they can profit by doing so. 
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‘boundaries guards’ of language, customs, food, which ensure the persistence of 
the group. Ethnicity is therefore nothing but a unit of ascription.  
 
Examining the phenomenon through the social psychological perspective, Donald 
Horowitz (1985) recognises that ethnic affiliations are ultimately based on kinship 
myths and a sense of group belonging in relation to other communities, Horowitz 
emphasises the connection between group strategies (some of which are 
irredentist or secessionist) and the resources of the region they inhabit. Influenced 
by Tajfel’s group psychology, the approach allows the study of ethnicity to be 
considered in a historical perspective, taking into account factors like role of 
different social groups or classes, collective memories or persisting group 
antagonisms.  
 
Based on the assumption that people are rational and motivated by self-interest in 
their everyday actions, the rational choice approach (applied by M.Olson, 
R.Hardin, M.Hechter, R.Brubaker and D.Laitin, Lake and Rothschild, etc.) looks 
at ethnic group membership as determined by an individual gain. According to 
this interpretation, certain situations can activate ethnic affiliations, while they can 
remain irrelevant in others. The expectations for material and/or non-material 
advantages can motivate individuals to choose membership of a particular ethnic 
group. In the view of Jeffrey Ross (1982), in this way a pressure could be put on a 
political system to allocate public goods for the benefit of the members of a self-
identified group.  
 
The ethno-symbolic approach investigates the ethnic past(s) as a factor for 
shaping present cultural communities. Applying Barth’s general approach when 
studying pre-modern ethnic communities, John Armstrong (1982) focuses on the 
cultural forms neglected by Barth to explain the persistence, change and 
resurgence of ethnicities. Idealisation of the past, language modifications, and 
religious organisations are in his view some of the factors that play an important 
role in the creation or shifting of ethnic identities. Essential feature of the ethno-
symbolic approach is the recognition of the importance of myths and symbols for 
unifying the population and ensuring its continuity over many generations and for 
associating the group with a particular territory. A.D. Smith (1986, 1991) suggests 
that these have provided the patterns for the rise to modern nations. The 
resurgence of ethnicity in the modern world is then a reaction to the impersonality 
of bureaucratic rationalism (Smith 1991). 
 
Despite the historical approach of many ethnic studies, the concept of political 
ethnicity is modern and in its contemporary understanding is used by the studies 
focused on the development of new political cultures in contexts of social change 
(Cohen, A. 1974). The element of culture appears fundamental to any ethnic 
construction, but the social interaction and social organisation determines the 
formation and the existence of an ethnic group (Leach 1954, Barth 1969). Starting 
from this assumption, the modern anthropological approach presents a 
theoretical framework that emphasises the social and political responsibility that 
internal and external actors (in respect to the given community) can bear for its 
establishment and relevancy. Viewed as a ‘dynamic situation of variable contact 
and mutual accommodation between groups’ (Eriksen 1993:9), the concept of 
ethnicity returns to the realm of the phenomena that if not controlled can at least 
be influenced or guided by social and political actions.  
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The anthropological approach addresses ethnic affiliations not as primordial 
phenomena, but as a type of reaction to the processes of modernisation. In the 
words of Jonathan Friedman, cultural fragmentation and modernist 
homogenisation are two constitutive trends of global reality (Friedman 1990:311). 
Groups and identities have developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation 
and the maintained policies of cultural determination often bordering with 
hostility and violence are often present when there is also a goal of political 
differentiation. According to the theory of Thomas Eriksen it is not the cultural 
differences between two groups that should be considered the distinctive feature 
of ethnicity. Rather it is the existence of conditions for a minimum contact 
between the groups that would lead towards establishing and communicating the 
idea of being culturally different from each other16 (1993:10-12). Cultural 
differences become identity factors when they are socially relevant. Metaphors of 
fictive kinship (Yelvington 1991:168) supported by ideology encouraging 
endogamy, legitimise such social identities. When cultural differences structure 
interactions between members of groups on a regular basis, the ethnic element 
within social relationship becomes rather explicit. Hence, ethnicity appears a 
social organisation of communicated cultural differences (Eriksen 1993:80), a 
complex structure with political, organisational, and social aspects17. 
 
The ethnic construct establishes a systematic distinction between insiders and 
outsiders, confirming and strengthening group membership and loyalties through 
stereotyping, and articulation of conflict or competition (Eriksen 1993:27). 
Without this usually mutual demarcation (‘dichotomisation’) being activated, 
even in multiethnic societies where cultural differences are pervasive, ‘there are 
many situations where ethnicity does not matter… the ‘we’ category may expand 
and contract according to the situation’ (Eriksen 1993:30). It is empirically 
evident that individuals may have many statuses and many possible identities. The 
answer to the question of when and how a particular ethnic identity would become 
relevant lies in the social context: ethnicity would occur where and when ‘cultural 
differences make a difference’ (Eriksen 1993:32). To incorporate the ethnic 
element on a personal level, the affiliation should provide the individual with 
something ‘valuable’. When cultural differences are not a part of the everyday 
living, the affiliation with a culturally determined group could well remain 
dormant. In wholly mono-ethnic settings there is effectively no ethnicity since 
cultural difference could not be communicated (Eriksen 1993:35). 
 
Social identities are relational and closely connected with social circumstances. 
Eriksen argues that, despite common assumptions that identities are ‘inner’ and 
immutable, they may change as society changes because they are constituted in 
                                                 
16 Eriksen defines ethnicity as an ‘aspect of social relationship between agents who consider 
themselves as being culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a 
minimum regular interaction’ (Eriksen 1993:12). Several categories introduce different ‘kinds’ of 
ethnic relations like urban ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, proto-nations, and ethnic groups 
in ‘plural societies’ (Eriksen 1993:13-14). 
17 Anthropological studies however suggest that economic environment also plays an important 
role for the establishment of ethnic communities as interest groups organised on the basis of ethnic 
identity in the context of the imposed colonial capitalism (Epstein 1978, 1992, for the Copperbelt 
area (Zambia), Mauritus and Trinidad; Nash 1988, for Malaysia; Williams, B. 1991, for Guyana). 
In many of these societies ethnicity is still a major social preoccupation and a chief principle for 
political organisation (Comaroff & Comaroff 1992:54) 
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relation to others18. It is also possible that the ascriptions undertaken by the others 
contribute to the creation of ethnicity. Ethnic identities are flexible, constituted on 
unambiguous classification based on the principles of inclusion and exclusion 
(digital differences) or on more relative ones, where there are no clear-cut 
boundaries (analogical differences) (Eriksen 1993:65)19.  
 
Ethnic identity formation based on the differentiation between groups needs a 
mechanism for bonding community members and constituting a sense of 
togetherness. Here the symbolic dimension plays an essential role. Notions of 
shared origin, fed by relevant interpretations of history, references to ancient 
language, religion, kinship system, or way of life are crucial elements for 
maintaining the ethnic identity through periods of social and cultural changes. 
Social identity becomes most important when it seems threatened. Respectively, 
when boundaries are under pressure all the symbolic bonds get activated in order 
to strengthen the community and emphasise its wholeness.  
 
A key conclusion that this approach reaches is that encompassing supra-identities 
are compatible with other ‘smaller-scale’ definitions of the self. In the 1940s, 
Evans-Pritchard suggested that social identities are segmentary and it is not a 
problem for a person to be simultaneously a member of a family, of a local 
community and of an ethnic group. The point is that these encompassing identities 
would exist only if they are socially relevant and the targeted group (Eriksen 
1993:76) perceives the material, political, or symbolic goods they deliver as 
valuable.  
 
These findings offer a possible platform for appeasing problematic inter-group 
relationships in a multi-cultural (multi-ethnic) environment. Empirical examples 
reveal that multiple identities can coexist without clashing. Cultural theories and 
social studies have recognised their emergence in the context of the socio-
economic and technological transformations of the contemporary world. In 
complex multi-level societies, it is logical to expect development of multi-level 
identities. As social constructs, they correspond to the social environment and to 
its changes. As part of that system, ethnic identities are a group-formatting factor 
that would be called upon when and if needed. Thinking about ethnic identities 
that have clashed in an inter-group conflict and that could not reconcile, the 
logical conclusion is that in order to overcome the rigidity of the situation of 
active hatred or total negation of the others, alternative (supra-) identities need to 
be invoked. 
 
It might be difficult to defend the concept of ethnicity as modern, but it is 
definitely a concept with ‘old’ and ‘modern’ meanings. This is to say that, despite 
the etymological equivalent, in its modern usage the term has rather different 
connotations than in the past. Apart from addressing ethnicity as ‘social 
                                                 
18 The social identity theory emphasises that identities are complex and composed by various 
factors, which under certain circumstances can become salient. The process of active 
differentiation underlies the group formation providing the individuals with a sense of belonging 
within the collective by strengthening the relationships among its members (Tajfel & Turner 1986; 
Hogg & Abrams 1988).  
19 In a complex multi-ethnic environment agents is likely to develop a number of standardised 
forms of behaviour to the members of each one of the other groups depending on whether they are 
perceived ‘almost like us’, ‘not exactly like us’, or ‘extremely different from us’. 
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organisation of cultural distinctiveness’ with activated political consciousness or 
elite-formulated aspirations (Eriksen 1993: 36), the anthropological discourse 
contributes to the clarification of the contemporary implications of the term, 
pointing out that: 
 
¾ Ethnic identities are based on cultural differences. They can be activated in a 
given situation, but only when these differences matter and are communicated. 
The idea of shared culture distinguishes ethnicity from class. 
 
¾ As a product of contrast (us vs. them) ethnicity does not develop in isolation; 
dichotomisation and complementarisation are necessary preconditions. Group 
membership and loyalties are confirmed and strengthened through 
stereotyping and articulation of conflict and competition. Hence, a shared 
culture cannot provide grounds for establishment of different ethnic identities 
(Eriksen 1993:36).  
 
¾ There are certain (either real or imagined) elements that provide the necessary 
basis for articulating an ethnic identity: 1) biologically self-perpetuation and 
endogamy; 2) ideology of shared identity: based on race, blood, or cultural 
competence; 3) religion (Eriksen 1993:34). However, ethnic identity can allow 
the existence of an overarching supra-identity. 
 
¾ Interethnic relations could be highly asymmetrical regarding access to 
political power and economic resources (Eriksen 1993:28) 
 
¾ As a complex structure with political, organisational, and social aspect, 
ethnicity can be influenced by social, political, and economic changes of the 
environment.  
 
The socio-political context plays an important role for ethnicity to become a 
salient identification issue. People can fall back on ethnic identity when other 
projects of loyalties become deficient (Hutchinson & Smith 1996:13, Hobsbawm 
1990). In the context of the depersonalising bureaucratic structures of the late 
modernity, of syncretistic culture and inclusive identities, when the traditional 
authority structures and social units have broken-up, a need for distinctive cultural 
and psychological ethno-national conceptions to sustain interaction networks has 
emerged20 (Bell 1975, Hutchinson & Smith 1996:14).  
 
Ethnic formation is sometimes used as a means of demanding group rights or 
providing a defence against other groups and in these terms, as a strategic choice 
made by individuals (for gaining power and privilege, for security purposes, etc). 
From this perspective, attachment to ethnicity can change depending on political 
and economic circumstances (Bell 1975:160-71). Power structure changes can 
become an important mobilisation factor (Cohen, A. 1969). While the privileged 
under a collapsing structure face the danger of losing power and mobilise in 
defence, the unprivileged would respectively align to gain power. Competition 
and conflict are likely to break out not only for political power, but also for 
economic benefits, social status, etc. (Brass 1991:18-26).  
                                                 




Analysing the various approaches to ethnicity, the research accepts that the 
collective concept of ethnicity emerges as a socio-political context-dependent 
variable constituted around active innate and/or culturally determined (but not 
necessarily unique) characteristics of the human being. There are two main 
implications that this definition makes. First, that various non-negotiable elements 
under particular circumstances can become a ‘difference-factor’, and second, 
these same elements will clash and become a mobilisation factor only if there are 
specific conditions present. 
 
A provocative question that ensues from here is whether a change in the socio-
political environment could transform ethnic identities or even eradicate them, if 
they are no longer of use. If ethnic identities get activated when differences 
matter, then a possible strategy for solving major problems in post-ethnic-conflict 
environment can be to identify mechanisms that can reduce the importance of 
cultural affiliations and practices where they would be irrelevant or subjected to 
inclusive formal principles. Such are the principles that the concept of civil 
society is based upon. These encompassing formal affiliations suffer severe 
damages in the course of an ethnic conflict. 
 
1.2 Theories of ethnic conflicts 
 
The number of theories examining ethnic conflicts is as large as the number of 
theories addressing the issues of ethnicity and the formation of ethnic groups. 
According to the rational choice approach, regarding ethnic groups as coalitions 
formed in a rational attempt to compete for scarce goods in the context of social 
changes brought about by modernisation, there are three general reasons for ethnic 
war, the most prominent being the security dilemma. The most important factors, 
according to the economic rivalry theory, are distribution issues, relative 
deprivation and declines in living standards. A problem that this theory faces is 
that it cannot explain ethnic mobilisation in general, or the patterns of violence21. 
Analyses and statistical studies show that ethnic groups mobilise under all 
economic circumstances and economic discrimination not always has a significant 
effect on ethnic mobilisation or on demands for group autonomy (Kaufman 
2001:18).  
 
According to the soft rationalists, despite the rational calculated pursuit of any 
consistently defined goals, the core causes of ethnic violence are extremist group 
values (Rabushka & Shepsle 1972). The hard rationalists see ethnic war as a 
function of individuals’ rational pursuit not of material benefits but of personal 
security (Hardin 1997). In cases of emergent anarchy, when the state will not or 
cannot guarantee people’s safety from violence, and escalating preparations for 
violence and outbreak of fighting creates a security dilemma, it is rational for 
groups to start mobilising in pre-emptive self-defence. Mobilisation here is aided 
by a mass-led ‘tipping process’ and selective incentives provided by the elites like 
promised rewards for killing and entering into battle (Kaufman 2001:20). 
Critiques against this theory argue that it does not take into account that security 
                                                 
21 Looking at the conflicts in the dying Soviet union, Kaufman argues that it is not only the case 
that areas, which suffer more, are more prone to ethnic violence (2001:19; Table 2.1).  
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dilemmas result more often from openly stated pursuit of dominance than from 
overzealous self-defence under emergent anarchy - it is the security dilemma that 
causes anarchy to emerge and not vice versa22. (Kaufman 2001: 21).  
 
Despite not being able to explain ethnic violence, rationalist theories offer some 
important insights. By using ethnicity instrumentally in pursuit of their own 
personal interests, the (ethnic) elites can powerfully shape the course of ethnic 
conflict. The mass-led ‘tipping’ process and selective incentives have an 
important role for the mobilisation of population and the security dilemma can 
exacerbate due to information failures and problems of credible commitment 
(Lake & Rothschild 1998:24, 29). To attain support, leaders can also instil 
culturally defined groups with a mythical and heroic past, a sense of mission and 
messianism, or a belief that the group had intrinsic and unique rights to territory 
by virtue of its ethnic or religious identity (Crawford 1998: 20). 
 
Stuart Kaufman (2001) suggests that the elite-mass relationships determine the 
general structure of an ethnic war (Figure 2). In a case of a mass-led ethnic 
movement, politicians seek support by making chauvinist symbolic appeals, 
goading mobilisation even if the government opposes. In a case of elite-led ethnic 
movement, a few powerful elites (typically government officials) would engage 
ethnic myths and symbols to provoke fear, hostility and a security dilemma and 
mobilise their group for violence.  
 
The mass-led violence scenarios can take place in a society of existing and 
publicly articulated myths justifying ethnic hostility and fears, when an 
opportunity emerges (like a lifting of existing barriers to ethnic self-expression 
imposed by the coercive force of a state). Such an environment can easily spawn 
ethnic movements promoting mobilisation as a mechanism for improving safety. 
In an ethnically mixed settlement, the security dilemma follows naturally 
increasing fears, hostility, and extremist symbolic politics on both sides23.  
 
In the case of an elite-led violence scenario, leaders would mobilise their group 
in pursuit of their own goals. They would use the propaganda resources of modern 
political organisations and mass media to manipulate ethnic symbols and fan 
ethnic hostility.24 Having the power to define political agenda and control 
negotiations leaders can block any potential compromise, discredit opponents 
promoting moderate programmes, organise militias or armies to launch violent 
provocations in order that a cycle of violence begins. If the other side responds in 
                                                 
22 Kaufman points out that in ethnically mixed settlements we can speak about security dilemma 
only if both communities are threatened. If the minority (e.g., Bombay’s Muslim community) is 
seriously threatened, but the majority (Bombay’s Hindus) are not, then it is a pogrom. If one side, 
usually the state, has an overwhelming military advantage, the result is ethnic cleansing, genocide, 
or more limited riots rather than war (Kaufman 2001:32). 
23 Kaufman (2001) suggests that there is no single path, which all mass-led conflicts follow to 
ethnic war. Some masses with already established hostile attitudes towards other groups just ‘wait’ 
for the elites to offer chauvinist platforms (Georgia). In other cases, security dilemma occurs when 
masses engage in violence and leaders with extremist views on implementation of chauvinist 
policies take advantage of the situation (Karabagh). 
24 Minor demographic changes can be redefined as mortal threats to group survival, ancient 
disasters recast as current threats, and violent methods promoted as the only alternative to group 
catastrophe (Kaufman 2001) 
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Figure 2: Processes of Ethnic Conflict Escalation 







Ethnic mobilisation is a mechanism used by the ethnic elites for achieving their 
private political and/or economic goals. This mobilisation however would not 
occur if there were not particular conditions to enable the invoking and activating 
of shared symbols that would powerfully transform reality by interpreting it in the 
desired perspective. The emotional motivations in ethnic wars can fill in some of 
the gaps in the rationalist theory. If the issues at stake are defined not only by 
rational interests, but also as a status contest and fears of extinction then it is easy 
to see why groups would prefer to weaken or harm other groups even at some cost 
to their own material welfare. In the context of ethnic conflict, attitudes towards 
other groups become determined by negative feelings rather than by stereotypes 
(Young 1976, Horowitz 1985). According to the psychologists, at the core of 
ethnic conflicts are not economic, linguistic, or other specific benefits, but status 
issues. When a group wants to establish its superiority over the others, the ethnic 
conflict becomes a competition for group advantage and a contest for dominance 
of the state. Each group would try then to prove its legitimate rights to political 
dominance in the inhabited territories pre-exposing the value of its moral and 
                                                 
25 The examples that Kaufman (2001) gives are with the cases of government jingoism (Milosevic 
in Serbia) or elite conspiracy, in which low-level guerrilla leaders (aided from the outside) initiate 
a similar process (Moldova’s Transnistria conflict). 
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historical claims (Horowitz 1985:145-47). Beyond the contest for dominance, 
group violence can break out due to the rise of feelings of hostility stemming from 
anxiety-laden fears of group extinction, which on its turn increase group 
solidarity, encourage the groups to perceive events in ethnic terms, and promote 
misperceptions across group boundaries (Kaufman 2001:26). 
 
Building upon the insights provided by rational choice theory and the 
psychological approach, the symbolist synthesis draws a more detailed and clearer 
picture of the upsurge of ethnic identity and the outburst of ethnic violence at the 
end of the 20th century. Combining the psychologists’ ideas that people often 
choose emotionally because they are reluctant decision makers26 and the 
fundamental rationalist assumptions that 1) people have stable, ordered 
preferences; and 2) in choosing they try to maximise their utility as defined by 
those preferences, the symbolic choice theory explains the emotionally charged 
ethnic mobilisation by the role of symbols. With both their cognitive and 
emotional charge27, symbols function as powerful integrative mechanisms 
because they address and exploit emotionally laden myths that give events and 
actions a particular meaning28. From this point of view, facts do not matter. Facts 
that confirm the myths are redundant, while those that contradict the myths are 
unimportant. Symbolic politics therefore refers to any sort of political activity 
focused on creating and charging emotions, on stimulating actions, rather than 
addressing interests29 (Kaufman 2001:29). 
 
The central assumption of symbolic politics theory is that political choices based 
on emotions and in response to symbols fits closely with the psychologically 
driven understanding of ethnic war. If ethnicity is an emotional bond evoking 
kinship feelings, then in a case of a perceived threat of group extinction emotional 
appeals to that bond can lead to a mobilisation. If emotional appeals to ethnic 
issues simultaneously refer to blaming another group, it is likely that feelings of 
anger and aggression would arise and would motivate people on the individual 
level to fight (Kaufman 2001:29-30). In deeply divided societies, symbols have 
the potential to play crucial role for the outburst of violence (Horowitz 1985:216-
24). Still, the settlement patterns are not a precondition for violence per se. 30
 
According to symbolic politics theory, violence could break out if there are 
several conditions present. The first condition is the existence of at least two 
groups in opposition, one of which justifies the pursuit of ethnic dominance and 
                                                 
26 Kaufman refers to the work of Janis & Mann (1977:7-17) developing the idea of people being 
reluctant decision makers (Kaufman 2001:27). ‘Emotion commits one to action more than does the 
cost-benefit calculation of intellective cognition’, ‘divert people from pursuing one goal and point 
them toward pursuing another goal that has meanwhile increased in importance’ (Fiske & Taylor 
1991:433, 456 quoted by Kaufman 2001:27 and 28, respectively)  
27 Stuart Kaufman (2001) quotes the studies of Elder & Cobb (1983) and Edelman (1971)  
28 The web of myths-related symbols that collectively define meanings or national belonging forms 
a ‘myth-symbol complex’ (Kaufman 2001:16). 
29 Since people chose by responding to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked, politicians 
manipulate symbols in order to induce people to make choices. Emotionally laden and 
symbolically constituted, ethnicity is a rich resource for politicians engaged in symbolic politics. 
30 According to Brass, (Brass 1991:18-26) ethnic wars may occur even where ethnic groups are 
geographically separate – as in southern Sudan for example, but where ethnic symbols are widely 
known, a myth-symbol complex justifies hostility to the other group and cultural differences are 
associated with political cleavages. 
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thus ethnic hostility. Fear is another conflict trigger, especially when ethnic 
groups define their security in mutually incompatible ways (Kaufman 2001:34). 
The third condition for an ethnic war, as defined by Kaufman, is that the ethnic 
groups must have the opportunity to mobilise, arm themselves and fight31. Within 
a political space opened to all sorts of political entrepreneurs32 – after the collapse 
of an oppressive power system such as a colonial rule, dictatorship, or 
totalitarianism - ethnic violence is more likely to occur. The last factor that can 
play a role is the involvement of third parties. External agents can be a factor for 
preventing a conflict but also for its escalation. By changing the opportunity 
structure, through supporting one of the sides or by providing money, advice, and 
guiding the propaganda foreign patrons can help extremist policies, promote 
ethnic hostility and thus to contribute indirectly for the escalation of tensions and 
violence (Kaufman 2001:34).  
 
To sum up, according to symbolic politics theory, subjective preconditions 
(myths, fears) are as important for the outburst of an ethnic war as any objective 
ones (opportunity, resources, conflicts of interests, real threats to the group’s 
existence). Hostility and fear, symbolic events activating pre-existing myths, 
leaders explicitly manipulating symbols, changes of political power and power 
structures or even the emergence of new information indicating a threat to the 
ethnic group – all of these factors can lead to violence. When fears and hostility 
are already high, ethnic war might spur from a new political opportunity. While 
chauvinist political programmes can lead to armed mobilisation and violence, it is 
the violence itself that feeds back to make the chauvinist political programmes 
more popular.33  
 
While symbolic politics theory provides a rather comprehensive explanation of 
the specific factors that motivate people to engage in ethnic violence, it does not 
indicate why ethnic markers would provide such vital grounds for mass 
mobilisation and why some societies have experienced fragmentation along ethnic 
lines while others have managed to resolve peacefully any identity politics issues. 
The institutional approach attempts to offers answers to these questions. It takes 
into account three key areas: 1) the strength/weakness of state institutions; 2) the 
degree to which culture has been politicised; and 3) the role of political 
entrepreneurs in the context of both identity politics and economic conditions.  
 
Determining the rules for political membership, institutions can provide the 
background conditions for the outburst or the sustaining of cultural violence 
(Crawford 1998b:517). When institutions are not preferential to any of the groups 
inhabiting the state, they can prevent cultural identity politics from becoming 
                                                 
31 This assumes that they would have enough freedom to mobilise politically without being 
stopped by state coercion. Kaufman (2001) argues that the effective state apparatus of repression 
suppresses the possibilities for ethnic mobilisation and thus for ethnic violence. On the opposite, 
under specific circumstances as the Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, or when leaders who 
want to start ethnic violence are in power (Rwanda’s Hutu government), ethnic clashes are quite 
likely to occur Kaufman (2001:32-33). 
32The concept of ‘political entrepreneur’ comes from rational choice theorists, who argue that only 
those    individuals who can provide appropriate incentives to potential group members will be 
able to mobilise them as followers (Lipschutz 1998:69)  
33 If violence occurs as a result from a power structure collapse and there are no strong ethnic 
mythologies and identities, then it is likely that non-ethnic coalitions are established (Kaufman 
2001:36). 
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politically relevant, while institutional collapse in states of deeply politicised 
cultural identities is more likely to lead to cultural violence (Crawford 1998b:540-
541, Table 2). When the weakened state cannot uphold the social contract, a good 
opportunity for political entrepreneurs to propose alternative platforms arises 
(Crawford 1998b:527).  
 
The second factor for the outburst of cultural violence is a politicised culture. 
Through preferential policies (of colonial rulers in India), culturally based ‘nation-
building’ process (Germany) or through the precepts of religious beliefs (Muslim-
majority states), cultural identity can easily be transformed into political 
(Crawford 1998b:515). When a culturally defined community sees itself as 
politically relevant but excluded from political participation, or from access to 
resources and benefits – struggles for ‘compensating the deprivation’ are likely to 
occur. Claims based on cultural criteria are incompatible as cultural identities are 
non-negotiable. Thus, political entrepreneurs appear an engine-factor for the 
outburst of violence. When the central state weakens, economic hardship and 
perceived discrimination in distribution offer a better chance to ethnic leaders to 
attract followers, especially in the context of existing identity politics. Thus, the 
success of the political entrepreneurs depends on the institutional legacies – 
deeply politicised ethnic and religious cleavages provide resources needed for 
mobilisation34 (Crawford 1998b:540).   
 
The critique against most of the theories of ethnic conflicts is that they adopt a 
narrow perspective for understanding and explaining the outburst of violence. As 
Dan Smith (2000) points out, social science aiming to offer a general explanatory 
mechanism appears more interested in the background conditions and long-range 
causes. Focusing on identifying the most important cause of an armed conflict in 
most of the cases is likely to be misleading. A better understanding of the 
problems can be achieved only if the attention is drawn upon the question of how 
the different causes interact (Smith, D. 2000:8). Developing further the idea of 
Dressler (1994), who suggests that causes of violence should be considered 
typologically, Dan Smith (2000) outlines four types of causes: background 
causes, mobilisation causes, triggers and catalysts. These refer respectively to 1) 
the basic elements of the social and political structure as characteristics of the 
group 2) the full range of political behaviour (including goals and strategies) and 
its legitimisation 3) the factors that affect the onset of the conflict; 4) the factors 
that affect the intensity and the duration of the conflict (Smith, D. 2000:9-10). 
Similar approach is used by Michael Brown (1996), who distinguishes between 
causes that underlie an internal conflict and the particular outbreak, defining them 
as underlying causes and proximate causes (triggers), presented in details in the 
table below. Thus a conflict escalation can be studied on the basis of clusters of 
variables.   
 
 
                                                 
34 Not surprisingly, the role of the intermediary political entrepreneurs within a multi-culture 
society is also determined by the state. For instance, in pursuing loyalty, communist-style central 
institutions promoted ethnic identities through their transformation into a basis for cultural-
administrative divisions. By offering a degree of autonomy and collective representation to the 
groups, the state legitimised ethnically distinct political elites having control over resources and 
distribution of privileges. This ‘ethnic machine’ was widely applied in ex-Yugoslavia (Crawford 
1998b:523). 
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Table 1: Conflict Factors and Causes  
(Source: Brown 1996) 
 
Factors Underlying Causes Triggers/Proximate Causes 
Weak states Collapsing states 
Intrastate security concerns Changing intrastate military balances 
Structural 
Factors 
Ethnic geography Changing demographic patterns 
Discriminatory political institutions Political transitions 
Exclusionary national ideologies Influential exclusionary ideologies 
Inter-group politics Growing inter-group competition 
Political 
Factors 
Elite politics Intensifying leadership struggles 
Economic problems Mounting economic problems 
Discriminatory economic systems Growing economic inequalities 
Economic/ 
Social 
Factors Economic development and 
modernisation 
Fast-paced development and 
modernisation 




Factors Problematic group histories Ethnic bashing and propagandizing 
  
 
The proximate causes emerge from rapid and unexpected changes of any of the 
underlying causes. Changes hence play the role of a catalyst. The structural, 
economic, and cultural forces that influence shared perceptions and diffused 
hostility are defined also as mass-factors. The category of the triggers, or the elite-
factors, refers to the behaviour of specific leaders, assigning precise political 
responsibilities to the promoters of policies that deliberately fuel conflict and thus 
become the ultimate proximate triggers of the outburst of ethnic violence (Brown 
1996).  
 
Part of the problem with misunderstanding ethnicity and ethnic conflicts is the 
tendency towards simplification arising from their populist depiction (Storey 
1997:63). Myths about ‘deep-seated hatreds’ and ‘ancient animosities’ have often 
been promoted by media or governments presiding over communal violence. As a 
‘natural phenomenon’, the source of violence appears beyond control and 
therefore a good excuse for inaction or preventing intervention (HRW 1995: vii). 
Addressing the mass murders in Rwanda, for example, as an ‘African tribal 
bloodletting’ implies that the aggression is not a political act but an event that 
nobody could have predicted or prevented. When ‘ancient hatreds’ (Calhoun 
1997:61) or ‘hot blood’ arguments are used for explaining the reasons for a 
conflict - even not using the term ethnic directly, another implicit suggestion is 
that there is nothing to be done to resolve them. Thus the only logical solution can 
be the separation of the populations (Smith, D. 2000:12). 
 
As it becomes clear from the theories presented above, ethnic conflicts can be 
considered a type of identity-based inter-communal conflicts. Although collective 
(cultural) identities not always give rise to politically active groups and conflict-
related cleavages, identity can inspire political action if turned into a basis for 
mobilisation (Gurr 1993). Collective behaviour and group identification are key 
elements of group conflict, but they are often a function of perceptions, activated 
by particular circumstances such as the changes in the socio-political or economic 
context (SAIS, online).  
 
Often emerging within states, identity-based conflicts can spread over political 
borders and become regional or international issues. Struggles might occur 
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between group and central authority with demands for autonomy or secession. If 
within a state there are geographically and/or culturally distinguished groups, 
conflicts could outburst over power and control of resources. When groups are 
intermixed throughout given territory and there are domination-subjugation 
patterns or religious confrontation the conflict might aim at overthrowing a 
regime (centralist) or at redesigning society by changing completely the way it 
operates (revolutionary wars) (SAIS, online).   
 
The simultaneous rise of local and global at the end of the 20th century in fact is 
not mutually exclusive but represents two aspects of one single process (Friedman 
1990, Hannerz 1990). Globalisation has stimulated the emergence of a reflexive 
consciousness about the global system and the place of the individual (and the 
smaller group) on its scale. Thus, the powerful waves of cultural homogenisation 
and tighter economic integration lead to the emergence of a ‘new localism’ of 
ethnic, religious, or regional nature that constituted the world as a single place but 
locally constructed (Eriksen 1993:150)  
 
The idea that the current research defends is that many theoretical difficulties stem 
from the fact that studies discuss various aspects of ethnic conflicts without a 
clear conception of which conflicts are ‘ethnic’ and what are their distinctive 
features. The ‘new wars’-theory of Mary Kaldor (1999) offers some valuable 
insights about the specific characteristics of the ethnic conflicts that broke out 
after the end of the Cold War.  
 
 
2. MAPPING THE TYPE  
2.1 The ‘new wars’  
 
The end of the Cold War was to usher in a world order where peace would reign 
and the United Nations would govern with effective power and supranational 
impartiality. This idealist dream disappeared with the wave of conflicts that the 
world witnessed at the end of the 20th century. The collapse of the communist 
system and the bipolar model preserving an artificial international stability 
released both discernible and hidden confrontations, sustained and frozen 
tensions. Identity-based and inter-communal struggles between culturally 
determined groups broke out in different parts of the world - in Somalia, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Chechnya, former Yugoslavia, and Congo/Zaire. Together 
with the number of the persisting long-running conflicts (Turkey, Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan) the picture of the world became anything but peaceful (van de 
Veen 1998, Gurr 2000, Deutsch 2006).  
 
The conflicts between communities in the 1990s affected the political map of the 
world and the international agenda, respectively. The right for self-determination 
of peoples, defended by the UN Charter, provided the necessary legal grounds for 
the international community to support the disintegration of former political 
unions (as the USSR and the FRY) and to recognise the new formations as 
sovereign countries. The ethnic agenda, invoked as a formative principle for these 
new political structures, and the unwillingness of the central powers to loose 
territories and/or dominant functions within states, provoked the armed conflicts. 
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Characterised by a high degree of violence, ignoring national borders, threatening 
peace in neighbouring countries and creating possibilities for domino effect, these 
struggles widely referred to as ‘ethnic conflicts’, seemed to have an eroding effect 
upon local and international stability and security, proving to be far more savage 
and incomprehensible than traditional interstate wars (Baird 1999).  
 
Intra-state violence appeared to have more devastating effect on the civilian 
population than interstate wars (Kaldor 1999; Crawford & Lipschutz 1998). It is 
characterised by a high level of material damages, destruction of infrastructure 
and housing facilities (van de Veen 1998). The figures of conflict-related deaths 
and the number of refugees are indicators for the associated higher human costs 
(Ropers 1998). The figures show that while in World War I and World War 2 the 
percentage of civilian deaths on the total was respectively 14 and 67, in the 1990s 
(where most wars were within rather than between states) the civilians deaths 
reached 90 percent35 (Crawford 1998a). Material damages, destruction of 
infrastructure and housing facilities in addition to the political, ecological, and 
social consequences have obstructed development for years ahead (Ropers 1998). 
The activated ethnic nepotism and psychological mechanisms of raising 
prejudices and discrimination resulted in subsequent higher rates of crime and 
violence (Alesina 1997), frequency of wars, military actions and casualties 
(Rummel 1997a; Haas 1974; Vanhanen 1999) and respectively low investments in 
public goods (Easterly & Levine 1997:112). 
 
The conflicts of the 1990s are a product of the restructuring of the world power 
systems within the changed international context. Uncompleted historical 
processes and developments combined with new political ambitions have found 
propitious ground to flourish and explode. Political instability, anticipated 
economic and political benefits, and the lack of functioning international control 
framework enabled local elites to take an advantage of the situation and to 
mobilise support on ethnic basis, exploiting the desire of the developed 
democracies to aid the transition of the formerly oppressed societies to new 
democratic political systems36. 
 
The conflicts that spread after the end of the Cold War are often defined as 
identity-based and ‘ethnic’. Racial, religious, and cultural clashes, those between 
language groups, indigenous inhabitants and immigrants, majorities and 
minorities are usually recognised as sub-types. Among the examples, given to 
illustrate the problematic area, are the tribal fighting in Somalia, the Kurd 
minority problems in Iraq, the civil war in Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda, 
and the disintegration of Yugoslavia  
 
                                                 
35 ‘By 1995 deaths in the war in the former Yugoslavia reached over 200,000; over half the 
population of Bosnia became refugees, and virtually all of the Serb population of Croatia was 
forced to flee. By 1993 civilian deaths in the war in Abkhazia were estimated at between 25,000 
and 30,000’. (Crawford 1998a:3) 
36 Western democracies assumed that by recognising the right of formerly oppressed communities 
to political independence will provide support the transition from communism and launching 
democratisation. However the lack of properly formulated standards for recognition of 
independence and the precedent set launched the domino effect in former Yugoslavia.   
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Identity conflicts are not a new phenomenon37, but those of the late 20th century 
fall under the type, denoted by Kaldor as ‘new wars’. Kaldor (1999) takes into 
consideration the mode of warfare. The combination of mass production, mass 
politics, and mass communications has eventually established a war model 
beyond the Clausewitzian one38, wiping out the distinction between public and 
private, military and civil, internal and external and even war and peace. From this 
derived the exterminist character of this type of conflict, which developed through 
the historical experience of the two world wars and the Cold War (Shaw 1988) 
and reached extremes in the inter-community clashes of the late 20th century39.  
 
Kaldor’s theory suggests that the conflicts of the late 20th century are a part of a 
new political economy of war, in which a range of new militaries (from remnants 
of state armies and paramilitary groups to international troops) engage in new 
forms of violence40. Acts like the systematic murder of ‘others’ and ethnic 
cleansing are seen as ‘genocidal’41. In Kaldor’s term, this war economy that 
emerged after the Cold War was not only demobilising and parasitic, but a 
‘predatory social condition’ damaging economies of neighbouring regions as well 
as the zone of warfare itself, spreading refugees and identity-based politics 
(Kaldor 1999:113). Moreover, civilians were ultimately ‘transformed’ from 
accidental victims of war into strategic targets. Another important aspect of 
Kaldor’s approach is a warning against the widespread assumption that most of 
the 1990s wars were civil. The author emphasises that the Bosnian case together 
with some other conflicts of the period should be regarded as a political conflict, 
involving state power and ‘private’ forces, in which identity politics were used by 
which political elite to mobilise support and ensure their power. 
 
Examining the ethnic conflict data from the last 50 years, scholars believe that 
competition over scarce resources such as property, jobs, language, and rights 
(Lake & Rothschild, 1996:44; Paul 1998:56) is only one of the factors. Violence 
between ethnically determined communities occurs due to low capacity of states 
and societies to adapt to changing environmental, social, political,42 and/or 
                                                 
37 Crawford point out that there is a large number of culturally-based struggles between 1945 and 
1990 (Crawford 1998a:3) 
38 The Clausewitzian approach articulates the Napoleonic-Wars experience – the trinity of state, 
army and people and a culmination in a decisive battle. 
39 Martin Shaw (2000) criticises Kaldor for underemphasising the role of the conventional military 
forces in the ethnic conflicts, because when they are defined as new wars because state and leader 
responsibility for initiating wars and genocidal acts against civilian population are not taken into 
account. Russia (in Chechnya) and Israel (in the West Bank and Lebanon) are examples that states 
today ‘go to war because of uncertainty in their control over ‘their’ territory and these wars are 
directed largely against civilian populations’ (Shaw 2000:177). 
40 Kaldor’s theory has been challenged by the fact that the aggression towards civilians has been 
established as a practice yet with the 30-years war (1618–1648). Acknowledging that such 
criticism has certain grounds, the author of the research believes that the problem with Kaldor’s 
theory is terminological and not conceptual (replacing the ‘new’ with ‘modern’, the 17th century 
war and the late 20th century conflicts could easily fall under the same category). 
41 According to Kaldor (1999) the principal aim of Serbian or Croatian forces in the respectively 
controlled territories in Bosnia was ethnic ‘cleansing’. In Rwanda the war was double-edged as it 
was directed both against ethnic groups and plural urban communities. 
42 Crawford emphasises that the experienced political transformation should also be taken into 
account to understand ‘the outbreak of cultural violence in industrial societies where central 
authority is relatively strong and social contracts are largely considered legitimate’ (Crawford 
1998a:15). A conflict emerging as a product of the political system is the one in ex-Yugoslavia 
(Smith D. 2000:14). 
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economic conditions (Smith, D. 2000; Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). In post-
industrial societies undergoing dramatic social transformations, ethnic 
communities came into being in the process of competition and conflict for 
political power, economic benefits, and social status both within and among 
different ethnic categories (Brass 1991:18-26.) Transition to democracy or any 
radical changes in the political systems can further affect different groups within 
society (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:477-8). The explanations of the phenomenon vary 
from marginalisation of old political structures and ideas to the ethnicity as the 
only stable basis for mobilisation, through lack of institutions to channel the 
emerging social conflicts, and to the usage of ethno-nationalism by certain 
political elites as a means for attracting mass support. In that light, the wave of 
local conflicts following the collapse of the communist system that has been 
regulating internal as well as international affairs seems understandable. 
 
Adopting the Handelman’s terminology43, the identity conflicts that occurred after 
the collapse of the communist system involved ethnic associations but 
predominantly ethnic communities (see Table 2). The examples from the 1990s 
suggest that violent conflicts occurred when non-dominant ethnic associations 
made open claims for their political recognition as communities, i.e. claimed 
political rights over a territory (Eriksen 1993:42).  
 
 
Table 2: Degrees of Ethnic Incorporation 
 (Source: Eriksen 1993:44) 
 
Degrees of ethnic incorporation 









Standardised ethnic ascriptions X X X X 
Interaction along ethnic lines  X X X 
Goal-oriented corporate organisation   X X 
Territorial base    X 
  
 
The changes of the socio-political context and the economic conditions opened up 
the political space after the end of the Cold War. Recalled myths and memories 
for past injustice legitimised new claims for political determination. Although 
involving the identity component, the ethnic conflicts of the late 20th century are 
in fact struggles for (state) power inspired by global processes and forces 
impinging on the specific domestic configurations (Lipschutz 1998:44; Storey 
1997, Kaufman 2001:16). In these politically mobilised actions for the pursuit of 
particular goals and interests, ethnicity was a catalyst and not a cause of the 
conflicts. Ethnic conflicts after the Cold War occurred between politicised ethnic 
                                                 
43 There are four types of association distinguished upon the degree of ethnic incorporation. The 
ethnic category is the least incorporated type of ethnic grouping. It activates in a context of 
political fragmentation and serves for identification of members on the bases of shared values and 
cultural assets. An ethnic network has the ability to distribute resources among its members and 
impose strong moral obligations for support to individuals on ethnic basis. The characteristic of an 
ethnic association is the organisational apparatus that channels the established relationships. 
Embodying presumed shared interests, it might take the form of political parties, youth clubs, or 
religious associations. The highest degree of ethnic incorporation is the ethnic community. 
Embracing ethnic categories, networks and associations, the group relates to a particular territory 
with more or less permanent physical boundaries – e.g. an ethnic group in command of a nation 
state (Handelman (1977) quoted by Eriksen (1993:43)). 
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groups and had a direct impact upon the international politics. The attempt to map 
the type below, aims at clarifying the differences from a post-conflict 
reconstruction perspective.  
 
2.2 Ethnic conflicts – general features 
 
To assess the typology of conflicts, it is necessary to look at the elements in their 
interrelation. This can be achieved through conflict mapping (Wehr 1979:19). 
Although there is no single approach adopted44, many of the studies focus on a 
number of basic features that provide fundamental indicators.  
 
Wehr’s conflict maps take into account information on the following points:  
 
• Conflict History and Context (physical and organisational settings) 
• Parties (fighting behaviour, direct and indirect stakes in the conflict 
outcome, third parties) 
• Causes and Consequences 
• Issues (contrasting beliefs and values) 
• Goals and Interests 
• Dynamics 
• Functions (purposes; positive consequences) 
• Regulation Potential (conflict-limiting elements) 
 
Hocker & Wilmot (1994) introduce another guide to the conflict mapping to bring 
specific aspects of conflict into focus and serve as a check on gabs in information. 
Here the main points for consideration are:  
 
• Nature of Conflict (trigger events, historical context, perceived 
incompatible goals by the parties) 
• Styles (of each party and how they change) 
• Power (attitudes, dependencies, sources of power) 
• Goals (of each parties, content goals, and relational goals) 
• Tactics (strategies, tactical options, interlocking of tactics and their role 
for pushing the conflict through phases of escalation, maintenance and 
reduction) 
• Assessment (rules of repetitive patterns, possibility for quantitative 
analysis) 
• Self-regulation (perceived options for change, techniques for self- and 
system-regulation) 
• Attempted Solutions 
 
Based on the above presented approaches as well as on the information, provided 
by the databases indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the text will attempt to 
assess the elements and to map the type of ‘ethnic conflicts’ in order to distinguish 
it from the other contemporary violent struggles. 
  
                                                 
44 As Wehr (1979) reveals the approaches can differ from general principles for analysis to micro-
analytical or combined. 
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2.2.1 Conflict context  
 
The widely used statement that ‘instead of the expected peace and stability the 
end of the Cold War brought ethnic tensions, violence, and wars worldwide’ is in 
fact misleading because it suggests that in the previous years the number of 
violent clashes and tensions was at least lower. The databases introduced can 
challenge the myth that in the late 20th century ethnic violence spread on an 
extremely large scale. The VINC database reveals that out of 83 conflicts in total 
identified as ethnic (1945-2003), only 22 started after 1989. The Warlist and the 
SFTRF tables reveal more or less the same picture. The numbers of ethnic 
conflicts between 1945 and 1989 against this since the end of the Cold War are 
respectively 56 against 35 (for the period until 2003, plus additional 12 for the 
period 2003-2009) and 54 against 22 (until 2003).  
 
The data reveal that, although the overall number of Post-Cold War intrastate 
community struggles does not exceed this of the previous years, violence 
outbursts occurred in waves, following the collapse of the communist system and 
the changes in the international status-quo (Hewitt et al. 2008, Figure 3). While 
the frozen peace of the bipolar world could suppress or ‘hide’ the conflicts on 
ethnic grounds in the past, in the 1990s violence emerged in different spots of the 
globe and became widely visible.  
 
 
Figure 3: Trends in Ongoing and New Conflicts 1946-2005 










The ‘contextual’ change offered the nationally emancipated communities a good 
chance to raise their claims and for local political entrepreneurs – an opportunity 
for pursuing power (Lipschutz 1998:51). As the UDCP/PRIO dataset reveal, the 
end of the Cold War system was a trigger for many old intra-state conflicts to 
reoccur. The ‘climate’ in the early 1990s was generally favourable, because the 
enthusiasm after the fall of communism to introduce democracy to all the states 
worldwide prevented the international community from objectively pre-assessing 
the negative consequences from opening the contest between power holders and 
power-contestants. Figure 5 demonstrates (Hewitt et al. 2008) an increase in the 
number of intrastate wars, but at the same time, the comparison between the 
conflicts of the Cold war and the Post-cold period, as presented in a table from the 
same Peace and Conflict edition (Appendix 1: Table 2) does not indicate any 





Figure 4: Ongoing Conflicts, New Onsets 1980-2005 















Figure 5: Global Trends in Violent Conflicts 1946-2005 







Nevertheless, the increase in domestic tensions within the countries of collapsing 
ideologies and regimes did not occur overnight. The uneven development of 
different zones within a single state resulted from certain economic dynamics 20th 
century. In some democratic countries the ‘fault lines’ were perceived as 
administrative; in other cases these administrative differentiation overlapped the 
ethnic (cultural) division of societies (Lipschutz 1998:50). This ultimately 
enhanced any already existing division between culturally determined 
communities and their competition over resources or power.  
 
2.2.2 Conflict agents  
 
When defining the type, the very first assumption that comes to mind is that 
conflicts are ethnic because the opposing parties are ethnically determined. This is 
confirmed by the databases and the theoretical literature.  
 
Considering the demographic aspect, the states that have suffered ethnic conflicts 
are of ethnically non-homogeneous population with (at least two) identity-
determined groups. If separate communities are not yet established, certain factors 
can serve as grounds for such a differentiation. Among these are different 
religions and cultural formations, opposing beliefs and values, several actively 
spoken languages. Although cultural differences and non-homogeneity of 
population are not factors for an outburst of communal violence, these can 
become important catalysts for the mobilisation of supporters once the conflict 
erupts. In cases of a group(s) constituted as an irredentist community, the 
escalation of tensions would be dependent on the connections with the mother-
state and -nation.  
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Ethnic conflicts are usually regarded as clashes occurring between two or more 
communities within the borders of a given state, defined along the lines of certain 
cultural or biological differences. The analysis of the databases suggests that the 
number of the cases of ethnic clashes between unranked groups45 is too small. The 
VINC database suggests that only 10 out of 83 cases of ethnic conflicts are 
between unranked groups. In the other 73 cases the opposing parties are ranked, 
i.e. these conflicts involve ethnically determined groups, one of which has 
dominant position over the others. The conflict agents in the ranked clashes can be 
divided further into dominant group, often represented by the central state 
institutions, and community(s) deprived from power, resources, or rights. This in 
the UCDP/PRIO Dataset for examples is coded as ‘Incompatibility: Government’.  
 
2.2.3 Conflict frameworks  
 
To map the ethnic type among the contemporary violent conflicts, it is important 
to look also at what and where is happening. The section of conflict frameworks 
will consider the specific features of the type as at the particularities about its 
dynamics, intensity, and duration.  
 
As it was mentioned above, the concept of ethnic conflict implies that the cultural, 
socio-political, and/or economic affairs of the country become articulated in 
ethnic terms and in most of the cases, various aspects of the domestic status quo 
are challenged. These conflicts have disruptive effects on the stability and 
integrity of the state emerging as internal clashes and often causing an implosion 
of the political structure and fracturing of the unit. In case of 
territorially/politically defined communities claim autonomy or separation, the 
struggles can also interpreted as inter-entity.  
 
Ethnic conflicts are considered implosive because of their potential to cause a 
collapse of the pre-conflict political unit, especially in cases when an ethnically 
determined community challenges the official state authorities by claiming a 
fundamental change of status. The fragmentation of states in this context is more 
or less explicable by the fact that the power of the central authorities appears 
initially weakened and thus grounds for contesting the legitimate (until that 
moment in time) structures emerge.  
 
Another characteristic appears the scale of the conflicts - i.e., the area over which 
the violent actions take place and spread. The SFTFR table suggests that in 50 out 
of 75 cases of the violent struggles studied, the area affected directly or indirectly 
is between one quarter and more than the half of the country. The high level of 
mobilisation is also indicative. According to the SFTFR table, the number of 
combatants or activists involved in the struggles in most of the cases is greater 
than 15,000.  
 
Analysing the intensity of the conflicts in focus, the data reveal that the level of 
violence reaches beyond sporadic isolated incidents and spreads among a large 
proportion of the population divided into identity-based groups. Ethnic conflicts 
                                                 
45 As defined by Horowitz (1985:22) 
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often known for the great number of civilian deaths as well as for the intensity and 
the brutality of war crimes against the population of the opposing ethnic group 
(Crawford 1998a:3). The second figure – victims as a total number - as estimated 
on the basis of the data in the Warlist, comes up to more than 900 000 (in 27 
conflicts between 1990 and 2003). 
 
The last aspect to be considered under this section is the duration of the conflicts 
discussed. The VINC database shows that out of 83 ethnic conflicts that have 
taken place since the end of the Second World War only 32 have ended by 2003. 
The UDCP/PRIO Dataset reveals that out of the total number of post-1989 hot 
spots – 61, in 30 of these conflicts reoccurred (in six of these 30 countries apart 
from the revival of ‘old’ struggles, new disputes appeared and led to outburst of 
violence). An indicator of the poor regulation potential of this type of struggles is 
represented by the figures referring to the number of cases where agreement 
between the combatants was reached and implemented – according to VINC 
database an agreement was reached in 26 of 83 cases only.  
 
2.2.4 Conflict causes & goals 
 
Competition is one of the most discussed causes of ethno-political mobilisation 
that can take a form from peaceful protests to violent war. Apart from political 
and economic competition, Wilkes and Okamoto (2002:3) identify three further 
types. Changes in ratios of relative seize between groups can increase fears about 
diminishing resources and can lead to ethnic (demographic) competition, which in 
ethnically disintegrated societies can result also from political or economic 
instability. Ethnic mobilisation can occur when land, territory, and related natural 
resources are at stake (ecologic competition) or because of competition over non-
material issues such as identities and believes (cultural competition).  
 
The recent historical situation of ‘wedding of status issues to political demands 
through ethnic groups’ (Bell 1975:160-71) enabled the association of cultural 
differences with political cleavages (Brass 1991:18-26) and thus provided the 
necessary grounds for the outburst of conflicts. Comparing and analysing the 
databases introduced earlier, it becomes clear that all the conflicts considered 
under the category of intra-state ethnic clash (either between ethnically defined 
communities or between a community and the state) have political goals (in the 
broader meaning of the term). These in the ICB Database are referred to 
‘secessionist’ and ‘irredentist’. Although the conflict issues of incompatibility in 
the cases of intrastate wars UDCP/PRIO database codes as ‘territory’ or 
‘government’ these are also easily recognised as power/political goals.  
 
Further, the VINC table reveals that the initial demands in 65 out of the total 
number of 83 cases have been independence. The claims of 11 other cases are 
identified as political autonomy. Out of the last five examples, four fall under the 
categories of assimilation or cultural autonomy and only in one case (Rwanda) the 
genocide of minorities appears as violence ‘justification factor’. The same pattern 
appears from the data presented in the Peace and Conflict 2005 tables (Gurr & 
Marshall 2005). It is interesting to note here, that after the 1989 the number of 




In the context of the opened international space after the end of Cold War, ‘the 
own state strategy’ became a model for acquiring power, and for achieving 
potential political and economic benefits46. This strategy appeared very attractive 
to groups, previously dominated by totalitarian rule. As Lipschutz (1998) 
discusses, this strategy proved successful with the democratic countries, which in 
their willingness to ‘repair cases of historical injustice’, viewed the claims for 
secession as a possibility for rapid change and an opportunity to support 
previously oppressed and underprivileged minorities.  
 
In the light of the quantitative data, it is important to clarify the contradictory 
findings of different theoretical studies about the causes of ethnic conflicts - seen 
sometimes as rational and other times as irrational. As the datasets suggest, all of 
the intrastate conflicts before and after 1989 have formulated claims and goals. 
These first-level goals are rationally calculated political and economic advantages, 
as communicated by elites and leaders.  
 
The second level, more emotional and open to manipulations, relates to the 
masses, experiencing ‘national emancipation’, security dilemmas, hostility, desire 
for revenge, etc. At this second level in fact ethnic mobilisation occurs through 
activating identity markers as language, religion, culture, etc. ‘If men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences’, pointed out the American 
sociologist Thomas as early as 192847 (Merton 1995:380). Once violence occurs, 
with the real physical damages and human losses, the grounds for anger, hatreds, 
and revenge are no longer fictional. Despite the economic costs a conflict is likely 
to entail, the ethnic activists would expect new opportunities and chances for 
political and economic gains to arise from it48 (Horowitz 1985:238). Violent 
conflict along ethnic cleavages is thus a result of policy decisions from the top 
rather than of a popular upsurge (Kaufman 2001:5).  
 
At first glance, this statement might seem to contradict the above-introduced 
models for the two possible scenarios of conflict escalation and in particular the 
‘mass-led’ process. It is important to note that, when opportunity arises, the 
existing tensions in society offer better chances for political entrepreneurs to ride 
                                                 
46 But when both the ruling regime and the state are threatened, the effects for a country and its 
population cannot be other but negative. Therefore, if economic factors are considered, this should 
be only in form of expected future advantages; which on the other hand should not be 
underestimated as a factor – a risky (and often bloody) investment for ensuring future benefits. 
Some places of violent conflicts ‘have fallen out of ‘history’ indeed. But places able to break away 
from the political grip of larger polities, as Slovenia escaped the competitive drag of Serbia’, have 
chance to participate in the global economy (Lipschutz 1998:50). This conclusion that Lipschutz 
makes introduces the idea that at least some of the conflicts, usually approached as ‘ethnic’, can be 
viewed as resulting from the efforts for achieving political and economic benefits under the 
changed circumstances.   
47 Thomas, W. I. & Thomas, D. S. 1928. The Child in America: Behaviour Problems and 
Programmes. Knopf, p.572 
48 The ‘rules’ for participation in international politics might also become an important factor. In 
the age of the inter-national politics, institutions and economic relations, a community deprived of 
a nation (or at least of a certain formal recognition) is underprivileged in terms of rights to 
participate equally in the global political and economic affairs. The idea of the world divided into 
nation states was fully established with the end of the World War II and the projection of this idea 
was in fact the UN. Thus, the nation state appears the structure that compensates this deficit and 
transforms ‘outsiders’ into players. 
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the wave of popular emotions and attitudes, manipulating them in a desired 
direction. Therefore, the two scenarios should be regarded as variations of conflict 
‘genesis’, whose escalation depends not only on the emergence of suitable 
conditions, but also on the mobilisation of the negative dynamics by leaders and 
on the lack of appropriate mechanisms for containment of the process. This idea 
finds support in the views of Lipschutz who suggests that in the Post-Cold War 
era ethnicity and religion operated as ‘instrumental means rather than ends’ 
(Lipschutz 1998:72). Once the causes for these conflicts, especially after 1989 are 
recognised as going beyond the cultural differences, they can be understood 
better, considered not only in the context of the ‘domestic configurations within 
the countries where they occur but they are also the result of global processes and 
forces impinging on those domestic configurations’ (Lipschutz 1998:44). In fact, 
issues related to power, resources, or security dilemma are also causes for 
international wars or for internal political (class) conflicts.  
 
Looking at the conflict elements analysed above, it appears that the quantitative 
data contributes to the terminological chaos. Considering the parties involved, the 
theoretical literature and the quantitative analyses identify two or more ethnically 
defined groups, ranked or unranked, in contest. The problem here is whether we 
need to evaluate also the degree of ethnic incorporation, as Eriksen suggests 
(1993), and then also to determine which would be the ‘ethnic conflicts’ – these 
that occur between communities with higher or lower levels of ethnic 
incorporation. Looking at the causes of the intra-state conflicts, it appears that 
most are ‘political’ (‘secessionist’, ‘irredentist’, ‘power-contest (government)’), 
but these might also be economic, ecological, cultural. Along the line intra- or 
inter-state wars, it is also difficult to establish the type, because under the category 
‘intra-state’, a range of conflicts can be placed.  
 
The scope of the territory over which an ethnic conflict spills cannot be used 
either as a clear parameter for distinguishing the type – civil violence or 
international wars also can involve large part of the territories of the respective 
countries. On the basis only of scope, ethnic conflicts can be distinguished from 
local clashes, but not as a type. The same problem emerges with the levels of 
violence. Even fewer in number, the international wars of the late 20th century 
result in more than 1000 deaths (as the threshold used in the UDCP/PRIO 
dataset), while the number of deaths in the internal wars vary – involving both 
more and less than 1000 deaths. As the Warlist reveals, the top eleven conflicts 
since 1945, where the number of deaths exceeds 1 000 000 people are as follows:   
 
¾ 7 civil wars (China 1946-1950, North Korea 1950-1953, North Vietnam 
1958-1975, Cambodia 1975-1978, Angola 1975-2002, Afghanistan 1978-
2002, Dem. Rep. of Congo (Zaire) 1996-2008+) 
¾ 1 civil violence (China 1950-1951) 
¾ 3 ethnic wars (India 1946-1948, Bangladesh 1971- , Sudan 1983 – 2002) 
 
 
All this indicates that using the quantitative data only cannot help clarifying the 
conflict type referred to as ‘ethnic’. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature does 
not provide a clear model either. Therefore, taking into account all of the above 
discussed features and defining them as ‘general features’, the research would 
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focus on two specific parameters that can provide the necessary grounds for 
outlining the parameters of a possible clear definition of ethnic conflicts.  
 
2.3 Ethnic conflicts – specific features 
2.3.1 Mobilisation structure  
 
To understand the specific features of the ethnic conflicts as a type, it is important 
to look at the mobilisation structure of combatants, the elite-masses relationships, 
and the role of the myth-symbol complex for organising and activating support. 
When analysing the mobilisation power structures in an ethnic conflict, several 
facts appear as common for the type. Among these are: 
 
¾ (Forced) identification with one or the other side involved in the conflict 
¾ Outburst of hatreds leading to mass involvement; instances of violence against 
members of the ‘other’ community, often interpreted as ‘punishment’ or 
revenge   
¾ Lack of security and reliable legitimate forces to provide such (army, 
institutions) 
¾ Former ‘neighbours’ transformed into enemies along the ethnic lines  
¾ No respect for civilians -  addressed aggression, forced involvement  
¾ Central command hardly in control of paramilitary structures and their leaders 
(warlords); demoralisation of regular army, guerrilla war adopted; episodes of 
violence instead of strategically planned actions  
 
The inclusion of civilians as targets in order to destroy the opponent’s ability to 
engage in war is one of the features of the ‘new wars’ that also appear in the cases 
of the 20th century ethnic conflicts. Other features are mass mobilisation, use of 
propaganda and the level of overall devastating effects.  
 
The power structure is among the distinguishing characteristic of the type. The 
‘classic’ warfare builds up a clear hierarchy between the levels. Power is 
concentrated in the hands of a central political authority, military structures lead 
wars in pursue of the goals set at political level, and the civilian population is 
rarely (if at all) an active war agent. Together with the defeated territories, it is 
often the winner’s gain. Preserving the first two levels – the organisational 
(leaders, political elites, decision makers) and the operational (military/armed 
units under the command of a centralised leadership), the ethnic warfare converts 
the civilian level not only into a target (as the total war does), but into an 
inseparable part of the mobilisation structure. Furthermore, the political and 
military levels in an ethnic conflict are not exactly ranked. Due to the nature of the 
conflict based on contesting the political authority and its legitimacy by the means 
of open aggression, it is not rare that military leaders appoint themselves to 
political roles and become ‘independent’ from any central control.  
 
Even if war started between clearly defined structures, the conflict dynamics can 
dissolve the initially formed units and shift the focus from the agendas at the 
outset, eventually constituting the conflict as personal for every member of the 
communities involved. From a clash between institutions (government, 
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community leaderships, etc.), the ethnic struggle transforms itself into a war 
between neighbours.  
 
The personalisation of conflict results in mass involvement and ‘militarisation’ of 
population. Thus, the activities of the paramilitary gangs, led by local warlords, 
and the waves of armed struggles between civilians belonging to the rivalling 
ethnic groups are among the distinctive features of this type of warfare. 
Furthermore, there is no neutral (civilian) side of non-involvement. In the ‘us vs. 
them’ situation, a neutral party is quite likely to suffer an open aggression from 
both (all) sides. The high number of refugees associated with the ethnic conflicts 
results exactly from these dynamics.  
 
The concept ‘civilians’ is thus not exactly appropriate to describe the third 
mobilisation level in the cases of ethnic conflicts. The mass-led ‘tipping process’ 
driven by peer pressure (the more people join, the more they can pressurise others 
into joining) and the selective incentives provided by the elites (promised rewards, 
threats or activation of the respective myth-symbol complexes) can explain why 
the mobilisation process snowballs (Kaufman 2001:16). Thus, the concept 
‘avalanche’ appears much more illustrative and relevant to describe the third level 
that becomes involved on a large scale in the interpersonal violence.  
 
Once the armed conflict breaks out, its energy level feeds on the acts of violence 
accumulating and increasing its destructive power. This also contributes to the 
enormous number of deaths, which corresponds to the idea, typical for the new 
wars, of ‘mass elimination’. Put provocatively, the civilians in a contemporary 
ethnic conflict eventually become fighters, victims, or refugees. Mass killings and 
forced migration can cleanse ethnically not only villages and cities but also whole 
regions.   
 
One of the fundamental problems of ethnic conflicts theory, the need to explain 
the escalation of violence based on identity issues and the rebirth of kinship 
affiliations, can be approached through the third power level, which is often 
subjected to intensive, albeit not always formal, mobilisation and recruitment. 
When members of one group start engaging in ethnic activities the attention shifts 
to society’s ethnic division. Members of other ethnic groups are thus reminded of 
their status alongside the group that has initiated the process (Crawford 1998a:28).  
 
The spread of uncontrolled and intentionally provoked violence appears a 
particular war strategy. Once launched, the ‘avalanche’ can hardly be contained 
and leaders rarely have as much control over the fighting, as they would like to 
think. Eventually brought to the negotiating table, commanders and leaders in fact 
do not represent the whole society and often have even no control over all the 
regiments. Thus, a total cease-fire cannot be commanded. Even in cases when 
certain control has been established over the organisational and the operational 
levels (often by a third party), the frameworks imposed has little if any effect on 
the mass (avalanche) level. In contrast to the other two goal-oriented levels, the 
leading principles here escape any pragmatic and rational definition. Of course, 
the security dilemma, the lack of trust, and the fears for the future have a rational 
explanation. They are however strongly complemented by activated symbolic 
perspectives and attitudes, hatreds based on imagined or real grounds, and the 
desire for revenge for the experienced personal losses, suffering or tortures.  
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This specific mobilisation structure explains the increased levels of ethnic-conflict 
related deaths, the scope of the conflicts (covering large parts of the territory of a 
state), the war intensity and dynamics (following not ‘an eye for an eye’ response, 
but rather the ‘tenfold' vengeance model), as well as their poor regulation 
potential.   
 
2.3.2 Conflict outcomes and consequences  
 
It might look odd as a statement, but the most specific element upon which an 
ethnic conflict can be distinguished from the other types of violence concerns the 
conflict outcomes and consequences. Similarly to the other types of violent armed 
conflicts, these wars have devastating effects on the states in terms of damaged 
physical capital, infrastructure and economy, destroyed stability and functionality 
of institutions, negative effects on the demographic factors. Beyond these 
common features, the post-ethnic-conflict environment is different because the 
experienced intra-state violence has severe negative effects on economic and 
political processes in transition countries (Bodewig 2002). The decreased state 
capacity, worsened social problems and continuing ethnic tensions complicate the 
social safety net reforms and can ‘rule out interethnic redistribution because 
different ethnic groups may refuse to share funds with a former enemy…[may be] 
left out and discriminated against the labour market’ (Bodewig 2002:ix). In a 
post-conflict situation of the type, all systems appear to be constrained by the 
political acceptability of interethnic redistribution. This social fracture eventually 
reflects upon the economic and political capacities of a country for recovery and 
development. 
 
It is important to clarify here that approaching ‘outcomes and consequences’ as a 
distinctive feature of the types of conflicts discussed, the research looks not at the 
successful or unsuccessful fulfilment of any (initial) intentions of the parties 
involved, but the overall effects on society resulting from the experienced 
violence. This mapping element refers to the processes that occur in the conflict 
aftermaths, the understanding of which is of particular importance for the 
formulation of post-conflict reconstruction policies. 
 
Intra-state conflicts along ethnic lines have specific negative effects on the social 
fabrics. Apart from the physical destructions, economic and institutional collapse, 
the post-ethnic-conflict environment is especially problematic because of the 
simple fact that the inter-ethnic struggles eradicate the very concept of citizenship 
(if it ever existed in the first place) with regard to the larger political unit, 
overarching the war-constituted or war-activated ethnic groups. In the course and 
in the aftermaths of an ethnic war a relapse into closed-community membership 
and disappearance of any overarching supra-identities can be observed. In 
societies where even before the ethnic clash the citizenship-platform has not been 
achieved or fully accepted, an ethnic conflict would hold back the societal 
development, preventing the establishment of possible civil identities.  
 
This fundamental shift is one of the specific consequences and hence a prominent 
characteristic of the ethnic conflicts. Adapting Cassirer’s theory of symbolic 
forms, this societal transformation resulting from an experienced violence along 
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ethnic lines can be explained as lost of formal (pragmatic) bonds of 
interdependence and interest and transferring all their functions to the symbolic 
bonds49 of the particular group. Religious and/or nationalist feelings are examples 
for very powerful cohesive factors establishing strong affiliation to an imagined 
community. The term ‘imagined communities’, introduced by Benedict Anderson 
precisely reflects the association of each member with other individuals beyond 
their physical proximity or immediate interests. 
 
Functioning simultaneously, the pragmatic and symbolic ties transform 
individuals into community members. The principles of inclusive citizenship 
require that formal civil affiliations are dominant over the cultural, racial, ethnic, 
religious, or any other type of identity-based differences. A civil community is 
formed on the basis of the common recognition of the rule of law, of shared supra-
ethnic values, respect for human rights, among which falls the right for self-
determination and for preserving particular cultural practices, provided they 
respect the law and are tolerant of other society members. Peaceful co-existence 
of members of a non-homogeneous society is possible when shared civil 
principles become dominant within a particular political unit.  
 
The ethnic conflict destroys these formal civil relations, making people perceive 
their cultural/identity differences as incompatible and/or hostile and hence as a 
threat to their personal security. Trust becomes limited only within the ethnic 
group, which closes inwards in order to provide security to its members and even 
to guarantee people’s lives. The symbolic ties become more important than any 
formerly existing functional (pragmatic) bonds. When a membership affiliation 
becomes defined on the basis of identity-characteristics, minority oppression, 
discrimination and aggression are logically to be expected.  
 
Within an ethnically defined community, symbolic factors become dominant and 
constitute the membership affiliations. Thus, the outburst of ethnic conflict in 
modern societies can be seen as resulting from the destruction of the balance 
between the two sets of bonds that constitute the larger civil (state) community. In 
fact, the disruption of the supra-ethnic grounds for loyalty and affiliation is what 
transforms the citizens into members of different ethnic groups.  
 
Such a disruption is likely to happen in times of social instability, political or 
economic transition, or because of competition over resources. These are 
moments when everyday life suffers radical changes. When social order is 
disturbed, a community would re-organise itself into groups legitimised by 
relevant existing symbolic bonds or by newly invented ones. This compensatory 
mechanism to make up for the loss of pragmatic bonds creates new frameworks 
for re-distribution within the newly constituted community. Ethnic conflict might 
also break out when there is a direct aggression (or fear of aggression) against the 
                                                 
49 A necessary explanation here is that the notion of the symbolic bonds implies the idea 
introduced by Ernst Cassirer. His study ‘Philosophy of Symbolic Forms’ (1923-1931) suggests 
that an essential part of human life is determined by the unique human capacity to symbolise (i.e. 
to imply meanings). Thus language, myths, religion, even science are all products of the various 
symbolising activities of man; the human world itself could be viewed as constituted by systems of 
symbols. Language has double nature – of ‘sign’ and of ‘symbol’ (using the semiotic categories). 
It is the first level (sign) that is the ‘pragmatic’ one, i.e. the necessary basis for communicating 
information. 
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symbolic forms, which are constitutive of the identity of certain group-members 
of the larger multiethnic community. Discrimination and oppression or fear they 
might occur can also provoke the re-establishment of smaller groups, where 
members are united by the challenged symbolic element.   
 
In established democracies, cultural or ethnic identities are private and 
encompassed by the public symbolic bonds of the civil culture and the formal 
pragmatic distribution of social roles. However, when the institution of the state 
(as a bridging mechanism) and the respective pragmatic and symbolic ties 
collapse or weaken, there is nothing to hold the social puzzle together.  
 
This can also be called a loss of social capital at the level of state. As it was 
mentioned earlier, ethnic communities can co-exist within a single space (defined 
in political, geographical or economic terms), in cases where there is an 
established and maintained social capital within the common (and commonly 
recognised!) macro-structure. A conflict between the components of a macro-
structure - what in fact are intrastate ethnic wars – causes an implosion. When the 
macro-frameworks are contested and destroyed, units can be hold together only by 
external factors or forces. In this light, it appears logical that the most stable and 
in many cases desirable outcome of an ethnic conflict is the separation of the 
rivalling units.  
 
The problem occurs when such a separation is either impossible, or undesirable. 
The most serious post-ethnic conflict problem is to ‘lock’ the established war 
enemies together and to expect that a state with a deeply fragmented society along 
non-negotiable ethnic lines would become a functioning unit. The lost affiliation 
with the state and the damaged communication channels and trust among the 
ethnically defined communities result in fragmentation of the societal structure of 
state and its ‘replacement’ by para-state structures. Therefore, from a post-conflict 
reconstruction point of view, the restoration of social capital at the level of a 
macro-framework, or the creation of a new one, is the factor that can enable or 
hamper the success of the process in general. 
 
With the collapse of the communist system in the 1990s and its (non-democratic) 
institutions, the factor that had been suppressing local communities to strive for 
power and political recognition disappeared. The socio-cultural groups, tied-up by 
the coercive administrative mechanisms of the totalitarian machine, have 
challenged the dominance of the ruling ethnic groups and mobilised for a power-
contest. The members of the particular communities claimed recognition of their 
symbolic bonds as nation-building factors. In Yugoslavia, the existing cultural-
administrative division enabled communities to operationalise the political 
organisation of the republics and to claim independence. Thus, with the collapse 
of the oppressive regime, emancipated communities claimed for the right to 
replace the weakened institutions of the former dominant structure with their own.  
 
In the context of a well-established and functioning democracy on the other hand, 
where cultural identity is only a part of a deeply rooted, internalised civil identity, 
even in cases of a weakening of institutions, the system would not collapse, and 
the society would hardly break down into smaller units. However, even in 
democratic settings, if cultural division becomes a basis for establishing 
administrative or political structures, if functional ties are defined along ethnic 
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lines, it is likely that under certain circumstances cultural communities become 
power-contestants; especially if political entrepreneurs take advantage of a 
possible institutional instability. The pragmatic ties and the symbolic bonds of 
citizenship function as supra-ethnic unifying factor ensuring stability of the 
system and the societal net, where cultural identity, citizenship affiliation and 
social roles are nested. Such an environment offers also a supra-ethnic basis for 
approaching and solving confrontations of any type.  
 
Considering the fundamental principles of community living (presented yet in the 
Rousseau’s social compact theory), it becomes obvious that ethnic violence leads 
to a radical transformation and collapse of the societal structure at the level of 
state. With the collapse of the state institutions, political boundaries and the social 
compact, the citizens also disappear. Without a social compact recognised by all 
the individuals within given political boundaries, there could be no ground for a 
formal citizenship affiliation. The ethnic conflict establishes culturally defined 
communities closed and hostile to each other. In addition, this hostility is not only 
a result from the activated opposing symbolic affiliations and emphasised us-them 
perceptions but because of the real loses, the experienced violence and the war 
trauma.  
 
Attempting to distinguish the type, a conclusion was reached that ethnic conflicts 
should be considered a dynamic complex of several components. The most 
distinctive feature, upon which the research defines a conflict as ethnic, is the 
fragmentation of the post-conflict society to a puzzle of ethnically determined, 
closed, and hostile to each other units. Thus, the conflicts where violence is 
performed along ethnic lines and which establish the ethnic membership as a 
factor determining affiliations, relationships or other aspects of political, 
economic and social life are considered ‘ethnic conflicts’ by the research.  
 
 
3. WHAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT THE POST-COLD WAR ETHNIC CONFLICTS?  
 
From a post-conflict reconstruction perspective, ethnic conflicts differ from other 
types violent clashes upon the interaction of several parameters. Conflicts agents 
are defined along ethnic (cultural) lines, establishing horizontal or vertical 
identity-based groups. These groups define themselves as different from the 
‘others’ or are constituted as such in the course of the events. One of the groups 
can have a dominant position, but apart from the vertical direction, the ethnic 
conflict has also a horizontal dimension – fights ‘among neighbours’ supplement 
fights between power-contestants. The clash is likely to occur (or at least to start) 
within the borders of a state with claims for secession, power or status demands. 
On the political map of the world, these conflicts are seen as local, but in fact they 
can have a direct affect on international politics and relations. Internally, armed 
struggles break out over large parts of the territory of the state involving mass 
mobilisation. The levels of violence go beyond sporadic isolated incidents. 
Spreading among large proportion of the population, these conflicts have poor 
potential for containment, regulation, or termination. Conflicts often reoccur after 
ceasefire. They can be referred to as implosion, because a subsequent 
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fragmentation (disintegration) of the state is a result not from external aggression 
but from the action of its population.   
 
The mobilisation structure of these conflicts indicates a specific configuration of 
the hierarchy levels. Although the ‘traditional’ organisational and operational 
levels are present, there is also a third one constituted - the level of the 
‘avalanche’. This in turn affects the mobilisation strategy and requires that the 
conflict goals and causes also be considered according to the separate levels.  
 
Referring to shared symbols and/or interpreting events through a particular 
perspective, political entrepreneurs aim at introducing and activating a mythology 
to attract followers and to motivate community members for action. Once 
violence breaks out, the role of the symbols becomes complementary (albeit still 
important), because the violence transforms the war into personal for the members 
of the involved communities, many of whom at that stage are driven by feelings 
of aggression, lack of personal security and revenge. Thus, while the goals of the 
organisational and the operational levels can be spelled out as political power 
and/or economic benefits and advantages, the goals at the mass level can be 
identified as security, identity recognition, and access to resources. The same 
logic of differentiation of levels can be applied to the conflict causes (rationally 
calculated goals as opposed to the competition, security dilemma and identity 
struggles).  
 
Another factor that has a direct effect on the type is the conflict context that 
establishes preconditions and triggers for the outburst of violence. Among the 
preconditions are previously existing lines of separation, history and practice of 
identity politics, non democratic and oppressive regimes, discriminatory to 
particular groups, as well as lack of cross-cutting policies and practices. The 
triggers in their turn can be divided into local and international. Under the first 
category are the radical political, economic or/and social changes, as well as the 
collapse of the (oppressive) institutions. International triggers are policies 
supportive of political changes (corresponding to the dominant ‘ideological’ 
values of the ethnic upsurge, e.g. self-determination, democracy and human 
rights) and of the emergence of new actors on the international stage.  
 
New political and territorial structures can emerge from the disintegration of 
former multiethnic establishments. Among the conflict consequences can also be 
institutional collapse, destruction of the pre-conflict infrastructures, economy, and 
social nets. In cases where fighting communities fail to achieve political 
autonomy or independence and become constrained to remain within the political 
borders of a single state, the socio-political space is characterised by deep 
fragmentation, while the demographic geography of the country is likely to have 
established ethnically ‘pure’ and consolidated territories as a result of the forced 
displacement and refugee movements. The state loses its legitimacy in providing 
an overarching identity. A social contract bridging the ethnically determined 
inhabitants of an established political unit can hardly exist under such conditions; 
hence, it is likely that there is no social capital on the level of the state.   
 
The violence along ethnic lines results in the destruction of pre-conflict social 
structure and arrangements of the larger political unit. Destroying the pragmatic 
(rational) links between people, the ethnic conflicts affirm the bonding affiliations 
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as dominant. At the state level, ethnic community members replace citizens. The 
pre-conflict ‘national’ social capital disappears in favour to the community social 
capital. Societal fragmentation along ethnic lines of separation appears among the 
most serious negative consequences from the discussed conflicts, especially in 
cases when separation of communities is impossible and where ex-combatants 
have been forced to remain within the political frameworks of a single state.  
 
A possible argument against the presented definition would be that it does not 
distinguish between ethnic and religious conflicts. When considering all of the 
parameters above, ethnic and religious conflicts are quite alike indeed. The main 
difference however is at the level of the mobilisation structure. Each party in the 
religious conflicts has a single power-core, supported by commonly recognised 
within the particular community values and morals. An ethnic conflict can have 
various power-centres each introducing and ‘promoting’ its own agendas. In 
contrast to the ethnic affiliation, the religious one is based on moral grounds, 
which enables religious leaders to be in better control of their followers. 
Furthermore, the poor regulation potential of an ethnic conflict is not necessarily 
based on non-negotiable issues, while religious believes are hardly conversable.  
 
Finally, addressing the question whether the ethnic conflicts of the late 20th 
century are different from the earlier ethnic conflicts, the answer based on the 
introduced framework would be ‘yes and no’. According to the adopted 
definition, the Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts are not different as far as they are 
ethnic conflicts. However, the feature that distinguishes them from the armed 
clashes before 1989 emerges again at the level of the outcomes.  
 
In comparison to the conflicts from the earlier decades, those of the 1990s were a 
direct result of global developments and on their turn had a specific impact on 
international relations and politics. The transformation of the established 
international status-quo and the agenda for aiding the process of democratisation 
and compensating for past injustice created incentives for political entrepreneurs 
that they can take an advantage of the situation. The lack of suppressive 
institutions enabled community leaders to mobilise supporters, activating ethnic 
identities and openly to put their claims with estimated better chances for success. 
The data from the quantitative studies reveal that proportionally the ethnic 
conflicts that started after 1989 were more successful in achieving their identified 
goals, than those of the pre-1989 period. The other aspect that makes the Post-
Cold War conflicts different is their impact on the international politics and 
agenda. Apart from becoming international concerns and engagement, they 
influenced the development of human rights platforms, minority rights issues as 
well as issues of sovereignty and concepts of domestic/international affairs.  
 
Although recognising the negative effects that such ‘local’ wars can have on 
global developments, the international community still needs to pay attention to 
the specific consequences of ethnic conflicts (and of identity politics in general). 
When non-negotiable differences become associated with political cleavages, and 
lines of separation deepen during armed conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes must not ignore the social capital restoration issues. If conditions do 
not allow the immediate implementation of initiatives and practices, relevant 
policies need to provisioned and enabled as early in the reconstruction process as 
possible. The next section of the research will focus upon this problem.   
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Two interrelated aspects enable the understanding of post-conflict reconstruction 
as a concept and practice. The first one is the ‘ideologically’ charged agenda50 
justifying the undertakings in general, and second, the ‘imported’ and sometimes 
‘imposed’ character of the reconstruction goals and programmes. Following the 
conviction that un- and underdeveloped non-democratic societies are prone to 
conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction practice addresses democracy and 
development as factors for achieving sustainable peace. This is the first element 
binding the numerous activities within the frameworks of the concept. The second 
element stems from the conviction that a society emerging from a violent conflict 
lacks capacity and resources to move forward in the direction of (re)establishing 
stable and sustainable political, economic, and social environment. Achieving 
peace, democracy, and development is hence impossible without external 
assistance and financial aid. The question whether these values and practices are 
appropriate for implementation in a specific post-conflict environment, 
unfortunately often becomes undermined. Before examining these two aspects 
that could provide a better understanding of post-conflict reconstruction concept 
and practice, a general framework of the notion will be provided below. 
 
 
1. FRAMING THE CONCEPT 
1.1. When does a post-conflict reconstruction take place? 
 
According to political scientists and practitioners, it is very difficult not only to 
draw the threshold between conflict and post-conflict, but also to identify with 
certainty the end of the period (WB 1998). While peace agreements or elections 
can be regarded as conflict closure points, they are not always markers for the 
commencing of a post-conflict phase. The cessation of fire in fact indicates the 
beginning of a period of transition, during which peace needs to be consolidated 
within the frameworks of the recovery process.51 As suggested in the literature, a 
post-conflict period starts with the signing of a formal peace agreement; and ends 
with the ‘normalisation of life’ (AUSA/CSIS 2002) within the conflict region. The 
                                                 
50 The concept of ‘ideology’ here is used to emphasise the strong and undisputable convictions that 
underlie the concept of post-conflict reconstruction and that determine and justify its goals, 
approaches, and practices.   
51 Despite the explicitly defined post-conflict objective of ‘supporting the transition to peace and 
the resumption of economic and social development’ (WB-OED 1998:9), it also appears 
complicated to distinguish between these operations and the ‘normal’ activities of some 
international actors. The World Bank post-conflict projects for example are usually developed 
within the frameworks of poverty alleviation programmes, public sector management, or 
decentralisation (WB-OED 1998) 
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research adopts this framework as delineating the boundaries of the period of 
post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
Although implying that violent struggles have stopped at a certain moment in 
time, the cessation of fire is not an indicator that conflict has come to an end. 
Restraining physical violence does not resolve problems or address the causes that 
have led to the armed clash. Hence, a post-conflict environment is prone to 
relapse into conflict. The effective prevention of reoccurrence of violence is hence 
also an important task during the transition to the normalisation period.  
 
The emphasis on formal peace agreements implies that the establishment of peace 
requires an official document between the conflicting parties in order to certify the 
end of war and to legitimise all subsequent actions. It is obvious that an official 
peace agreement could not change the conflict environment overnight, not it can 
solve or erase existing problems and tensions. Hence, a peace agreement marks 
the official end of the centrally controlled violence and the readiness of the 
opposing parties to open a new page in their relationships and to address the 
existing problems by non-violent means. This general picture however describes 
mainly the attitudes and the actions taken by the elites. The implementation of the 
peace accords all over the region of the conflict takes time and focused efforts; 
sporadic instances of violence can are quite likely to occur.  
 
According to the definition introduced above, a post-conflict period ends with a 
normalisation of life. This implies that (1) there would be no need for 
extraordinary outside intervention; (2) that governance and economic activity 
would largely function on a self-determinate and self-sustaining basis; and (3) that 
accepted norms of behaviour would regulate external relations (AUSA/CSIS 
2002). Introducing the idea of resolving a conflict situation by achieving and 
successfully implementing standards of normal living, the concept challenges 
theorists and policy makers, because it does not define these standards52. The 
World Bank experts recognise that rebuilding socio-economic frameworks of a 
war-affected country does not necessarily mean restoring the particular conditions 
that existed before the onset of the conflict. This might not be possible or 
desirable (WB-OED 1998:5). 
 
1.2. What does a post-conflict reconstruction aim at? 
 
Most of the agents of reconstruction, representing developed Western economies 
and democracies, connect peace with the fundamental values of their own cultures 
and its implementation – with their home policies. This explains why already 
                                                 
52 The concept of normalisation is rather sensitive area for theorists and policy makers, because of 
its relative character. ‘Normalisation’ might imply restoration of pre-war structures and practices, 
or construction of a new environment. The type of experienced conflict should be taken into 
consideration as a factor for identification of the most suitable reconstruction strategy and policies; 
in practice, it is most likely that a set of uniform procedures is implemented. Certainly a number of 
challenging questions emerges here. For example: is it possible that the ‘Western package’ create a 
normal environment in a country with no civil society or self-governing practices and where 
culture does not accept human equality? Is it appropriate to introduce market economy in a society 
where exchange systems are still in place? Is success feasible if post-conflict reconstruction is 
based on principles, contradictory to local norms and practices? 
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established patterns are widely applied for introducing lasting peace, stability, and 
development. Nevertheless, by no means the concept of normalisation of life (if 
accepted for an end of the reconstruction process) implies that values of 
democracy or human rights should be installed during a post-conflict 
reconstruction period.  
 
Standards of normal living differ. In the light of post-conflict efforts, these might 
be interpreted as ‘restoration of pre-war structures and practices’, ‘establishment 
of new arrangements with respect to the specific local conditions’, or ‘creation of 
a completely new environment’. The character of the experienced conflict and its 
consequences would determine the most relevant strategy. The practice however 
reveals that the ‘Western package’ (democracy, market economy, secularisation 
and human rights) is largely applied with the expectation that it will start 
functioning once introduced. Logically, this raises a provocative question. If some 
or all of these values are foreign to the society emerging from conflict, shall the 
process be called ‘reconstruction’, in terms of rehabilitation of the previously 
existing norms and practices? Or shall it be regarded as ‘(re-) construction’, in the 
sense of construction of a new way of living, new standards and structures to 
replace the old ones that have suffered or been destroyed by the conflict? 
 
As it was pointed out earlier, the idea of normalisation of life after a conflict is 
hence challenged by the lack of universal values to lean upon. At the same time, 
the process of globalisation closely linked with the technical progress has enabled 
the spread of ideas creating eventually a set of more or less ‘common principles’, 
such as the conviction that democracy and development are fundamental 
prerequisites for enabling lasting peace and stability. As a transition from the 
chaos of war to peaceful living structured and regulated by law and order, post-
conflict reconstruction has its imminent goal in assisting the war-affected 
countries in the restoration of a functioning state and society, of the physical 
infrastructure, institutions, and human capital. (AUSA/CSIS 2002:2). The longer-
term goal of the process is to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace and to 
create the enabling conditions to support the political, economic, and social 
development of a given region (WB-OED, 1998:5, CFR 2001, Bailey 2007).  
 
Enabling faster and successful rebuilding of the socio-economic frameworks and 
the physical capital of a war-affected society does not imply that previously 
existing structures, which in many cases had contributed to the outburst of 
conflict, are to be restored. Reconstruction therefore should be regarded as ‘re-
construction’ of conditions that enable the existence of a functioning society and 
economy within the frameworks of liberal53  peacetime governance and rule of 
law. Facilitating the transition from war to a sustainable peace, rebuilding 
economy and restoring state-society relations at all levels is the platform that 
serves not only the international peace-making and peace-keeping operations, but 
also the involvement of development organisations, national and international 
agencies and governments54 (WB 2003:24-25).  
                                                 
53 Understood as ‘non repressive’. 
54 These objectives, as discussed in a World Bank experts meeting, require that assistance is 
focused not only on support for macroeconomic stabilisation, for rebuilding viable financial 
institutions and appropriate legal frameworks, and for reconstruction of urgent transportation and 
communication infrastructure but also on measures to address conflict-related social 
transformations (displacement, vulnerable groups). War-affected changes in traditional social 
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Although recognised on a policy level as crucial for the success of a 
reconstruction process, the practice is still far from addressing all the needs by 
simultaneously and successfully implementing such a comprehensive package of 
assistance. The great variety of levels and areas demanding attention poses 
another requirement before the post-conflict reconstruction – the establishment of 
an analytical and practical tool assessing donor capacities and local post-conflict 
needs, which will contribute to more focused interventions based on specific 
political mandate and strategic choices to support particular processes of peaceful 
change (de Zeeuw 2001a and 2001b, WB 1998).   
 
1.3. Who is involved in a post-conflict reconstruction? 
  
Post-conflict reconstruction agents are easily distinguished along the line of local-
to-external (international). Two other categories can clarify the role of the 
different actors in the process.  
 
The first one – the subjects of reconstruction – embraces the actors playing a 
major role in the planning, implementation and co-ordination of the reconstruction 
programmes and activities. As the practice reveals, these agents are predominantly 
(but not exclusively) external to the conflict55 and the respective conflict-affected 
political units and structures. These agents are not individuals but political bodies 
representing countries, national and international organisations. The literature 
usually refers to them with the term the international community.  
 
The role of the international actors and the international response to conflict 
situations in general can be considered within four fields of activity that to a 
certain extent are projections of the post-conflict phases (WB 1998:20). The key 
political-diplomatic actors of peace negotiations and conflict resolutions are the 
governments as a part of multilateral alliances and forums such as the United 
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the EU, and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These are the most 
active structures within the frameworks of the second area of security and peace-
keeping operations. In the field of the provision of necessities during or after a 
violent conflict, the major contributors are donor states and organisations through 
agents such as the UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the World Food Programme 
(WFP), local or international NGOs. 
 
The interest of the present research is focused mainly in this direction - the 
support for reconstruction and development offered by the external actors. Among 
the promoted activities are rebuilding of economic and physical infrastructures, 
strengthening institutional capacity, and providing a basis for sustainable 
development. The main providers on the international scale are the European 
                                                                                                                                     
safety nets and in family structures have a major impact on economic recovery. Supporting the 
civil society institutions and the private sector is hence essential so that commercial and productive 
activities can resume (WB 2003:24-25).  
55 ‘External agents’ here implies players, who are not involved as a side at the conflict outburst. 
Their eventual involvement in the conflict could occur at a later stage in the format of the peace 
missions. 
 73
Union (EU), the UN agencies such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), donor states, NGOs, and international financial institutions, 
as regional development banks, the World Bank, and the IMF (WB 1998:19-20). 
  
Having the capacities and motivation to undertake certain actions in order to bring 
and to maintain peace within the war-prone regions the reconstruction bodies 
often leave local actors out of the process. Despite the recognition that external 
agents should support and not directly implement changes (WB 1998), local 
actors are rarely treated as partners in the process of restoration of normal 
conditions of living and quite often as ‘objects’ of reconstruction (Kartas 2007, 
Englebert & Tull 2008, Muggah 2009). 
 
As it is already clear, the second type of post-conflict reconstruction actors are the 
‘objects’ of the reconstruction efforts. While under the first category there might 
be both foreign and local actors present, the second category embraces solely the 
conflict-affected community. Often ignored as partners in the implementation of 
the programmes at local level (Forman & Patrick 2000:56), local actors are 
constrained to follow policies imposed by foreign institutions and organisations 
even without a widely achieved consent. This passive participation in the 
reconstruction process subordinates internal agents to external agendas 
(Mckechnie 2003:2, Barakat 2005:20). 
 
An approach that does not involve the members of the war-affected community 
and does not allow them to participate in the decision-making processes can 
hardly be successful. It would rather provoke mass discontent, hostile attitudes 
towards the foreign intervention in the internal affairs and resistance to any of the 
undertakings. Without support from the active structures of the local community 
and their elites, it is quite likely that the reconstruction process would be 
obstructed, slowed down, and possibly fail56.  
 
In terms of key parties involved, the post-conflict reconstruction appears a space 
for joint and synchronised efforts of both local and external actors. Although 
recognised as a requirement for any successful war-peace transition, this co-
operation is still a goal to be achieved in order to combine the reconstruction 
capacities and experience with the channels and mechanisms for their 
implementation (WB-OED 1998, Barakat 2005:8) 
 
1.4. Which areas does post-conflict reconstruction address?  
 
The burgeoning number of reconstruction agents with the range and scope of their 
interests, has established post-conflict reconstruction practice as a wide field of 
programmes and actions. As von Meijenfeldt reveals (2001), a peace-building 
agenda has four clusters of components: 1) security; 2) social cohesion; 3) 
governance (democracy level, legal and institutional framework and corruption); 
                                                 
56 The recognition that local leaders could be more successful in influencing society and promoting 
desired policies and programmes many of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, have incited the 
international community to direct efforts towards attracting and engaging the local elites in 
developmental programmes and  democratic values. However, in certain cases – as for example 
with a post-ethnic-conflict situation – working solely with leaders could not enable the 
achievement of expected positive results. 
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and 4) economic performance. The Comprehensive Development Framework of 
the World Bank divides the elements along the lines of: 1) structural/institutional; 
2) social/human; 3) physical/rural/urban; and 4) macro-economic/financial (von 
Meijenfeldt 2001).  
 
The peace-building activities of the UN entities57 cover also four sectors. These 
are 1) security (military, police and mine actions assistance); 2) governance and 
democratisation (assistance to the political and civil affairs, administration, public 
information, judiciary and rule of law, promotion and protection of human rights); 
3) humanitarian assistance (to refugees and internally displaces persons, to 
vulnerable groups; gender mainstreaming); and 4) recovery, development and 
sustainable peace (UN DPKO 2003). Among the most active agencies in the post-
conflict reconstruction activities, the World Bank58 gets involved in post-conflict 
situations as soon as minimum-security conditions and a credible political 
authority have been established (WB-OED 1998; UN DPKO 2003:183-184). 
Aiming at breaking the cycle of conflict and help countries resume development, 
the Bank supports the establishment of security, good governance, economic 
recovery, and social stability (illustrated by the figure below (WB 1998:25-27). 
These examples demonstrate that post-conflict reconstruction assistance ranges 
from economic reconstruction to livelihoods support59. Constituting different 
aspects of the ‘normal’ environment, these sectors are interrelated and require 
long-term commitment form both internal and external actors (de Zeeuw 
2001a:5).  
 
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework (AUSA/CSIS 2002) presents 
an attempt for classification of different reconstruction practices (among them 
those of Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and Sri Lanka) and for building up a model for 
assessing reconstruction efforts, analysing upcoming needs, challenges, and 
opportunities. Table 3 presents a summary of the model, indicating the pillars and 
the key areas of post-conflict reconstruction; a detailed breakdown of the 






                                                 
57 Among the UN entities that often work closely with peacekeepers are: the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
58 As a UN specialised agency, the World Bank is made up of 184 member countries. The name 
‘World Bank’ has come to be used for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). 
59 Applying the ‘capital’-terminology, we would be discussing the rebuilding of  
• natural capital: natural resources of the emerging form conflict state or region 
•  physical capital: infrastructure, transport, telecommunications, housing recovery 
• economic capital: fiscal, industry, agriculture, energy, environment 
• institutional capital: governance, democratisation 
• human capital: health, education, social services, vulnerable groups  
• social capital: institutions of governance and trust, civil society participation, 
reconciliation (OED 1998, WB 1998). 
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Figure 6: Cycle of Post-Conflict Reconstruction 






Table 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction 





Control of Belligerents, Territorial Security, Protection of Population, 
Protection of Key Individuals, Infrastructure, and Institutions, Local 




Transitional Justice, Law Enforcement, Judicial System, Laws, 
Human Rights, Corrections, International Courts and Tribunals; Truth 
Commissions, Community Rebuilding, Individual Healing and 
Empowerment 
Social and Economic 
Well being 
 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Food Security, Public 
Health, Shelter, Educational System, Social Safety Net, Economic 
Strategy and Assistance, Physical Infrastructure, Employment 
Generation, Markets, Legal and Regulatory Reform, International 




National Constituting Processes, Transitional Governance, Executive 
Authority, Legislative Strengthening, Local Governance, 





The four independent, yet mutually reinforcing pillars play a crucial role in 
supporting and consolidating peace. It is not only that the absence or deterioration 
of any of them might threaten and put under risk the entire peace process. Also of 
critical importance for achieving the targeted stabilisation is that the issues related 
to the different pillars are addressed simultaneously by the reconstruction 
programmes and projects. The highly idiosyncratic nature of conflicts challenges 
the feasibility of a general post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Nevertheless, 
although there could hardly be a universal formula devised, the identification of 
appropriate post-conflict policies is necessary on the way towards a sustainable 
peace and development within war-affected regions (Collier 2000:2).  
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1.5. What mechanisms does post-conflict reconstruction use? 
 
Presenting programmes and their implementation, the literature on post-conflict 
reconstruction focuses predominantly on particular peace missions and practices. 
The critical perspective towards concepts, principles, strategies, and activities is 
still undeveloped (Hay 2001). A systematic normative theory of post-conflict 
reconstruction is still missing (Gheciu 2009).  
 
The theoretical model of the reconstruction practice - the Task Framework 
(AUSA/CSIS 2002) - provides a good basis for analysing the mechanisms used by 
international actors. It classifies the mechanisms not only under the four pillars 
and the respective target areas and sectors, but also with respect to the post-
conflict reconstruction stage: initial response, transformation, and fostering 
sustainability. Without going into details about the mechanisms used at the three 
different stages, it is important to outline the character of the planned and 
undertaken tasks for each one of them. As we can see from the table below, 
presenting the main pillar-goals for each stage, the first phase is one of assessing 
the situation and the respective needs, of planning and laying the foundations for 
further actions. During the Initial Response stage, the mechanisms used aim at the 
establishment of frameworks, rules and procedures, as well as of the necessary 
institutions for carrying out the activities planned.  
 
Table 4: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Stages and Respective Goals 
 (Task Framework, AUSA/CSIS 2002) 
 
 Initial Response  Transformation Fostering 
Sustainability 
Security Establish a safe and 
secure environment  
Develop legitimate and 






for addressing past and 
ongoing grievances 
Build legal system and 
process for reconciliation 
Functioning legal 
system based on 
international norms 
 
Social &  
Economic 
Well-being 
Provide for emergency 
humanitarian needs 








structure and establish 
foundation for citizen 
participation 
Promote legitimate 







In the second stage, identified in the Task framework as Transformation, all the 
identified mechanisms are put into work (or at least it is envisaged so). The 
reconstruction process moves from the emergency relief towards building up the 
basis for a future sustainable development with the launching of the designed 
projects and programmes. The success of their implementation, as well as of the 
Transformation in general, depend not only on the provided financial and 
technical assistance, training and organisational management, but also on the 
motivated involvement and active participation of the local actors in the process. 
  
The final stage of the complex post-conflict reconstruction process is the one 
which engages mechanisms to enable a smooth and consistent transfer of powers 
to the local actors in all sectors. To foster sustainability, the efforts here are not 
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aimed at introducing new policies or structures, but at expanding those already 
established. The financial and technical assistance during this stage addresses 
predominantly the strengthening of local capacities, better performance and 
modernisation of structures and institutions. Approaching normalisation, the best-
designed mechanisms of post-conflict reconstruction naturally phase out.  
 
Apart from the above-mentioned mechanisms, the establishment of institutions 
with a special mandate is an alternative method that the international community 
applies to ensure the promotion and implementation of particular values and 
policies. Among the examples of such institutions are: the Office of the High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR), the UN, NATO and EU peace-
keeping missions, the EU Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
After framing the concept of post-conflict reconstruction by looking at its 
structural elements, it is important to address its conceptual platform, which will 
provide theoretical grounds for a critical analysis of the practice. This section will 
start with a historic overview to show how the idea of post-conflict reconstruction 
emerged and developed.  
 
 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT  
2.1. Historic overview 
 
Looking at the history of the concept, as presented by David Ekbladh (2003), 
reconstruction as a political, social and economic process, has been around at least 
since the mid-nineteenth century. During the period following the US civil war 
there were (rather unsuccessful) attempts to integrate African-Americans into the 
political system and to promote economic development. In the early 20th century, 
the application of reform ideas aiming at the transformation of inefficient social, 
political, and economic relationships, introduced a new meaning to the term, 
describing the diverse efforts to effect change within societies.  
 
Following World War I, ‘reconstruction’ maintained this developmental aspect 
but it was also employed to describe the necessity of re-shaping Central Europe 
into smaller and viable states in accordance to the new realities. During the 1930s, 
the international debate on the future of China introduced another aspect to the 
notion denoting a general building up on modern economic lines (Hubbard 1930 
in Ekbladh 2003). Referring to the reconstruction of a state’s viability, the term 
became connected more closely with the idea of broad transformation, expanding 
beyond the simple economic ‘recovery’ of any old methods of governance and 
organisation.  
 
The unprecedented destruction brought by World War 2, provided unparalleled 
opportunities to engage the enormous levels of immediate relief into a ‘project’ 
for society transformation. Initially envisaged as engines to foster development, 
structures like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) 
evolved beyond the immediate recovery of war damages to long-term 
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modernisation projects. This also contributed to the conceptual shift of the term 
towards the meaning of general economic, social, and political development. 
(Belshaw 1947 in Ekbladh 2003)  
 
Ekbladh discusses further that during the Cold War ‘modernisation’ aimed at 
demonstrating the supremacy of the Powers’ social systems to poorer nations and 
thus reconstruction preserved its developmental content. The focus was put on the 
well-being of people that was to be achieved through aid and support after 
intervention and war. The reconstruction plans of these years clearly indicate that 
development aid was bound to intervention and armed conflicts. These were not 
exactly humanitarian or recovery operations, nor simply development 
programmes. The aid offered to enhance the capacities of societies was used not 
only for creating stable (anti-communist) states, but also to justify military and 
political interventions both locally and internationally, especially during the 
period of ideological confrontation (Ekbladh 2003). 
 
Reconstruction since the end of the Cold War preserved its role as an important 
part of the Western involvement in the local affairs worldwide. Considering the 
range of examples from the last decades, in all of the cases (from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq) the reconstruction plans clearly 
implied altering conditions and extending capacities beyond those that existed 
before the conflict (Byrd 2002 in Ekbladh 2003). The engagement with damage 
recovery has become a good opportunity for donors to design and lay down 
foundations of new economic, social, and political relations. 
 
Many factors established post-conflict reconstruction as a tool of contemporary 
international politics. Although presented briefly, it becomes obvious that the 
development of the concept reflects the historical dynamics. The first significant 
shift in the model reflects the complex situation that the world faced with the end 
of the War in 1945. The global spread of the conflict, the scale of devastation 
even in the most ‘isolated’ places, and the power rivalry between former allies, 
had direct effects on international politics, structures, and processes. Assessing 
and evaluating the reasons for the war and the possible ways for preventing a 
reoccurrence of such, the goal of the post-war U.S. planners like John Maynard 
Keynes and Harry Dexter White was to design an economic system that would 
ensure peace60. The Soviet Union however countered as a direct power challenge 
the attempts for overcoming consequences and preventing re-emergence of the 
pre-war conditions by introducing liberal standards and development models. 
Communism and its institutions became perceived as the other threat to peace. 
Fears that popular discontent, group oppression, and mass poverty would provide 
good grounds for the spread of communist ideology made theories of economic 
development very influential with the designated role of enabling conflict 
prevention (Lipschutz 1998:46, Huntington 1996) 
 
The goal of achieving normalisation of life by introducing stable and sustainable 
economic and social conditions entered the area of politics in the form of 
                                                 
60 Based upon gradual lowering of tariff barriers to trade, convertibility of major currencies, the 
free flow of capital (but not labour); an international division of labour based on comparative 
advantage, the Bretton-Woods system was envisaged to prevent the re-emergence of pre-war 
conditions. This on its turn resulted enabled countries controlling currency, capital, and technology 
to obtain more advantaged positions than others (Lipschutz 1998). 
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‘containment of communism’ policies. In this respect, the Marshall plan is the 
first reconstruction programme that openly defined not only economic 
development as a tool for preventing new armed conflicts, but also democracy and 
liberalism as preconditions for success and a model for ‘adjusting’ the value 
systems of societies. With the Marshall plan, post-conflict reconstruction became 
viewed as a ‘moral obligation’ of the advanced countries to the rest of the world. 
It also acquired two clearly defined but interconnected areas of activities – the 
practical rebuilding of physical, economic, and institutional infrastructure and the 
(moral) engagement with directing the socio-political development of the post-
conflict country in the ‘right’ way.  
 
The second event with a direct impact on the transformation of not only 
perceptions and understandings was the end of the Cold War. The collapse of 
communism was a triumph of democracy and liberalism over the rival political 
and economic system. The fall of the Iron Curtain opened the ideologically 
stagnated borders and enabled the re-union of the bipolar world. Unfortunately, 
the removal of the nuclear deterrent created new conditions61, which led to a 
revival of old ethnic and cultural antagonisms and conflicts (Mearsheimer 1990, 
Huntington 1996). 
 
After the collapse of the bipolar model, the growing interdependence between 
places and processes62 deepened the perception of the world as a single place, 
where local problems, socio-political or economic instability, and eventually 
conflicts, could easily spread beyond national or regional borders. Under these 
circumstances, the prevention of negative developments entered the international 
agenda and legitimised intervention in politically and economically unstable 
zones, regardless of whether these were sovereign states.  
 
This new context logically shifted the post-conflict reconstruction concept and 
practice. Remaining closely connected with the peace-development paradigm, the 
‘moral obligation’ became more or less a moral imperative. Supported by the 
conviction that a strong economic recovery is not viable in a fragile peace, nor a 
strong peace can be built on the basis of a fragile economy (OED 1998), post-
conflict reconstruction became acknowledged as an important mechanism for 
conflict prevention. Thus, it became legitimate grounds for intervention in the 
local affairs aiming not only at assisting the war-recovery processes but also at 
redesigning and of re-making of societies. 
 
2.2. Peace – Development – Democracy paradigm 
 
Reflecting on historical developments, the ‘ideological’ charge of the concept of 
post-conflict reconstruction developed upon the conviction that peace is not 
                                                 
61 In 2004, an international survey presented at the World Economic Forum, revealed that people 
today feel ‘unsafe, powerless and gloomy’, fearing that the next generation would live in a world 
even less prosperous and safe, and more internationally insecure. In the 1920s and 1930s these 
same conditions bred civil and international conflicts, culminating thereafter in the Second World 
War! (Panić 2005:3). 
62 The establishment of a global economic system and the intensification of the interconnectedness 
among processes in different spheres of life are often viewed as the ultimate extension of the 
Bretton-Woods project (Lipschutz 1998). 
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possible without development and democracy. This, in its turn, is projected in the 
reconstruction practices and the various programmes implemented by the 
international community worldwide.  
 
On a theoretical level, the phenomenon can be viewed as ‘implementation of the 
peace-development-democracy paradigm’. Therefore, these two aspects – the 
underlying paradigm and its implementation – will be expanded in some more 
details below, opening a discussion for their role in the achieving the goals of 
post-conflict reconstruction of peace, stability and general ‘normalisation of life’. 
 
2.2.1. Development  
 
The core idea of the UN Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1995) that rapid 
economic growth and poverty reduction can contain and eliminate conflict, w  
acknowledged as early as 1880s when, under Bismarck, the foundations of the 
modern welfare state were laid (Panić 2005:21). Subsequently, the professed 
civilising mission of nineteenth and early twentieth century colonialism 
transformed it into delivering of ‘aid’ (Barbanti 2004). A particular role for the 
incorporation of the developmental ideas of the Western civilisation63 into the 
post-conflict reconstruction ‘project’, was played by the Inaugural Address of 
President Truman (January 1949). It established the link between democracy, 
material prosperity and the development of industrial and scientific techniques 
and expanded assumption that faster and successful development is achievable 
through a controlled change64. Apart from the Marshal Plan, a direct 
implementation of these ideas in practice was the foundation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, whose primary goal was to prevent 
another European war.65 The wave of conflicts in Europe that occurred after the 
collapse of the communist system emphasised once again the need for tools and 
mechanisms able to manage conflicts peacefully and to treat their consequences66 
(OECD 1997).  
                                                 
63 In fact, there is no ‘universal’ developmental idea. Within the European tradition, there are three 
different concepts: 1/ development as growth understood mathematically (through Locke - taking 
the Biblical injunction ‘increase and multiply’; in this context poverty is seen as a consequence of 
one’s failure to be ‘industrious and rational’); 2/ development as growth understood biologically 
(through Kant, Herder, Hegel, setting a grid against which advancement and correlatively 
backwardness can be measured (the theories promoting the West as the standard have been 
discredited now); 3/ development as a projector task to be fulfilled (as a policy to be adopted – 
such as government initiatives in Australia to encourage settlement, for example) (Bernasconi 
1997:196) 
64 Delivering aid could hardly be seen as purely technical matter. The U.S. provision of aid during 
the Cold War was largely directed to countries that were, or could come, under Soviet influence 
(Barbanti 2004). The change of the political concerns after the end of the Cold War resulted in 
redefining the criteria for selection of recipients of developmental/reconstruction aid.  
65 Signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the Treaty 
of Paris (1951) was intended to engage former enemies in a shared production and to achieve not 
only economic revitalisation of post-war Europe, but also an economic community that will unite 
peoples and bring together interests over historic rivalries (Treaty of Paris 1951)  
66 In 2001, development policy and co-operation programmes were officially acknowledged as 
especially powerful in this respect. Among these programs are the EC Communication on Conflict 
Prevention (2001a), the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European Council in 
December 2003, and the European Consensus on Development adopted by the Council, the 
European Parliament, and the Commission in November 2005. 
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According to the development agenda, economic stability can contribute greatly 
to peace alongside politics and diplomacy67. According to Dean Babst (1993), 
economic interdependence can be a force for peace, because it creates long-term 
and large-scale trade commitments68. Supportive to this is the example that 
representatives of fighting ethnic and religious groups in various parts of the 
world manage to live together in more economically developed areas as North 
America, Western Europe, Australia, while most of the wars in the 20th century 
occurred in developing countries where population suffered poverty and economic 
depression. Therefore, internal conflicts (civil wars) are not only a core 
developmental issue bit also a failure of development, which requires viable 
international measures to reduce their global incidence (Collier et al. 2003). When 
on the other hand, development succeeds, countries become safer. A rebuilt 
economy creates prosperity and employment for the population and so aids 
progress towards a viable political and security agreement (Balls and Cunliffe 
2006).  
 
In the dawn of the international developmental policies, it was believed that the 
methods and techniques of solving problems and delivering services would prove 
as successful in the developing nations as they were in the economically advanced 
countries. The direct transferability model of Western values onto non-Western 
cultures framed developmental assistance. Organisations such as the World Bank, 
and USAID not only promoted a dependent path to development, but also ignored 
the problems of power imbalances they created (Barbanti 2004; Rondinelli 
1987:23). Economic decline and extreme poverty may reinforce conflict 
tendencies, but economic growth alone cannot prevent violent outbursts. The 
critics of the development ideas point to the fact that economic growth and 
foreign aid failed to bring the expected lasting peace and prosperity, as it was 
believed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Neither had it brought political stability 
(Bernasconi 1997:194). It has become apparent that economic growth increases 
inequality within societies and hence functions as a destabilising factor69. 
 
                                                 
67 The concept of ‘development’ cuts across many levels. It refers not only to macro issues (as 
patterns of a nation's growth), to but also to meso- and micro problems (such as river-basin plans 
or local community development). The three interwoven levels and the dimensions at them – 
economic, cultural, religious, and gender have a direct impact on development and in the same 
time are affected by it (Barbanti 2004). The assumption that economic development is 
accompanied by social, political, and even moral progress brought about the understanding that 
social development serves both as a precondition and as a moral justification for economic growth 
(Wilkinson 1996:216).  
68 ‘Sound economic development and strong trade relations can prove powerful ingredients of 
stability and antidotes to conflict. If the stability of your economy and the well-being of your 
population depend on trading with your neighbour, you will think twice about going to war with 
them’ Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon (CNIS 2004) 
69 Another popular conception during the 1960s was that foreign aid directed to development was 
necessary for peace (developed in 1967 by William Gaud, the Administrator of the Agency for 
International Development in the United States in a lecture ‘The U.S. Foreign Aid Programme’). 
The growing unemployment and inequality, as well as the absolute poverty in the Third World, 
outlined the need for targeting basic human needs rather than economic growth. ‘Resource 
shortage, environmental destruction, rising protectionism in the industrial world, militarism in the 
Third World, the international arms race, and the structure of the world economy all made the 
design of development strategies a complex problem in political economy rather than a simple 
technical economic issue’ (Wilber 1994:135).  
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Changing access to resources or control over existing political, economic, and 
social systems, creating or exacerbating socio-economic tensions, a development 
project may reduce, create, or intensify violent conflicts (Shore 1998). Imposed 
forms and pace of development can be rather destructive. Destabilising might also 
imposition of alien values on a culture, regardless of the merit of those values 
(Bernasconi 1997:188). In the ‘North-South: A Programme for Survival’, Willy 
Brandt argued against the uniform application of the Western-style development 
model (Brandt 1980). He rejected the conception of progress as simply following 
the economic path set by the more advanced countries70. If deployed in disregard 
of the overall political situation in developing countries, development assistance 
may have rather unwanted and negative effects (European Council 1998). 
Furthermore, critics of current development theory (Crush 1995, Escobar 1995) 
discuss development as a set of managerial prescriptions, through which 
industrialised nations have not only fostered their models onto the aid 
beneficiaries, but also promoted and forced cultural changes (Barbanti 2004).  
 
Developmental thinking and practice have evolved throughout the years to 
recognise that they are means for achieving better and more equitable living 
conditions. Sustainable economic development nowadays appears as an aspect of 
the structural stability that should be enabled in countries at risk71. Structural 
factors can affect development and conflict in society because they have an 
impact both on macro- and on micro-level72. A reflection of these views and an 
appreciation of their importance is the UN Millennium Development Goals 
platform (UN MDG). The document defines development as an interdisciplinary 
field, implementing programmes in various areas and dealing with innumerable 
and highly intertwined variables – such as economic, social, political, gender, 
cultural, religious, and environmental issues. 
 
Since the early 1990s reconstruction has become a subspecialty within the broader 
development agenda (Colletta et al. 1998:3, IDRC 2004), merging the short-term 
responsiveness of an emergency operation with the longer-term development 
schemes (WB 2003:14, Colletta et al. 1998:4). Facilitating the re-establishment of 
functioning institutions, minimum level of security, basic infrastructure and living 
standards, post conflict reconstruction has been recognised as a critical step in the 
continuum between humanitarian relief and longer-term development support73 
(Colletta & Cullen 2000:119, Figure 2). This hybrid field, combining conflict 
                                                 
70 The assumptions that economic progress will in some way secure social and moral progress, and 
thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy, is a result of deeply-seated 
assumptions resisting empirical refutation (Bernasconi 1997:188). Such ideas were formulated in 
Europe in 18th and 19th century history idea (Bernasconi 1997:185). 
71 Structural stability requires a long-term and integrated approach to all of its components such as 
democracy, respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy environmental and social 
conditions (European Council 1998) 
72 The illiteracy of population, fragility of educational system, long-standing social inequities 
maintained by the elites, as well as strong patron-client relationships are among the structural 
factors that can have a direct impact on conflict management (e.g. on the attempts of empowering 
powerless groups, communicating a very basic information, or impeding the rational conflict 
resolution approaches) 
73 In 2001, the UN Security Council statement introduced ‘peace-building’ as an umbrella term for 
the comprehensive efforts ‘aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of 
armed conflict and, therefore [encompassing] a wide range of political, developmental, 
humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms’ (UNSC 2001).  
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prevention, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and traditional 
development, is a new form of developmental aid, which challenges the 
traditional boundaries. It is neither sustainable development mechanism, nor a 
humanitarian response (Mark Malloch Brown, Vice President of External Affairs, 




Apart from being directly connected to the idea of Western-style development, the 
concept and practice of post-conflict reconstruction also imply transformation of 
conflict affected societies74. In the words of the former US President Bill Clinton 
(1994), Western-style democracy is the best strategy to ensure security and to 
build a durable peace. 
 
In the 1970s, the recognition that economic growth could not automatically bring 
social stability shifted the focus towards the possibilities and prospects of 
democracy as a precondition for achieving a lasting peace. The interest was 
provoked not only by the conviction that democracy was a powerful mechanism 
in the ideological war, but also because of the evidence that democratic 
governments could successfully manage deep societal divisions75. Thus, for the 
two decades thereafter, the ‘aided’ expansion of democratic governments resulted 
in threefold increase in their number around the world (Harris & Reilly 1998:135; 
Reynolds 2002:2). Of course, this did not happen without the persistent efforts of 
the developed countries in providing of economic aid to improve both the 
economic well-being and the human rights records, sharing political and 
institutional experience, introducing non-governmental/private organisations that 
have proven to be effective in helping countries develop democratic governments 
(Babst & Eckhardt 1992). 
 
Democracy has been identified as a peace-factor as early as in the 18th century76. 
Dean Babst however is considered the first researcher to have clearly delineated 
this relationship. In his view, democracy is a peace force number one77 because 
democratic countries have proven to be less violent78 and not to fight each other 
                                                 
74 The late 18th century assumption that ‘economic progress will in some way secure social and 
moral progress, and thereby contribute to world peace and the spread of democracy’, had a direct 
impact on the post-Second World War development programmes and the establishment of the 
integration of economic and social as an axiom (Bernasconi 1997:189).  
75 This argument might appear a bit controversial, since under oppressive regimes societal 
divisions have no possibilities for expression. Nevertheless, the democracy indeed provides 
mechanisms for both articulation of such divisions and for peaceful settlement of disputes with 
regard to the protection of human rights.  
76 Yet in 1795 Immanuel Kant suggested that democracy was as a necessary condition for 
achieving perpetual peace.   
77 Other peace enabling forces identified by Babst and Eckhardt (1992) are: equitable commerce, 
worldwide communication, reducing militarism and cooperative security. Babst defines the 
concept of democracy upon four criteria: 1/ Democracy implies that the legislature controls 
finances, that there are at least two political parties, and that the decisions are made by majority 
vote; 2/ The executive branch is responsible to the legislature or directly to the citizens; 3/ The 
citizens have right to vote to the legislature, enjoy freedom of assembly and freedom of speech; 4/ 
A country must be independent of foreign rule at the outbreak of war 
78 According to the democratic peace theory, democracies rarely if ever go to war against each 
other and that they tend to have less internal violence, which is considered a structural tendency, 
 84
(Babst & Eckhardt 1992). Democracies also have the capacity to resolve disputes 
peacefully, without falling into the trap of military actions, which would 
eventually lead to outburst of conflict79. Democratic political structures on their 
turn place institutional constraints80 (Kant 1795) that create obstacles to 
manipulative leaders to mobilise resources for war without a general consent 
(Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). It also has capacities to empower economic interest 
groups that may be opposed to disruptive wars (Russett & Oneal 2001, Lagazio & 
Russett 2004, Oneal & Russett 2005)81.  
 
Since there is no uniform model of democracy82, the most important issue in the 
context of the post-conflict agenda should be the identification of the type to serve 
the particular local needs. In practice, reconstruction agents somehow omit to 
address the question about the institutional arrangements that are likely to secure 
stable and legitimate democratic government in divided or war-torn societies. The 
design of political institutions is a key factor in the process of introducing and 
consolidating democracy and achieving lasting peace and stability, but such are 
also the territorial structure of the state; the form of the state’s legislative and 
executive functions; and the nature and structure of a state’s rules of political 
representation (Harris & Reilly 1998:135).  
 
Critics of the democratic peace theory argue that it is very difficult to draw 
conclusions about the peaceful nature83 of democratic regimes because of the lack 
of sufficient statistical data (Gowa 1999; Layne 1994, Mearsheimer 1990:50). 
According to Ostrowski (2002), on the scale of peacefulness democracies have 
too many similarities with dictatorships, because both impose their will by force 
(physical or constitution), use centralised power to control vast areas of social and 
                                                                                                                                     
i.e. related to the nature of the regimes, and not an accident or coincidence (Rummel 1997b, Weart 
1998).  
79 Two approaches offer explanations, focussing respectively on the democratic norms and on the 
democratic political structures (Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). 
80 ‘[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared … 
nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, 
decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, 
having to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the devastation 
war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with a heavy national debt 
that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the 
future’ (Kant 1795) 
81 The connection between this theory, emphasising on the fact that increased trade, economic 
interdependence, and membership in intergovernmental organisations can reduce the risk of war, 
and the ideas expressed yet in Kant’s Perpetual peace (1795) has make it popular as Kantian peace 
theory. Higher economic development makes the effect of democracy stronger, while low 
economic development may hamper the establishment of liberal institutions and values 
(Mousseau, Hegre & Oneal 2003).  
82 Approached structurally, democracy is defined through elements and practices such as free 
elections, possibility to vote, parliamentary control over the executive power (Small & Singer 
1976), market, externally sovereign policies, juridical rights and representation (Doyle 1983), 
constitutional transfer of executive power (Ray 1995), freedom of speech, religion, and 
organisation; and a constitutional framework of law to guarantee equal rights (Rummel 1997b). 
Apart from the binary definitions, there are also non-binary classifications, which score each state 
on two scales (for democracy and for autocracy) and evaluate the level of democracy each regime 
has achieved (Polity IV Project 1800-2003 - Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2003)  
83 According to Layne (1994), there is no evidence that democratic powers have institutional or 
cultural constraints against war, but a pragmatic attitude for making the necessary concessions to 
avoid one.  
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economic life, actively cooperate to suppress impulses such as secession and the 
private ownership of arms. As critics of the theory argue, the empirical link 
between peace and democracy has been established based on the relations among 
democratic states (Spiro 1994). Although democracies hardly ever fight wars with 
each other, they get involved in conflicts with non-democracies84 (Newcombe 
2001, 1997) in pursuit of their domestic political goals, special interest politics or 
messianic goals85.  
 
Elaborating further his counter-arguments, Ostrowski asserts that there is evidence 
to indicate that democratic regimes, or at least the ‘immature’ ones, are unstable 
both politically and economically86; that they can provoke terrorism (especially 
when pursuing interventionist foreign policies) and enable ethnic and religious 
conflicts87 (Ostrowski 2002:25-26, Figure 11). A reason for this is the dynamics 
of the democratic process, where voting for representation can logically lead to 
providing support for candidates, who favour respective ethnic or religious group 
interests, views and values. Thus, in a case of an underrepresented minority that 
perceives itself controlled by a majority hostile to their interests, and under certain 
circumstances, members of ethnic minorities might prefer to fight wars of 
secession.  
 
Presented as the best path to peace, when ‘the organising principles of the political 
system elevate tolerance and national unity above ethnic and religious domination 
and privilege’ (Crawford 1998a:15) democracy presents an effective system for 
handling conflicts (Pirages 1976, Harris & Reilly 1998). It is an important factor 
in the peace-building process because it offers some of the fundamental pillars of 
any sustainable settlement of a violent conflict. Apart from offering effective 
means for peaceful addressing of deep-rooted differences through inclusive, just, 
and accountable social frameworks, it has capacities to enable the process of 
building specific set of institutions and behaviour patterns, and to contain the 
exercise of power within limits regulated by the rule of law88 (Kumar 1998 in de 
                                                 
84 Defining war as any armed conflict, involving one or more governments, and causing the death 
of 1,000 or more people, Babst and Eckhardt (1992) found that only 23% of the democracies 
compared with 72% of the non-democracies have been involved in foreign wars. Domestically, 
while 90% of the non-democracies had experienced internal wars or violent military coups, for the 
period 1950 - 1991 no civil war has taken place in democratic states.  
85 The messianic spirit is projected in the Woodrow Wilson words: ‘America is […] to stand for 
the assertion of the right of one nation to serve the other nations of the world’, pushed the United 
Stated not only into the World War I, but later in wars such as Viet Nam, the Gulf War, and the 
bombing of Serbia (Ostrowski 2002:40). 
86 Ostrowski gives the example with Germany that went from democracy in 1918 to dictatorship in 
1933 to launching the war of the millennium in 1939. In fact, the German democracy allowed for 
the rise of Hitler. Furthermore, a number of democracies have been overthrown by dictatorships:  
Pakistan (five times in fifty years), Spain (1936), Czechoslovakia (1948), Guatemala (1954), 
Brazil (1964), Greece (1967), the Philippines (1972), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) 
(Ostrowski 2002:37) 
87 Out of the 32 intrastate conflicts, 25 were ethnic or religious, 22 of which outburst in democratic 
setting. In certain cases, ethnic/religious subgroups, feeling that their interests were not advanced 
by the democratic government, contributed for its overthrowing (Ostrowski 2002:25-26, Figure 
11). 
88 According to the liberal idea, the construction of democratic institutions and markets, and the 
decentralisation of political and economic power, ensure legal protection and political participation 
for the individual. Evidences however suggest that there are certain factors, such as perceived 
economic inequalities or decline, break down of established patterns provoking insecurities, etc. 
that can undermine liberal political practices and lead to illiberal policies and conflicts 
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Zeeuw 2001b:19). Adhering to the ‘rule of law’ and to the protection of both the 
political actors and the wider civil society, democracy can provide all the required 
structures and mechanisms to introduce and maintain peace in a war-torn society 
as well as to manage peacefully any deep-rooted conflicts. It provides dialogue 
spaces and opportunities for collaborative work (McAfee 2008:109).  
 
When democratic practices and values become internalised in the workings of 
society, democratic governance creates conditions for its own sustenance, laying 
the political relations between people and governments based on negotiation, 
compromise, and co-operation. It is not surprising then that the international 
community considers the assistance to and the involvement with the 
democratisation process as an investment in local and international security. 
However, critics of the universal imposition of Western values emphasise that the 
international interests in promoting democracy stem from the expectations of 
economic benefits resulting from enhanced political stability (de Zeeuw 
2001b:19). 
 
Discussing the process of democratisation from the post-conflict reconstruction 
point of view, it is necessary to point out that despite a common set of programme 
parameters89, their content, practical implementation and management is country-
specific (de Zeeuw 2001b). Having in mind that intra-state violence usually 
results from weakened or collapsed structures, ensuring the appropriate 
governance institutions is crucial for the conflict reconstruction process and for 
the establishment of functioning democratic systems. Building an enduring and 
peaceful settlement requires the establishment of appropriate democratic 
institutions to suit the particular needs90 (Reilly 2001:6). Inappropriate and 
unsustainable institutional choices for deeply divided societies might lead to 
breakdown of post-conflict settlements and relapse into violence (Harris & Reilly 
1998:17); they could systematically favour or disadvantage ethnic, national and 
religious groups (Reynolds 2002:3).
 
As it becomes clear, many issues need to be addressed and many factors to be 
taken into account to achieve a functioning and sustainable democratic system in 
post-conflict settings. Capacities of the democratic structures should not be 
overestimated91. Developing the idea of John Stuart Mill that democracy could not 
                                                 
89 A programme for establishing democracy in a post-conflict settings covers the following sectors: 
1/Governance Reform, 2/Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, 3/Security Sector Reform, 
4/Post-Conflict Elections, 5/Human Rights, 6/Role of Civil Society) (de Zeeuw 2001b) 
90 To prevent a relapse into violence, rebuilding of governmental structures to guarantee rule of 
law, separation of powers, fair representation, and involvement of all groups is necessary (de 
Zeeuw 2001b:23). ‘Different types of society require different types of institutions. Federalism, for 
example, may be irrelevant to small homogenous countries but a virtual necessity for large 
heterogeneous ones. Different types of electoral systems can ensure the proportionate 
representation of minority groups or single-handedly ensure their exclusion. Parliaments and 
executives can be structured in such a way as to give all groups a share of power or to enable one 
group to dominate over all others... Appropriately crafted democratic institutions are thus crucial 
to the sustainability of any negotiated settlement’ (Harris & Reilly 1998:19) 
91 Although liberal democracy can settle down cultural conflict with institutions of inclusiveness, 
universal representation, and appropriate electoral systems, its establishment in not a panacea 
(Crawford 1998a:16). In times of transition, an illiberal democracy could provide fruitful grounds 
for the spread of ethnic and religious claims, promising power and welfare to those who feel 
powerless. Newcombe (2001) argues that contrary to the general assumptions, democracy and free 
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succeed unless its citizens share a common national identity O'Flynn (2006:32) 
argues that sometimes the problem faced by divided societies might not be the 
lack of a strong sense of common nationhood. Rather, it might be the 
impossibility to balance the need to recognise competing ethnic identities with the 
need to create an overarching civic allegiance to the state. Ethnic nationalists 
typically seek to impose their identity on the institutions of the state and not to 
build a common political identity that can be distinguished from citizens’ more 
particular cultural or ethnic affiliations (O'Flynn 2006:56). This transition from a 
narrowly defined identity component to a more inclusive one (nation-state) is one 
of the major challenges to democratic transformation in a divided society.  
 
Democracy can make people think of themselves as citizens. It can provide the 
sense of a common national identity or of a common political purpose (O'Flynn 
2006:34, 142). It however is not always capable of supporting the process of 
building overarching identities (McAfee 2008:109). As a conflict management 
system without recourse to violence, democracy does not aim at suppressing or 
overcoming existing or emerging conflicts. When democracy is ‘transplanted’ to 
post-conflict societies without adapting its structures and mechanisms according 
to the particular realities, it is likely that it would not provide the expected peace 
and stability, nor it could last as a political system92 (Harris & Reilly 1998:19). 
  
The critics against the universal application of the democratic model emphasise 
that poorly designed institutions can inflame communal conflicts rather than 
ameliorate them. In such a context, the introduction of ‘democratic’ politics can 
mobilise ethnicity, turning elections into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ conflicts. Other 
divisive democratic institutions (such as referendums for example) can also have 
negative effects in divided societies. In addition to that, some researchers fear that 
the democratic peace theory, justifying the ‘peace-bringing’ wars against non-
democracies, might provide a justification of a democratic crusade (Chan 
1997:59). 
 
Urging democracy by coercion would hardly lead to the establishing of lasting 
peace (Newcombe 2001). To ensure that the system settles and starts functioning 
according to the expectations, democratic values need to be cultivated in place. 
Achieving and introducing a stable democratic system is feasible only after in-
depth change of the political culture. Pluralism, tolerance, inclusiveness, 
negotiation, and compromise and their institutional embodiments (power sharing, 
autonomy, proportionality, forms of group recognition) are keys to building 
lasting settlements to conflicts (Harris & Reilly 1998:17). 
 
Bonded to moments of international tension and often used as a means to justify 
interventions in local wars and crises, the ultimate aim of the reconstruction 
process is the establishment of new social, political, and economic structures 
(Ekbladh 2003), effective and accountable institutions, equitable access to 
political power by all citizens, and a free flow of information (Amoako 1996). In 
                                                                                                                                     
markets confront on conceptual level: while democracy requires equality, capitalism produces 
inequality. 
92 Burundi and Cambodia are examples for the negative effects stemming from imposing 
democracy with no respect to the particular circumstances. Inappropriate and unsustainable 
institutional choices for deeply divided societies can lead to conflict re-escalation and break down 
of the post-conflict settlements (e.g. Angola 1991-1992), (Harris & Reilly 1998:19).  
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this respect, post-conflict reconstruction often goes beyond the restoration of pre-
war structures and conditions towards the fundamental remake of societies and the 
construction of new realities.  
 
2.2.3. Implementation  
 
Viewed as intervention in local affairs or as a provision of necessary support and 
assistance, post-conflict reconstruction is always lead by agents, external to the 
society emerging from conflict. Therefore, to clarify the concept further, the role 
of the ‘implementation agents’ of the peace-development-democracy platform is 
also taken into account. This is the second key aspect of the post-conflict 
reconstruction phenomenon.  
 
A war-affected political entity is likely to lack capacities for overcoming the 
conflict consequences. This, together with the conviction that functioning 
democratic institutions and developed market economy minimise the risks of 
violence, have provided grounds for the legitimisation of the international 
involvement in local affairs through post-conflict reconstruction policies and 
practices. In the world of growing interdependence among states, and of local 
conflicts with global impact on politics, economics, and security, the importance 
of crisis management and conflict prevention has been widely recognised 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2005:125).  
 
Establishing common principles and values for member-states, the UN Charter93 
also justifies international involvement in the management of local conflicts. 
Driven partly by a humanist motivation and partly by their interests for 
establishing and maintaining a prosperous international environment (Eide 1996), 
the interests of the various states may stray considerably from the general goal to 
preserve peaceful international order94. This logically results in attaining of 
ambivalent attitudes in response to specific conflicts, avoiding involvement, or 
transferring the responsibility for handling such issues to inclusive international 
organisations.  
 
The character of the international post-conflict involvement projects particular 
historic developments and international agendas. The high number of conflicts 
around the world, the specific demands, and the scales of the rebuilding tasks, 
challenged the unilateral capacities to provide the required aid and full package of 
assistance (OED 1998). The raising awareness of the fundamental changes that 
had occurred in the international environment since the end of the Cold War 
demanded adoption of new approaches in the field of post-conflict 
                                                 
93 The concept ‘international community’ here refers to the collective concept embracing the 
multiple forms of foreign governmental and non-governmental agencies, bilateral and 
multinational bodies and institutions that undertake various and not always coordinated actions in 
a post-conflict region/country. 
94 According to Eide (1996), the international community is driven partly by a humanist motivation 
and partly by their interests for establishing and maintaining a prosperous international 
environment. Among the examples of interest-driven interventions are the one of Turkey in 
Cyprus (to ‘protect’ the Turkish minority), of India in Sri Lanka (concerned with the Tamils), as 
well as the war between Armenia (supporting the majority in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh) 
and Azerbaijani (Eide 1996). 
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reconstruction95. The recognised interdependence between development, security, 
and human rights issues has lead to redefining international power relations. The 
adoption of a multilateral approach and the formation of respective alliances was a 
natural consequence of this process (Ocampo 2005).  
 
Characterised by use of force in attempts to resolve conflicts, unilateral actions 
can contribute to local instability by deepening grievances and hardening societal 
divides. Multilateralism on the other hand, has a capacity to encourage non-
violent means of conflict resolution grounded in international law96, to introduce 
and promote abiding rules. By reaching collective decisions, devising and 
applying common standards, and accommodating legitimate interests and points 
of view of different countries, multilateralism helps laying a solid foundation for 
peace, security and development97. 
 
Looking at the mechanisms used by the reconstruction agents, there are two 
approaches of external conflict management assistance that can be distinguished 
on a theoretical basis - legal and diplomatic (Eide 1996). While the first one 
focuses on standards-setting, supervision of implementation, and settlement of 
disputes over the application of standards, the second one embraces the areas of 
preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building98.
 
Since the late 1980s, the development co-operation policy of the international 
community acquired a specific normative and political dimension through the 
introduction of new aid criteria, aiming at promoting and establishing good 
governance and democracy (Harris & Reilly 1998). Thus, the core requirements99 
for external development aid placed an emphasis upon the political context of 
development. The expansion of political aid as democracy-assistance and the 
promotion of participatory development and good governance in the 1990s are 
indicators of the strong political conditionality adopted by bilateral and 
multilateral donors in their developmental policies (promoting the interrelation 
                                                 
95 According to Ocampo (2005), an indicator for the changed perceptions is the fact that in 2003 
the UN Secretary-General established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
with a mandate to evaluate the efficacy of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms. 
Internal wars are placed among the six clusters of threats, identified by the Panel. The original UN 
document can be found as: UN 2004 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004(A/59/565) 
96 Among the peaceful tools for resolving conflicts are: public awareness, education, respect for 
diversity, dialogue, mediation and diplomacy (Ocampo 2005) 
97 Over the last 50 years, the single most influential democracy-promoting organisation that has 
contributed significantly to the adoption of new strategies for addressing the consequences of 
violent conflicts worldwide has been the United Nations. Evolving together with the changing 
global realities UN has expanded its scope of democracy-promotion activities, adopting a focused 
approach to the implementation of policies for promoting, sustaining and developing peace and 
institutionalising its conflict prevention structures through the establishment of number of 
Departments (since 1990s). The introduction of programme documents as An Agenda for Peace 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992) and Agenda for Democratisation (1997) developed further the embedded in 
the Charter guiding principles of the organisation and the mechanisms for their implementation 
(UN Charter, article 33 - UN tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes).  
98 While preventive diplomacy addresses inter-state disputes to ensure that they do not escalate into 
violent conflicts, peace-making aims at bringing the hostile parties to an agreement, which to be 
enforced even if local groups continue fighting despite the peace-keeping operations (Eide 1996). 
99 These core requirements are: 1) reform of state; 2) strengthening of democratic institutions and 
the rule of law; 3) respect for human rights; 4) creation of an enabling environment for economic 
and political development (Harris & Reilly 1998). 
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between sustainable economic development and democracy). Positive (democratic 
conditionality) and negative measures (democratic sanctions)100 have been applied 
by the international community to foster the establishment of local social and 
political structures capable of managing and resolving disputes without resort to 
violence, thus contributing to conflict prevention and peace-building.  
 
Threatening the recipient country with reduction, suspension, or withdrawal of 
foreign assistance in the event of interruptions to democratic development or 
reversals of democratic gains, the democratic conditionality approach is perhaps 
the hardest one used by international donors inspired by the democracy-
development ideology (Harris & Reilly 1998:369). Under particular socio-
political conditions the conviction that sustainable development can be fostered by 
enhancing participation, democratisation, good governance, respect for human 
rights and prevalence of the rule of law have been endorsed not by exerting 
pressure on recipient governments, but by effective stimulus for peace-building - 
by the approaches of democracy assistance101 and democratic requirement102. 
Thus, the focus of most technical co-operation has become the strengthening of 
democratic governance through enabling an environment for optimal development 
co-operation (Harris & Reilly 1998:376-377).  
 
Apart from the political conditionality, membership criteria can also be an 
effective factor in underpinning the commitment to democratic structures. 
Regional frameworks for security dialogue and co-operation, which emerged in 
the second half of the 20th century because of the increasing development of a new 
form of regionalism based on a shared commitment to democratisation and the 
defence of democracy, play an important role as democracy and peace promoting 
systems. As Harris and Reilly point out, evidence suggest that the more a country 
engages in regional and international integration, the less likely it is to become 
embroiled in armed conflicts with another state (1998:370). Through regional 
organisations and initiatives, the international community adopts and 
institutionalises additional conflict prevention and management mechanisms103.  
 
                                                 
100 Harris & Reilly (1998:378) argue that sanctions can result from donor’s opposition to a 
particular political regime (such as in Haiti, Kenya and Malawi), or as a specific response to 
negative political developments (Guatemala, Zambia or Lesotho). In such circumstances - when 
donors work with internal opposition movements (Kenya or Malawi) or demand specific reforms 
before aid is resumed (Guatemala or Zambia), aid sanctions can induce change.   
101 Democracy assistance - the promotion of democracy and democratisation processes in recipient 
countries as a main objective of foreign aid (Harris & Reilly 1998:369). 
102 Democratic requirement - aid is conditional upon a democratic political system by the recipient 
country, or upon a commitment to democratic development (Harris & Reilly 1998:369). 
103 The possibility of EU membership for example has strongly influenced the development of the 
Eastern and Central European countries applying the ‘membership conditionality’ to ensure that all 
candidate-members would subscribe to the institutional frameworks and the norms and procedures 
of the European Union (Copenhagen Summit 1993). By establishing the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994 NATO has also refined 
its structures and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, confidence building and 
reform support (Harris & Reilly 1998:372). The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) has also a particular contribution in this field providing a forum for discussion 
and co-operation, establishing the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); 
the High Commissioner on National Minorities; the European Pact on Stability in Europe (1995); 
and the Convention and Court on Conciliation and Arbitration (1994).  
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The power of international reconstruction agents to induce democratic change or 
reverse democratic regression through such measures is proportional not only to 
the dependence of the recipients upon aid, but also to the unity of the donor 
community. Well-planned and coordinated external assistance as well as 
institutions addressing real issues through creative structuring of incentives and 
constraints can further post-conflict transitions effectiveness beyond the technical 
and the financial assistance (Maiese 2003). Despite the international consensus on 
central issues, there is still a need for coordinated international commitment to 
peace-building, for a division of labour between the international development 
organisations and other members of the international community (Maiese 2003). 
 
In general, the post-conflict reconstruction process lacks a unified and consistent 
approach to democracy building - in many post-conflict environments, the chaos 
on the ground is paralleled by the chaos of the international response (Harris & 
Reilly 1998:384). Uncoordinated or inconsistent conditionality policies may lead 
to abuse of foreign aid, which can have disruptive effects on the fragile situation. 
Inappropriate approaches to reconstruction and resources can distort the 
implementation of economic and social development plans, or they can eventually 
lead to restoring the policies that have contributed to the conflict in the first place 
(Pugh 1998). Together with the much needed resources, expertise, and energy the 
international organisations, governmental agencies and non-governmental 
structures involved in the reconstruction process can bring very different 
assumptions, working styles, and goals, which can eventually contribute to the 
complication of the reconstruction and aid co-ordination processes (CSIS 2003:7, 
WB-OED 1998). 
 
Loaded with developmental ideas as well as with the policies and strategic plans 
of those who sponsor it, the practice of reconstruction is not straightforward 
(Ekbladh 2003). Sometimes it serves as a means to assure international public 
opinion that intervention, even if it requires armed force, will eventually provide 
benefits to those people exposed to violence or dislocation. It often provides the 
‘investors’ with tools and mechanisms for influencing the political, economic, and 
social life of the recipient society. Hence, it is arguable whether the international 
engagement with local problems over the last 50 years has made the world a more 
peaceful place. Instead of enabling stability and prosperity, programmes launched 
to support transition to democracy and market economy often inspire contests for 
power and dominance (Trager 1995 quoted in Lipshchutz 1998:50).  
 
Providing in this way grounds for political antagonism against neighbours and 
authorities, which have contributed to their competitive advantages (Lipshchutz 
1998:50), it is not surprising that international activities sometimes are seen as 
contributing to the societal fragmentation along pre-existing social and political 
fault lines. Contextual and contingent, the manifestations of antagonisms 
determine the course of events. As Lipschutz reveals, ‘in some countries, these 
fault lines were intended to be administrative but were drawn up in ethnic or 
national terms; in other places, the fault lines are linguistic, religious, clan-based, 
‘tribal,’ or even vaguely cultural’ (Lipschutz 1998:50). The irony of post-conflict 
reconstruction practice is that while aiming at decreasing the risks of conflicts, the 
international community imposes Western socio-political models on non-Western 
countries, which because of the poor overall management and strategic planning 
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of the process eventually lead to fragmentation, rather than integration of war-torn 
societies (Lipschutz 1998:45). 
 
Although a signed peace agreement does not guarantee peace, the examples of 
Angola (1993) and Rwanda (1994) suggest that failed peace implementation can 
lead to more deaths than the conflict it was supposed to end (Stedman, Rothschild 
& Cousens 2002). Developing appropriate strategies and providing adequate 
resources is essential for securing peace. Despite that conflict resolution theory 
tended to treat all civil wars as more or less alike, the contemporary approach 
based on empirical examples recognises the importance of the context-specific 
dimensions104 (Coyne 2007).  
 
Discussing the peace-implementation process and the issues associate with it, 
Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002) conclude that the degree to which a 
particular environment is amenable to peace corresponds to the difficulty of an 
environment, determined by the three variables – the nature of its spoilers, the 
neighbouring states, and valuable spoils105. Implementation hence needs a proper 
strategy developed upon the evaluation of the difficulties of the environment 
(spoilers, neighbours, spoils), their attributes (few-many, reconciled-hostile, 
coherent-fragmented), motivations and intent106. Implementation strategies need 
to be coordinated, clear, and coherent, accepted by the collective body of the 
international community.  
 
Apart from asserting that peace-implementation must address the specific needs of 
the environment, the authors emphasise that success of the process also depends 
upon the international commitment. Using the economic term ‘incentive 
compatibility’, Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002) emphasise that strategies 
must directly related to the self-interest of both internal and external actors in the 
peace implementation process107. A heavy international commitment does not 
guarantee success, but the lack such guarantees failure.  
 
Following the peace implementation process, post-conflict reconstruction 
eventually aims at the establishment of a normal environment, a lasting peace and 
                                                 
104 The particular environment, the willingness of international actors to provide resources and 
troops, the type of conflict, its intensity, and the external conditions are among the variables that 
constitute the conflict context as amenable to peace or not. These variables should also determine 
the logic of any peace implementation strategy (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002) 
105 The spoilers - hostile to a peace agreement leaders or factions, which are also willing to use 
violence to undermine it, and neighbouring states that oppose peace has a potential to create 
negative environment and to impede the peace implementation process. Potentially a major benefit 
to a peaceful society, valuable spoils or easily marketed commodities (gold, diamonds, oil, timber, 
etc) can also play a negative role by providing an economic wedge between parties, exacerbating 
problems and increasing the likelihood of third-party war profiteering (Stedman, Rothschild & 
Cousens 2002).
106 With its underling emphasis on confidence-building "traditional peace-keeping" is likely to be 
effective in environments with few "difficulties", while in extremely "difficult" environments, a 
degree of coercion is often necessary (Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens 2002). 
107 According to Stedman, Rothschild & Cousens (2002), the most dramatic example is the 
Rwandan crisis, in which the international community pulled out, costing hundreds of thousands 
of lives. When there are strong regional or worldwide interests (as in the Middle East because of 
oil), commitment is likely to be quite high. This unfortunately cannot guarantee good results – 
sometimes, limited commitment can be enough to end violence (Cambodia against the Khmer 
Rouge). 
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sustainable development. However, by combining rebuilding of political, 
physical, and economic infrastructures, providing emergency relief, financial, 
technical, and/or humanitarian assistance, dealing with refugees and migration 
issues, focusing on the problems of justice and reconciliation, the reconstruction 
practice is often challenged as being a contemporary global business instead of a 
noble engagement and responsibility. 
 
 
3. POST-ETHNIC-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION SPECIFICS 
 
Discussing the phenomenon of post-conflict reconstruction, a paradox should be 
pointed out. As early as 2000, Reinfeldt (2000) noticed that in comparison to 
Slovenia, where there were limited international investments in grassroots-
initiatives, the former Yugoslav republic had enjoyed remarkable investments of 
money and personnel. Yet, while Slovenia has become an example of a stable 
economy and consolidated democracy, Yugoslavia has been criticised for serious 
violations of human rights and protracted reforms and transition in general. 
Almost a decade later, Serbia is still undergoing a period of transition. In contrast 
to the achievements that the post-conflict reconstruction attained after the World 
War 2, at the end of the 20th century, despite the amounts of money and other 
resources invested, hardly any of the reconstruction projects could be viewed as 
particularly successful.    
 
In fact, a range of interpretations have attempted to explain this situation. A factor 
impeding the achievement of expected levels of success of post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts and activities, for example, are the communication gaps 
between the parties involved in the reconstruction process. The lack of a coherent 
focus on transition and of a long-term approach to the implementation of the 
reconstruction and peace-building programmes also can have negative effects. 
Pursuing sometimes contradictory rather than complementary strategic objectives, 
different institutions with their strengths and priorities108 could not always achieve 
agreement on essential issues (Kumar 1997 in Pugh 1998). As Pugh (1998) points 
out, even the existence of peace agreements, such as the Dayton Accords, do not 
necessarily imply that a coordinated programme of funding and support for 
reconstruction activities is in place. Instead of strategic planning of impacts, of 
short-term measures being designed in accordance with longer-term macro-
economic stability projects, civil society and social programmes incorporating 
mechanisms of local participation and a culture of multifaceted accountability 
(Pugh 1998), international intervention often leans on ad hoc activities, which 
                                                 
108 While the World Bank focuses its reconstruction efforts on the establishment of conditions for 
resuming commercial and productive activities, priorities for OECD are the rule of law and the 
internal security, the legitimisation of state institutions and the establishment of a stable basis for 
economic growth. NGOs and humanitarian agencies are usually inclined to focus on social welfare 
and human rights, and local organisations deal with country-specific issues. Accelerating the 
transition to a market economy, increasing refugee returns, law and order, and developing central 
institutions were recognised by the Peace Implementation Council as priorities for the 
reconstruction of Bosnia (Pugh 1998). The above mentioned reconstruction priorities are defined 
in programme documents of the World Bank (1997:11); OECD - DAC (1997: para 191); Contact 
Group Chairman's Conclusions, US Department of State Press Release (1998) 
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provokes perceptions for their experimental character109. Mr Dennis McNamara, a 
Director of the Division of International Protection of UNHCR: ‘The field 
agencies are not research organisations. We go wherever there is a need for our 
involvement and we start working. We do what we know is best to do’ (McNamara 
in interview with the Author, 04.04.2003). 
 
The particular conditions under which states emerge from violence are usually 
contextual and related to the certain international developments and environment 
in general. Contemporary (ethnic) wars, occurring within states, have resulted 
from the resurfacing of old rivalries after the end of the Cold War stagnation or 
because of economic change-of growth/contraction. In certain cases factors like 
global information linkages, freedom of expression, spread of democratisation, or 
unsuccessful reconstruction attempts, could also stimulate conflicts (WB 
1998:17). Global processes and forces impinging on domestic configurations 
might create situations, in which states and national economies are prone to 
fragmentation, rather than integration (Lipschutz 1998). Thus, taking into account 
the local dynamics and the inequities and schisms that have led to breakdown in 
the first place, post-conflict reconstruction programmes should opt for meeting the 
local needs that have arisen from an experienced conflict110 (WB 1998).  
 
Problematic division of roles, powers, and responsibilities among external 
reconstruction agents and local actors is a factor that can impede the success of a 
reconstruction process. The establishment of institutions and initiatives 
independent from local political control but dependent on Western support in fact 
results in transferring the responsibility for their actions to the international 
community (Reinfeldt 2000). The process of democratisation often suffers a direct 
imposition of institutions of unproven effectiveness, not adapted to local realities 
and thus contributes to the aggravation of problems in divided societies. In many 
cases the dispositions for engineering war-torn societies into peace evolves as a 
continuation of emergency relief operations, in which external actors assume the 
power and moral authority to bring about change and to secure peace. Instead of 
assisting and supporting, the international community often takes a prescriptive 
role (Harris & Reilly 1998).  
 
The destruction, disruption, dislocation and exhaustion in war-torn societies that 
call for a multi-dimensional restructuring and transformation, is not a tabula rasa 
environment (Pugh 1998). If introduced in a hegemonic discourse, even the most 
needed programmes and policies would not achieve the expected goals and in the 
end would not contribute to conflict resolution. When local actors do not have a 
stake in making adjustments, or in reforming relationships, then the process itself 
is likely to fail and the conflict to be renewed (Pugh 1998). Peace-building and 
standards setting can only be effective if there is a real agreement and a dialogue 
                                                 
109 In the last decades reconstruction has become somewhat a lab for social engineering, for 
experimenting with models and social standards not met even by western democracies (Pugh 
1998), and for testing ground for different practices, such as the new co-operation of NGO 
partnerships (Reinfeldt 2000) 
110 Recognising the importance of these issues, the international community has elaborated a post-
conflict needs assessment (PCNA) model to serve as a basis for the ensuing development process 
with regard to the specific country strategies (UNDG/UNDP/WB/GTZ 2004, UN/World Bank 
2007). Identification of the weaknesses of potential spoilers and determining of the appropriate 
sequence of activities depends on the understanding of local context (Teuten 2007). 
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in search of common solutions to common problems (Eide 1996). Social 
engineering in unstable societies lacking institutional structures for resolving 
internal disputes appeared eventually to lead to the exacerbating of societal 
conflicts (Paris 1997:57).  
 
To redeem the weaknesses of current reconstruction programmes, international 
intervention should aim at improving the strategic harmonisation of peace-
building activities111, at balancing short-term rebuilding efforts and the long-term 
qualitative change through social and civil development, at enhancing capacity-
building measures for local institutions and communities. To achieve the desired 
stability, international community has also to work towards transferring the 
ownership of reconstruction and reforms to local citizens (Pugh 1998). By taking 
away the ownership and responsibility for success or failure, the international 
community provokes a situation of falling of local communities into a permanent 
condition of reconstruction. To break out of this 'non-recovery' cycle, societies 
emerging from violent conflict need to prioritise future goals beyond immediate 
survival, to support interaction between internal and external aid organisations 
and eventually to enable the development of social capital and civil society, which 
have the potential to inhibit a return to violence. Thus, an important component in 
strategic planning for reconstruction is to promote public participation and self-
sustaining capacity-building measures for local institutions and communities - 
support for social development through systems of participation is more likely to 
have an effect than social engineering (Pugh 1998).  
 
Sustainable development, political and macro-economic reforms, investments in 
institution of governance and education are crucial for the establishment and 
maintenance of peace, but so is the existence of a strong, viable, and assertive 
civil society (Amoako 1996). As early as the 1990s, analysts and post-conflict 
reconstruction practitioners emphasised the need of civil society development as a 
precondition for successful implementation of (post-)conflict management 
programmes and activities. Although recognised as important, this area of the 
reconstruction practice remained to some extent overlooked. Relying on the 
assumption that the financial and non-financial assistance provided for the 
reconstruction of civil society will contribute to ensuring positive results in this 
field, the international community focused on providing support for building-up 
the third sector in terms of increasing the numbers of local NGOs. Engaged with 
the formal aspects of the civil society, donors failed to take into account that a key 
precondition for the development of a civil society is the existence of civil 
relations among community members, of bridging and linking social capital. By 
omitting to address properly the issues related to the state-level civil relations in 
the societies emerging from conflict, post-conflict reconstruction might become 
trapped in building structures without foundations.  
 
A post-ethnic-conflict environment is specific because of the deep socio-cultural 
separation and the eradication of civil inter-community ties at the level of state, 
resulting from the escalation of ethnic tensions and the experienced violence 
along these lines. Hence, the ‘traditional’ reconstruction tools and mechanisms do 
not appear appropriate or efficient because they do not treat some of the key 
                                                 
111 As Pugh (1998) indicates, a more explicit and consistent approach is needed when 
incorporating economic and political incentives and disincentives in peace agreements 
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consequences of conflict. Direct violence has both visible and invisible effects 
(Galtung 1999: Table 1), which need to be addressed and managed properly in 
order that peace is enabled within the frameworks of a reconstruction programme. 
 
Table 5: Negative Effects of Direct Violence 
 (Source: Galtung 1999) 
 
Space Material, visible effects Nonmaterial, invisible effects 
Nature Depletion and pollution; 
damage to diversity and symbiosis 
Less respect for non-human nature; 
reinforcing "man over nature". 
Humans somatic effects: 
number killed, number wounded, 
number raped, number displaced, 
number in misery, widows, orphans, 
soldiers, unemployed 
spiritual effects:  
number bereaved, number 
traumatized, general hatred, general 
depression, general apathy, revenge 
addiction, victory addiction 
Society material damage to buildings; 
material damage to infra-structure: 
road, rail, mail, telecommunication, 
electricity, water, health, education 
the damage to social structure: 
to institutions, to governance; 
the damage to social culture: 
to law and order, to human rights 
World material damage to infra-structure: 
breakdown of trade, international 
exchange 
the damage to world structure; 




land-mines, un-exploded ordnance;  
transmitted violence:  
genetic damage to offspring 
structure transfer to next generation; 
culture transfer to next generation; 
points of trauma and glory 
Culture irreversible damage to human 
cultural heritage, to sacred points in 
space 
violence culture of trauma, glory; 




While post-conflict programmes usually take into account the visible effects of 
violence, the invisible effects are not only difficult to detect, but in many cases 
their importance is underestimated. In a post-ethnic-conflict situation, repairing 
the nonmaterial damages is crucial for achieving peace and stability, because if 
not managed properly, trauma, hatreds, broken social structure and institutions 
might impede any positive reconstruction efforts.  
 
The post-ethnic conflict situation is specific, because apart from all the problems 
common for an after-war environment there are additional factors that aggravate 
the situation and obstruct the transition to peace. Economic and political processes 
are affected not only by the negative effects of war, but also the reluctance of 
ethnically divided population of a country to work for the restoration or for the 
construction of new ones (Bodewig 2002). The social protection system in a 
transition country emerging from ethnic conflict is both in need of reform and 
needs to deal with the social effects of war at the same time (Bodewig 2002). The 
post-war unemployment crisis and the difficult situation that the vulnerable 
groups fall in are likely to be aggravated due to the increased ethnic tensions, 
which may lead to labour market segmentation along ethnic lines.  
 
Ethnic struggles also have a direct impact on social assistance like pension 
schemes and other social funds. Certain post-war institutional constraints may 
eventually lead to the re-distribution of services and funds within particular 
(ethnically defined) groups of population. Therefore, in a post-ethnic-conflict 
situation, the main long-term goal should be the creation of a transparent social 
safety net system, which would also raise the level of trust in the institutions 
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(Bodewig 2002). The special requirements of a post-ethnic-conflict situation 
demand that the destroyed infrastructure is rehabilitated, employment generated 
and economic development stimulated on a grassroots level. To achieve these 
goals however it is essential that bridges between different ethnic groups and 
former opponents are built and that a minimum of interethnic tolerance is 
achieved to allow different ethnic groups to communicate at least over such non 
controversial issues (Bodewig 2002). 
 
In an ethnic conflict, cease-fire is only the first step towards achieving peace. 
Continuing ethnic tensions within a deeply divided society (along at least two 
lines of separation) would perpetuate the extremely negative attitudes towards 
former ‘enemies’. The unwillingness of a traumatised population to participate in 
any integrative activities is logical, but definitely problematic, because this 
complicates further the post-war situation and obstructs the reforms in any of the 
sectors; especially if there are expectations for sharing of funds or interethnic 
redistribution (Bodewig 2002). 
 
The post-ethnic-conflict situation is different from the post-conflict one because 
the reconstruction faces challenges of a polarised society (CHDCS 2003); 
furthermore, in such a society the destroyed bridging and linking social capital at 
the level of state challenge the possibility for (re-)construction of any civil 
relations. The (re-)emergence of civil consciousness, which would eventually lead 
to the overcoming of the communities division and would enable the 
transformation of the members of ethnic groups into citizens, could hardly occur 
on its own pace. Serious efforts are needed to rebuild bridges of communication 
between social groups and to promote participation in politics. Challenges relating 
to continuing ethnic tensions render many interventions difficult to implement and 
thus they hold back the reconstruction process as well as the ‘normalisation’ of 
life (Bodewig 2002).  
 
Without questioning the appropriateness of the universal application of the peace-
democracy-development paradigm and the need of international intervention in 
local affairs, the current research aims at identifying the factors that can contribute 
to the success or failure of a post-conflict reconstruction programme. However, 
this identification can be made only at a structural level, because in the context of 
post-conflict reconstruction success should be measured against the goals set at 
the onset of the process. Achieving the initially expected results within the 
respective (provisioned) timeframes is an objective indicator for success.  
 
The peace-democracy-development paradigm is a projection of the ultimate 
‘universal’ goals of the post-conflict reconstruction idea, but universal units of 
measurement would not produce commeasurable results if used under different 
conditions. In practice, managing strategically the process of transition to 
‘normalisation’ requires that context-dependent benchmarks be put along the way. 
In the context of the Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts, the focus is placed on the 
particular needs of a post-ethnic-conflict environment that must be met if the 
ultimate goal of the international community is the establishment of lasting peace 
and stability worldwide. Therefore, the following chapter will look at the specific 
issues that post-conflict programmes must address in order to achieve the desired 
levels of success in societies and countries emerging from ethnic violence.  
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The previous chapters revealed that the violent ethnic conflicts of the late 20th 
century have had negative effects not only on the natural, physical, and human 
capital, but also on the societal structure of the war-affected political units. 
Beyond the visibly demolished economic and political infrastructures, social 
fractures and destroyed basic human interactions can further impede the 
reconstruction process. Fragmentation along ethnic, cultural and/or religious lines 
of separation and war trauma lead to loss of social cohesion, will for co-operation 
and of any citizenship affiliations with a national state.  
 
A ceasefire or a formal agreement does not put an end to a violent ethnic conflict, 
but only marks the beginning of the next, post-military phase when post-conflict 
reconstruction could take place. Countries emerge from conflicts within specific 
international environments and under unique conditions. Identity-based, political 
or class conflicts are often determined by the dynamic relationship between social, 
political and economic interests, which explains its non-static nature. Achieving 
the ultimate goal - normalisation of life112, is hence impossible without addressing 
the specific conflict outcomes and consequences.113
 
The evaluations of the international aid practice since the end of the Cold War has 
shown that conventional aid mechanisms, aiming at rapid ‘normalisation’ can 
hardly enable success. Developmental efforts directed towards economic 
reconstruction and delivery of basic social services tend to leave aside problems 
related to human rights abuses, social dislocation and tearing of social fabric. As 
Simpson points out, economic reconstruction alone could not end an identity-
conflict or heal social fractures (Simpson 1997:475). Economic growth and 
development can even generate their own forms of social conflict, especially if 
resources ‘injected’ into a context of deprivation become distributed along 
established lines of separation and confrontation114. Economic reconstruction is 
vital to the process of rebuilding social capital, but it alone has no capacity to deal 
with the problems of reconciliation after war crimes, human rights, gender abuses, 
or inequality. Often economic growth and wealth have limited capacities to 
                                                 
112 To remind, the concept of normalisation implies that 1) there would be no need for 
extraordinary outside intervention; 2) governance and economic activity would largely function on 
a self-determinate and self-sustaining basis; 3) internal and external relations would be conducted 
according to generally accepted norms of behaviour (AUSA/CSIS 2002).  
113 Furthermore, it is not only that nature of the experienced conflict should be taken into account, 
but any concrete coping mechanisms that have emerged or have functioned during the period of 
hostilities are also to be integrated in the structures of peace-building interventions (Colletta & 
Cullen 2000:85) 
114 Simpson (1997) points out that the lack of social compact, i.e. agreement on the criteria to be 
applied in allocating new houses, seriously impeded a building project in Alexandra township, 
north of Johannesburg  
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address properly the ‘destruction of social capital, particularly institutions of 
governance and civil society and such basic attitudes and behaviours as trust and 
participation’ (WB 1998:30). Therefore reconstruction of seriously damaged 
societies should adopt an integrated approach and besides economic development 
should address not only the problems of providing security, establishing 
appropriate legal and institutional frameworks, of recovery or (re-)building of 
physical and human capital (WB-OED 1998:5), but also focus on the areas of 
politics, justice, institution building, and civil society (Simpson 1997). Rebuilding 
of social fabric requires a bottom-up approach that breaks down barriers and 
prejudices and brings people together. Peace brokering115 or putting up military 
shields to keep warring fractions apart (Simpson 1997) would hardly have a 
positive effect on developments in the long-term.  
 
As a basis for development of social capital, social contract is a determinant for its 
character and structure. Hence, a transformation of the system and its frameworks 
(social contract) eventually leads to the establishment of new forms of social 
capital. Therefore, before addressing the concept of social capital, the grounds for 
enabling reconstruction of a fragmented social space, where identity differences 
are voluntarily subjected to overarching formal rules, will be approached through 
the social contract theory.  
 
 
1. FRAMING THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL  
1.1 From a social contract to social capital  
 
Viewed as an actual or hypothetical compact between ruled and their rulers 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica), or as an implicit agreement among the members of a 
society to cooperate for mutual benefit (Oxford English Dictionary), the social 
contract regulates all social relations including political, religious, and economic 
ones. It also sets the parameters of any social order, which as a discursive 
practice, has to be formally introduced and recognised by all community 
members. As such, it is valid only within the limits of the community that has 
established and accepted the conventions. In the context of post-conflict 
reconstruction of deeply divided societies, the social contract theory can help 
understand why it is essential that the association of individuals into a single 
social organism needs to be promoted at the level of the macro- political unit as 
soon as there are minimum enabling conditions in place.  
 
Beverly Crawford ascertains that social contracts were constructed during the 
process of nation-building, embedding and forging the terms of citizenship and 
political community inclusion into state constitutions, legal systems, and political 
practices (Crawford 1998b:517 )116. Social contract provided grounds for building 
                                                 
115 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the peace-brokered agreement in fact consolidated the 
gains made through war. It ‘approved’ ethnicity as the organising principle of politics in the 
Balkans (better than even the war itself); federalism did not bring integration but consolidation of 
regional power bases. (Simpson 1997:475) 
116 ‘Nationalism’ has developed on the basis of the dominant identity markers and has become 
ideological justification for the terms of inclusion in/exclusion from the political community. 
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identities and relationships contrasting to those of the traditional societies, which 
were fixed both along the lines of family and lineage, and along the cultural and 
economic division of labour. In the form of written constitutions or projected by 
the political and social institutions of a state, the social contract established the 
‘internal’ configuration of societies, structuring: 
 
¾ the terms of citizenship and inclusion in a country’s political community 
¾ the rules of political participation 
¾ the political relationship between a central state and its various regions 
¾ the distribution of material resources within the country 
¾ the roles of the individuals within the country/ society and the relationships 
between these roles (Lipschutz 1998:62) 
 
In contrast to Lipschutz, Crawford asserts that it is the institution of the state that 
sets the terms of social contract and structures the terms of membership in the 
political community, the rules of political participation and accountability, as well 
as the criteria for production and distribution of material resources (Crawford 
1998a:28). The institution of the state has the capacity to determine whether or not 
a politicised cultural identity would be cemented in social and political practice 
and whether culturally defined groups would seek autonomy, separatism, or the 
right to participate with others in the political arena117.  
 
When political membership and resource distribution are structured according to 
ascriptive criteria, politicised cultural divisions become legitimate in the political 
arena. Preferential policies and political institutions are another factor that can 
intensify or even create political groups, foster identity-based political struggles or 
introduce biased principles for allocation of benefits. When identity politics 
dominate political competition, grounds for conflicting claims on resources based 
on cultural criteria emerge.118 It is likely that tensions between groups intensify, 
which would eventually reinforce the importance of ascription as a principle of 
choice in allocating benefits (Crawford 1998a:29). If institutions that support the 
social contract weaken, cultural conflict and violence is likely to occur and 
eventually affect community structure and function.  
 
Crawford (1998a) outlines that the state is the institution that sets and maintains a 
social contract. While political entrepreneurs can attempt to legitimise cultural 
divisions and to mobilise groups for political action, institutions that disregard 
cultural differences as politically relevant or as criteria for allocation of resources 
or for participation, can attenuate politicisation of cultural identities. Institutions 
can structure the rules of a fair political competition and thus maintain social 
                                                                                                                                     
Inclusive Nationalism results in universal citizenship laws, but still strong institutions are needed 
to guarantee stable multiethnic community living (Crawford 1998a:20-21) 
117 While in the Soviet Union the institutions created new cultural divisions, in post-war federal 
Yugoslavia the new institutions reinforced cultural divisions created by the historical 
interpretations of successful political entrepreneurs (Crawford 1998a:28?). 
118 Such claims are more prone to intense conflict than disputes between interest groups, because 
while interests are malleable and multiple, cultural identity is fixed and non-negotiable. (Crawford 
1998а:5). 
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stability119 even in societies, where cultural identities have been already 
politicised.  
 
It is the citizenship rules in place that determine whether cultural differences 
would become politically relevant or not. Inclusive citizenship constitutes 
individual civic behaviour, regardless of any cultural attributes, as membership 
criteria. Exclusive membership rules, in contrast, have the capacity to strengthen 
the political relevance of cultural differences, activating the barriers of cultural 
origin, language, or religion (Crawford 1998a:29). Therefore, a social contract 
that is to ensure the inclusive citizenship and to reduce the likelihood of outburst 
of tensions among different cultural groups needs to provide for a political system 
that represent the interests of all citizens and is supported by a system of justice 
and policing that bolster citizenship rights and protect cultural groups against hate 
crimes.  
 
Institutions play a key role for the maintenance of social contracts120. Therefore, 
any transformations they undergo would have a direct impact on the social 
arrangements. It is at these points of instability that social contracts are most 
likely to break out (Lipschutz 1998:63). Political and economic changes are also 
likely to challenge the distributions of power and wealth established and 
institutionalised over time by the social contracts121 (Lipschutz 1998:60). 
Transition hence enables political entrepreneurs to take advantages of the situation 
and to gain access to institutional power (Lipschutz 1998:63) 
 
Apart from the internal or external transformations, the constitution of new 
identities or opportunities (for acquiring power and wealth) can also challenge the 
foundations of an existing social contract122. According to Crawford (1998a:4), 
the outburst of ethnic violence in the last decades is linked to the Post-Cold War 
economic globalisation and institutional transformation that enabled the opening 
of new markets and the construction of new democracies123. These factors 
contributed to the disruption of the old social contracts, i.e. of the old rules and 
norms determining access to political and economic resources. In the cases where 
these shifts in political power were experienced as ethnic and/or religious 
                                                 
119 Universal suffrage and citizenship rights can weaken the political relevance of race and gender 
divisions, in the same way that secular institutions weaken religious differences.  
120 Social contracts are not by definition just, equitable and fair. When recognised by all members 
of society, they function as a constitutive source of social and political stability within countries. 
Even not necessarily respectful of human rights or economically efficient, social contracts have the 
capacity to maintain a relative degree of social stability and cohesion (Lipschutz 1998:58), because 
they regulate not only state-society relations, but also the relations between the various groups 
within societies. 
121 As a result of the Industrial Revolution, states became intervening in the workings of the 
economy to secure and protect their populations. From the middle of the twentieth century the 
welfare function of the state came to dominate, reaching its apogee in the countries of Western 
Europe (Lipschutz 1998:65). 
122 If levers of economic and political power are in the hands of a dominant group that is better 
placed and able to take advantage of the new conditions created under economic liberalisation, this 
can provoke disaffection among disadvantaged groups. When their identity is defined in ethnic or 
sectarian terms, such a situation could inspire ‘state of their own’ ideas (Lipschutz 1998:68). 
123 Globalisation and liberalisation are thus ‘triggers’ for cultural conflict, but definitely not ‘the 
only triggers’, and not the ‘underlying causes’. 
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discrimination, opportunities for political entrepreneurs124 emerged (Crawford 
1998a:5).  
 
When shifts in political power have been experienced or perceived as 
discriminatory, it is very important that post-conflict policies avoid politicising 
cultural identities and distributing resources or power on such a basis. 
Nevertheless, even if there are regulatory mechanisms for preventing the spread of 
identity politics, the association of individuals into a single social organism at 
macro-level would not occur, if people were not motivated to (re-) integrate. If, in 
the aftermaths of a conflict, the ‘general will’ that constitutes civil liberty is 
replaced by a number of contesting general wills, the building-up of a new 
overarching political identity is a requirement for a (re)construction of state-
citizenship and state-social capital. 
 
As it was shown in the previous chapter, the ethnic conflicts of the late 20th 
century destroy pre-war social cohesion125, i.e. the ‘extend to which people 
respond collectively to achieved their valued outcomes and to deal with the 
economic, social, political or environmental stress (positive or negative) that 
affects them’ (Reimer 2002:14). Therefore, social integration understood in terms 
of targeted social cohesion, togetherness, and solidarity among the members of a 
territorially defined political unit, is an important precondition for achieving 
lasting peace, sustainable development and prosperity in divided societies. Shared 
responsibility, will for co-operation and common living, social integration, and 
social cohesion, appear constitutive factors for the rebuilding of social capital. A 
precondition for the identification of appropriate mechanisms for its (re-
)construction and for the elaboration of adequate programs is the clear definition 
of the macro-framework, which will determine all the components of the social 
relationships and structures.  
 
1.2 Theoretical approaches to social capital 
 
A great variety of definitions reflecting complementary or even opposing ideas, 
tries to capture and explain the elusive notion of social capital. Burdened with 
different meanings, the concept appears rather vague and unclear - a fashionable 
buzzword in the socio-political and economic literature or ‘a black hole’ with 
more or less defined limits and all-absorbing content. Outlining a conceptual 
framework that will provide a basis for approaching the notion of social capital 
and its role in the reconstruction of divided societies is therefore needed.  
 
The concept of social capital can be easily recognised as a product of the 20th 
century socio-political thought. It appears for the first time as early as 1916 in the 
                                                 
124 Similarly to the economic counterparts, the political entrepreneurs seek to maximise their 
individual interests. In pursue of maximising political power, political entrepreneurs engaging in 
risk-taking behaviour, which in the end impacts the collective interests. (Crawford 1998a) 
125 According to Berkman and Kawachi (2000) social cohesion refers to two intertwined features 
of society. First, it is the absence of any type of a latent conflict and second - the presence of 
strong social bonds - measured by trust and norms of reciprocity, the abundance of associations 
that bridge social divisions, and the presence of institutions of conflict management, e.g. 
responsive democracy, an independent judiciary, and independent media (Berkman & Kawachi 
2000:175). 
 103
Lyda Judson Hanifan's work on the rural school community centres (Woolcock 
1998), but it was not until the 1990s when the concept came into widespread 
usage and became a focal point of research and policy discussions. Over a span of 
10 years the number of journal articles listing social capital as a key word rose 
from 109 (1991-1995) to 1003 in March 1999 (Baum 2000 quoted in UKONS 
2001:6). The subsequent application of the concept in a range of social issues has 
dissolved its empirical specificity into a fashionable word meaning all things to all 
people (UKONS 2001:6, Woolcock 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, it is still important that social capital be examined on a broad basis 
and not narrowed down to a single-aspect definition. Limiting the focus only to 
one aspect can deform perceptions and thus lead to biased or specific conclusions. 
A similar problem concerning the validity of the findings can be spotted in the 
fact that despite social capital being considered a community attribute, it is 
usually assessed through interviewing individuals, while collective social capital 
cannot be simply the sum of the individual projections (UKONS 2001:14).  
 
Social capital is often associated with trust, even though there is no common view 
concerning the relationship between these two concepts. Woolcock (2001) for 
example considers trust as an outcome of social capital, whereas Cote and Healy 
(2001) view it also a component of shared values. According to Fukuyama, social 
capital and trust integrate within an economic framework - trust emerges as a key 
measure of social capital (Fukuyama 1995). Accumulated through norms of 
reciprocity and successful co-operation in networks of civil engagement, trust 
within society is the primary factor for its prosperity, inherent competitiveness, 
and tendency towards democracy. A successful and stable society could be built 
only over a shared set of moral values, which will create expectations of regular 
and honest behaviour (Fukuyama 1995:151-153) as well as foster engagement 
with civic duties.  
 
While Fukuyama (2001) reflects on the ‘radius of trust’ (i.e. the circle of people 
where co-operative norms are fully functional) and Putnam distinguishes two 
different types of trust - thick and thin (Putnam 2000:136-137), other studies 
emphasise the multi-dimensionality of this social phenomenon challenging the 
dichotomy introduced (Sixsmith et al., 2001). Putnam's definition of social capital 
as ‘features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate 
co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam et al. 1993:36; 
Putnam 1993) clearly outlines the horizontal level that creates externalities for the 
community as a whole. According to this definition, developed within the political 
science context, the efficiency of society is improved due to the facilitated 
coordinated actions (Putnam et al. 1993:167). By supporting government, the 
functioning networks of civil engagement linked by solidarity, integrity, and 
participation determine positive economic development. The civic networks 
improve the effectiveness of communications and social organisation building up 
and fostering the trust within society (Colletta & Cullen 2000: 7). Thus, the 
efficiency of the institutions depends on trust, communications, and flows of 
information (Putnam et al. 1993:36-37). A public, not a private good, social 
capital performs as a ‘resource whose supply increases…through use’ and, in 




A number of theorists explore the active connections among people as formative 
for the fabric of social capital. According to Cohen and Prusak (2001:4), trust 
between individuals and in a broad fabric of social institutions ultimately 
promotes a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a 
whole. Cooperative action can become possible however only if it is supported by 
mutual understanding and binding behaviours of the community members.  
 
Examining social capital, Putnam distinguishes two types and defines them as 
bonding and bridging. In Putnam's terminology bonding social capital performs 
both as a ‘sociological super glue’ (Putnam 2000:19) and as a mechanism for 
exclusion. The term refers to relations amongst relatively homogeneous groups 
characterised by strong interpersonal ties, such as ethical fraternal organisations 
and church based women's reading groups (Putnam 2000). The social capital that 
is crucial for development Putnam defines as bridging - the examples given here 
are relations with distant friends, associates, and colleagues. These inclusive ties, 
rather diverse and weaker than the former type, bring together people to establish 
for example civil rights movements and ecumenical religious organisations. In 
addition, Cote and Healy (2001:42) suggest that the relationships between 
individuals and groups in different social strata stemming from the distribution of 
power and wealth among different groups constitute the ‘linking social capital’. 
 
The more complex theoretical model of Michael Woolcock (1998) also remains at 
the level of social relationships. His comprehensive framework regards social 
capital as incorporating four dimensions of inter-community relationships: strong 
ties between family members and neighbours; weak ties with the outside 
community and between communities; formal institutions (including laws and 
norms); and state-community interaction. The relations based predominantly on 
kinship, ethnicity, and religion are integration determinants, denoted with the term 
‘strong ties’. These basic social mechanisms build survival safety nets and are 
formative for a community. In this light, the connections with people outside the 
constituted community are weak ties. These mostly formal rather than innate 
linkages constitute different social networks and associations and underlie any 
civic engagement and economic enterprise. The civil society and its institutions, 
no matter whether complementary or substitute for state services and functions, 
have a direct impact upon state's integrity. The forth dimension synergy reflects 
the state-community relations and in particular the interaction between 
community and leaders and government institutions.  
 
An instrumental approach, looking at social capital through a pragmatic prism, 
derives from the works of Pierre Bourdieu in the early 1980s. Bourdieu has 
produced the first contemporary systematic analysis of the phenomenon, although 
his conceptions were not very popular at the time (Portes 1998). In his view, 
social capital encompasses not only the social relationships that would provide the 
individuals with the access to resources, but also the amount and quality of the 
latter. Actual or potential resources and the respective profits result from 
membership in a group and therefore they become basis for solidarity (Bourdieu 
1986:249). Then, a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships 
of mutual acquaintance or recognition would provide more benefits to the 
members (Bourdieu 1986:248-249). On the other hand, individuals possessing 
high levels of other forms of capital can enter or establish networks more easily, 
because the others view them as carriers of social capital (Bourdieu 1986:250). 
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‘The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent… depends on the size of 
network connections he can effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to 
whom he is connected’ (Bourdieu 1986:249). As a product of investment 
strategies, aiming at the institutionalisation of group relations, social networks 
require deliberate investment of both economic and cultural resources in order 
that social capital is acquired (Portes 1998). 
 
Identifying social capital based on social relationships appears controversial. The 
problem that the above presented references disclose is that most of the 
relationship-based theories on social capital seem to coin a notion that overlaps 
with other social phenomena. Therefore, definitions that concentrate on the 
structure that social capital constitutes will be examined below. 
 
Certain definitions of social capital consider the vertical relationships. From a 
sociological perspective Coleman (1988, 1990) examines social capital in three 
forms – as obligations and expectations, flow of information and presence of 
norms. Focusing on the hierarchy and the unequal distribution of power among 
the members of associations (Coleman 1990:598) and among groups, he suggests 
that the structure facilitates not only the individuals, but also the corporate actors 
and therefore the inter-group relationships should not be ignored in favour of the 
interpersonal ones. Depending on its characteristics and its applications, social 
capital might appear beneficial to some and useless or harmful to others. Social 
capital has a complex character and a capacity to enable the achievement of goals 
‘that in its absence would not be possible’ (Coleman 1988:S98). 
 
According to Uphoff social capital is an ‘accumulation of various types of social, 
psychological, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount 
of probability of mutual beneficial co-operative behaviour that is productive for 
others, not just one's self’ (Uphoff 2000:216). The relationships, networks, and 
associations or the institutional structures that exist among members, Uphoff 
identifies as structural social capital. It refers both to horizontal - existing among 
equals - and to vertical relationships, stemming from hierarchical or unequal 
relations due to differences in power or resource bases. The second type, the 
cognitive social capital, which underlies the visible, ‘material’ forms, reflects the 
values, norms, civic responsibility, expected reciprocity, charity, altruism, and 
trust. 
 
The above presented definitions encompass the horizontal and vertical networks 
of the social structure as well as the norms and relationships that build their 
fabrics. It is thus important to recognise that social capital does not exist per se. 
As a social phenomenon, it is not isolated from processes in the human world, 
determined by the respective macro-framework within which they have been 
developing. The horizontal and vertical relationships are a projection of the 
particular socio-political context and economic environment. Therefore, to 
understand and define social capital it is necessary to take into account parameters 
as government, legislation, markets, and development actors (Colletta & Cullen 
2000:11). Another factor that has a definite impact over social capital 
development is culture, both at micro- and macro-level – establishing values, 
determining and justifying the general socio-political perspective at the latter.  
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Civil and political liberties play an important role for social capital development. 
Therefore, according to Douglas North (1990) and Mancur Olson (1982) the 
institutional environment – which in many cases would be the state (Narayan 
1999) – should also be considered. The effectiveness of the state appears an 
important factor for understanding social capital as civic engagement, 
characterised by cross-cutting ties that link individuals and groups. A strong civil 
society operating within a weak state environment would not promote growth 
since it would substitute for the state inadequacies. In contrast, a well-functioning 
state complemented by a high level of civil engagement enables social and 
economic development. 
 
To summarise, the micro-approach to social capital focuses on the value of 
collective action and on the subjective factors that can motivate individuals to 
cooperate formally (by joining associations) or informally in order to attain 
certain objectives (Franke 2005:2). The other elements considered important 
within this discourse are the behaviour of the actors involved and their perception 
of collective issues (cultural beliefs and influences, etc.) 
 
While micro-level social capital appears as ‘cognitive’ or as ‘the potential of the 
co-operative strategies (groups, associations, etc.) to strengthen collective 
capacities’ (Franke 2005:2), on meso-level it can be referred to as ‘structural’ 
(Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001), taking into account the potential of social 
networks to produce resources such as information and support (Portes 1998). 
Examining the structures that enable co-operation, the meso-approach endues 
instrumental value to social capital and takes for its determinants the social 
networks and the types of interactions within and among them. As a 
resource/product emerging from the horizontal and vertical social ties, social 
capital is neither an individual nor a collective property (benefit), but both. 
 
With the focus on the value of integration and social cohesion, the macro-
approach to social capital emphases the environmental, social, and political 
structures that enable or impede social engagement and civic and political 
participation (Franke 2005:2). As a product of these structures and thus a 
collective benefit (Putnam 2001), social capital is seen as dependant upon the 
willingness of the individuals to get involved in civic life and on the trust and 
reciprocity inspired by the institutions.  
 
To complete the theoretical frameworks of the social capital concept and to put it 
in the perspective of post-conflict reconstruction practice, it is important to look at 
the definitions adopted by some of the major reconstruction players for their 
operational purposes. In its theoretical and practical work, the World Bank refers 
to social capital as a combination of cognitive (micro), structural (meso) and 
institutional (macro) elements. As one of the most active reconstruction agencies 
in the field, the Bank explores the ways social capital operates in specific 
development situations through a number of small-scale case studies. Therefore, 
‘given the variety of political, organisational, cultural and other contexts in the 
countries of intervention, the World Bank preferred model for addressing social 
capital has been based in the importance of the contextual variables as a 
determining factor for collective action’ (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001). 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) uses 
social capital as a marker of well-being, measured in turn through four major 
indicators: social participation, social support, social networks, and civic 
participation (Franke 2005). According to the OECD, the concept refers to 
networks together with shared norms, values, and understandings that facilitate 
co-operation within or among groups (Cote & Healy 2001:47). This definition 
also presupposes that social capital can manifest differently depending on the 
context and the issues involved.  
 
Emphasising the practical aspect of theory, research initiatives in UK, Canada, 
and Australia have also focused their efforts on studying the concept of social 
capital (Franke 2005). The Office of National Statistics in UK has adopted a 
pragmatic macro-approach to the concept, based on its social integration value in 
five major dimensions: 1) participation, social engagement and commitment; 2) 
control, self efficacy, 3) perception of community; 4) social interaction, social 
networks and social support; 5)trust, reciprocity and social cohesion. Aiming at 
making the concept operational and thus more useful for public policy, the 
Australian initiative addresses social capital as based on social networks, 
distinguishing between the concept itself and its effects. This approach builds 
upon the four interrelated types of capital: natural, economic, human, and social.  
 
The empirical analysis in the public sector performed by these statistical agencies, 
reveals that social capital is widely documented, but understood as an end-result 
rather than as an explanatory variable for socio-economic outcomes. By contrast, 
the goal of the current research is to establish the role of social capital in the post-
ethnic-conflict reconstruction process as a factor for achieving better socio-
economic outcomes. Therefore, in the following section the text will attempt to 
consider the micro-, meso-, and macro-approaches and their objects of analysis126 
in their interaction, in order to achieve a more comprehensive view of social 
capital.   
 
1.3 Towards a comprehensive model of social capital 
 
The lack of theoretical and methodological clarity has motivated researchers to 
attempt to produce a model of social capital that encompasses its different 
dimensions and manifestations. The Social Capital Assessment Tool, or SCAT 
(Krishna & Shrader 1999; Figure 7), was developed after studying a number of 
methodological approaches drawing upon empirical studies. This analytical 
framework does not neglect the need for contextualisation of social capital. 
Identifying some broad but constant categories for establishing the general 
framework, it accepts that the precise selection of sub-categories would be 
context-specific. For example, if horizontal or vertical organisations, types of 
networks, as well as norms and values determine the fields of analysis, their 
underlying elements, and specific features will be determined by the respective 
cultural domain. As the authors emphasise, what constitutes social capital in one 
context, might be unsocial in another (Krishna & Shrader 1999:6).  
                                                 
126 The micro-, meso- and macro-approaches to social capital are interested respectively in the 
nature and forms of co-operative behaviour, the structures that enable co-operation and the 
favourable or unfavourable conditions for co-operation (Franke 2005:1). 
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As a field-tested set of indicators and methodologies, measuring the levels of 
structural and cognitive social capital, SCAT is, in the words of its designers, a 
step towards the development of a uniform measure for social capital. Developed 
from qualitative and quantitative data and research instruments derived from 26 
studies in 15 countries worldwide, it helps determine certain baseline levels of 
social capital, observe the progress of project implementation, and analyse the 
relationship between development indicators and social capital accumulation.  
 
Elaborated upon data collected from communities – the designated beneficiaries 
of development projects - the assessment tool is only partially relevant to the field 
of interest of the current research defined as reconstruction of post-ethnic-conflict 
societies. Limiting its focus only to the structural and cognitive social capital at 
the micro-level, and the ways that they interact within the community, the SCAT 
leaves aside the macro-level indicators and thus the possibility to understand the 





Figure 7: SCAT Conceptual Framework: Levels and Types of Social Capital  












Figure 8: Grootaert & van Bastelaer’s Model of Social Capital  






Similarly to the SCAT conceptual framework for assessing social capital, the one 
designed by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001) incorporates the findings of 
different studies.127 The complex model of social capital built reveals its 
simultaneous manifestation at the different levels and in variety of forms. While 
the SCAT figure presents the macro- institutional context of formal relationships 
and structures as encompassing the micro-level of cognitive and structural social 
capital, Grootaert and van Bastelaer’s is developed as a four-dimensional co-
ordination system, where levels and forms of social capital intersect. 
 
In comparison to the SCAT model, which examines structural and cognitive forms 
of social capital only at micro-level, Grootaert and van Bastelaer develop the 
framework further and identify the manifestations of the two forms at macro-
level. Engaging with Uphoff's theory, Grootaert argues that the structural social 
capital appears a relatively objective and observable construct based on 
established roles, social networks and other social structures supplemented by 
rules, procedures, and precedents. The cognitive social capital in comparison, 
referring to shared norms and values, appears a more subjective and intangible 
concept (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001:6). 
 
Furthermore, Grootaert and van Bastelaer suggest that even in interaction, the two 
forms of social capital can be complementary but are not necessarily 
interdependent. Personal cognitive bonds might not develop into structural social 
capital, as well as the existence of community associations does not imply strong 
interpersonal relations among its members. Social interaction however could 
                                                 
127 E.g. Olson (1982), Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993a), Fukuyama (1995), Uphoff (1996) 
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promote a basis for constitution of social capital through the persistence of its 
effects at either or both levels (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001:7). 
 
In contrast to the majority of the definitions, the two discussed here adopt a rather 
comprehensive approach to social capital, addressing simultaneously various 
elements of its manifestation. Critics may argue that such a multi-dimensional 
perspective creates a rather broad and vague concept. The interconnected levels 
and elements of social capital however need to be examined, as a change in a 
component would affect the entire system, either positively or negatively.  
 
All the elements of the social capital system, as introduced by the two models, 
should correspond to the macro-level. The macro-unit determines the scope of the 
matrix and all of the elements it encompasses. In a post-conflict reconstruction 
context, this implies that the macro-unit of reconstruction will pre-set the scope 
and the types of the areas of interest. Referring to the Grootaert-van Bastelaer 
model of social capital, if the goal of the reconstruction process is to (re-)create a 
stable and prosperous state, then the elements presented in the matrix would also 
refer to the institution of the state. The macro-cognitive element of governance 
would imply ‘state governance’, the micro-structural element of local institutions 
and networks would be congruent with those existing at the national (state) level, 
and the micro-cognitive trust and local norms and values should sustain an 
understanding of the people as citizens, i.e. state-members. The same principle 
also applies if the SCAT matrix is used. 
 
The situation after a violent ethnic conflict appears rather interesting if projected 
through the above-introduced models (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 below). 
Considering first the four-dimensional matrix (Figure 9), at the macro-structural 
level there would be the political unit, recognised by the international community. 
This might be the pre-conflict state with all or most of its territories, a new 
political entity, formed during the struggles and recognised as independent by the 
international community, or a secessionist region with a special after-war status. 
The macro-cognitive level of governance however can have two dimensions. The 
first one is the state, where usually during the process of post-conflict 
reconstruction certain national structures exist, whose efficiency is often doubtful, 
supported by, and in certain cases subject to a degree to, the institutionalised 
international presence. Although national governance might be present in the 
post-ethnic-conflict environment, it is quite likely that it remains only a concept – 
structures with no real capacities and power to move the process in a desired 
direction.  
 
Real governance in the case of a fragmented and war-traumatised society rests 
with local networks and institutions, i.e. at the micro-structural level. These local 
structures however are limited to the particular community formed during or after 
the conflict along one or another line of separation and constituted upon exclusive 
bonding ties they are likely to restrict membership. The different local (ethnic) 
networks and institutions do not seek interaction and quite often are hostile to 
each other. In this context, trust and norms at the micro-cognitive level are present 
only among the members of each ‘community’ and not across the members of the 
different groups. The state becomes an abstract and ‘hostile’ entity, run by 
foreigners through their local ‘puppets’. This lack of trust in the institutions of the 
state prevents the emergence of any affiliations with the state. A counterpoint of 
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the state appears the super-ethnic structure – the dream of a homogeneous national 
state, powered by the governance of myths and ethnic ideologies that political 
entrepreneurs use for their purposes.  
 
The situation one could observe in a post-ethnic-conflict environment is a 
‘mirrored’ model, as presented in Figure 10. The number of (politically) 
determined communities can multiply the mirrored section. In the figure below 
the model has been simplified for clarity, presenting only one mirrored structure.  
 
 
Figure 9: Social Capital of a Divided Society (model 1) 
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The same reflections are valid also for the SCAT model. Graphically, the distorted 





Figure 10: Social Capital of a Divided Society (model 2) 
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While the macro-level has been disconnected from its core, the micro-level has 
been embraced by a para-macro ethnic structure. In the case of a heterogeneous 
society, the number of these micro-levels would again correspond to the number 
of the existing politically defined ethnic groups. 
 
All of this is to say, that the most common mistake of the international 
involvement in the process of reconstruction is the presumption that once the 
formal state institutions are restored, the state-machine eventually will start 
functioning. In a ‘traditional’ post-conflict situation, such expectations would be 
realistic, because the micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels would have been 
preserved, and not fragmented into closed and hostile units. The war-traumatised 
citizens would still be citizens! In the case of the ethnic conflict however, the war 
and/or the survival mechanisms have forced the majority of citizens to become 
members of ethnic communities.  
 
In the case of artificially supported statehood, the latter simply reinforces existing 
ethnic identities and motivates people to get rid of the imposed but not 
internalised affiliations. Since there is no micro-level affiliated with the macro-
level of the state emerging from an ethnic conflict, it means that the state has no 
citizens, but only inhabitants. Therefore, immediately after an ethnic conflict, any 
efforts that require the involvement of citizens and civil society at the level of 
state are more likely to fail. Before launching programmes to support and enhance 
civil society, it is necessary that bridging ties are restored, social cohesion (re-) 
enabled and investments in linking state-level social capital made. Only then, it is 
likely that ethnic members become willing to identify themselves not only as 
belonging to a certain ethnic, cultural, or religious group, but also with the larger 
political unit as citizens.  
 
This is where the importance of addressing social capital rebuilding in the early 
stages of the reconstruction process lies, especially if the ultimate aim is the 
establishment of a stable and prosperous (heterogeneous) state. For a programme 
 113
to be successful, it is essential that the elements addressed in all of the four 
quadrants (Figure 9) are of respective scope128. If the ethnically (culturally, or 
religiously) determined micro-level becomes a foundation of a new construction, 
the political unit built over is likely to emerge upon non-civil principles, rather 
than as based upon a civil social contract. When the reconstruction goal is the 
establishment of a civil and democratic state, then the micro-level demands rather 
focussed attention, while the macro-level would serve as a point of reference. 
Reconstructing social capital in this context means enabling co-operation among 
people and development in general, by creating an environment within which 
tolerance, will for co-operation and integration, interest in the common future and 
the common good and social cohesion can re-emerge. To summarise, the macro-
unit chosen as a unit of reconstruction would determine the appropriate strategies 
and action and would serve as a point of reference for their effectiveness. 
Supportive of the ideas expressed above appears one of the research 
recommendations made by Colletta and Cullen that the model of social capital 
employed should match the desired outcomes. ‘For instance, if the goal is to 
produce recommendations for government action, the social capital paradigm 
should include aspects of organisational integrity and synergy, with a focus of all 
four dimensions on the degree of social cohesiveness and subsequent management 
of conflict’ (Colletta & Cullen 2000:132).  
 
 
2. BUILDING AN INTEGRATIVE ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 The role of social capital 
 
Different studies attribute different functions to social capital. Some forms may 
contribute to social cohesion, while others are more likely to spur social 
fragmentation; some can be a source of mutual aid and protection, others simply 
enable the mobilisation for violence (Colletta & Cullen 2000:93). By bridging and 
mitigating exclusive relations, social capital can prevent conflicts, but it has also a 
potential to reinforce exclusionary bonds (like those within gangs and extremist 
ethnic groups). Social capital can complement provisions of basic protection or 
safety nets, bring about greater safety, social inclusion, and economic 
participation, or substitute for state and market failures (Colletta & Cullen 
2000:93), but it is by no means a panacea and not necessarily a societal good 
(Woolcock 2001).  
 
Social capital is a change-generating mechanism (Bayat 2005:2). It can mobilise 
resources and distribute them within society, but agents of reconstruction have to 
be sensitive to the particular context as well as to the complexity and the 
multidimensionality of the task, in order to achieve positive economic, political, 
and social outcomes.  
 
                                                 
128 Looking at the SCAT model (Figure 10), then the elements of the disconnected core (micro-
level) and periphery (macro-level) should also be of a corresponding scope.  
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Performing in various fields129, social capital has the capacity to generate 
beneficial externalities (Grootaert & van Bastelaer 2001) and facilitate collective 
action. Trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity play an essential role in forming 
people’s opportunities and choices and hence influence their behaviour and 
development (Putnam 2000:296-306). Underlying social relations, they enable the 
flow of information within networks, facilitating in this way the achieving of 
goals. Norms and their enforcing networks provide institutional mechanisms for 
ensuring compliance of individuals with community130. Within an environment 
that facilitates investments in beneficial kinds of social capital, collective 
problems can be resolved more easily131 (Putnam 2000) and members can use 
their social resources for addressing their own needs. 
 
Social cohesion is another characteristic of community life, which is directly 
dependant on social capital. Projecting the extent to which people work together 
to achieve various objectives (Reimer 2002:14), it is an attribute of society only 
when people interact regardless of their origin or status. A cohesive society is 
highly conducive for economic growth and development, because different groups 
cooperate in pursue of common goals. Inter-group bonds, intra-community ties 
and the links that connect the communities with the state are the determinants of 
social cohesion. Domination or scarcity of any of these manifestations of social 
capital may lead to the exclusion of groups, often along ethnic or caste lines 
(Putnam 2000). While the bonding social capital can reinforce closed identities 
and homogeneous groups and thus under-gird specific reciprocity and mobilise 
solidarity, the bridging networks function as a kind of sociological superglue, 
generating broader identities and reciprocity, and providing better linkage to 
external  assets and information diffusion (Putnam 2000:22-23).  
 
The development of social capital can bring about specific advantages and 
instruments for achieving policy-related objectives, such as increasing stocks of 
human and financial capital (Schuller 2001). Well-functioning local networks and 
attitudes of mutual trust enable group decisions and implementation of collective 
actions. Thus, civic engagement resulting from strong and functioning social 
capital can strengthen state institutions. The latter, in turn, create an environment 
in which civic engagement is likely to thrive (Feldman & Assaf 1999:4) Weak, 
hostile, or indifferent governments have a different effect on community life, than 
do governments that respect civil liberties, uphold the rule of law, and resist 
corruption (Woolcock & Narayan 2000:226). A strong social capital can 
compensate for absent or weak institutions by the creation of informal 
organisations (Narayan 1999).  
 
Increasing the levels of interpersonal trust and enabling participation of 
individuals in social networks and labour market, social capital may have positive 
effects on economic performance and development (Fafchamps and Minten 2002, 
                                                 
129 Woolcock & Narayan (2000) identify nine primary fields of social capital ‘performance’. These 
are families and youth behaviour, schooling and education, community life (virtual and civic), 
work and organisations, democracy and governance, collective action, public health and 
environment, crime and violence, and economic development. 
130 Social pressures and fear of exclusion are among the mechanisms that control behaviour of 
individuals for meeting established standards. 
131 Studies suggest that social capital also has the potential to improve quality of individuals’ life, 
income and welfare, to lower crime, and to provide better child or health care (Putnam 2000:331) 
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Knack and Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 2000:319-325). Trust enables 
co-operation, reduces transaction costs between people, and liberates resources. 
The obligations created on mutually agreed rules, norms, and sanctions, supports 
reciprocity and exchange, generate confidence to invest in collective or group 
activities. High levels of social capital ensure that group interests will be placed 
above individual ones, but with respect for individual rights132. 
 
Until the 1990s, the theoretical approaches held rather narrow, even contradictory, 
views about the role of social relationships in economic development133 
(Woolcock & Narayan 2000). The traditional developmental policy-making 
changed with the understanding that a society could generate mechanisms to 
reduce transaction and to control costs within productive systems (Montaes et al. 
2004). Density of voluntarily associations (Putnam 1993), nature and extent of 
social interactions, became recognised as key factors for shaping economic 
performance134 (Woolcock & Narayan 2000).  
 
Natural, physical, and human capital, determine economic growth, but the 
different patterns of development depend on the social capital. Countries with 
similar structures of natural, physical, and human capital can have different levels 
of economic performance depending on the variations of the existing social 
capital with its respective components135 (Grootaert 1998:1). Social capital shapes 
the quality and quantity of social interactions, enables people to build 
communities and to cooperate (WB 1999, Cohen & Prusak 2001:4). The 
improved co-ordination among people has a direct impact upon functioning of 
markets (Putnam et al. 1993, Grootaert 1998:7). Networks can even substitute for 
rule of law and formal court system (Grootaert 1998:12), while hierarchical 
associations based on clan or intergenerational relationships can ensure local 
stability and security, which in its turn would improve economic activity.  
 
The collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, leading to 
a collapse in trust and forcing people to rely on local networks and informal 
associations is a good illustration of the importance of macro-level social capital. 
In a context of ethnic diversity, increased civil strife and political instability can 
lead to social disintegration that eventually dissolves social capital. As Grootaert 
points out: ‘ethnically fragmented societies are prone to competitive rent-seeking 
behaviour by the different ethnic groups and have difficulty agreeing on public 
                                                 
132 It also implies multiple membership, high organisational density, and cross-organisational links 
(Pretty & Ward 2001). Organisational stability and shared understanding in their turn lead to 
greater coherence of action (Cohen & Prusak 2001:10) and to better and just allocation of 
resources among groups and individuals (Smith, M.K. 2007). 
133 Whole in the 1950s and 1960s the traditional social relationships and ways of life were 
considered impediments to development, in the 1970s these were regarded as primary mechanism 
of capitalist exploitation, which resulted in overestimating the virtues of isolationism and self-
sufficiency of local communities (Woolcock & Narayan 2000:227). In the 1980s and early 1990s 
neoclassical and public choice theorists focused on the strategic choices of rational individuals 
interacting under various time and constraints, held that groups existed primarily to lower the 
transaction costs of exchange. 
134 Education, training, and health as well as the possibility to cooperate are among the 
determinants for the successful utilisation of resources (Woolcock 2001:3). 
135 Economic performance might differ depending on government policies enabling efficiency, 
exchange of information and cooperation with industry, density of voluntarily associations, 
security force, council of clan elders, and joint management (Grootaert 1998:1). 
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goods like education, infrastructure and good policies’ (Grootaert 1998:17). 
Woolcock however argues that ethnic fractionalisation per se is not a problem and 
diversity sometimes can be even an asset (like for example in US, Canada, and 
Australia). A situation of ripping conflict might appear when large ethnic groups 
become competitive in an environment of weak public institutions (Woolcock 
2001:7) 
 
There are beneficial and harmful types of social capital136 (Carroll 2001:11-13). 
The bonding type of social capital for example can also exclude or divide 
people137. Sometimes groups constrain their own members, but sometimes, when 
membership promotes self or group interests, social capital takes the form of a 
restricted, rather than a public good. Strong bonding ties can reduce contacts 
between communities and even enable potential adverse consequences by 
restricting the access to the labour market and other opportunities. Actions of 
groups, based on strong internal bonds, can have socially negative outcomes138. 
The asymmetries in access to power lead to monopolies, oppressions, and 
exclusions by highly organized groups. Community members usually do not 
benefit as much from this considerable social capital (Kerns & Forrest 2000) and 
the effects for the broader society are usually negative (Carroll 2001:11-13). 
Weak or indifferent governments have also negative effects on community life 
and development (Woolcock 2001:5). They can even contribute to the social 
conflict, not being able to compensate for the unequal distribution of benefits139 
(Woolcock 1998, Carroll 2001:11-13).  
 
Although it might not lead to ‘public bads’ social capital will not necessarily bring 
societal good. Putnam (2000) acknowledges the tyranny of social capital in the 
form of social control140, the effects of which are not always positive. Portes 
(1998:15-18) identified four further examples of negative consequences. The 
exclusion of outsiders (1) results from the same strong ties that bring benefits to 
members of a group and commonly enable it to bar others from access (Waldinger 
1995; Portes 1998). Under certain circumstances, group or community closure 
may prevent the success of business initiatives by individuals. As early as in the 
1920s Weber ([1922] 1965) points out that the successful entrepreneurial requires 
impersonal economic transactions guided by the principle of universalism as 
opposed to the excess claims on group members. (2) Closed traditional 
communities might have negative implications for initiative and entrepreneurship 
                                                 
136 On this issue, the works of Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam bear most criticism, because they 
have failed to consider the negative potential of social capital and the respective consequences or 
effects (Portes 1998). 
137 Bridging, i.e. ‘cross-cutting ties’ can counteract the adverse effects of certain bonding 
relationships (Carroll 2001: xii) 
138 Intolerance, hatred, and violence toward others characterise closed groups like street gangs, 
mafias, or the Ku Klux Klan, for example (Carroll 2001:11-13; Harper 2001:12). Organised crime 
also possesses strong bonding ‘criminal capital’. 
139 The social value of associations is not static. Immigrants can benefit from the support of the 
ethnic community, advancing economically they would need access to new networks beyond the 
original community. Social capital will then expand to extra-ethnic networks. As a result from an 
inadequate social integration, the Chinese ethnic immigrants in Indonesia have successfully 
established networks highly beneficial to members, which have become a source of serious social 
tensions and conflicts in the society at large (Woolcock 1998).    
140 Social capital in the forms of social norms and beliefs can encourage compliance with local 
rules and customs and thus reduce the need for formal controls (Portes 1998). 
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(Geertz 1963). (3) Community or group participation creates demands for 
conformity, which can be quite restrictive of personal freedoms, individual 
initiative, and human capital accumulation (Woolcock 1998 11-13, Carroll 
2001:11-13). In such situations, activated downward levelling norms (4) keep 
members of a downtrodden group in place and force the more ambitious to escape 
from it.  
 
Among the most specific problematic outcomes of an ethnic conflict is that 
productive social interactions occur mostly within closed groups and not across 
them. Established macro-frameworks lack respective functioning micro-levels – a 
post-ethnic-conflict state appears as a puzzle of units and relationships of different 
‘calibres’ and sometimes of opposing principles and values. Therefore, in contrast 
to ‘traditional’ post-war settings, where investments in the macro-level would 
have positive effects, after an ethnic conflict it is essential that the micro-level is 
properly addressed. Micro- and macro-levels require separate, but ‘synchronised’ 
efforts. Therefore, among the conflict resolution mechanisms, the development 
assistance must focus on the establishment and support of civil institutions that cut 
across traditional bonding ties (Colletta & Cullen 2000:94).  
 
The number of civil society organisations per se is not an indicator for the 
existence of integrative social capital (Colletta & Cullen 2002). If relations 
created by the different types of organisations forming a civil society were 
exclusionary, they would not have the potential to prevent violent acts of hate-
politics. Social cohesion is therefore critical for societies to prosper economically 
and for development to be sustainable (WB 1999).  
 
If social cohesion is the ‘extent to which people act collectively to achieve their 
valued outcomes’, the question then is how to create grounds for such a collective 
action, overcoming the boundaries of the closed ethnic group, how to create or 
introduce common pragmatic bonds that would become dominant over the ethnic 
divides. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, among the most important 
features of social capital is that it presents a basis of ‘civicness’. 
 
Reflecting upon the model by Grootaert and van Bastelaer, if the goal of 
reconstruction is to (re-)constructed the macro-level of a (democratic) state, the 
efforts at the micro-level should be directed towards bringing back the ‘citizens’ 
to the socio-political scene. Having the national state as a macro-level component, 
at micro-level there should be the component of ‘citizens’. Alternatively, if the 
ethnic identity appears as the largest unit at the micro-level, then at the respective 
macro-level would be the element of ‘ethnic community’.  
 
Therefore, if the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction is to stabilise and develop 
a state, then the reconstruction of the state-citizenship and social capital must be 
among the first elements to address. To (re-)build a social capital at a state level, 
grounds for motivated integration, new social contract, and citizenship rules 
should be established and promoted. Only later, the (re)building of a civil society 




2.2 Identification of elements/sectors for reconstruction 
 
A state emerging from an ethnic conflict might emerge as a political unit, which is 
predominantly homogeneous in terms of ethnic, religious, or cultural affiliation of 
the population141. When it is not possible to constitute such a homogeneous 
(national) community, ex-combatants and/or hostile groups have to find grounds 
for coexistence. Reconstruction strategies should take into account these two 
different types of macro-frameworks when developing their programmes. While 
in the first case, the degree of integration among people might be even higher than 
before the conflict, in the second case it is likely that efforts to bring back people 
together face strong resistance and suspicion. (Re-)building a multi-ethnic state 
after an ethnic conflict is a challenging task because it is quite likely that any pre-
existing formal social contract establishing a supra-ethnic citizenship, has been 
lost in the course of the ethnic struggles.  
 
The first type of macro-framework allows implementation of established post-
conflict practices, because the state would need support mostly for building or 
repairing the political and economic infrastructures. In the second case, the 
fragmented and ‘resized’ micro-levels within the boundaries of the larger political 
unit need to be reconnected to the macro-level of reconstruction (the multi-ethnic 
state) and eventually integrated. This does not imply that people have to discard 
their identities and their ethnic, cultural or any other affiliations. Nested identities 
can even contribute to the establishment of a formal social contract that respects 
diversity and prevents their transformation into grounds for discrimination. Only 
such a formal social contract can become a proper basis for promoting democratic 
values and principles and for ensuring their further accumulation.  
 
A balanced socio-political structure is a precondition for enabling the achievement 
of lasting peace and stable development. The scope of the social order, or the 
above-introduced ‘macro-framework’, depends on the scope or validity of its 
founding conventions - local, regional, or international. Therefore, it is necessary 
that any conventions set be accepted as fundamental principles throughout the 
respective political unit. If the reconstruction unit is a ‘state’, then the overall 
compact should be at ‘state’ level enabling connections among people based on 
shared values and ideas. As it was shown earlier in the text, the problem that the 
post-conflict reconstruction of fragmented societies faces is that at state level  
there are different (often opposing) social compacts of established ethnic, cultural, 
religious or other units. The situation becomes even more complex when, despite 
no suitable conditions being present at grass-root level, reconstruction actors 
attempt to impose democratic values. When local understandings and traditions 
contradict international norms and values, a cultural clash can be expected. This 
would eventually impede co-operation between the sides and reduce the chances 
for successful implementation of planned programmes.  
 
Given that peace and development are among the ultimate goals of post-conflict 
reconstruction, it is a necessity that local communities are involved in the 
processes designed and implemented by the external (international) actors. Clash 
between local and international interests, visions for the future, and chosen 
                                                 
141 It can emerge as a result of actions of non-democratic power-institutions, of successful local 
separatist actions (Kosovo), or formally constituted by external forces (Israel). 
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approaches will definitely have negative effects on the entire process. A society 
united by force and not by rights, would fracture in the very first moment when 
the unification factor weakens or disappears. The post-conflict social contract has 
to be built on conventions accepted by local communities and not imported and 
imposed from outside. Political leaders can also contribute to the process by 
activating ignored, forgotten, or neglected possibilities and links that exist among 
people. In an appropriate context, they can mobilise public activity as well as 
social integration around an idea or against a common threat. When none of these 
conditions are present however, the reconstruction process is likely to fail because 
the external agents would not have a counterpart in their efforts aimed at 
establishing lasting peace and economic stability.  
 
The formulation of a new social contract and the recognition of its principles by 
all members of the political unit emerging from a violent conflict, can take place 
only if there are conditions creating an integrative environment and enabling the 
post-conflict reconstruction of social cohesion and capital. One of the most 
important preconditions in this respect is the containment of any identity politics 
based on exclusion or on different rules from the agreed. De-politicisation of 
cultural identities can occur if there are conditions that motivate and support the 
identity transformation. Strong state institutions promoting inclusive national 
affiliation and universal citizenship laws are also crucial for diminishing the 
political relevance of any cultural background. In other words, the rules of 
political participation and allocation of resources are underlying any demographic 
and economic stability, as well as the power-balance (Crawford 1998b).  
 
Strong state institutions can counteract any possible efforts by political 
entrepreneurs to use cultural origin as a resource for developing forms of 
exclusive nationalism and for inciting communal conflicts, by promising benefits 
in exchange for supporters’ ‘loyalty’. In addition to the institutional factors that 
can weaken the political relevance of cultural identities, an integrative political 
system can foster national allegiances through welfare programmes, upholding of 
legal equality and equal economic opportunities142. Political will, justice and 
human rights, and media support are among the most important success factors for 
achieving an integrative post-conflict environment. This perspective emphasises 
that social capital can be fostered by focusing on socially owned forms, such as 
education, health, or technology-transfer services (Colletta et al. 1998:9). On the 
other hand, a lack of such factors can seriously hamper the efforts to rebuild trust 
among civil society and other institutions143. 
 
Co-operation between state and civil society actors in building and maintaining 
synergetic relations, and between the local and international organisations provide 
                                                 
142 In Germany the Constitution obliges the state to protect individual rights of residents regardless 
to their citizenship (Crawford 1998b) 
143 Development intervention is not likely to be efficient if it is not supported by respective 
political processes. Examples for this interconnectedness can be spotted in the cases of the 
reoccurrence of violence in 1994 in the West Bank and Gaza, after the launch of the peace process 
in 1993; the complication of the rebuilding of civil society due to the human rights and justice 
issues in Post-genocide Rwanda (1994); the negative role that media can play during a 
reconstruction period, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even after the Dayton Peace Accord, the 
media continued to operate as it had during the conflict, refuelling tensions and posed a potential 
threat to rehabilitation and the restoration of social capital (Colletta, Cullen & Forman 1998:10) 
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fruitful grounds for social capital accumulation. Building and reinforcing the 
capacity of local membership groups and organisations along with building 
support linkages beyond and above the community are crucial for the process of 
restoring the war-damaged societal structure (Carroll 2001).  
 
Developing further these conceptions, Reychler (1999) explains the differences in 
the peace-development processes with differences in the installation of the peace-
building blocks144. The prevailing conceptual framework of the peace-building 
practice of the international community tends to neglect ‘subjective’ issues such 
as reconciliation, political commitment, and trust building and to put the emphasis 
on the installing of peace structures and institutions (Reychler 2002:3). To 
establish an integrative post-conflict environment, reconstruction efforts should be 
directed six different areas (Reychler 2002). These are: 
 
1. Human security – subjective feelings of security as opposed of the objective 
threats or feelings of insecurity 
2. Reconciliation  
3. Political commitment – promoting multiple loyalties and inclusiveness as 
opposed to the exclusive loyalties and ‘we’ versus ‘they’ structures 
4. Senti-mental walls – identified, lowered or dismantled, which enables  
mindsets to open up 
5. Social capital – feelings that one can trust others, willingness to cooperate as 
opposed to the distrust and lack of will for co-operation 
6. Future perspectives – hope and expectations for common future as opposed to  
defeatism and despair  
 
An important factor for the establishment of integrative post-conflict environment 
is the political commitment to promote the idea of ‘unity in diversity’, i.e. 
tolerance towards views, opinions, and convictions, which after ethnic conflict is 
particularly low. Promoting multiple loyalties and instrumental attachments that 
differ at the different levels can eventually enable the development of an overall 
feeling of togetherness and of inclusive membership and hence it can have a 
positive effects on the peace process (Reychler 2002). Overcoming the exclusive 
affiliations and any negative stereotypes that inhibit the development of 
overlapping loyalties is therefore crucial for enabling (re)integration. The 
reconstruction process should therefore aim at promoting mutually compatible 
and reinforcing identities and fostering the development of an overarching 
common identity despite the limited interethnic interaction. Reychler (2002) 
identifies education, sport, and culture as crucial factors for enabling and aiding a 
nation building process. The most important however are the legislative and 
political structures that can entail collective rights and freedoms, and cultivate 
respect for different religious, linguistic, social, and political identities. 
 
The establishment of an integrative environment is also dependant on the ability 
of individuals to overcome negative stereotypes and prejudices related to ‘the 
others’, reconcile with the past and coexist with the former enemies. The process 
of demolishing the senti-mental walls, using Reychler’s terminology, is not an 
                                                 
144 According to Reychler, peace-building block are for example: quality of negotiation, 
consolidation of democracy, security arrangements, external support, focusing his attention on the 
integrative nature of the political psychological climate (Reychler 2002). 
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easy task, because such exist not only in victims and offenders, but also in actors 
like third parties or analysts. According to Reychler, the concept of senti-mental 
walls ranges from perceptions and expectations to strategic analyses, values, and 
social psychological pressures. Despite their variety and the differences145, they 
all have the same negative effect, impeding the sustainable peace-building.  
 
Overcoming mental barriers is a prerequisite for re-constructing trust and 
reciprocity of material and non-material exchanges, which is crucial for enabling 
coexistence and co-operation among members of the war-traumatised society. 
Hope-rising mechanisms are vital for achieving a positive change. Activating the 
‘anticipatory principle’ could enable the emergence of this affirmative basis of 
organising (Reychler 2002:8).  
 
Among the most important resource for generating constructive organisational 
change or improvement however is the individuals’ vision and expectations about 
the future. The prospects for an attractive common future can guide persons and 
organisations, as well as mobilise support and/or action. The establishment of an 
integrative environment could not happen if individuals do not perceive 
themselves as members of a single society with compatible visions and interest in 
the common living.  
 
Bringing people together after experienced violence and making them interact and 
cooperate for achieving a better future is a difficult task and quite often an 
impediment to many reconstruction efforts. The process of (re-)establishing social 
cohesion and generating social capital is a challenge, but ignoring its importance 
may have many negative consequences, especially in the context of post-ethnic-
conflict reconstruction. The next section will attempt to sketch the areas, which 
should be addressed by reconstruction programmes for societies divided along 
ethnic, cultural, or other non-disputable lines of separation. These areas have been 
identified on the basis of the indicators that theorists use for measuring social 
capital because having the capacity to reveal the quantity or quality of 
accumulated social capital they provide a solid basis for identification of the 
respective programme goals.  
 
While some authors believe that social capital, determined by historical factors 
and a by-product of other activities, cannot increase in the short term (Putnam et 
al. 1993, Schmid 2000, Dekker & Uslaner 2001), others insist that governmental, 
non-governmental organisations and other local and external civil society actors 
can contribute to its accumulation (Cernea 1993; Huntoon 2001; Mondal 2000). 
In pursue of the latter opinion, some possible social capital building mechanisms 
are outlined below. The dimensions of social capital reveal several focal areas146.  
                                                 
145 Reychler (2002:13) points out that different actors is likely to be burdened by different ‘senti-
mental’ walls, as for example: ‘Victims’ (despair, pluralistic ignorance, political inefficacy), 
‘Offenders’ (historical falsification, stereotyping, indifference, preference falsification and 
pluralistic ignorance), ‘Third parties’ (neutralism, passivity, non-intervention, cultural arrogance), 
‘Analysts’ (one-dimensional approach, elitist/biased analysis, wrong assessment of future 
developments) 
146 While Woolcock (1998) distinguishes four dimensions within his conceptual framework of 
social capital, Onyx and Bullen (2001) identify eight146. Approaching the problem from another 
perspective, Dekker & Uslaner (2001) stress that social capital components need to be treated as 
multi-dimensional rather than one-dimensional. 
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Table 6: Institutional Manifestations of Social Capital 










Irrigation associations, Water 
user groups, Forest protection 
committees 
Objective and transparent 
management of resources 
based on formal (non-ethnic) 




Association of producers, 
village committees 
Stimulation of multi-ethic 
enterprises and initiatives 
Informal sector 
support 
Association of vendors and 
merchants 






groups, family groups 
Unified curriculum: to develop 
a common knowledge base, 
promote tolerance, 
reconciliation, overarching 
civil identities and principles 
Child care and 
nutrition  
Mother groups, Women 
groups  
Policies avoiding any 
differentiation on ethnic basis
Urban 
development 
Urban neighbourhood groups Interest and civil groups to 





women groups, tribal groups 
Support to interest –based 
cooperation; promotion of 
larger inclusive associations 
Projects & 
programs 
Environment Environmental groups Protection of the ‘common’ 
goods and space 




Trust, honour code, watch 
dog groups, board of traders/ 
financial planners  
Formal & transparent rules, 





Trust, honour code, ‘watch 
dog’ and consumer groups 
Enabling of single market; 
customers protection  
Market 
operations 
Trade Trust, honour code Guaranteed common trade 
rules, free access to markets 




in the non-profit sector 
Enabling and stimulating 
cross-cutting and inter-




Political party groupings Support for non-ethnic 
parties, formal associations 




Disclosure groupings, press 
overseeing groups 
Enabling reconciliation and 
trust  
Governance 
Legal system Association of lawyers, self-
regulating boards 
Non-discriminative legal 
system with emphasis on the 
civil rights; punish 
 
 
Identifying the different dimensions of social capital and their main components is 
a precondition for proper designing of policies and programmes that correspond to 
specific societal conditions and needs. Table 6 (adapted from ADB 2001) lists the 
areas considered essential for social capital building and the respective social 
entities at micro-, meso- and macro-level, functioning as sources of social capital. 
Furthermore, it reveals that social capital has direct implications not only at 
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micro-level, but also for the market and governance macro-frameworks147. 
Capacity building efforts however are likely to be more successful if local social 
capital entities are engaged not only to support the processes, but also to take over 
the ownership of any planed initiatives. The last column presents some measures 
and basic principles that could contribute to reconstruction of social capital in a 
post-ethnic conflict context.  
 
Although developed within a different context, the Policy Research Initiative 
project (PRI 2003), provides an example for approaching social capital building at 
the targeted levels defined here as individual, community or national. While on 
the first level the programmes provide supports directly the individuals, at the 
community level the focus is placed on the establishment of various information 
networks, and on the national level – on civic education programmes, citizen 
forums, national volunteering or civic engagement initiatives.  
 
The great number of existing approaches and measures obstructs the possibility 
for a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of policies in place. 
However, projects that fail to consider the importance of building links among 
people and among communities, and focus only on meeting certain imminent 
needs, can easily reinforce societal exclusion and deprivation (PRI 2003, 
Campbell & McLean 2001).  
 
2.3 Including social capital into public policy - strategies for integration  
 
When shaping the structure of peace-building interventions, the nature of conflict 
that needs to become a basis for designing the relief, reconstruction, and 
reconciliation policies and programmes. The analysis of conflict and the related 
coping mechanisms map extant social capital relations and the types of social 
capital that may need to be encouraged or discouraged (Colletta & Cullen 
2000:85) 
 
Promoting and increasing civic participation, relationship between civil society 
and government, and evolution of democratic institutions, depend on the efforts to 
help people re-connect and/or to remain bonded by formal or informal social 
contracts. The PRI findings (2003) once again emphasise that there is an explicit 
need for policies to encourage a right balance of bonding with bridging and 
linking forms of social capital and for activities that at least do not harm any 
functioning social networks and norms. Building programmes and projects over 
existing forms of social capital can maximise the expected positive outcomes. The 
PRI (2003) identifies several dimensions that intervention programmes usually 
address. These are: 
 
¾ Development or mobilisation of social networks, social support structures, and 
local associations 
¾ Strengthening of ties among existing communities and social institutions/ 
organisations 
¾ Promotion of civic engagement (volunteering, civic participation) 
                                                 
147 Trust and honour code can play a significant role in number of market operations, while groups 
with high levels of social capital can easily make impact on governance. 
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¾ Development or access to information channels and links with political or 
economic power brokers and institutions 
 
Apart from these areas, seen as fruitful grounds for establishing and launching 
mechanisms for social integration, pillars of common living are also the 
institutions of media, education, sport, culture. Politics and economy can also play 
a positive role for social capital building, especially when they address shared 
problems and raise interest in the common future.  
 
Essential in post-war reconstruction are the collaborative efforts of international 
and local actors targeting the specific needs of a war-torn society. Reconstruction 
of economic, governmental, legal, and business structures should support the 
rebuilding of socially owned forms of capital like education, health, and 
technology-transfer services. Strengthening of social institutions and civil society 
and increasing citizen participation in reconstruction processes appear as 
important as the existence of a strong and legitimate government. Furthermore, 
any reconstruction of the judicial system must ensure the legal rights of the 
citizens, while investments in community should support the development of 
strong local ownership. To prevent tensions within a society emerging from 
conflict, it is necessary that all groups (especially the vulnerable ones) are 
included in the distribution of the emergency assistance (Colletta, Cullen & 
Mendelson-Forman 1998) 
 
The process of incorporating the concept of social capital into developmental 
policies and interventions also requires particular attention. Woolcock & Narayan 
(2000:242-243) make explicit recommendations that emphasise the key steps in 
this process. First, it is the identification of the range of stakeholders and their 
interrelations. Proposed policy interventions and the way they affect power and 
political interests as well as the potential for dominant groups to mobilise, also 
require attention. The information disclosure policies can encourage informed 
citizenship and accountability of both private and public actors who purport to 
serve the public good. Then, it is crucial that improvements in physical access and 
modern communications technology complement social face-to-face interaction, 
because they can foster information exchange across social groups. Lastly, social 
capital should be seen as a component of conventional development projects. 
Where communities have direct input into the design, implementation, and 
management of projects, returns on investments and the sustainability of 
processes are enhanced (Woolcock 2000). 
 
As it was emphasised already, in the light of the context-dependent reconstruction 
programmes, a universal success-formula appears unfeasible. However, there are 
certain key elements and processes that can serve as pillars of any plan for 
reconstruction of a war-torn society. To design a strategy-construct, first it is 
essential to look at the mechanisms that can enable the creation of social capital. 
According to Soubeyran & Weber 2002, repeated exchange and face-to-face 
contacts, facilitated by geographic proximity, are a precondition for (re-)building 
of social capital. Active and willing engagement of citizens within a participative 
community and the outsourcing by government are considered crucial factors 
respectively by Onyx & Bullen (2000a, 2001), by Lowndes & Wilson (2001). 
Warner (1999, 2001) points out that local government can create local social 
capital through community-based interventions. Non-intimate and non-exclusive 
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groups enable the key social dynamics for building social capital to occur (Cox & 
Caldwell 2000).  
 
Durston presents five key hypotheses about building social capital (Durston 
1998:22), according to which: 
 
1. ‘Reciprocity norms and practices exist in small groups everywhere. Co-
operation and accountable leadership are part of most modern human cultures; 
iteration of trustful practices usually leads to co-operation. 
 
2. Cultures contain contradictory repertoires; systemic change can come from 
culture or from social structure; removal or reduction of repression allows 
social capital to re-emerge; complex systems do not tend toward equilibrium 
but change constantly through co-evolution; path dependence lasts only until a 
new shock produces a transition phase. 
 
3. Changes in national elites produce windows of opportunity for the emergence 
of local social capital; alliances with reformists in government open the way to 
social capital building. 
 
4. Trust, co-operation, shared identity and reciprocity can be replicated among 
leaders to ‘scale up’ local social capital from small communities to the 
regional level. 
 
5. Methodology and techniques for building social capital now exist that make 
possible the construction of social capital intentionally, rather than as a side-
product or spontaneous experience ‘ 
 
Social capital is not a static construct, but a living system, open to changes and 
transformations, and to ‘interventions from outside’. Engineering of social capital 
can be successful, only if the process is planned and implemented with respect to 
cultural, social, and other specificities, and provided that submerged norms and 
practices of trust are engaged in the process (Durston 1998). According to 
Durston, favourable conditions of the changing environment should be used to 
promote and enable the resurgence of social capital. This also includes an 
awareness of any negative factors that might obstacle the process.  
 
Analysing the various definitions of social capital and the respective units of 
measurement, theoretically deducted and/or empirically tested, there are certain 
elements that recur systematically in the process of social development, enabling 
social integration. These features are logically a basis for modelling the construct 
of a reconstruction strategy of social-capital, which must be limited only to the 





Table 7: Target areas for Social Capital Development 
(See next page) 
ELEMENTS  MECHANISMS TO ENABLE SOCIAL CAPITAL (RE-)CONSTRUCTION SOCIAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION GOALS 
MACRO-STRUCTURAL (NATIONAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES) 
• Institutions of state 
• Rule of law 
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• Transparent, accessible, and accountable national institutions 
• External assistance and support with respect to local needs 
• Justice and security for all 
• Fair distribution of resources on formal (non-ethnic) principles 
• Inter-ethnic relations regulated by formal/civil principles and rules 
• Law and institutions safeguarding equality and non-discrimination; Civil rights 
and freedoms ensured; suppressed identity politics 
• Enabled economic & social development   
MACRO-COGNITIVE (NATIONAL LEVEL BONDING TIES) 
• Governance 
• Democratic institutions: 
inclusive citizenship, 
participation rules, etc. 
• Inclusive politics 
• Common knowledge base & 
value system  
• Implementation of democratic practices and values - equal access to power & 
services, fair distribution of resources, political representation; development of  
state-community relationships  
• De-politisation of ethnic/cultural differences  
• National educational policy (common curriculum); National communication, media 
& information policy; ‘National’ sport events  
• National reconciliation policy 
• Trust in state institutions and support for governmental policies  
• Active participation in elections  
• Objective & supportive to integration media 
• Common knowledge & value base  
• Overcoming of prejudices and hatreds, opening of mindsets 
• Reconciling with the past  
• Visions for common future 
MICRO-STRUCTURAL (LOCAL LEVEL BRIDGING TIES) 
• Local institutions 




• Community development in line with inclusive national agenda - non-
discriminatory politics, integrative practices, non-discriminatory policies,  
• Transparent & accessible institutions; equal distribution of resources 
• Participation in local governance open to all communities 
• Support for local, supra-ethnic initiatives solving community problems  
• Support for inter-communal cooperation & interaction  
• Support to formal associations, interest groups, inter-community networks and 
groupings 
• Raising trust in local institutions & in the state in general 
• Interaction and communication within & between communities 
• Development of supra-ethnic bridging ties & cross-cutting relations & 
interdependence 
• Community problems becoming individual concerns  
• Transfer of ownership of processes, activities, and responsibilities - active 
citizenship enabled 
• Development of nested identities & multiple loyalties 
MICRO-COGNITIVE (LOCAL LEVEL BONDING TIES) 
• Trust, values & norms 
• Relations, attitudes, 
stereotypes & prejudices 
• Will for cooperation 
• Individual self-perception: 
affiliation with a supra-ethnic 
national community, active 
citizenship, Multiple nested 
identities 
 
• “shaping the future”  
 
• Civil social contract recognised by all (equality & rights) - new values & norms 
introduced through existing networks; promotion of inclusive national identities 
(supportive media) 
• Interaction between groups; inter-group & inter-cultural communication  
• Identification of common interests and problems; involvement into reconstruction 
practices; transfer of ownership of processes; incentives for common future – e.g. 
membership in international organisations,   
• Reconciliation programs 
• Creation of community (nation) feelings through sport/culture/others  
• Education – common knowledge base, overcome prejudices, open mindsets 
• Integration and networking programs for youngsters 
• (Re)construction of citizenship and civil affiliations; empowerment of individuals 
as citizens – feeling for control over the institutions & of security; motivated 
participation in public processes  
• Community feelings developed (affiliation with larger/national community)  
• (Re-)emergence of trust & will for cooperation, of tolerance and respect for 
diversity; overcoming of negative stereotypes & prejudices 
• Creation of ‘nested’ identities & multiple loyalties 
• Will for integration and cooperation, personal involvement with common 
problems & future  
• Individual appeasement with the past; overcoming trauma 




Developing a strategic model for post-conflict reconstruction of social cohesion 
and social capital within a fragmented society requires a relevant definition. Table 
6 presents the areas, within which the post-conflict policies and programmes 
(aiming at creating enabling conditions for social integration) should plan, design, 
and eventually complete their activities. Following the prescription that social 
capital building can be more successful if the efforts are directed at improving its 
structure (Stone 2001), the first column presents the elements that constitute the 
very grid of the concept within each of the identified dimensions (macro-
structural, macro-cognitive, micro-structural, and micro-cognitive). The second 
column looks at the mechanisms that can contribute to the reconstruction of the 
respective elements, while in the third column are given some provisional 
outcomes resulting from the implementation of the prescribed activities.  
 
‘Shaping the future’ is the symbolic title of a very important component of social 
capital that is difficult to be defined as a ‘proper’ element. It refers to the capacity 
of society to enable the transfer of values and norms, of processes and practices to 
the future generations and to ensure their sustainability. This long-term process 
does not allow that immediate results are observed; ensuring sustainability of 
processes however, requires building up of structures that will provide 
environment and conditions for positive developments and practices.  
 
The table above does not claim to present the full and only set of elements and 
strategies for generating social capital in the course of a post-conflict 
reconstruction process. It should rather be approached as a map for policy 
designers, who work towards developing of reconstruction programmes with 
focus on social integration and de-fragmentation. Although the models are not 
empirically tested as a set, they have been identified based on the field-reports, 
analyses and theoretical literature considered throughout this research.  
 
Setting up a comprehensive post-conflict strategy for (re-)construction of social 
capital does not necessarily mean designing and implementing programmes that 
address simultaneously all of the identified elements. It is however important that 
there is awareness that the levels and processes are interdependent and that an 
element cannot exist in isolation. Therefore, a strategy needs not only to focus on 
a particular issue, but also to consider how it can be supported at the different 
levels and how it would affect them.  
 
To achieve success reconstruction requires that minimum conditions form a more 
or less balanced structure of all the levels (micro/macro, cognitive/structural). As 
it becomes obvious, the most challenging level that has failed many programmes, 
is the micro-cognitive one. Although the existence/establishment of (minimum) 
supportive macro-structures and principles is a condition sine qua non, this is not 
enough. The very finest structures would collapse; the best political and social 
norms and practices would meet strong resistance and would degenerate into 
vicious forms, unless supported by motivated individuals, willing to participate 
and to cooperate for a better common future.  
 
Focusing on the micro-cognitive dimension is an important strategic step, which 
unfortunately is often ‘left for later’ or performed in the format of complementary 
activity. A strategy for (re-)construction of social cohesion and capital should not 
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only make it a priority, but also should follow the logical sequence of actions, 
starting with:  
 
1. Acquiring an understanding about the particular society and the conflict (so 
that policies, programmes and projects be designed and/or adapted 
accordingly)  
2. Identifying the sectors/actors that are willing to cooperating and assess the 
possibilities for mobilisation of social networks, social support structures, and 
local associations  
3. Identifying local (still existing or recently developed) mechanisms for 
generating social capital and integrating them into the programme-design 
4. Motivating people to cooperate, to integrate, and to work for a better common 
future 
 
The final requirement is crucial. Mechanisms for motivating people to reconcile 
with the past and forgive former enemies, to cope with trauma and to overcome 
hatreds would vary from one case to another. An essential role in the process of 
the development of the particular instruments to meet the identified needs play the 
international community. Its role for the (re-)construction of social capital will be 
briefly examined in the conclusion of this chapter.  
 
 
3. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
 
Social capital reflects the goal-oriented will for co-operation that emerges within a 
social structure with recognised common rules, norms, and authority. This will 
stems from the relationships among the members of the social unit and thus it 
comes to existence mainly in action. Social capital in this perspective is a function 
of the totality of horizontal and vertical, formal and informal relationships and 
networks within a given social unit (macro-framework) which: 1/ determines the 
cost-benefit pattern of the achievement of common goals, and 2/ re-constitutes, 
updates and develops in the process of pursuing common goals. Social capital has 
no value per se, but as a tool, it enables people to achieve their common goals at 
minimal costs. Similarly to the other types of capital, the output (i.e. the effect of 
the common activities) serves as a basis for evaluation. These can be positive 
(societal good) or negative (the latter not necessarily being societal bads). 
Beneficiaries of social capital are both the individual community members and the 
social unit as a whole. Social capital requires investments, but it in contrast to the 
other types of capital it accumulates only when used.  
 
Despite the numerous approaches to social capital, there is a common 
understanding that this social phenomenon facilitates collective action and 
achievement of desired outcomes. It has the capacity to motivate individuals to 
work together, because the end-result is seen not only as a ‘common good’, but 
also as a ‘personal benefit’. Having the potential to enable development and to 
assist in overcoming problems, social capital improves the quality of life. Social 
relations however do not exist in a political vacuum. Therefore, the nature and 
extent of the interactions between communities and institutions are determinants 
of the prospects for development in a given society and for the opportunities for 
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mobilising growth-enhancing resources, provided by the social relations discussed 
(Woolcock & Narayan 2000:243). 
 
The lack of agreement on concepts, terminology, and measures, impedes the 
assessment of the effectiveness of social capital policies. On the other hand, 
theorists agree that social capital is the factor that determines the success of 
interventions aiming at improving social and economic outcomes for individuals 
and communities (PRI 2003). Addressing social capital from diverse perspectives, 
all the approaches outline the importance of social engagement and social ties. 
Examining the problem of co-operation through collective action, participation, or 
social networks, however has direct implications for public policy.  
 
Policy designers need to be aware that not all forms of social capital are 
beneficial. This implies that the possible effects should be considered prior to 
undertaking any actions to maximising them. Instead of bridging people and 
improving their lives, ill-planed community development programmes might 
result in reinforced exclusion and deprivation by isolating participants. Among the 
examples are labour market and social security policies that fail to recognise the 
importance of informal networks, or policies that does not provide the right 
balance between bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital (Levesque 
& White 2001). 
 
In the context of the post-ethnic-conflict, the reconstruction of social capital is the 
engine that has the capacity to power all the other processes of physical, 
economic, or human capital rebuilding. Within a war-traumatised and ethnically 
fractured society however, setting the principles of a new social contract is a 
crucial point, but definitely not enough for achieving social cohesion and for 
accumulating social capital. After recognising the importance of early addressing 
the problem of de-fragmentation of society and supra-ethnic integration, 
reconstruction agents need to address the imbalanced social capital structure. 
Development programmes and projects have to pay attention to the possibilities 
for bringing people back and for motivating them to be willing to cooperate for 
the common good. Social capital can be accumulated at different levels and in 
various forms. Positive effects on society could be achieved only if the micro-, 
meso- and macro-levels are in dynamic and coherent interaction and of a 
matching scope. Existing institutional arrangements should also be considered 
when designing interventions (PRI 2003). ‘Well-directed efforts to help people 
remain connected are likely to become more important than ever, particularly in 
light of the potential implications for civic participation, the relationship between 
civil society and government, and the evolution of democratic institutions’ (PRI 
2003:51).  
 
Outlining the basic requirements for a post-conflict social capital reconstruction, 
the role of the external support appears essential for the success of the process in 
general. Unfortunately, the international community has approached this key role 
mostly in the form of financial contribution to the reconstruction of different types 
of physical and social infrastructures and have left the issue of societal integration 
aside. In the few cases of demonstrated interest in fostering integration and inter-
group dialogue, the adopted approaches have not been very different from placing 
conditions on societies or threatening them with sanctions.  
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The conflict-prevention agenda has recognised that economic sanctions and 
embargoes are not always the best solution to the political problems. It affirms 
that reconciliation is not possible without justice, that institution building is an 
important element both within government and civil society, and that the media 
has enormous potential to influence attitudes and behaviour and thus to play a 
positive or negative role in civil society building (Colletta, Cullen & Forman 
1998). Despite outlining the importance of addressing these areas, it seems that 
there is no consent about the post-conflict reconstruction of the societal links that 
have been damaged during the experienced violent (ethnic) struggles. 
 
Building up structures on meso- and macro-level is a necessary action in the 
reconstruction process, but it cannot be successful if it lacks the stable basis of a 
respective micro-level. The micro-level of shared values, attitudes, relationships, 
trust, etc. cannot be imported, nor transformed instantly or imposed from outside. 
It should be nourished and enabled to emerge and develop. In a post-ethnic-
conflict situation, it is quite likely that it is impossible to rehabilitate a previously 
existing social capital; hence, a new one needs to be constructed. In support of the 
statement that reconstruction appears dependent on the micro-level, are the 
evidences indicating that the size and density of social networks and institutions, 
and the nature of interpersonal interactions, significantly affects the efficiency and 
sustainability of development programmes (IRIS, Social Capital Initiative) 
 
Unfortunately, as the authors point out, donors’ ‘resources are usually allocated to 
large scale reconstruction efforts and only fewer to developing new models for 
rebuilding institutions or providing for community rehabilitation’ (Colletta, 
Cullen & Forman 1998:13). The same negative effects on development might 
have any involvement, which has not been planned with respect to the needs of 
the particular environment. Yet in 1997, Simpson criticised the UN involvement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of ‘how NOT to reconstruct a society’ 
(Simpson 1997).  
 
Contrary to the declared aims of the UN involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
defined in terms of bringing the people together and ensuring a decent level of 
welfare on all sides, an effective dividing wall was put up by the military shield to 
keep warring factions apart. People were forced to survive on the external aid, 
rather than on their own productive labour148. According to the author, hardly 
anywhere the ‘assistance in the process of rebuilding social relations, bringing 
people together, breaking down the barriers and prejudice which had played such 
a part in generating social conflict in the first place’ (Simpson 1997). The 
internationally brokered peace agreement has in fact effectively consolidated the 
gains made through war. As a result, the constitutional arrangements cemented 
ethnicity as the organising principle of the politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
in the Balkans in general. No war had achieved this before. Instead of bringing 
integration, federalism consolidated the regional power bases and opened the 
route to ethnic segregation. 
 
As it has been emphasised by the text above, a successful reconstruction of a post-
conflict state that aims at introducing lasting peace and sustainable development, 
                                                 
148 Simpson gives the absurd example that in one village the ‘shield’ had separated the saw-mill 
from the woods: the result was that both sides were unemployed  (Simpson 1997) 
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must recognise in the first place that societal (re-)construction is as important as 
any other area for rebuilding. Then the involvement should follow the same steps 
as of any project-management cycle:  
 
¾ Needs assessment of the situation  
¾ Strategic planning and designing of programmes and actions  
¾ Implementation of the planned activities 
¾ Monitoring and adjustment of the programmes  
¾ Managing the processes directly and gradually shifting to a control from a 
distance in order to enable the transfer of ownership 
¾ Motivating local participation and support through promoting reconciliation 
and developing the pragmatic solidarity (in Bourdieu’s terms) 
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During the 20th century, post-conflict reconstruction evolved as a concept, 
merging the international (moral) obligation to the war-affected societies with the 
conflict-prevention mechanisms. Arguing that a precondition for the successful 
achievement of the reconstruction goals is an adequate response to country-
specific conditions, the research focused on the context that an ethnic conflict 
creates. In the attempt to establish clearer frameworks for the post-ethnic-conflict 
environment, a model for assessment was developed upon existing theories of 
ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. Destruction of social capital at the level of state, 
fragmentation of society along ethnic lines and ‘replacement’ of citizens with 
ethnic-community members, were identified as some of the most distinctive 
outcomes of the armed ethnic struggles. Therefore, focusing on the phenomenon 
of social capital, its role, and its potential to contribute for positive changes, the 
first part of the research outlined several areas and mechanisms that could enable 
the (re-)construction of social capital.  
 
The next two chapters will address the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
conflict that emerged in 1995 is widely known as ‘ethnic’. Nevertheless, in order 
to verify that the reconstruction, running in the country since 1996, has faced the 
challenges of a post-ethnic-conflict environment, the conflict will be assessed 
through the model developed in Chapter 2. Thereafter, the focus will fall on the 
reconstruction practices and achievements with special attention to the 
programmes and projects targeting the rebuilding of social capital at the level of 
state, i.e. on a multi-ethnic basis. In an attempt to identify and study the post-
conflict reconstruction of social capital, a fieldwork was carried out. The findings 
presented at the end of this chapter reveal not only the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2003, but also the levels of success of the reconstruction process 
and programmes in general.  
 
 
1. THE ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1992-1995)  
 
The goal of this research, as stated in the initial chapter, is to open a discussion 
about the key factors that can enable success of post-conflict and post-ethnic 
conflict reconstruction. Therefore, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
assessed in order to verify and to illustrate the theoretical model introduced.  
 
Several factors determined the selection of the case study. First, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) has experienced one of the most devastating wars in the recent 
(Post-Cold War) history of the world. After the military NATO intervention and 
political pressure from the international community, the country emerged from a 
three-year war, with heavily damaged physical and human capital, ruined 
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economy and infrastructures and a population divided into three mutually hostile 
communities. From the first day of its existence as an independent country (after 
the end of the war in 1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina was dependant on foreign 
assistance and for the years since, it has become a testing ground for policies and 
practices (McMahon 2004, Chandler 2007).  
 
Thus, this is a case of a reconstruction process that started after the ceasefire and 
the signing of the formal peace agreement in Dayton. Furthermore, various 
organisations, institutions, international and national structures and countries have 
taken part and still are playinga  role in the rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The great number of programmes and initiatives and the substantial financial 
support should have contributed to the fast recovery of the country, yet this has 
not been the case. Before attempting to assess the situation and to explore the 
reconstruction policies of the international community through some of its 
representative structures, it is necessary to verify that the 1992-1995 conflict 
qualifies as ethnic in terms of the definition adopted by the research. For this 
purpose, the empirical data will be considered in the light of the theoretical model 
introduced in Chapter 2.  
 
1.1 Conflict context  
 
To understand the developments that have led to the outburst of the Bosnian 
conflict, it is necessary to look at the preconditions as well as the local and 
international triggers. In its history of existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
an independent state only for about 150 years (1377-1527). Since the Middle ages, 
it has been a part of the territories of Serbia, the Byzantine Empire, Hungary, the 
Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Yugoslavia; as such, it has grown as a 
multicultural political unit. Thus the multicultural and multi-religious society of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite its long-standing traditions for peaceful 
existence, has provided a fruitful ground for political entrepreneurs to exploit the 
ethnic and religious differences for their own purposes.  
 
Referring to Bosnia as “multicultural” requires outlining that this widely used 
notion should not be applied directly in its Western-style format, emerging from 
the theoretical frameworks of Taylor (1994), May (1999), Kimlicka (1995;  2002). 
Pointing at the historically, socio-politically and culturally determined differences 
between the East and the West ideas underlying multiculturalism, Kimlicka 
argues that countries of post-communist Europe “have been pressured to adopt 
Western standards or models of multiculturalism and minority rights” (2002:1). 
The two main principles of the Western multiculturalism 1/accommodating sub-
state nationalisms through regional autonomy and official language rights and 2/ 
ensuring that indigenous peoples would be able to sustain themselves as distinct 
societies, emerged as challenging the nature of the state-group relations in Eastern 
and Central Europe, where state-minorities have been regarded as ‘disloyal’ and a 
risk to the state and to the security. Therefore they have been ‘securitised’ over 
the course of the years (2002:20).  
 
Taking into account the differences in the underlying principles, the legal 
implications and the political charge of the term, it is important to point out that 
although Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a multi-ethnic unit, it should 
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not be referred to as ‘multicultural’ without first defining the term. The vision of a 
future ‘multicultural Bosnia’ corresponds more closely to the Western standards, 
despite the arguments and the evidences that this might not be an achievable goal 
due to the same regional characteristics.  
 
The research has accepted that the despite being widely accepted, the concept of 
‘multiculturalism’ has a dual nature and that a degree of attention is needed when 
used. Since the leading agents of the reconstruction process are the Western 
democracies, the plans for a future ‘multicultural Bosnia’ build over the Western 
perspective. ‘Multicultural Bosnia from before the war’ however has not been a 
country of minorities enjoying equal rights, but of people (individuals) of different 
identity backgrounds, accustomed to the diversity to a degree of ignoring it and 
even of projecting it over one’s self. Evidences for this emerge both from the 
literature (the switching identities ‘Spaho-case’ (Purivatra 1974:399-400)) and 
from the fieldwork interviews (Puljić in interview with the Author, 08.04.2009). 
Nevertheless, the existence of multicultural society in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
before the 1992-war, should be addressed carefully due to the lack of studies and 
data about the intensity and the quality of inter-ethnic relations  
 
As it was discussed in the previous chapters, identity differences become 
politically relevant only when they are associated with possibilities for acquisition 
of political and/or economic gains. In this context, the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution that divided the country into six Republics149, each given the 
possibility for self-determination, the unequal economic development and the 
mechanisms for distribution of resources, wealth and power, should be taken into 
account when discussing the preconditions for the accumulation of pre-war ethnic 
charge. In the early 1990s, however, some immediate local and international 
triggers played an important role for raising the tensions to the extremes.  
 
The collapse of the communist system and the end of the Cold War opened the 
possibility for a number of nations to overthrow the imposed political, economic 
and cultural dominance. This wave of change in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was unconditionally supported by the liberal-democratic nation states, advocating 
peoples’ right to self-determination, liberal market, democracy and human rights. 
The western ‘democracy and free market’ ideology150 that justified the 
intervention in local affairs, in the case of Yugoslavia clashed with some 
nationalistic and other perspectives (Treanor 2002). 
 
Pursuing their geopolitical goals and in support of the vision that democracy and a 
free market were the greatest benefits that the previously oppressed nations could 
now enjoy, the NATO countries supported the separatist movements in Slovenia 
and Croatia, setting in this way a precedent. The bloody disintegration of 
Yugoslavia probably could have been avoided, if the mosaic ethnic and religious 
structure of the region and the existing strong nationalist feelings had been taken 
into account. The international community blinded by the opened possibility to 
support these socio-economic and political transformations, omitted to recognise 
                                                 
149 In addition to the six Republics there were also two autonomous regions established 
150 The WB report of 1997 emphases that the focus should fall on the establishment of a ‘viable 
institutional structure for effective and countrywide governance, as outlined in the Dayton 
Agreement, and on undertaking the key structural reforms for transforming the old socialist 
economic structure into a new, market-based economy.’ (WB 1997:xii) 
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the complexity of the issue. The lack of appropriate (re-)actions during the initial 
years of war over the territories of ex-Yugoslavia supports such conclusions. 
While the view that the re-make of the world was a moral crusade of the liberal 
market-democracies (Treanor 2002) is provocative, the fact is that the 
international politics of the early 1990s contributed significantly to the 
development of the processes in Yugoslavia.  
 
As far as the local triggers were concerned, the termination of the war in Croatia 
without actually resolving the problems that had provoked it in the first place 
appears an immediate factor. In addition, plenty of weapons remained in the hands 
of the locals. Thus, the transfer of warfare to another territory of concentrated 
Serbian and Croatian population, not controlled by external forces, was a rather 
logical consequence. Factors such as emerging secessionist movements, economic 
crisis, power struggles between the Republics and their leaders, or intensified 
security dilemmas, also contributed to the outburst of conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992.  
 
1.2 Conflict agents 
 
Indicators for the occurring ethnic disintegration in pre-war Bosnia could have 
been spotted as early as in the autumn of 1990, when after the collapse of 
communism, the multi-party system was restored and the first parliamentary 
elections took place. The Party of Democratic Action, the Serbian Democratic 
Party, and the Croatian Democratic Union - the three largest nationalist parties in 
the country won the elections. The three highest positions of power in the country 
– the President (of the ex-Yugoslav Bosnian Republic), the Chairman of the 
Parliament and the Prime minister - were respectively divided between the 
Bosniak Alia Izetbegović, the Serb Momčilo Krajišnik, and the Croat Jure 
Pelivan. In the context of the collapse of the communist system, the rise of 
nationalist parties, and the power contest between the leaders of the (former 
socialist) republics, the activation of the ethnically based political cleavages 
contributed to a rise of tensions among communities. Fears and political ambitions 
additionally charged the situation151, and even international efforts to provide 
solutions acceptable to all sides, such as the Carrington-Cutileiro plan for 
example, also remained void152.  
 
In October 1991, the Bosnian Serb representatives abandoned the central 
parliament in Sarajevo and formed the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In November, the Bosnian Croatian Democratic Union, a branch of 
the ruling party in the Republic of Croatia, proclaimed the existence of the 
                                                 
151 The meeting between Milošević and Tuđman in Karađorđevo in March 1991 provoked fears 
that the two leaders plan a redistribution of the territory of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. The 
declarations for independence proclaimed by Slovenia and Croatia on 25th June 1991 and by the 
Republic of Macedonia in October 1991, provided incentives for the possibilities that the new 
realities could offer.  
152 The Carrington-Cutileiro plan of the international community resulted from a conference held 
in September 1991. It proposed ethnic power sharing on all administrative levels and the 
devolution of central government to local ethnic communities. All the three sides accepted the plan 
and Alija Izetbegović signed it for the Bosniaks, Radovan Karadžić for the Serbs and Mate Boban 
for the Croats. However, the plan did not prevent the war from occurring.  
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territorial and political Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia. In response, the 
Bosnian Serbs held a referendum and in January 1992 the Assembly announced 
the establishment of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Declaring 
this referendum illegal and invalid, the central Bosnian government held another 
referendum in March 1992 on Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia. This 
referendum was largely boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade in turn 
declared the referendum unconstitutional and illegal.  
 
‘The war was in the air…the elections were not the reason for the war, but a 
projection of the tensions at the time’, was the comment on the pre-war situation 
offered by Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Law Faculty of the University of 
Sarajevo (Grebo 2003, personal discussion). Despite that there are different 
interpretations about which events should be considered the ‘the beginning’ of the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the spring of 1992, intensive attacks were 




Table 8: Ethnic Composition of Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Census 1991  
(Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina)  
 
 
Region Total Muslims Serbs Croats Yugoslavs Others 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
4 377 033 1 902 956 1 366 104 760 852 242 682 104 439 
% 100.0 43.5 31.2 17.4 5.5 2.4 
  
 
The figures of the official census carried out in 1991 (Table 8), indicate that the 
pre-war composition of the population in the former socialist republic was 43,5% 
Muslims, 31,5% Serbs, 17,4% Croats, 5,5% Yugoslavs and 2,4% others. The 
religious affiliation of the largest group became a basis for ethnic self-
determination exactly during the war of 1992-1995, when the community took the 
name Bosniak. Before the constitutional changes of 1974, when this population 
was given the official ‘national’ name Muslims, this community had been defined 
according to the activated context. The population was addressed as either Serbs 
or Croats of Islamic faith; during the World War 2, the Ustasha movement 
considered them exclusively Croats.  
 
Discussing the conflict agents, it is important to mention another existing point of 
view, expressed by a British historian of Yugoslav origins, Marko Atila Hoare, 
commenting on the Research Documentary Centre – Sarajevo findings related to 
the deaths in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period 1991-1995 (published in 
2007 and known as ‘Bosnia's Book of the Dead’). Hoare (Hoare 2008) 
emphasised that the presented figures of civilian casualties suggest that the war 
should not be considered as three-sided, but two-sided (Bosniaks vs. Serbs), 
within which there were some smaller-scale conflicts among the ranks of one of 
the two sides. Especially having in mind that the Bosnian Croat military (HVO) 
remained throughout the war, formally, a constituent part of the Armed Forces of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some forces (in the areas of Tuzla and Bihać for 
example) remained loyal to Sarajevo. Even if approaching the war as two-sided, 
the parameters elaborated in Chapter 2 suggest that the conflict agents would be 
 137
‘at least two parties determined along ethnic lines’, which indeed applies to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.153  
 
1.3 Conflict frameworks  
 
The outburst of conflict between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
a logical stage step in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, in the course of which 
ethnic communities were re-discovered and affirmed. The distribution of the 
Bosnian territory among the ethnic groups had become a conflict catalyser.  
 
As it was pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of ethnic conflict implies that the 
cultural, socio-political, and/or economic affairs of a society become articulated in 
ethnic terms and in many cases, various aspects of the domestic status quo are 
challenged. In the case of the war in Bosnia, the proclamation of independence by 
the Bosnian Serbs in January 1992 put at risk the territorial integrity of the 
republic. From the point of view of Belgrade, the referendum held by the Bosnian 
government in March 1992 was also illegal and the proclaimed independence in 
its turn challenged the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The impossibility to 
achieve consensus on the power distribution within Yugoslavia and within the 
former republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to the implosion of both 
structures. Yugoslavia lost another part of its body, but Bosnia and Herzegovina 
also fell apart into two rather autonomous ethnically determined Entities – the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska 
 
 
Table 9: Casualty Figures According to the RDC Project Findings 








Ethnic group People % People % People % 
Bosniaks 64,036 65.88% 33.071 83.33% 30.966 53.83% 
Serbs 24,906 25.62% 4.075 10.27% 20,649 36.21% 
Croats 7,788 8.01% 2.163 5.45% 5,439 9.78% 
Other 478 0.7% 376 0.95% 171 0.18% 
  
 
The international dynamics and climate after the end of the Cold War contributed 
to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but the fragmentation of the country, and later 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a political entity, resulted from the actions of its 
citizens. The policy of ethnic cleansing applied throughout the country by the 
Serbian forces, and the responses from the opposite sides, resulted in large 
number of refugees and internally displaced people, estimated as exceeding 1.8 
million people (RDC 2007). The findings of the project, completed in 20007 by 
the Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, also suggest that the real total 
                                                 
153 The RDC (2007) figures indicate that the number of Croat victims is far behind the number of 
Bosniak and Serb victims, which allows that the war is considered two-sided. Furthermore, there 
are also evidences that in some areas the Croat-Bosniak union was preserved during the period of 
war. This however in fact emphasises that there were other (politically and rationally calculated) 
interests underlying the constituency of the parties in the conflict and not only the ethnic 
identification. 
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number of casualties is minimum 97,207 people (the breakdown by ethnicity is 
given in the table below).  
 
As a result, the formation of large predominantly ethnically homogeneous regions 
changed the ethnic distribution within the country. The maps provided in Figure 
11 illustrate the ethnic composition and the ethnic distribution in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina before and after the war. It is important to mention that despite these 
maps being published officially by the Office of the High Representative, the 
estimates for the period after the end of the war, as well as those of today, are 
based exclusively on reports and surveys, carried out by various institutions and 
organisations. Vedrana Rebić, an officer from the National Statistical Agency of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, confirmed in an interview that since 1991 (until July 
2009), no official census has been carried out and the 1991 data are the only 
official data about the ethnic structure of the country (Rebić in interview with the 
Author; 21.05.2009).  
 
 
Figure 11: Ethnic Distribution in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 1991 (census) and 1998 (estimates) 





























Ethnic distribution in 1998 
  
In 1993, the armed struggles occurring all over the territory of the country, forced 
the international intervention and the establishment of six ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Sarajevo, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Žepa and Bihać. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent violence from happening, e.g. the 1995 
massacre in Srebrenica. Apart from taking over more than 70% of the territory of 
the country, the Serbian forces performed some of the worst atrocities since the 
end of the World War 2. Ethnic cleansing, aiming at producing ‘clear’ ethnic 
areas, became the most prominent feature of the Bosnian war. Intimidation, forced 
expulsion and/or killing of undesired ethnic group, as well as destruction or 
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removal of places of worship, cemeteries and cultural and historical buildings 
were among the methods used for purifying the different parts of the country.  
 
The main target of the ethnic cleansing, mass rape, psychological oppression, and 
genocide, was the Muslim (Bosniak) civil population. Nevertheless, during the 
three years of war, people from all three ethnic groups suffered violence and 
hostilities. No part of the country was spared from damages to the infrastructure, 
land, and properties. Even the areas with relatively homogeneous ethnic 
composition saw people from minority groups fleeing in fear for their lives 
(Kaufman 2001). According to the RDC findings (2007) more than 40% of the 
victims during the 1992-1995 war were civilians. These figures qualifies the 
Bosnian war as a ‘new war’ in Kaldor’s terms (1999).  
 
Continuing exploring the parameters introduced by the theoretical model 
presented in Chapter 2, throughout the years of conflict, armed struggles occurred 
over more than half the territory of the country (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The 
number of combatants or activists involved exceeds the suggested 15,000. As 
Massimo Moratti, a Legal Advisor for OSCE, revealed in an interview, the 
official data upon which the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) process was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war, indicate 
that about 264,500 soldiers fought on the side of the Bosnian Army while another 
154,500 fought with Serbian forces (Moratti in interview with the Author, 
19.06.2003). An UNDP survey from 2004 (Chapman, D. 2007), indicates that 
there were 353,000 legally registered weapons and half a million more estimated 
to be illegally held by 16% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
number of the potential or occasional combatants therefore should be considered 
much higher. Finally, the violence gradually transformed from isolated incidents 
in 1991 and clashes mostly between Serbs and Croats –which in the words of 
Alija Izetbegović was ‘not our war’ (Magaš, Žanić & Noel 2001:204) – into a 
series of heavy battles between Bosniak and Serbs, Bosniak and Croats and finally 
Bosniak and Croats forces vs. Serbs forces.  
 
The outburst of systematic violence is usually seen as dating from the referendum 
on the proclaimed independence of the Bosnian state in 1992. As it was 
mentioned above, initially the clashes occurred between the local Serb and Croat 
population supported by the respective national armies. Yet for the first months of 
the war, the Serbs supported by the Yugoslav army occupied large territories in 
the eastern and in the north-western part of the former republic. Territories that 
were more ethnically homogeneous were spared from the armed clashes, but the 
non-Serb population was expelled; similarly, the Serb population of central 
Bosnia and Herzegovina migrated to the Serb-held areas. Although the Serbian 
National Army (SNA) and the Croatian Army (HVO) were actively involved in 
the struggles during the Bosnian war, the military actions did not spill over the 
other ex-Yugoslav territories.  
 
After the failure of the Vance-Owen peace plan in 1993, which practically 
intended to divide the country into three ethnic parts, Bosniaks and Croats found 
themselves involved in struggles over the 30 percent of the territory they held at 
the time. Until February 1994, the Croat-Bosniaks clashes dominated the warfare. 
With the signature of the cease-fire agreement in Zagreb, followed by the peace 
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agreement signed in March 1994, the war between the two ethnic groups ended 
officially and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established.  
 
The peace agreement of 1994 reduced the conflicting parties to two. The allied 
Bosniak-Croat forces managed to take much of western Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and threatened the Serb positions, which provoked more hostilities from Serbian 
side. Eventually, after the massacres in Srebrenica and Markale, NATO took 
definitive actions towards putting an end to the war. After three years of armed 
struggles, only the international military intervention forced an official ceasefire. 
Pressured by the international community, Milošević, Tuđman and Izetbegović 
signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in Paris on 14 December 1995, which was finalised a week later in Dayton, Ohio.  
Tensions however did not end and stability remained dependant on the presence 
and the actions of the international forces in the country. Incidents, cases of 
assaults and discrimination were reported even in 2003, as confirmed by Snejana 
Ivandić from the HRC: Balkan Human Rights Network, Sarajevo (Ivandić in 
interview with the Author, 23.06.2003). Despite the NATO-led mission of the 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina officially ended in 
December 2005, the NATO presence is still there – with Headquarters (HQ) in 
Sarajevo. Following the NATO decision to conclude its SFOR mission, on 2 
December 2004 the European Union launched a military operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUFOR – Operation ALTHEA). The official Mission statement of 
EUFOR154 is that ‘Operation ALTHEA’s purpose is to provide a military presence 
in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a 
resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace and thereby allow all EU and international community 
actors to carry out their responsibilities’ (EUFOR; http://www.euforbih.org). In 
summary, even if the international community does not it consider a ‘protracted 
conflict’, apparently it has taken into account the potential for reoccurrence of the 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
1.4 Mobilisation structure and strategy 
 
Examining the different levels of the mobilisation structure in their interaction can 
enable the outlining of a clearer picture of the processes and the events within the 
context of an ethnic conflict. The goal of this section is to look at the 
organisational, operational and at the ‘avalanche’ levels in order to reveal some of 
their major characteristics, without focusing on a detailed description.  
 
Discussing the conflict agents and the frameworks of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, several actors appear at the organisational (political) level. First, 
there is the Bosnian government, represented by Alija Izetbegović. Then, it would 
be logical to expect that the two other actors at this organisational level should be 
prominent politicians and leaders of respectively the Bosnian Croat and the 
Bosnian Serb communities (especially having in mind that the Republica Srpska 
had been organised politically even before the outbreak of the violence in 1992). 
                                                 
154 The Mission statement is available online – from the website of the EUFOR in BiH 
http://www.euforbih.org  
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However, the very fact that the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace, 
which put the end of the Bosnian war, was  signed by the three leaders Milošević, 
Tuđman and Izetbegović, indicates that the Serbian and the Croatian government 
were in fact the other two actors at the political level in the ethnic conflict in 
Bosnia.  
 
At the operational (military) level, the situation was slightly different. Although 
the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) officially left Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 
1992, most of the people in command and high ranked officers joined the Army of 
Republica Srpska. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was organised with the 
proclamation of Herzeg-Bosnia for a Croatian territory. In the attempt to justify 
the largest group as the true Bosnian side in the conflict and to assemble a multi-
ethnic pro-Bosnian defence front, President Izetbegović appointed a number of 
non-Bosniaks among the staff in command of the formed Army of Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). In fact, around 25% of the army were non-
Bosniaks. Apart from the armies under the direct command of the political 
leaders, various paramilitary units have taken part in the war. Nationalist parties 
of the neighbouring countries also provided support; number of volunteers joined 
these units (Table 10).  
 
The religious element in the war activated additional international support for the 
fighting parties in the conflict. It is difficult to make a conclusion concerning the 
extent to which the Serb-supportive Slavic fighters from countries like Russia and 
Greece, or radical and Neo-Nazi Western fighters joining the Croatian forces, or 
the Islamic volunteers supporting the Bosniaks, were under the command of the 
respective political and military centres. The sole fact that these are known as 
paramilitary and not joining the regular armed forces of the opposing sides 
suggests the units were not exactly viewed as officially ‘belonging’ to sides. The 
fact that many war crime trials after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have been held against members of different paramilitary units, gives a hint about 
the nature of the activities of these structures.  
 
In order to explain better the emergence of the ‘avalanche’ effect as well as to 
outline the mobilisation strategy that in the views of researchers (Crawford 1998, 
Kaufman 2001) is typical of the process of gathering support in an ethnic conflict, 
it is necessary to look at the leader-mass relationships and in particular, at some of 
the mobilisation mechanisms used.  
 
The Bosnian conflict can be viewed as the point of escalation of the accumulated 
ethnic myths and fears, hostilities, and security issues, especially during the 
process of disintegration of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the myths are not harmful 
by themselves, but when employed by people (Duijzings 2007:142). Perceptions 
of the past played a great role in the interpretation of events during the war in 
Bosnia; historical allusions to explain and justify actions were largely used by 
politicians and military leaders. Duijzings (2007:143) points out that during a 
speech near the town of Bijeljina, just days before the attack on Srebrenica, 
General Ratko Mladić referred to the Battle of Kosovo of 1389. Later, when his 
troops entered Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, the event was presented as an act of 
revenge for the defeat suffered at the hands of the Turks during the First Serbian 
Uprising (1804-1813). Revived myths fed into the living local memories of 
attacks or massacres carried out during 1992 and 1993 resulted in a desire for 
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vengeance, which in the views of Duijzings (2007) was one of the key factors 
contributing to the participation of local Serbs in the massacre of Srebrenica.  
 
 
Table 10: Mobilisation Structure of Combatants  
  (Main source: Nation 2003) 
 
 
Combatants Bosniaks Serbs Croats 
Leaders & 
Commanders 
Alija Izetbegović  
(President of BiH) 
Sefer Halilović  
(Army chief of staff 1992-
1993) 
Rasim Delić  
(Army chief of Staff 1993-
1995) 
General Jovan Divjak, Serb 
(Deputy commander of the 
BiH Army's HQ) 
General Stjepan Šiber, 
Croat (Second deputy 
commander)  
Colonel Blaž Kraljević, 
(Commander of the Croatian 
Defence Forces in 
Herzegovina, member of 
BiH Army's HQ) 
Dobrica Ćosić  
(President of FRY 1992-
1993)  
Zoran Lilić  
(President of FRY (1993-
1997) 
Slobodan Milošević 
(President of Serbia 1989-
1997) 
Radovan Karadžić 
(President of the 
Republika Srpska) 
Ratko Mladić  
(Commander of the Army 
of Republika Srpska)  
General Pereljakin 
(ex-commander of the 
UNPROFOR Russian 
contingent; adviser to the 
Serbian Army commander) 
Franjo Tuđman  
(President of Croatia)  
Mate Boban  
(President of the 
Croatian Republic of 
Herzeg-Bosnia) 
Milivoj Petković  
(HVO Chief of staff)  
Dario Kordić  
(political leader of 
Croats in Central 
Bosnia)  
Valentin Ćorić 
(commander of the 









Army of Republika 
Srpska 
Serb Herzegovina Corps 








1st Corps in Sarajevo - 
non-Bosniaks; around 25% 
of the total number of the 
soldiers 
5th Corps - operating in 
Bosanska Krajina; 
cooperated with the HVO 
units in and around the city 
of Bihać  
Paramilitary & civil 
defence groups:  
• Patriotic League   
• Territorial Defence  
• Zelene Beretke (Green 
Berets) 




Mujahedins; citizens from 
Algeria, Egypt, Russia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey 
Supporters from Al-Qaeda 
- not confirmed 
Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards 
Yugoslav People's Army 
(JNA) 
Serbian secret police 
(not proven officially)  
Fighters, mercenaries & 
volunteers from FRY and 
Russia ("Tsarist Wolves", 
the Cossacks), Ukraine, 
Romania, Greece, Armenia 
& Bulgaria 
Paramilitary units from 
FRY 
• White Eagles (Beli 
Orlovi) 
• Arkan's "Tigers" 
• Serbian Volunteer 
Guard  
International brigade (in 
eastern Bosnia) - mostly 
of ex-Russian veteran 
soldiers 
Greek Volunteer Guard 
Croatian Army (HV) 
Croatian Defence 
Forces (HOS;  
paramilitary group, 
organized by the 
right-wing Croatian 
Party of Rights (HSP 
Croatian secret 






















While moving toward independence, Croats revived their World War 2-era 
symbols, which in turn provoked the reoccurrence of violence carried upon the 
Serbs under those banners. The mobilisation of the Serbs against the Muslim 
population was supported by stories about Jihad threat and killing lists (Kaufman 
2001:3). The Serbian martyrdom in the name of defending the state and 
Christianity were re-evoked on different occasions. The emergence of armed Serb 
extremists on the other hand helped motivate the Bosnian Muslims also to push 
for independence. The vocabulary used to describe the enemy or the events was 
also symbolically charged and introduced to serve the propaganda goals 
(O'Shaughnessy 2004:139).  
 
A special role for spreading these myths and fears was played by the media. Many 
of these propaganda mechanisms were revealed in the course of the Milošević 
trial. Covering the process in 2003, Judith Armatta reports the words of Nenad 
Pejić, a former Sarajevo TV programme controller that ‘without the media, and 
especially without television, war in the former Yugoslavia is inconceivable’ 
(Armatta 2003, online). Testimonies at the Milošević trial revealed that part of the 
propaganda campaign were clandestine actions like mining a soccer field or a 
water tower, which were then blamed on Croats. According to the expert report 
presented at the trial, official Serbian propaganda reached more than 3.5 million 
people every night, broadcasting fabricated conversations of Croat authorities 
addressing the Serb population or showing corpses and presenting them as if these 
were Serb victims of aggression (Armatta 2003). 
 
Radio and television played a key role for spreading nationalism, for gathering 
support and maintaining the conflict. Recognising that fact, taking the electronic 
media in the country from the hands of the nationalists was among the first 
priorities of the OHR after the end of the war. Until the late 1990s, this was still 
an issue, evidence for which is provided by various reports on the media fuelling 
tensions and spurring propaganda (Hedges 1996). 
 
Although without the potential to reach such a high number of people as the 
television or the radio, an essential feature of the printed media is that it can 
remain active for a longer period. Furthermore, it offers the possibility for 
different interpretations depending on the context. An interesting case is the first 
cover of a satirical magazine Novi Vox of the alternative youth movement in pre-
war Sarajevo (Hoare 2008). The front-cover illustration of its issue No 3 from 
October 1991 shows a Bosnian Muslim Nazi SS officer of the ill-famous Handzar 
Division stepping on the decapitated and bloody heads of Serbian leaders, 
including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. The text says ‘The Handzar 
Division is ready!’ and ‘The Fourth Reich is coming – Welcome!’ (Figure 12) 
 
More than a decade after the end of the conflict in Bosnia, two historians of ex-
Yugoslav origins155 entered a tense discussion about the meaning of this 
                                                 
155 The discussion in focus took place between the above mentioned Marko Atila Hoare and the 
Serbian-American historian Carl Kosta Savich, known for his public denials of Srebrenica 
genocide. The articles discussing the above presented illustration are: Savich, Carl 2008. Reviving 
Nazism: Bosnian Muslim Government Reformed the Nazi SS Division Handzar in 1993, [online], 
posted October 15, 2008, Available from http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/104.shtml 
and Hoare, Marko Atila 2008, Monty Python vs. Carl Savich and Serbianna: Who are the real 
 144
illustration and the purposes for its publication in 1991. This fact per se indicated 
that even an innocent or humouristic image, as this one is said to be, could be 
interpreted to serve a nationalist cause. In an environment of rising tensions and 
fears, things can acquire unexpected meaning or can be used for specific purposes 
and goals. Yet, if people today can re-invent the past based on an illustration, and 
if today such an illustration can provoke strong emotions, then it certainly could 
have played the same role in the past, especially if seen by eyes full of real fear. 
Not to mention that during the Bosnian war, real pictures from 1943 of the 
Yugoslavian Muslim ‘Handzar’ (Sword) division were used by the propaganda to 























By interpreting events through particular perspectives that inspire the rebirth of 
myths of ancient conflicts and stories of past injustice, the ‘initial mobilisation’ 
can fuel hostilities and raise the level of negative charge and hostile attitudes. 
Kaufman argues that even though applicable to a certain extent to the Yugoslav 
wars, the theory about the manipulative leaders that provoke ethnic conflicts is not 
overarching, because the manipulation tools would work only if there was a real 
or perceived conflict of interests and without this people have no reason to mo-
bilise (Kaufman 2001:6).  
 
During the Bosnian war, insecurity and extremist politics mutually reinforced 
each other in an escalatory spiral. In a conflict-charged environment, the first 
victims of violence already can transform the war into personal acts, releasing the 
‘avalanche’. When people do not feel safe, when they realise that there is nobody 
to protect them but themselves, when they believe that justice is in their own 
hands a single spark could inflame the charge.  
                                                                                                                                     





Hatred and desire for revenge are very difficult to overcome or suppress, 
especially in a no-control armed situation. In his book ‘Not my turn to die’, Savo 
Heleta (2007) reveals that it took him years to overcome the fury he felt against 
the Bosniaks as a people after the end of the war. Heleta also confessed that when 
a couple of months after the Dayton agreement he came face to face with the man 
who had terrorised his family in Goražde during the war: ‘I was 17, no longer the 
little boy who had to be a victim. Now I could fight back. I didn’t care about the 
consequences … [my friend] understood my rage and wanted revenge too. His 
father had been killed in Goražde during the war’ (Heleta 2007:4). In a video 
testimony, Heleta adds: ‘I was 17 and I had a gun in my hands. I just wanted to 
kill the monster. Somehow my dad showed up. He said that I would go to jail and 
that he didn’t want to lose me. In the end I didn’t pull the trigger…’ 
(www.savoheleta.com). Imagine the ending of this story without the jail in focus. 
 
1.5 Conflict goals and causes 
 
Conflict mobilisation levels have different goals and are driven by different 
causes. From an organisational level, the conflict goals are more or less clear. In 
the Bosniak point of view, this was the right for self-determination and for the 
pursuing of a state, independent from Belgrade. The Serbian standpoint however 
is two-fold. On one hand, there was the Bosnian Serb community, claiming in its 
turn a right for self-determination. On the other hand, there was Belgrade that did 
not want to lose another part of the ex-Yugoslav territory. The Bosnian Croat 
leadership had also declared its power ambitions. These stands constituted the 
different views on the war, as the OSCE Legal advisor Massimo Moratti revealed 
in an interview (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). For the Serbs, 
it was a ‘civil war’, for the Croats a ‘liberation war’, and for the Bosniaks – an 
‘act of aggression’. When the leadership did not manage to resolve the power 
disputes by peaceful means, the outburst of war became the logical development 
of the events.  
 
Throughout the years of conflict the international community has made several 
attempts to resolve the disputes and to put an end to violence. After Alija 
Izetbegović rejected the initially accepted Carrington-Cutileiro plan (1992), none 
of the three other peace plans – of Vance-Owen (1993), Owen-Stoltenberg (1993) 
and the Contact Group (1994) – could make the three parties lay down arms, since 
in each one of them, at least one of the fighting parties felt underprivileged. The 
first plan apparently challenged Izetbegović to accept the power-sharing system. 
The rejection of the other peace plans is explicable – hardly any party would give 
up voluntarily the gains obtained through warfare, or would accept a loss. The 
political goals did not take into account the human suffering.  
 
Supported by the respective military structures, the political leadership pursued 
the identified political goals. Approaching the conflict from the operational level, 
the situation appears slightly different. On one hand, the armies were formed to 
serve the political leadership. The appointed commandership of the Army of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) is an example of a political 
statement. The presence of ethnic Serbs and Croats in the headquarters and in the 
senior commanding staff of the ARBiH signified that this was the true Army of 
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the multicultural Bosnia, fighting to defend the Bosnian population and territory. 
Political reasons can be also detected behind the involvement of the armies of the 
neighbouring states of Yugoslavia and Croatia.  
 
The activation of the religious element in the war and the support offered to all of 
the parties in the conflict by volunteers and paramilitary structures, some of which 
organised along the Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim lines, indicates another level 
of the power struggle. The inclusion of nationalist and extremist elements further 
complicates the picture. While ethnic cleansing in terms of ethnic redistribution of 
the territory can be put in political terms, the massacres, genocide, assaults, rapes, 
and extreme forms of violence can have a type of explanation (if any) only at this 
operational level, when Kaldor’s theory of the total war is applied. Humiliation, 
de-humanisation, extermination, and proofs of dominance of the powerful over 
the powerless are the tools used in the new-wars strategy to transform civilians 
into targets of violence that hardly any rationally calculated political goals of 
expected future benefits can justify.  
 
In terms of the ‘avalanche’ effect, the ‘deserved punishment’ element could be 
considered the strongest one. In the words of Robert Block, describing how 
Bijelovac was put in flames by Muslims in December 1992, ‘the Serbs were 
suffering from a post-ethnic cleansing hangover: a violent backlash of revenge 
killings by Muslims which reflects the changing balance of the war’ (Block 1992). 
Exactly at this level, the security issues discussed by various theories of ethnic 
conflicts can be considered relevant. The collapse of the central institutions 
providing security to people and the immediate threat to their properties and lives, 
urged many to arm themselves and to organise the informal defence of their 
homes and families. In the words of the Muslim engineer Mirsad: 'The army came 
to our homes in the night, shooting… My family fled the house but I stayed to try 
and protect it’ (Fisk 1992, online). In his book, Chuck Sudetic reveals that the 
authorities also exploited hatred, desire for revenge and hunger of refugees 
(Sudetic 1998). When Bosnian forces attacked surrounding Serb villages, the 
Muslim leaders left the impoverished refugees to fan out, killing Serb civilians 
and wounded soldiers and pillaging whatever food and supplies they could find. 
 
The high number of small arms and light weapons in possession of civilians, years 
after the end of the war in Bosnia, was also indicative for the fact that people felt 
threatened and that they had to protect themselves. In an audio-testimony for the 
Imperial War Museum, Peter Caddick-Adams describes the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1996 when he joined the NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR). In his words weapons were easily available: ‘…Two or three machine 
guns (for ‘game-hunting’ only) per household is the norm, and hand grenades are 
five Deutschmarks each in the local market, next to the egg and watermelon stall’ 
(Caddick-Adams, P., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes - Online Exhibition: 
Bosnia, 2008). A pilot weapons collection project run by the UNDP in December 
2006, offering rewards to civilians who handed over weapons collected 332 
weapons and 4,900 rounds of ammunition (Chapman 2007).  
 
The fear for personal life and the imminent threat that provokes hostile feelings 
and aggression emerges from the memories of Denis Abdić, who had grown up in 
a Bosnian town on the Border between Croatia and Bosnia. ‘…I never had any 
problems with Serbs or Croats…I only had problems with my next door neighbour 
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who decided to burn my house…’ (Abdić, D., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes 
- Online Exhibition: Bosnia, 2008). For Denis and many others, the war was not a 
war between institutions, but between neighbours, not for independence, but and 
for survival.  
 
His statement suggests that the political reasons for war did not mean much to the 
common people. ‘There were about 100,000 people in the region [Bihać], 
whereas maybe 30,000… [didn’t] agree with the central government…’  Forced to 
join the army, he had no idea what he was doing on the battle field. I ‘didn’t have 
a clue…somebody gave you a gun and you were supposed to shoot…’ (Filipović, 
Z., audio-testimony; Through My Eyes - Online Exhibition: Bosnia, 2008). 
Similar views – that ethnic problems had not existed on personal level before the 
outburst of war – appear from the memories of Savo Heleta about his childhood in 
the multiethnic Goražde (Heleta 2008). Supportive are also the comments from 
Zlata Filipović’s diary (Filipović 1994) about the sound of church bells 
intermingling with the muezzin coming from the mosques in pre-war Sarajevo. 
Recalling her experience from the siege of Sarajevo, Negra Arnautović shares: 
‘We would all hide in the shelter to wait for the fire to stop… we all suffered 
without water, electricity, food…then the Serbs had to leave, because they were 
afraid of staying in Sarajevo…’ (Arnautović in interview with the Author, 
17.07.2003) 
 
1.6 Conflict outcomes and consequences 
 
As it was introduced in the theoretical model, the most distinctive feature of the 
ethnic conflict as a type is the conflict outcomes and consequences. Namely, these 
are:  
¾ radical transformation of the social and political environment (including the 
formation of new political units and/or states),  
¾ collapse of central institutions and of pre-conflict political and economic 
infrastructures 
¾ fragmentation of society with a relapse from citizenship to ethnic communities 
¾ destruction of any previously existed social contract and hence of the state-
level social capital 
 
With the forced ceasefire agreement in Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina came out 
from the violent conflict united only in name. Allocating 51% of the country’s 
territory to the Muslim-Croat federation, and putting 49% under the control of the 
Bosnian Serbs, the peace agreement gave the fighting parties something that they 
could not secure during the warfare – the institutionalisation of the ethnic 
division. The governmental framework composed of a state presidency of three 
presidents with one chair and a bicameral ‘parliamentary assembly’ with each 
ethnic group getting about a third of the representatives, is further complicated by 
each Entity having their institutions of president, Assembly, Army (united sine 
2006), customs and tax systems.156
 
                                                 
156 The law to merge the country’s three separate customs administrations and create a single, 
state-wide value-added tax (VAT) system was passed by the Bosnian state parliament on 29 
December 2003 (Alić 2004) 
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Figure 13 below presents the structure of the country as designed by the Dayton 
Agreement. The organisational chart is deliberately provocative. The state-
element appears not only on par with the Entities, but also in between them; on 
the top of the structure is the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The 
visualisation aims at emphasising the fact that the Dayton state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is more or less a structure with no content. As a set of institutions, it 
functions to regulate the relations between the two Entities and to represent the 
imaginary nation before the international community. The powers of the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton Constitution are limited exclusively to 
the fields of the foreign and inter-Entity relations. Thus, the state apparatus 
appears something like a channel for communication between the two Entities and 
hardly an overarching body. A regulative organ with limited executive powers 
(especially before the unification of the army and the police forces), the state in 
fact does not have much control over the Entities, while the Entities can boycott 
the functioning of the state by simply withdrawing their representatives from the 
state institutions. The Entities maintain independently direct relations with the 
OHR and the vice versa; by Constitution they also have powers to establish and 
maintain separately international relations.  
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The limited role of the state became explicitly clear in the presentation of Nikola 
Špirić before the Woodrow Wilson centre in April 2009. In his words, it was the 
OHR to influence local politicians and to make officials from the two Entities 
discuss common problems, but not the state (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the 
government’; 24.04.2009). In fact, by 2009, the Office of the High Representative 
has been the real overarching structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and still is the 
guarantor for the country's relative stability and the progress achieved so far (ICG 
2009).  
 
The figure also represents the complex organisation of the Entities with regard to 
the distribution of the population. The different shadings indicate the ethnic 
composition of the respective administrative units. The state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has no direct jurisdiction over the territories of the Entities, but only 
over the Brćko District. Thus, since the population of the District nominally 
belongs both to FBiH and the RS, while governed by the state institutions, it can 
be viewed as the population ‘belonging’ to the state.  
 
Table 11 below presents in details and in a comparative perspective the major 
power institutions of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republica Srpska. The Table reveals that while the 
state institutions are a puzzle of multi-ethnic representation, the two Entities in 
fact are structured as vivid para-states. From both Figure 13 and Table 11, it 
becomes clear that the consolidation of Republica Srpska has been enabled by 
Constitution, while the stability of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
not been ensured. Furthermore, the administrative organisation of every canton as 
a projection of a para-(micro-)state, complicates additionally the situation.  
 
This power structure and the administrative organisation established with the 
Dayton Constitution have become a foundation for the development of the sub-
macro-frameworks of social capital, presented in Figure 14. The possibility ‘to 
ignore’ the central state and its institutions and the lack of functioning structure to 
enable productive communication and interaction between the two Entities 
constitutes the problem with the lack of established bridging relations between the 
communities that are addressed below.  
 
Based on the assumption that separation of conflicting parties would end violence 
and leaving any integration related issues aside, Dayton has in fact created and 
legitimised institutional separatism (McWhirter 1996). The structure does not 
enable the emergence of a viable institutional framework to create a unified state 
based on ethnic autonomy (WWICS 2007). The forced union between the two 
Entities under the Dayton pact and the lack of any strategic and organised 
attempts to re-integrate people resulted in the lack of stability of the political 
formation of the Bosnian state, that can be observed even after all the years of 
reconstruction. The international community is not eager to withdraw the military 








Table 11: Major Power Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
ELEMENTS STRUCTURE OF ELEMENTS 
Political Unit REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA 




Capital SARAJEVO SARAJEVO BANJA LUKA 
Active 
Constitution 
Constitution of BiH Constitution of FBiH Constitution of 
RS 
Presidency Triple Rotational Presidency 
(Bosniak + Croat + Serb) 
President FBiH President RS 
Prime Minister BiH Prime Minister FBiH Prime Minister 
RS 
Government 
Council of Ministers BiH Council of Ministers FBiH  




Parliament Parliamentary Assembly: 
• House of Peoples:              
15 delegates (5 Bosniaks 
+ 5 Croats + 5 Serbs) 
• House of Representatives: 
42 delegates (28 from 
FBiH; 14 – from RS) 
Parliamentary Assembly: 
• House of Peoples – 
representatives from the 
cantonal parliaments 
• House of 
Representatives:  






United Military Forces - 
since 2006 




United Police Forces  
(from 2010) 
Police Force FBiH  
(until 2010) 





Brcko District  10 cantons with own 




Sana (Canton 1), Tuzla 
(Canton 3) , Zenica-Doboj 
(Canton 4), Bosnian 
Podrinje (Canton 5), 
Sarajevo (Canton 9) 
 
‘Croatian’ cantons: 
Posavina (Canton 2), West 
Herzegovina (Canton 8), 
Canton 10 (Canton 10) 
 
Mixed: Central Bosnia 
(Canton 6), Herzegovina-






The structure has reaffirmed the ethnic division established throughout the years 
of war and it can hardly enable the de-fragmentation and the restoration of the 
pre-war Bosnian multicultural society. Throughout the period of war, people 
relapsed from citizens to members of ethnic groups. It would have been 
interesting to know how people, who had determined themselves as ‘Yugoslav’ in 
the 1991 census, would determine themselves now. Unfortunately, this is 
something that we might never know. Fear, distrust and war trauma have affected 
the very essence of the social structure – the relationship between people from 
different origins or religions, enabling them to coexist, to cooperate and to build a 
common future. The pre-war social contract has disappeared at large. Leaving 
aside interpersonal relations, social cohesion at the level of state is non-existent. 
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Evidence for this emerges not only from testimonies of people about the 
difficulties to reconcile with the past and with the experienced violence and 
trauma (Heleta 2008), or from the comments of intellectuals, provided in the next 
section of the chapter. Events like the 2006 referendum in Montenegro or the 
proclaimed Kosovo independence in 2008 appear as catalysers for local tensions 
charged by nationalist organisations and leaders 157(Ninkovic 2006, Stanic 2008). 
In April 2009, the High Representative Valentin Inzko stated before the UN 
Security Council that Republica Srpska was driving for secession; unplanned 
developments and lack of expected progress postponed once again the closure of 
the OHR (lastly scheduled for 30th June 2009). 
 
Projecting the conflict outcomes through the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model of 
social capital introduced in Chapter 3, the macro-structural level represents the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Dayton Accord and 
recognised by the international community in 1995, and its central institutions. It 
is obvious that immediately after ceasefire these central institutions were not 
functioning. They had been established mostly on a formal level. The state also 
did not acquire immediate control over key structures like customs and tax 
system. The whole country was put in fact under the control of the Peace 
Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative. Nevertheless, 
one can argue that the macro-structural level was set up at least formally. 
Referring to Figure 3 and Table 4 (presenting the constitutional arrangements of 
the country), it could be argued that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
initially established as a parallel and not as an overarching structure (Figure 13). 
Nevertheless, looking for the grounds of a common non-ethnically based political 
identity; this level appears as the macro-level of the structure.   
 
The principles of governance are projected at the macro-cognitive level. 
According to the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution, the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a parliamentary democracy, organised as a union between the two 
Entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska. 
Leaving aside the complexity of the constitutional arrangements and the success 
(or lack of) of the pursued (i.e. imposed by the international community) policy of 
integration through separation, one can accept that the macro-cognitive level is 
also present.  
 
The most problematic area in a post-ethnic-conflict situation is the (re-)building 
of a micro-level that corresponds to the macro-perspectives as defined by the 
reconstruction agents. While the macro-framework is a ‘product’ that can be 
designed and implemented by external actors either with the consent of the local 
leaders, or by putting them under pressure, the micro-level requires much more 
attention exactly because of the discussed fragmentation resulting from the 
struggles between different communities. The reconstruction model can be built 
up starting from any of the four quadrants of the Grootaert-van Bastelaer model of 
social capital. The stages of the process and the expected developments can be 
                                                 
157 Following the Montenegro referendum for independence, the Bosnian Serbs NGO ‘Choice is 
ours’ organised signing of petition for secession RS from Bosnia and Herzegovina in several 
towns of Republica Srpska. The Media Round-up provided by the OHR for 23 May 2006 reveals 
that there was a good coverage of the events (OHR BiH Media Round-up 23/05/2006).  
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determined more easily, if taking as a starting point the largest or the smallest 
structural unit that will be targeted. The whole strategy should then be designed 
with respect to the chosen unit.  
 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reconstruction process led by the 
external powers started with the setting up of the macro- political framework. 
Establishing central institutions and relying upon them to be the driving force for 
progress in the direction towards achieving peace and stabilisation, proved not to 
be a very well calculated step. In the case of this fragmented and war-traumatised 
society and following the institutionalised and officially recognised division along 
ethnic lines, true power remained in the hands of each Entity’s structures and 
players, networks and institutions. Instead of identifying themselves as 
‘belonging’ to the macro-framework of the Bosnian state (i.e. as micro-structural 
units), these local institutions and structures of Republica Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively took over the role of macro-
units and became recognised as such by their members. Constituted on the basis 
of exclusive bonding ties, defined during the three years of struggles, the two 
Entities did not seek any co-operation or interaction; and their members remained 
to a large extend hostile to the people from the other community. In this context, 
trust, shared values, and norms remained limited only within the closed 
community. The state was largely perceived as an abstraction, a hostile entity, run 
by foreigners through their local ‘puppets’. This lack of trust in the institutions of 
the state prevented the emergence of cross-ethnic relationships (not speaking 
about the exceptions) and affiliations with the central state. The counterpoint of 
the imposed status-quo was the dream for a super-ethnic structure, a homogeneous 
national state. These feelings and perceptions about the international community 
and the political elites in the country are presented in details in the next section of 
this chapter, discussing the findings of the 2003 fieldwork in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 
Figure 14 presents a graphic illustration of the specific social capital structure 
developed in post-ethnic-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Dayton 
Constitution. Fragmenting the multiethnic social contract of the former socialist 
republic and constituting three rather closed and hostile ethnic communities, the 
war destroyed the overarching social capital at the level of the former political 
entity of Bosnia. Evidence for its existence appear in published memories about 
the pre-war situation (as in Filipovic 1994, Heleta 2008, etc.) and in the 
testimonies of local citizens gathered during the conducted fieldwork (interviews 
with S.Turulja, H.Batinić, Z.Grebo - quotations follow). 
 
Critics of the Dayton Constitution point out that it managed to achieve what the 
war could not. Institutionally and functionally, the country was divided into two 
ethnically determined Entities. Thus, the ethnic consolidation processes that began 
during the course of war was reaffirmed and enhanced. The establishment of the 
central state as a bridging element between the two separate political units could 
not contribute per se to the (re-)construction of a national-level social capital. 
Focused on developing the macro-framework, the international community 





Figure 14: ‘Organisation’ of Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
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The political and institutional organisation of the new state however did not 
contribute to this development. Instead, it pushed the processes in a very different 
direction. The two Entities obtained their own sub-macro-structures (as presented 
in Table 11), which allowed the interested parties to work for the consolidation of 
their own community, for the development of social capital within the Entities and 
not between them. The initial lack of will for constructive interaction and co-
operation was later ‘supported’ by the lack of institutions, programmes and 
initiatives to stimulate such.  
 
Thus, at the micro-level of the state social capital, two ethnically determined 
micro-levels emerged. Each one reproduced a projected model of its ‘own’ social 
capital with no or very limited bridging structures and mechanisms between them. 
Underestimating or ignoring this problem, the efforts of the international 
community since the signing of the Dayton Agreements could hardly be defined 
as planned and systematically directed towards eliminating the sub-macro-
frameworks discussed. This on its turn impeded the emergence of a supra-ethnic 
micro-level within the political unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a 
precondition for the establishment of proper civil community, citizenship 
affiliation and a ‘national’ social contract.  
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Supporting evidences to the above claims emerge from different sources. Such 
can be found in the comments of the interviewed local representatives about lack 
of trust and co-operation between people from the different communities (as of 
2003), or in the International Crisis Group (ICG 2009) article about the fragile 
stability of the country. Indicative of the gravity of the processes is the concern of 
Mr Špirić (‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009) for when the OHR 
would close down: ‘Now when politicians form the Federation and Republica 
Srpska have problems they contact the OHR to seek solutions. They are not used 
to discuss things among themselves and to work together. And this would create a 
problem in itself.’ On the other hand, the fact that co-operation and bridging ties 
have emerged at the level of NGOs in the two Entities, suggests that positive 
energies exist and they could become an important constructive factor, if properly 
directed and supported. 
 
The adapted model of social capital (as introduced in Chapter 3), illustrates the 
importance of the problem with the fractured societal structure in post-war Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the relapse from civil platform into ethnic communities. 
With the imposed macro-framework and the two quite autonomous Entities, and 
without established grounds for reconciliation and integration of the population 
based on non-ethnic and civil local structures, the micro-state-level simply does 
not exist, nor s its development is enabled. Instead of a micro-level corresponding 
to the macro-framework of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two parallel 
micro-levels have been constituted reaffirming the ethnic divide. 
 
Having in mind that there were three warring parties, one can argue that the 
mirrored structures should be more than two. In fact, the model allows more than 
two projections to be examined (in contrast to the SCAT model, where for visual 
clarity there should not be more than two projections presented). The reason for 
looking only at the two mirrored models is that Republica Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent political units with quasi-state 
structures (not exactly the case of the autonomous regions for example). As such, 
the mirrored macro-levels of the Entities with their presidents, assemblies, and 
armies are clearly recognisable.  
 
In 2003, Sead Turulja, a hostel owner from Sarajevo, observed, reflecting 
widespread views among ordinary people: ‘The government is not responsive very 
much to the local citizens, sometimes because they don't know, sometimes because 
they don't want to, sometimes because they don’t have the money for it. Usually 
they do not do much for the citizens because of different reasons. The two 
government systems are too complicated and most of the funds go for government 
structures, the military, the police’ (Turulja in interview with the Author; 
06.05.2003). 
 
The most common mistake of the international involvement is the presumption 
that by restoring political institutions and economic infrastructure, the functioning 
of the state machine is only a matter of time. In the case of a post-conflict 
situation, where there were no inter-ethnic, cultural, and religious clashes, this 
would be possible, because the micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels would 
not have been fractured into closed and hostile units. The war-traumatised citizens 
would still remain citizens. During an ethnic conflict, survival mechanisms are 
likely to push people to (re)construct and (re)emphasise their ethnic identities. In 
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the case of any artificially supported statehood before the conflict, the latter 
simply reinforces the existing ethnic identities and motivates people to get rid of 
the imposed, yet not internalised, affiliations.  
 
In the post-ethnic-conflict situation, the citizens, i.e. the people bridged by their 
common acceptance of formal principles and supra-ethnic/cultural/religious 
identities, are missing. Therefore, immediately after an ethnic conflict, any efforts 
that require the involvement of citizens and civil society are doomed to failure. 
Before launching programmes for supporting and enhancing civil society, it is 
necessary that bridging ties are restored, social cohesion enabled and investments 
in social capital made. Only then, it is likely that ethnic members become willing 
to identify themselves not only as belonging to a certain ethnic, cultural, or 
religious group, but also with the larger political unit as citizens.  
 
According to Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Faculty of Law at the University 
of Sarajevo, the only way to overcome the ethnic separatism and division in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is to establish a civil society, but for this are needed 
citizens and a common political platform for their formation – a concept of a 
supra-ethnic political Bosnian nation. At the same time, as Zoran Puljić from the 
Mozaik Foundation (formerly NGO Development Foundation) argued, in 2003 
the economic problems and the collapse of state services in the cities where the 
organisation was involved (of population up to 35 000), ‘reflect on people's minds 
that they ARE LOSING HOPE, THEY ARE FRUSTRATED. They have this large 
sense of apathy and there is a feeling of hopelessness and such little initiative for 
action, because they believe they cannot change anything’ (Grebo in interview 
with the Author, 16.07.2003).  
 
As it was discussed in Chapter 3, for a reconstruction programme to be successful, 
it is essential that the elements of the four quadrants of the Grootaert-van 
Bastelaer model be synchronised and of corresponding scope. The identification 
of the highest macro-structural level would determine the character of the 
elements in the other three quadrants, as the appropriate strategies and actions for 
creating a balanced and synchronised structure and would serve as a point of 
reference for their efficiency. When the goal is to (re-)construct a modern state, 
with citizens respecting their nested identities, then the development of a 
supportive micro-level should be considered and planned carefully. 
Reconstructing social capital in this context means enabling co-operation among 
people, by creating an environment within which tolerance, will for co-operation 
and integration, interest in the common future and the common good and social 
cohesion can re-emerge.  
 
To sum up, instead of a micro-structural level of local institutions developed on 
the basis of civil relationships and cross-ethnic networks and a micro-cognitive 
level constituted on the basis of trust, local norms and values that the citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina share, Dayton has established two separate micro-levels 
framed by the macro-levels of the Entities. It is difficult to assess retrospectively 
whether in 1995 there would have been any other option than enforcing the 
Dayton Agreement. It is difficult to evaluate whether attempts to establish such a 
state-level micro-structure would have been successful without addressing first 
the security issues, the war trauma and the lack of willingness to co-exist, even 
less to cooperate for building up a common future. The current text does not 
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intend to discuss who is to blame for Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming a ‘black 
hole’ and swallowing foreign aid without achieving the expected levels of 
success. By many, especially people from Bosnia and Herzegovina (among which 
the interviewed respondents Professor Zdravko Grebo, Hrvoe Batinić, Professor 
Dragoljub Stojanov), the Dayton Accords are seen as a mechanism that has 
institutionalised the fragmentation of social relations, with cohesion limited to the 
specific framework of the ethnic group. Although there are good arguments and 
evidence in support of this thesis, the current research is interested in the 
international efforts for reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina planned and 
implemented in the light of the Dayton arrangements 
 
The described situation reveals that under the existing circumstances, the sole 
reconstruction of the macro-framework would not enable the micro-level to 
develop naturally or with minimum interference. The positive results that the 
research performed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) & 
Oxford Research International (ORI) presents are that in 2006 about 43% of the 
respondents to the survey identified themselves as ‘Bosnians’ above all (i.e. 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and not only as belonging to the respective 
ethnic group (UNDP/ORI 2007)158. The question however is whether this is a 
good result or a bad one, especially when these figures are projected in the light of 
the 12 years of reconstruction, numerous projects and programmes that have been 
or still are running in the country and the billions of foreign financial and material 
aid, of technical, economic, political and social assistance. The donor-driven 
approach relies on directing and channelling the societal powers and energies in 
the desired way only by setting up frameworks and limiting the processes within 
them, therefore it is more likely to be doomed to failure.   
 
Dayton constructed the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federation. In 
order to work, federalism requires a balance between the centre and the 
constituent parts of government. Such a balance is still non-existent in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The powers of the central government are still rather limited. Apart 
from being neglected by the governments of the Republica Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it earns little loyalty from the citizens. 
Despite the early- established democratic electoral structure, there were no 
frameworks in place to give moderate political forces a chance to cohere and 
organise (WWICS 2007).  
 
Another essential mechanism that has the potential to compel political co-
operation between ethnic regions are the shared economic interests, demanding 
co-operation between institutions and in this way enabling the success of a 
federated state. Reports also suggest (WWICS 2007) that in an ethnically 
fractured state aiming at (re-)integration, the coalescence of non-ethnically 
defined political groups (defined by mutual social, economic, or political interest) 
should be enabled and supported. The ethnic factor however is still a determinant 
for many aspects of the life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton did not manage to 
foster reconciliation between ethnic groups, nor did the international community 
for all these years of active reconstruction work, because the structure of the state 
                                                 
158 Unfortunately, the figures cannot be compared against such from previous years, because of the 
lack of official surveys.  
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itself provides little incentive for national progress or a national interest (WWICS 
2007). 
 
Exploring the 1992-1995 Bosnian war through the model developed in Chapter 3 
it appears that it bears all the characteristics of an ethnic conflict as defined by the 
research. The ethnic violence, involving more than involved more that 15,000 
people, spread due to the impossibility to address peacefully the claims for 
independence. With ethnicity and religion used as “instrumental means rather than 
ends” and with a complex and dispersed commandership, the conflict had poor 
regulation potential; thus, the efforts of the international community to help the 
fighting parties to reach an agreement remained void. Furthermore, the 
militarisation of the civil population (refugees or common citizens) created 
obstacles before the stabilisation of the environment years after the end of the 
conflict. Applying the evaluation structure suggested in Chapter 3, Table 12 (next 
page) summarises the particular features of the Bosnian case. 
 
 
2. VIEWS FROM THE FIELD (2003) 
 
The findings from a fieldwork, carried out in Sarajevo and Konjić in 2003, frame 
the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of the period between the 
end of the war and today. This is an interesting point of time because after seven 
years of reconstruction, in 2003 weaknesses and essential problems were already 
identified and until the present moment (almost seven years later), there have been 
time for approaching their solution.  
 
With focus on the issues concerning inter-ethnic integration and any consistent 
policies targeting the reconstruction of social capital at the level of state, a range 
of people was approached. Carried were interviews with representatives of the 
public sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the academia, the third sector – both 
local and international NGOs and structures, as well as with representatives of the 
international institutions as agents enabling, supporting, and in general running 
the process of reconstruction of the state. The list of the approached institutions 
and persons appears in Appendix 3.  
 
The reason for the focus on Sarajevo was that the head offices of almost all of the 
major ‘players’ in the field were and still are located there. The initial assumption 
was that before examining implementation practices related to social capital 
reconstruction, it was necessary to find out information about existing structured 
policies in this direction. Furthermore, the research was interested in the 
parameters of social capital at the level of state. Paradoxically, as it was discussed 






Table 12: Summary of the Suggested Ethnic-Conflict Assessment-Model 
 (See next page) 
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Elements  Theoretical description The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Preconditions – identity 
politics; oppressive & 
discriminatory regimes 
Tito’s “multi-national” state was based on administrative 
and institutional division along ‘ethnic’ lines; Internal 
power and economic challenges; Political ‘opening’ after 
1989 
Local Triggers – 
experienced changes, 
collapse of institutions  
Collapse of the system, secession of other Yugoslav 
republics; BiH - good grounds for development of radical 
ethnic politics  
Conflict context 
& history  
International Triggers -  
support for political 
changes 
End of the Cold War; group  rights agenda, support for 
political change and democratisation 
Conflict agents  Identity-based groups 
along ethnic lines 
Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox), Bosnian Croats (Roman-
Catholics), Bosniaks (Muslim)  
Frameworks Conflict occurs as 
internal for a state 
Over the territory of the former Yugoslav republic Bosnia 
and Herzegovina - claiming independence 
‘Local’ from international 
perspective 
Conflict between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks closed 
within the borders of the ex-Yugoslav republic 
Scope 
Mass involvement Mass mobilisation   
Type Implosion  Bosnian population divided in 3 in the course of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia; violence and hostilities 
performed on ethnic division. Territorial consolidation of 
ethnic groups (also by force) - two Entities established 
Scale   Violence over large parts 
of the territory  
By August 1992 the Serbs had conquered about 60%, 




Over 100 000 deaths (most of which civilian population), 
more than 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced 
people. Massacres of civilians (from each side), ethnic 
cleansing 
Poor potential for 
containment, regulation 
or termination 
War terminated only after the NATO intervention. 





Reoccurrence rather than 
peace after ceasefire 
Continued tensions after formal cease-fire, stability 
remained dependant on the presence and the actions of 







civilians as ‘targets’  
Regular army supported by paramilitary structures, Local 
warlords – own ‘agenda’; revenge; ethnic cleansing and 
war-crimes perpetrated by all parties - massacres, rape, 
assaults; continued tensions 
Activation of shared 
symbols  & myths for 
gathering support and 
followers 
Historical examples used to justify actions against 
another ethnic group – reborn myths of ancient conflicts, 
of delayed revenge for past injustice, of historical events
Mobilisation 
strategy 
Real threats and 
personal  loses 
Real threats and lack of personal security motivated 




Different for the different 
conflict mobilisation 
levels 
By ethnic group: Serbs - against the secessionist and 
for their right to remain part of the Serbian nation; Croats
–against the aggressors as well as against the religious 
enemies, Bosniaks –community rights and 
independence 
By level: Political (organisational) level - war for 
independence, power-shift and expectations for (possible 
future) benefits; Operational level - demonstrations of 
power and domination; Personal level – symbolically 
justified war, lack of personal security and desire for 
revenge for human and material loses 
Political re-organisation 
of territories/ new states 
Bosnia and Herzegovina became internationally 
recognised as a new state 
Political and economic 
problems  
Destroyed infrastructure, collapsed economy, no 





previously existing civil 
affiliations (bridging and 
linking ties) replaced with 
bonding ethnic relations 
Three ethnically closed communities but no ‘national 
Bosnian’ society. Destroyed pre-war societal relations 
and networks. “Ethnic-community members” replaced 
former Yugoslav citizens. No social contract binding the 
inhabitants of the established state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. No social capital on the level of the state. 
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 Another aspect that needs to be mentioned, because this can be considered a 
projection of the then existing attitudes within Bosnian society (to be discussed in 
details below), is the fact that both locals and foreigners (whose presence in the 
streets of Sarajevo was rather visible), were not very open for interviews. Over the 
years, the international people working for NGOs or other structures in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have become suspicious about ‘researchers’ and annoyed of the 
constant interest in their work. Locals have also become tired of being ‘examined’ 
by foreigners. Despite these obstacles, the informal channels activated on personal 
and networking levels were functioning and allowed me to gather substantial 
information on the ground. The findings are summarised in the sections below. 
 
2.1 Inter-ethnic relations  
 
In 2003, the existing lines of separation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had various 
manifestations. Regardless the 7 years of reconstruction, by 2003 the border 
between the constitutionally divided Entities was stronger than the borders with 
the neighbouring countries. Yet these were and still are the ‘two sides of the same 
medal’, as the current Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Nikola Špirić 
referred to FBiH and RS. The movement of people between Serbia and Republica 
Srpska was visibly more intensive than that between the two Entities. Even in the 
limited space of the city of Sarajevo, the lines of separation between the 
communities, invisible to the foreign visitors, were in fact very clear for the 
locals. In the words of the taxi driver Reuf Bojrović, not all ‘colleagues would 
take clients to the Serbian part, but I don’t mind, I don’t feel threatened’ 
(Bojrović in interview with the Author, 04.07.2009).  
 
‘What makes a Bosnian Serb is that he is a bit Croat and a bit Bosniak; what 
makes a Bosnian Croat is that he is a bit Serb and a bit Bosniak; what makes a 
Bosnian Bosniak is that he is a bit Croat and a bit Serb’, the hostel owner from 
Sarajevo, Sead Turulja, quoted his favourite author Ivo Andrić (Turulja in 
interview with the Author, 06.05.2003). The war however has transformed the 
former multicultural society of the Bosnian Republic into an ethnic puzzle. In the 
views of the former politician Stipe Suvar, expressed during the Sixth 
international seminar ‘Democracy and Human Rights in Multiethnic Societies’, 
held in July 2003 in Konjić, the Bosnian society was divided into three ‘nations, 
each behaving with the other two as landlords behave with tenants’ (Suvar 2003, 
conference presentation). In addition, the feeling of equality, promoted during 
Yugoslav times, had also disappeared. The paradoxical fact noted by intellectuals 
like Stipe Suvar was that all the communities developed a perception of their 
status as that of a minority. Without such a feeling for equality, a Swiss-style 
political structure was rather impossible to achieve.  
 
The pre-war multiethnic Sarajevo (with population of 44% Bosniak, 30% Serb, 
15% Croats, and 11% others) emerged from the conflict rather homogeneous – 
with about 80% of Bosniak population. At least that was the perception of the 
local people, expressed by Sead Turulja. ‘Now the situation is worse than the one 
in Ottoman times. Communities were mixed then, while today every valley has its 
own master’ (Turulja in interview with the Author, 06.05.2003). 
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‘In the 1970s and 1980s the Bosnian spirit existed without being politically 
articulated’, commented Hrvoe Batinić, Programme Director at the Open Society 
Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Batinić in interview with the Author, 
13.06.2003). In 2003, as the words of another intellectual, professor Dragoljub 
Stojanov from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Sarajevo revealed, 
people felt forced to identify themselves as ‘Bosnians’ (Stojanov in interview with 
the Author, 23.06.2003). 
 
Religious and ethno-confessional identities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
always been much more political than spiritual. The war has also resulted in a 
revival of religious practices. ‘Years ago one could hardly see young girls 
wearing long sleeves and scarves and teenagers with heavy beards; at least not in 
Sarajevo’, explained Snejana Brkić, a teaching assistant in the Faculty of 
Economics. ‘Many of my students visibly expose their religion now. Before we 
never knew who was who’ (Brkić in interview with the Author, 23.02.2002). The 
respondents from the public sector and the academia emphasised that the religious 
factor was an obstacle to the (re-)integration of the people from different 
communities not because of the religious practices per se, but exactly in the 
sociological aspect of the manifestation of religious affiliation and its 
requirements.  
 
Another interesting point addressed by Hrvoe Batinić, a Programme Director at 
the Open Society Foundation – Sarajevo, was that social relationships in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today (2003), had to be considered at two levels (Batinić in 
interview with the Author, 13.06.2003). The first one was the level of inter-
personal relations. On an informal daily level, there was intercultural 
communication. Perhaps not always cooperative in their actions, people from 
different groups talked to each other. The problem was that people were tied to 
their groups and that the war reinforced the ‘us’ vs. ’them’ division. This in turn 
was not a communication-enabling factor, because inter-groups relations are all 
about power, especially after having played ‘their ‘imperative role’ and 
ethnicities having been promoted into nations’ (Batinić in interview with the 
Author, 13.06.2003).  
 
The opinion that the problems with the troubled and non-existing inter-ethnic 
relations, owed in fact to the political class, was expressed in various 
conversations during the conducted fieldwork. In the view of the OSCE officer 
Massimo Moratti, people were afraid to promote reconciliation, because there 
were still many unresolved problems and nationalist parties still interpreted 
everything through the ethnic prism (Moratti in interview with the Author, 
19.06.2003). The lack of political awareness and democratic traditions were 
recognised as factors, enabling the politics of fear to flourish. Phrases like ‘if you 
don't come with us, if we are not unified as a community, THEY will kill us; the 
others will be unified and you will have no choice’, according to Sead Turulja, 
could easily be heard all around Bosnia and Herzegovina (Turulja in interview 
with the Author, 06.05.2003). The assertion of the OSF Programme Director, that 
national organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina still enjoyed strong support, 
was confirmed by the words of a common citizen from Sarajevo. Reuf Bojrović 
commented that the nationalist charge in the neighbouring Serbia and Croatia had 
a direct effect upon the dynamics of the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Bojrović in interview with the Author, 04.07.2003). An example for some 
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emerging positive processes was the fact that in Sarajevo and many parts of the 
Federation, for the first time after a decade the Social-Democratic party won the 
elections. Far away from an ideal multicultural party, the victory of the social-
democrats was nonetheless encouraging as a ‘step towards more democratic 
development, given that the members of this party are members of different 
communities and not 100% one party-one nation’ (Moratti in interview with the 
Author, 19.06.2003).  
 
The ethnic fragmentation of Bosnia, which was a consequence of the collapse of 
Yugoslavia, in the words of Hrvoe Batinić resulted from Serbs and Croats in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming diasporas opened to political manipulations 
and from fears that ‘the others are consolidating’. ‘The war was in the air even 
before the referendum in 1992; the referendum was a result of the processes of 
ethnic consolidation; and to this contributed also the fact that Alia Izetbegović 
was a religious person, not a politician. It was unfortunate for the Bosniaks, 
because Tuđman and Miloshević played with him’ (Batinić in interview with the 
Author, 13.06.2003). 
 
A widespread critical perspective from within Bosnian society identified the inter-
ethnic fragmentation and the lack of efforts and progress towards consolidation as 
stemming from the frameworks imposed on the country by the Dayton 
Constitution. More problematic however were considered the lack of a critical 
mass to enable the civil processes and the lack of support from the international 
community for such a critical mass to emerge. A strong civil society would be 
able to limit political manipulations and make politicians serve the public, not 
their own goals, only if supported to come (back) into being.  
 
Statements by public officials and international officers in connection to the 
particular parameters of their work appeared supportive of these personal views 
about the high degree of ethnic fragmentation of the Bosnian society and the lack 
of interest towards integration of the different communities. Dzenana Deljkić, 
working for the Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, revealed that many of 
the complaints received were about discrimination practices or related to minority 
issues (Deljkić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2003). It is necessary to 
emphasise that the Ombudsman institutions have also been multiplied in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In fact, apart from the Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
there are also an Ombudsman of RS and an Ombudsman of FBiH – three different 
independent institutions.  
 
Representatives from the UNHCR and the OSCE also confirmed the information 
about complaints for discrimination against minorities (with respect to the 
particular community). The UNHCR officer Lisa Kirkengen pointed out that such 
discrimination issues sometimes are not directly visible. In the context of the 
refugees returning home, for example, people were not prohibited to return to 
their pre-war homes, but discrimination appears in the social and the economic 
field, as well as in respect to the lack of security (Kirkengen in interview with the 
Author, 25.06.2003). OSCE officer Massimo Moratti indicated employment 
issues as a particularly sensitive area. Although sometimes discrimination towards 
people from the returning minority community might be intentional, there were 
also cases when the local business and public institutions could not offer jobs to 
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returnees, because over the years, the positions had been filled and overstaffing 
was not an option (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003).  
 
Another fact established during the 2003 fieldwork concerning the ethnic 
separation, was the phenomenon of ‘two schools under one roof’: one director, 
one administration, and one building, within which the children are divided 
according to their ethnic origin and study separately following different curricula. 
As Jo-Anne Bishop, an OSCE officer in the Department of Education, 
emphasised, the solution to this problem was largely political (Bishop in interview 
with the Author, 14.07.2003). In 2003 the first post-war state-level Framework 
Law on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted, ‘providing the principles 
for a more cohesive education system which respects the rights of all – if the 
political will exists to implement it both in letter and spirit’ (OSCE in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina official website). The second part of the OSCE statement and the 
fact that there are still schools of this type in FBiH suggests that there has not 
been such a good political will over these years. Nevertheless, in April 2009, 
Prime Minister Nikola Špirić confirmed during the Director’s Forum held at the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre that the reforming of these schools was still an issue 
(Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).  
 
2.2 Challenges to integration  
 
Apart from viewing the politicians as contributing largely to the lack of progress 
and sometimes even hampering the efforts towards achieving inter-ethnic co-
operation and integration, the interviewed actors in the field identified some 
additional factors challenging or impeding the process.  
 
The media was a very serious factor that could not only maintain, but also deepen 
the fragmentation of society. By 2002, the legislative framework on the public 
broadcasting media and the regulating structure were already in place. 
Nevertheless, for media people like Melissa Dedović from the Media Plan 
Institute there was no national media space. The national public television was 
perceived as an umbrella over the Entities’ media, not least because it had to use 
their broadcasting infrastructure (Dedović in interview with the Author, 
23.07.2003). 
 
The framework for language representation in media was seen as another issue of 
crucial importance for the integration/disintegration of the communities. The 
proportional use of ‘national’ languages with respect to the number of speakers 
within the particular area, not only constituted three different languages, but also 
enabled the process of their development as such. This also contributes to the 
affirmation and maintaining of the established division between the people in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Education was also indicated as one of the crucial factors for enabling integration 
of the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of a national legislative 
framework on education, was overcome in 2003 with the above-mentioned state-
level Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education. Apart from the 
existing problems due to lack of political will or of sufficient efforts to implement 
the provisions of the adopted law, it is important here to note that the ‘much-
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needed state-level legislation’ on Higher education, Pre-school Education, 
Vocational and Educational Training was finally passed in 2007 – 2008. 
 
Police reform has been also a sensitive issue for quite a few years. On 16 April 
2008, the Bosnian upper house of the Parliament voted in favour of reform and 
ended years of dispute among the leaders of the Bosnian Croat, Muslim, and Serb 
communities about the extent to which they should integrate the country's 
ethnically-separated police forces. 
 
The separated (Entity’s) police forces had been established for ensuring better 
protection of the respective communities and because of the lack of trust across 
them. In an interview Snejana Ivandić, a programme coordinator at the Balkan HR 
Network, pointed out that people ‘would not trust a police officer from another 
community. If a woman has been raped during the war for example, which has not 
been an isolated case, or if a relative has been killed by the others, how would you 
approach a police officer for help when associating them with the former 
enemies?’ (Ivandić in interview with the Author, 23.06.2003). 
 
Over the years, the separated police has transformed from a security issue, into a 
power/status issue. This can be spotted in an OHR announcement of 2005, which 
‘exposes some myths related to the police reform’ and emphasises that the reform 
does not imply abolishment of the Entities (OHR, online).  
 
Return of refugees – in the course of our conversation the OSCE legal advisor, 
Massimo Moratti, revealed some of the problems that the very successful process 
of return of refugees has been facing. The most serious in his opinion was that it 
was not enough to build houses for the returnees. Unemployment and lack of 
places in the schools for their children were also serious issues. In addition, many 
of the returning refugees were returning to villages and towns that were not their 
original home places. Thus, they faced also problems socialisation within the new 
communities. In addition, there were people returning to their homes, where other 
refugee families had settled during the war. ‘Should you evict one family to give 
the house back to the old owner or ask the old owner to forget about their house 
and go and live somewhere else and if so where… and can you then expect that a 
community is established when there are these tensions among its members’ 
(Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003). In the context of the 
returnees-agenda, the existing ethnic prejudices formed a serious impediment to 
integration. Unemployment, lack of transparency of hiring practices, problems 
with enrolment of children in schools, have been additional challenges to the 
process.  
 
From a legal perspective, the steps taken to resolve the property issues of refugees 
and to enable them either to return to their former homes or to be able to sell 
them, was considered a success. In the eyes of some people from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as professor Dragoljub Stojanov stated, this continued the policy of 
ethnic cleansing in peaceful times (Stojanov in interview with the Author, 
23.06.2003). Enabling the refugees and displaced people to sell their properties in 
fact created a mechanism for encouraging a new ethnic distribution within the 
country. Massimo Moratti also confirmed that the policy concept of the refugee 
return excluded any forced migration ((Stojanov in interview with the Author, 
23.06.2003). There were even organisations established – as the Serbian 
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‘Ostanak’ (meaning ‘staying’), for example, that began claiming the same rights 
as the returnees.  
 
A priority agenda for many international organisations, the work for the refugees 
and the internally displaced people quite often stops once they are provided with a 
roof over their heads. UNHCR officer Lisa Kirkengen confirmed that housing 
issues were only part of the problems faced by the returnees, yet a lack of 
resources and capacities did not allow any single reconstruction agent to address 
all the needs of these people. Thus, despite physically returning, people still had to 
recover socially, economically and mentally – and these were in fact 
preconditions for achieving real integration (Kirkengen in interview with the 
Author, 25.06.2003). 
 
Economic recovery, according to Professor Dragoljub Stojanov, was also a key 
factor for achieving proper integration between people from different 
communities. In his view, labour or income related problems can contribute to 
ethnic competition and thus to the further raising of tensions.  
 
The need for a common platform for addressing the war emerged in several 
conversations as another important prerequisite for integration. The contrasting 
war discourses (of a ‘civil war’, created by the Serbs, as a ‘liberation war’ – by the 
Croats and as an ‘act of aggression’, by the Bosniaks) could not enable a common 
understanding, unless they are embraced by a shared narrative. This could start 
with the acknowledgement by each side that they did wrong, instead of accusing 
the others. In the views of Massimo Moratti, in a situation of such war trauma, 
there should be a high-level decision whether to talk or not to talk about the past. 
Surely, when signs of war are still present even after years of peace, when 
demolished houses in the middle of nowhere recall of heavy armed battles, when 
in the centre of the capital one could see buildings with holes of fire arms, and 
when the yellow ribbon still warns about land mines, war would not be forget 
easily. However, ‘official days’ in the calendar of local municipalities linked to 
war events such as the day when ‘the Serbs were expelled’ or ‘Bosniaks kept the 
city’ do not contribute for the consolidation of society,  
 
Finally, a challenge for integration of the communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as seen from within the field, was the lack of a legal framework for 
integration. According to Professor Zdravko Grebo from the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Sarajevo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a ‘unique thing 
imposed – ethnic representation in all spheres! The ethnic origin has become the 
factor; and furthermore, this ethnically divided society has been established as an 
international protectorate’. This ethnic division and the re-affirmation of the 
identity politics prevent civil society from developing. ‘There has been no 
improvement for these seven years, but only buying time for a final dissolution’ 
(Grebo in interview with the Author, 16.07.2003).  
 
The most important thing, in the views of the intellectuals interviewed during the 
fieldwork, was that the reconstruction mechanism established in the country 
unfortunately did not support citizenship, but only ethnic representation. There 
were limitations on affiliation, as well as many obstacles on governmental level. 
Collective identities prevailed, the ethnic agenda was underpinning the political 
debate, and the leaders of all three groups were sending messages to their 
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communities emphasising the ‘need’ to stick together. This created a situation of 
‘controlled frustration’.  
 
The prospects for integration and for the future in general were viewed as 
connected to the idea of transforming the ethnically separated community 
members into citizens. As professor Zdravko Grebo suggested, this could happen 
‘if we manage to establish the Bosnian nation as a political nation’ (Grebo in 
interview with the Author, 16.07.2003). Only then a genuine co-operation, rather 
different from the existing artificial forms, could have been possible. Expanding 
on this, the OSF Programme Director Hrvoe Batinić identified the priorities for 
any reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina as:  
 
‘Development (creation) of a civil society with citizens and not members of three 
different groups as the basic political unit; ethnic identities have to accept the 
overarching national identity; rationality must overcome ethnic and religious 
identities; establishment of a national state’ (Batinić in interview with the Author, 
13.06.2003). 
 
The emergence of youth organisations such as the Alumni Association at the Law 
Faculty or the Bosporus Network (presented further in the text) proved in his view 
that there are energies among the young people that can forward the process. EU 
integration and membership in international institutions were considered both by 
members of the public and by officials as the engines for advancing integration. In 
the words of Valida Repovac, a representative from the Directorate for EU 
Integration, Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘EU integration – 
the single and unique goal for which there is consensus among people of different 
ethnic groups. EU integration is the strongest integrative point – a precondition 
for the establishment of a strong state’ (Repovac in interview with the Author, 
18.06.2003). Unlike some intellectuals, like Professor Grebo, considering the 
impulse towards the EU a paradoxical situation – ‘the destroyed country 
(Yugoslavia) unites again in the EU!’ – most agreed that this might be the last 
chance for social integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina.    
 
2.3 The views on the international community  
 
The findings of the fieldwork revealed that within the Bosnian society there were 
at least three different stands towards the international community, its 
representatives, and its role in the country.  
 
In the first group, there were people who had great expectations as regards the 
support and the assistance received by the foreign organisations and donors. These 
were seen as a regulatory mechanism that would not only set up certain structures, 
programmes and practices, but that would also solve all the existing problems. 
According to this view, expressed by Reuf Bojrović (in interview with the Author, 
04.07.2003), the international community had to help ‘to build a professional and 
not nationalistic local administration, provide know-how, create a tax system and 
economic space, suppress extremist forces and punish them by seising their 
assets, which then the EU could use to rebuild the country. It should of course 
help Bosnia and Herzegovina to integrate within EU and not treat the people from 
this country as a refugee danger that has to be kept away as far as possible’. In 
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the context of the reconstruction practice, this group of people, adopting the 
attitude that nothing depends on them, that they are passive aid receivers, could 
hardly become partners in the process.  
 
The second group shared an opinion that can be described with the words 
‘conspiracy theory’. According to these views, the international community in fact 
did not support the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It just wanted to 
close off the people within the country and thus to ‘protect’ itself from an invasion 
of refugees. Helping with money, but not providing sufficient amounts, was in 
fact a way to bring the state/society to a particular stage at which they can be 
used, i.e. exploited. The interesting aspect here was that various people, like the 
hostel owner Sead Turulja, shared both opinions – apparently the dissatisfaction 
with the achievements of the international community in the field of  
reconstruction and normalisation of life transformed itself into a type of self-
victimisation. In none of the interviews, there was any open expression of hostility 
towards the international community; people were rather taking the stance of 
victims. Feeling frustrated and powerless, this group could hardly be seen as an 
active agent of change.  
 
It is interesting to note that among intellectuals and civil society activists there 
were also people who shared the opinion that Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
intentionally been transformed into a zone of ‘controlled instability’ through the 
implementation of a ‘colonial recipe for solving a problem: ‘Divide et impera!’. 
The international community had no interest in the establishment of a strong state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it could profit from the transfer of all the 
dirty industries to such regions. The aluminium production near Mostar was such 
an example (Batinić in interview with the Author, 13.06.2003). 
 
The third group identified within during fieldwork, was the group of people 
critically addressing the policies and the work of the different institutions and 
representatives of the international community. Apart from their criticism towards 
the constitutional frameworks established by the Dayton Agreement, 
representatives from academia and the NGO sector argued that the international 
community had adopted a generic approach to the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, instead of developing a specific one after taking into account all the 
particularities of the field. The top-down approach widely used by reconstruction 
agents and especially of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was not 
helping the reconstruction processes to develop in the right direction. 
Furthermore, the whole reconstruction policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina lacked 
transparency.  
 
A very important issue that emerged from the comments of this particular group 
was that the relationship established between the representatives of the 
international community and the local actors had enabled the development of 
‘parasitism’, in the words of Professor Grebo (in interview with the Author, 
16.07.2003). Bosnian citizens working for donor organisation shared the same 
opinion. They acknowledged that the work of the local NGOs was donor-oriented 
and not programme-oriented. Unfortunately, this status quo was acceptable to the 
donors, because in this way they were obtaining cheap service delivery for their 
own agendas.  
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Alida Vracić, a Project Coordinator at the European Stability Initiative (ESI), 
Sarajevo agreed that quite often representatives of different local NGOs, despite 
having certain ideas for projects and activities, would concur with donor’s 
agendas in order to obtain funding; the common trend was that donors would 
support only projects that corresponded to their priorities. This patron-client 
dependency had also enabled the teaming of the third sector with a number of 
NGOs, but only a few projects actively pursued concrete strategies and goals 
(Vracić in interview with the Author, 20.05.2003).  
 
As it became clear from the various conversations, the international community 
appeared not to have established a practice of ‘listening’ to any constructive 
criticisms but instead to follow a donor-driven approach to reconstruction.   
 
2.4 Efforts in the direction of social capital reconstruction  
 
The final issue of interest within the framework of my fieldwork was the 
identification of policies and practices related to the reconstruction of social 
capital, with an emphasis on any strategic and coherent approaches and 
programmes existing in this area. The information gathered revealed that in the 
various fields there were different activities that targeted integration, rising of 
trust among people, development of civil relationships, etc. The spotted problem 
was that in most of the cases these were isolated projects, pilot activities, or plans 
still to be implemented in practice. Nevertheless, it is important that some of these 
initiatives be mentioned in order to outline better the context and to acknowledge 
that there have been positive examples on the ground.  
 
Private associations ran various initiatives that aimed at enabling communication 
and integration between people from different backgrounds based on shared 
professional interests. Such was the organisation ‘Media Plan’, consisting of: 
Media Plan Institute Sarajevo, Media Plan Prima Sarajevo, Media Plan Banja 
Luka, and the news agency Safax. The Media Plan Institute, Sarajevo, was the 
first organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina founded to promote media 
development towards democratisation and technological modernisation, to 
perform media research and to educate journalists. In pursue of the goal of 
forming a single media community in the country, Media Plan covered all of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with offices in both the Federation Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.  
 
The Bosporus Network and the Alumni Association at the Faculty of Law were 
two examples for the existence of positive integrative energies among the young 
generation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Opened to the future and ready to leave 
the past behind, these young people had quite realistic and pragmatic attitudes 
towards the processes and problems, even though some of them had quite vivid 
memories of the war. Registered in 2000, the Bosnian branch of the international 
non-governmental youth organisation operating in the Balkans – the Bosporus 
Network, only for three years has managed to attract over 150 active members, 
willing to support, promote and participate in multilateral initiatives aiming at 
bringing people back together and overcoming prejudices. Its first project focused 
on the issues of common culture and the EU identity was launched in co-operation 
with Belgrade; another series of workshops were organised under the project 
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‘Religion connects Europe’. The Alumni Association of the Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies at the University of Sarajevo was also 
registered as NGO. Targeting not only maintaining relationships with former 
students, but also achieving regional co-operation, by 2003 it had already 
organised series of 6-7 debates discussing society reforms. Believing that the new 
generation has to become opinion makers, they have had also started issuing a 
monthly magazine.  
  
A striking example of the willingness of people to reunite and to restore their 
normal living is the one of the Prijedor community159, where people gathered  and 
put pressure upon the local authorities to enable the return of refugees and 
displaced persons. Prijedor is also an example that, despite the negative war 
experience, it is possible for integrative initiatives to emerge at a grass-root level 
(not defined as such in fact, but definitely having an effect of the type), in this 
case leading to ‘people from different communities rebuilding the houses of their 
expelled fellow citizens’ (Moratti in interview with the Author, 19.06.2003) 
 
By 2003, the Open Society Foundation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had also 
adopted an approach not to ‘launch’ programmes, but to announce open calls for 
proposals and to support the needs of local organisation, considering each case 
individually.  
 
The OSCE support to inter-school activities, organisation of training seminars and 
various cross-cutting events like the ‘Children’s movement for creative 
education’, as called by the officer from the Department of Education Jo-Anne 
Bishop, which brought together in one exhibition the art-works of children from 
separate schools, also needs to be mentioned (Bishop in interview with the 
Author, 14.07.2003).  
 
An interesting (pilot) project in relation to social capital reconstruction was 
implemented by the UNHCR in 2001. The project, called ‘Imagine coexistence’, 
was run simultaneously in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Rwanda with the aim 
of establishing grounds for co-operation between people from different origins 
based on their pragmatic interest in (mainly) income-generation activities. Aiming 
at rebuilding trust among people involved in common work the project has 
achieved certain levels of success (UNHCR 2002). An important conclusion made 
in the report was that ‘Small project work, even if done excellently, is NOT by 
itself a bulwark against future violence. Broader structural change is needed in 
both countries to ensure the safety and security of their citizens -- returnees and 
others alike.’ (UNHCR 2002:38) 
 
The general perception about the work related to social capital reconstruction was 
of a fragmented field, where different organisations targeting various issues have 
                                                 
159 From about 112 000 people before the war (44% of which Bosniaks), at the end of the war the 
municipality estimated their figures to be around 37,000. More than 50,000 persons were expelled 
from the municipality and a few thousands more had been killed. The Bosniaks have remained 
only couple of thousand. In a meeting in February 1998, displaced persons from Prijedor and 
Sanski Most, Bosniaks and Serbs respectively, joined their forces and stated clearly their intention 
to return to their homes, asking for the support of the local authorities and of the International 
Community. The event, known as the ‘Prijedor-Sanski Most Declaration’ marked the beginning of 
the return process in the area.  
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been running a number of projects. The only structure identified as having a 
systematic and coherent approach to social capital reconstruction, was a local 
institution called Mozaik Foundation (by that time known as ‘NGO Development 
Foundation’). However, in 2003, it has just started its projects on social capital 
reconstruction and it was impossible to evaluate its work apart from the 
statements of intention.  
 
Acknowledging these circumstances, the evaluation of the contribution of Mozaik 
Foundation to social capital (re-)building was intentionally postponed. The value 
of their efforts, regardless the limited capacities, becomes clearer when compared 
to the large players in the reconstruction field. Therefore, the following chapter 
will present the work undertaken by the Foundation in the light of the policies and 
activities of key international organisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
In summary, in 2003 any questions about the war and about ethnic identities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were rather sensitive topic. In many conversations held, 
the interviewed persons were not revealing directly their ethnic affiliation and 
there was a feeling of inappropriateness to ask about it. However, in most of the 
interviews, the concept of ‘others’ was present; especially when people from the 
Federation were discussing issues connected to Republica Srpska, or when 
citizens of Republica Srpska were talking about Sarajevo. Without using a 
particular vocabulary, the distant attitudes were tacitly acknowledged.   
 
Examining whether there were any measures taken for the reconstruction of social 
capital by international and local key agents, several general conclusions were 
reached during the fieldwork. First, it became apparent that the intellectual circles 
of the Bosnian society acknowledged the problems resulting from the still-existing 
fragmentation along ethnic lines. The need for more serious efforts for 
reintegration and for enabling the building of Bosnian citizenship was also well 
articulated. Bringing back people together, reconciliation, overcoming prejudices 
and hatreds, as well as nationalist politics, were areas within which local, foreign 
and international organisations were performing different activities. However, due 
to the lack of co-ordination and communication between the various actors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was very difficult (if not impossible) to spot from 
within the field any existing and strategically implemented policies for social 
capital reconstruction.  
 
Discussing various aspects of reconstruction, policies, and practices with 
interviewees, one expression recurred very often: ‘the international community’. 
The fieldwork findings identified it as an important agent and a factor in the 
Bosnian post-conflict reality. Both in terms of direct involvement and of securing 
the financial support needed, the international community has been and still is the 
driving force behind the reconstruction, development, and democratisation 
processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996. Therefore, it is important to 






3. WHO IS ‘THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’? 
 
According to the ESI study of the international power in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ESI 2000), the key concept of ‘international community’ denotes the moral and 
legal foundations for foreign involvement in the peace process and thus it falsely 
implies a single actor. Great variety of power centres with their own sources of 
authority and answerable to different constituencies, multiple and substantially 
autonomous, actors with their individual goals and separate activities, 
international NGOs and organisations, foreign national and development agencies, 
and other multinational structures, depict the great institutional diversity present 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
The ad-hoc institutional arrangements made immediately after the end of the war 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina established a pattern of horizontally rather than 
hierarchically organised peace missions. Different areas of the peace process, 
divided into the two major fields of civilian and military operations, were taken 
over by different institutional actors. The humanitarian and refugee issues 
remained a task of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). The elections, human rights monitoring and regional stabilisation 
became the focus of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) in its first major field mission. Institution building and economic reform 
issues (such as payment system reform, private sector reform and privatisation) 
were taken by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
while the World Bank and the European Commission engaged themselves in a 
range of other economic initiatives, as well as in the co-ordination of the 
reconstruction programme. The police-monitoring mission stayed with the UN 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). This allocation of fields among 
the institutions followed to a certain degree the model used in earlier peace 
missions under UN authority (ESI 2000:22). Thus at the end of 1995, the 55 
countries and agencies engaged with the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
formed the Peace Implementation Council. To provide a mechanism for co-
ordination and efficient implementation of the peace and reconstruction activities 
with respect to the civilian affairs, the Dayton Agreement (Annex 10) established 
the figure of the High Representative, institutionalising in this way the 
international governance of, and control over, the country.  
 
The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was successful in its role of 
mechanism for coordinating the international peace implementation activities only 
to a certain degree. The institutional proliferation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
continued, inspiring the establishment of a whole series of coordinating 
structures.160 During the years of reconstruction, the rationalisation of 
                                                 
160 By the year 2000 in Bosnia there is a whole series of structures involved in the reconstruction 
process and several bodies exercising an overview function. The PIC created a Steering Board 
made up of the states most directly involved in the peace process. UNHCR continued to operate 
the Humanitarian Issues Working Group. The EU and the World Bank operated the forum of 
periodic donors’ conferences. The inter-agency Human Rights Steering Board, a forum for 
declaring human rights priorities, established working groups on issues such as judicial reform, 
property rights and human rights institutions. The Economic Task Force is nominally responsible 
for everything from coordinating reconstruction projects to recommending economic 
conditionality to developing economic reform strategy. The Return and Reconstruction Task Force 
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international efforts and the co-ordination of resources and priorities have been 
constantly discussed. A contribution to the deepening of the problem can be 
ascribed also to the shift in the mandate of OHR and the change of its powers.  
 
The persistence of the Serbs and Croats in refusing to participate in state level 
institutions and resisting reintegration in the late 1990s was a factor obstructing 
the international community in its efforts to implement the reconstruction 
programmes and to secure refugee returns. To overcome this situation, the High 
Representative used quasi-legal mechanisms blocking the promotion of hatreds 
and hostilities in the media in 1997 and firing the board of the Serb radio and 
television. His actions were not sanctioned by the Peace Implementation Council 
(the group of civil servants from interested countries overseeing the reconstruction 
process in Bosnia), but institutionalised through an interpretation of the Annex 10 
to the DPA during the PIC meeting in Bonn, Germany in December 1997 (Parish 
2007:13). The ‘Bonn powers’ established the High Representative as an 
institution empowered to make ‘binding decisions’ and to undertake any 
necessary measures to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement (Parish 
2007). With the ‘unlimited legal authority to overrule domestic institutions, 
unilaterally impose legislation without the consent of Bosnia’s various 
democratically elected parliaments, and dismiss public officials’ (Parish 2007:11), 
the role of the High Representative gradually transformed from a manager of the 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts and mediator between the domestic parties, 
into an international legal authoritarian (Parish 2007).  
 
The unlimited authority of the international mission to overrule all of the local 
institutions, the lack of control mechanisms over the OHR actions and of 
accountability of its powers, 161 enabled the creation of ‘European Raj’ rather than 
conditions for strengthening the rule of law and the transition to a consolidated 
democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Knaus & Martin 2003). The criticism 
against the abuse of the Bonn powers, conceived as an emergency measure to 
confront concrete threats to the implementation of the peace accords, is that the 
OHR has been following a 19th century-style liberal imperialist philosophy.162 
This has been in contradiction to the constitutional and legal manner of resolving 
problems and thus against the principles justifying the international involvement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 
The concept of the ‘international community’ with respect to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina hence has two different aspects that are both present and active 
simultaneously. The first aspect is the one of the numerous institutions, working 
in pursuit of their particular objectives with no coherent organisation or proper co-
ordination of programmes and goals. On the other hand, there is the institution of 
the OHR, which was not very successful as a coordinator of the international 
involvement and aid, but has successfully established itself as an independent and 
powerful institution. This centralised structure has developed its own agenda, 
which at certain instances - as with the enforced judicial reform in 2000 – has 
                                                                                                                                     
was created to coordinate donor and international agency strategies in refugee return matters (ESI 
2000:23). 
161 Which according to Knaus & Martin is a definition of tyranny (Knaus & Martin 2003:73) 
162 Knaus & Martin (2003) refer to J.S.Mill and his idea that in certain circumstances the dominion 
of foreigners might be better able than that of all but the most exceptional indigenous rulers.  
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been contested and argued against by other international structures, like the 
Council of Europe, for example (Knaus & Martin 2003:65).  
 
Apart from this dual agency, the international involvement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has some other specific features that have contributed to the current 
state of affairs. First, a direct result of the misbalanced structure of the 
international control, with the OHR having accumulated unlimited powers and 
taking on the state-building and democratisation processes, leaving aside the task 
to monitor, coordinate and support the international activities, is the problematic 
organisation of the various missions and programmes in the field. Furthermore, 
the lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the different actors in the field 
and the lack of strategic plan for reconstruction has provoked disagreements 
among the different international actors with respect to policies and measures 
applied in Bosnia. 
 
Among the features that distinguish the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the 
financial support received over the years of reconstruction (1996-2008). The total 
amount exceeding 8 billions of US dollars is the largest aid per capita received by 
a country. Unfortunately, although obtaining more than 50% over and above the 
initially calculated sum of 5 billions of US dollars required for rebuilding Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and transforming it into a democratic country with stable social, 
economic, and political life, the project still has not been completed. There are 
even no clear indications that it will be finished successfully in the near future. 
The discrepancies between the amounts spent and the achieved results have 
discredited the positive aspect of the financial support and have contributed to the 
image of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a ‘black hole’ instead.  
 
Another specific issue, concerning the international involvement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, is the question about the balance between the imposition of coercive 
powers guaranteeing the state-building process and the natural evolution and 
incorporation of the democratic principles and structures. One of the most serious 
failures of the international community was the lack of a clear plan for handing 
over the ownership of the processes to the local constituents. When the 
internationally and locally supported Alliance for Change won the elections in 
2000, this was a success for the OHR policy against the ‘nationalist’ parties. The 
OHR however did not withdraw from direct execution of power and thus the 
international community missed a good chance to transfer the responsibility for 
the future of the country into the hands of its legitimate constituents. Together 
with the fact that there was no mechanism for exercising local control over the 
actions of the international structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this contributed 
to the negative tendency of seeing the responsibility for reconstruction as 
‘belonging to the others’. At the highest political level, the problems with the 
stabilisation and democratisation of the country and the unfruitful partnership 
were not seen as a responsibility of the local authorities, but as a failure of the 
international community to achieve results (Knaus & Martin 2003:68). Along the 
other line of the international involvement, the power shifted from the United 
Nations and the United States to the European Union. External control has even 
grown greater as the European Union now subjects Bosnia-Herzegovina to direct 
regulation and the country has still little ability to build its own capacity as a 
functioning state (Mertus 2005). 
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There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis. The first one 
is that the international community has established itself in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina not only as a regulator and as supervisor of the processes, but as a 
true ruler. This situation of course becomes even further complicated, because of 
the dual aspect of the international agency, the lack of co-ordination among the 
different players in the field, the lack of an overall strategic planning  for 
development, as well as the moving goalposts. 
 
Another point that becomes clearly visible is that the international actors spotted 
at a very early stage that the measures adopted during these first years of 
reconstruction (1995–1997) did not achieve any success in overcoming the 
hostilities and the hatreds among peoples and individuals in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Although this issue has been recognised as a serious problem, the 
only measure taken to deal with it was taking away the ownership of the political 
decisions from the constituent peoples in favour of the appointed foreign 
institution. The strategy drafted for resolving the issues with the civil (in this case 
this could be called ‘ethnic’) unrest was that the High Representative was to take 
unilaterally decisions when the parties were unable to reach an agreement, but not 
only then. The constitutionally divided population along ethnic lines was further 
put in a situation not to trust its central institutions and public officials, since it 
was only the will of the international powers in the figure of the High 
Representative to decide whether they have a say at all.163 From this point of 
view, the democratic vote of people during elections appeared meaningless 
(Parish 2007). 
 
Being directly involved in the processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
international actors are therefore responsible for the progress (or the lack of such) 
that the country has made since 1996 and the direction that the socio-political, 
economic, and cultural life has been developing within. Supported financially and 
technically by foreign governments and international organisations, run by the 
international community through the figure of the High Representative, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina can be taken as an illustrative example of the contemporary 
post-conflict reconstruction agenda and practice. The specific ethnic element here 
makes the case more interesting, because, as it was discussed in the previous 
chapters, the ethnic conflict destroys the very structure of the affected society, 
suppressing citizenship affiliations and enhancing ethnic belongings. This 
fragmentation along ethnic lines underlies the ruptures in all the other aspects of 
life in addition to the material and non-material damages caused by war.   
 
The international community has played and is still playing an essential role for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to become the country of today. Therefore, the research 
will assess how the major reconstruction players have addressed the issues 
identified as crucial for overcoming the effects of ethnic conflicts and for 
achieving the envisaged positive results. The focus will fall on the efforts in the 
direction of reconstruction of social capital with respect to interethnic integration 
and the restoration of citizenship affiliation. The number of international actors 
involved in the field does not allow all of them to be considered. Therefore, the 
                                                 
163 Between 1998 and 2005 inclusive, successive High Representatives issued 757 decisions, 
removing 119 people from public office and imposing 286 laws or amendments to the laws (Parish 
2007:15). 
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research will focus on the efforts of two types of agents – the OHR as a 
‘consolidated’ international actor (as the mechanism-in-place of the Peace 
Implementation Council - PIC), and key representatives of the multifaceted 
community of donors and organisations that have been actively involved in the 
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the years. The tricky aspect here is 
that the representatives of the so-defined second group are more or less the same 
countries and organisations that are members of the PIC. As such, their 
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is mediated by the OHR. On the other 
hand, the same actors have engaged themselves directly in the reconstruction 
process, developing and implementing their own programmes and projects that in 
a way appear alternative, or in the best cases complementary, to the actions of the 
OHR. Despite the possible arguments about the contradiction that emerges here, 
with the same key players acting both independently and as part of the 
consolidated international involvement, this approach is necessary exactly 
because this internal contradiction affects the results. This assessment would 
allow certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the connection between the 
investments in money, time, and efforts made for social capital reconstruction and 
the levels of success of the reconstruction process in general.  
 
The assessment of the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the 
theoretical literature and the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2 revealed 
that it qualifies as ‘ethnic’ in terms of the definitions adopted by the research. A 
closer consideration of the constitutional power-arrangements within the country 
and the findings from the fieldwork performed in 2003 indicated that the ethnic 
divide has been institutionalised in 1996 and ‘well maintained’ over the 
subsequent years of reconstruction. In 2003 both local actors and representatives 
from the international structures in the country recognised that serious efforts 
were needed to enable the emergence of a common (overarching the ethnic 
divide) platform for state-level citizenship. Despite the different perspectives, the 
point of intersection of the views from the field was that there is no single 
(national) society of Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore – no social capital at 
the level of state. Addressed by various organisations, in different forms and 
through a number of measures, no strategy was adopted to solve this problem. The 
lack of co-ordination of reconstruction programmes and activities and the lack of 
structured co-operation in this field, resulted in dispersed efforts and a puzzle of 
initiatives concerning social capital reconstruction, most of which with rather 
limited or little overall effect.  
 
The fieldwork findings confirmed that there were persisting problems concerning 
inter-ethnic integration and that civil society rebuilding was seen as crucial for 
enabling the common future of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
findings also revealed that the local organisations were largely dependant on the 
policies pursued by the international donors. Therefore, instead of continuing to 
assemble pieces of the social capital reconstruction puzzle from within the field, 
the interest of the research shifted to the policy frameworks of the ‘engines’ of 
reconstruction – the international community and its representatives. 
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 CHAPTER 5: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 






The previous chapter emphasised that from within the field it is rather impossible 
to obtain a holistic perspective about the reconstruction of social capital in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Taking into account the conclusion that a single positive 
initiative cannot bring about changes, unless being part of a broader agenda 
(UNHCR 2002:38), the analysis shifted to the reconstruction policies 
implemented by some key actors in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, in an 
attempt to identify whether such a broader agenda existed.  
 
In a number of interviews carried out during the fieldwork and later in the course 
of the research, it became clear that both donors and beneficiaries in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina perceived their donor-recipient relationship more as a patron-client 
connection and not as an active partnership. The limited control or the lack of 
such in the decision-making processes, in setting up of agendas, direction of work, 
or priorities contributed to the development of dominating passive attitudes 
towards the processes in general. Nevertheless, it is still arguable whether positive 
results are achievable at all without the critical involvement of the local 
community – in terms of support and corrective-factor.  
 
Focusing on the role of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the process of social capital (re-)construction after the experienced ethnic conflict, 
the current chapter will examine the reconstruction policies of some of the key 
agents in the field. After assessing the work of the local Mozaik Foundation in the 
context of the two examples of international contribution, the overall 
achievements of the reconstruction policies will be addressed by providing a 
snapshot of the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 
1. SOME EXAMPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION POLICIES (1996 – 2008) 
 
In 1997, two years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was established as an international protectorate. According to estimates made at 
the time, the rebuilding of the devastated country was expected to require about 
$5 billions (McWhirter 1996). In 2007, the international community recognised 
that the aid of $8 billions and more had not achieved the results envisaged 12 
years earlier (Appendix 4).  
 
Despite the view of some reconstruction agents, incl;uding the World Bank, that 
the post-conflict period in Bosnia and Herzegovina was contained between 1996 
and 2000 (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina), it could 
well be argued that the Bosnian reconstruction project is still undergoing. The 
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specific local context, the enduring war trauma, persisting hostile and obstructive 
attitudes and historic legacies, and lack of developmental capacities highlight the 
resulting discrepancy between expectations and reality. Problems can also be 
spotted at the level of implementation of international reconstruction agendas and 
activities.  
 
Without undermining the interrelation of different factors and the complexity of 
the issue, the research puts an emphasis on the role of social capital for enabling 
or obstructing success of post-conflict reconstruction practices (established in 
Chapter 3). Attempting to identify whether the broader and structured support 
needed for the achievement of positive changes (UNHCR 2002:38) existed, the 
section below will look at the reconstruction policy frameworks in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Addressing the international community as the ‘designer’, 
‘manager’ and ‘investor’ in the process, the interest was directed towards agendas 
and efforts related to social capital reconstruction and de-fragmentation of the 
ethnically divided society. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the large 
number of organisations and structures that the concept of international 
community encompasses and the fact that they rarely function in co-ordination, 
make it difficult either to consider the activities of each single agent, or to 
approach these as part of a single and coherent programme. Therefore, the field 
was approached as provisionally consisting of both consolidated and dispersed 
players. As the most prominent international organisation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the OHR was chosen as an example of the former category.  
 
1.1 Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High 
Representative  
 
Co-ordination and implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement 
have been the central elements of the mandate of the Office of the High 
Representative, deriving from the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace. 
The ad hoc international organisation has been provisioned both as a ‘coordinator’ 
and as a ‘mediator’ between the local and the international community. As the 
official statement reveals, it was envisaged to work simultaneously with the local 
people and institutions and with the international community to ensure that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. The High Representative subsequently 
was appointed also as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
 
Despite the numerous attempts to establish a contact with representatives from the 
OHR during the fieldwork in 2003 as well as over a period in 2008 and in 2009, 
the OHR remained formally unapproachable. It appeared that a view from inside 
could be obtained only by activating personal contacts. Nevertheless, the 
information gathering was not essentially impeded, because, as Mr Damir Gnjidić, 
a Legal Advisor in OHR pointed out, the official information about the goals and 
the activities of the organisation were available through the official 
communication channels, such as the web-pages of the OHR and the EUSR for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina164 (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 12.05.2009).  
                                                 
164 Respectively at http://www.ohr.int and at http://www.eusrbih.eu/ 
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The assessment of the OHR policies was based on programme documents, official 
reports, and public statements. Two main reasons validated the approach adopted. 
First, OHR appeared as a non-approachable and non-transparent institution. 
Formal and informal attempts to establish contacts with representatives from the 
organisation and to obtain detailed information about their policies, possibly with 
a focus on social capital reconstruction, were not very successful.165 Second, the 
interest in the publicly available documents can be justified by the conviction that 
as an institution established to coordinate the international support to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and to provide assistance to the processes for achieving a positive 
change, the OHR should apply the principles of transparency, approachability and 
open communication both on a national and international level166. If involvement 
and support from society are expected, the broad policy framework used as a basis 
of a strategically developed agenda cannot be less than a public platform. .  
 
Since 2003, the document that outlines the priorities for the OHR is the annual 
Mission Implementation Plan, which points out the core tasks identified by the 
OHR as essential for its mission. To assess the activities over the years between 
1996 and 2003, various PIC declarations, conference outcomes, and statements 
were analysed. Valuable sources of information for the priorities as identified by 
the OHR were the Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and the EU 
Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2001 – 2006. 
 
The very first conference of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), held in 
London in December 1995, just after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, 
outlined the direction that the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
envisaged to follow (PIC 1995, London Conclusions). The Conclusions revealed 
that the aim of the post-conflict activities by local peoples and international actors 
was the achievement of peace and prosperity through ‘creating a state which will 
bring the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina together within a social and political 
framework which will enable the country to take its rightful place in Europe’ (PIC 
1995:§1). Paragraph 3 revealed that the purpose of the London Peace 
Implementation Conference was to mobilise the international community in order 
to: 
 
¾ create a climate of stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
achievement of a durable and lasting political settlement 
¾ establish new political and constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that will bring the country together within a framework of 
democracy and the rule of law 
                                                 
165 A contact was established with two representatives from the OHR – the Legal advisor Mr 
Damir Gnjidic and Mr Christopher Harland, responsible for human rights institutions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1998-2000), Head of the Human Rights Department (2000-2002), and 
subsequently a member of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (2002-2004). While Mr 
Gnidjic confirmed the conclusions reached through the analysis of the documents, as a former high 
ranked official in the organisation Mr Harland provided valuable information about the OHR 
policies.   
166 Rather than revealing of the character of the organisation and its communication strategy, the 
reluctance to reply to general public queries was seen as resulting from the enormous interest in 
the work of the OHR. 
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¾ protect and promote human rights and the early return of refugees and 
displaced persons 
 
The need for urgent actions and immediate efforts to promote confidence and 
reconciliation were also identified as priorities by the authorities on both sides 
(PIC 1995:§14). Recognising the complexity of the tasks, the conference 
concluded that a new structure was required to manage peace implementation. 
The Peace Implementation Council (PIC), composed of all those states, 
international organisations and agencies attending the Conference subsumed the 
International Commission of Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) (PIC 1995:§20 & §21). 
The monitoring of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, the mobilisation 
and the co-ordination of activities of the civilian organisations and agencies, was 
given to a designated High Representative (Mr. Carl Bildt, at the time) (PIC 1995: 
§17).  
 
In November 1996, the PIC Paris Conclusions outlined the ‘Guiding principles of 
the Civilian consolidation plan’ of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(PIC 1996). The two-year consolidation period, divided into two 12-months action 
plans, was envisaged to cover several priority areas. The First Action Programme, 
introduced at the London Peace Implementation Conference in December 1996, 
largely repeated the conclusions of the Paris meeting.  
 
Assessing and comparing the Paris Guidelines and the London Action Plan, it 
becomes apparent that there are no clear indications of how exactly the identified 
goals would be achieved and what measures would be taken in that respect. In the 
action plan presented at the London conference in 1996, the elements that can be 
regarded as contributing to social capital (re)building are also defined rather 
generally. There were no specifications of the required conditions, or what 
measures should have been taken for achieving the goals set in the fields of 
‘Democratisation’, ‘Refugees and displaced persons’, ‘Reconstruction’, 
‘Reconciliation’ and ‘Education’. 
 
Yet at the end of 1997, the PIC meeting in Bonn came up with the conclusions the 
progress could have been greater ‘had the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
contributed their full share to the construction of a civil and democratic society in 
the country’ (PIC 1997). Despite achievements in the following areas: ‘elections, 
arms control and confidence’; security-building measures; restructuring and 
reform of police; beginning of minority refugee returns; economic revival; 
development of non-partisan professional media, the Council recognised that 
peace and the institutions of civil society to uphold it remained fragile. It also 
highlighted some matters of concern, among which were the still existing illegal 
structures of government in the Federation and the lack of functioning common 
institutions, the lack of strong multi-ethnic political parties, and a structured civil 
society. Citizenship was not legally defined, there was no national Bosnian 
passport, nor jointly agreed flag. 
 
In addition to the property and housing legislation that blocked the return of 
refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes, there were no 
comprehensive plans to facilitate the process. The police was not always 
supportive to the implementation of election results, and it did not deal effectively 
with politically or ethnically motivated crimes, contributing in such a way to the 
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widespread human rights violations. There were ongoing discriminations between 
Entities’ citizens with regard to visa regulations and free movement. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina had failed to finance its common institutions, to 
implement common policies on foreign trade, apply a common customs tariff, 
issue common bank notes, and achieve transparency and good governance in the 
use of public funds. Effective institutions to curb corruption and revenue evasion 
were also missing. The lack of an economic policy framework was preventing an 
IMF Standby Arrangement and World Bank adjustment lending and rendered the 
country vulnerable to financial crisis. 
 
As it becomes obvious, the expressed concerns were in contradiction to the 
statement that ‘essential progress was made in the respective areas’. At the same 
time, the highlighted issues can easily be recognised as consequences of the 
destroyed social capital and citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic 
factor, underlying the social and political divide, has constituted the local (ethnic) 
authorities as more important and trusted than those of the central state. Without 
trust among the members of the different groups, the formation of multi-ethnic 
association (a political party for example) is impossible. This in turn explains the 
lack of any multi-ethnic agenda. The lack of shared ‘symbols’ and identity 
markers like a national passport or a flag indicates precisely that there is no single 
national-level community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although most of these 
1997 problems were overcome during the subsequent years of reconstruction, it 
still can be argued that (by 2009) the ethnic factor underlies national affiliation. 
‘In order to be citizens of the State of BiH, all are conditionally citizens of one of 
the Entities. There are still some legal problems concerning possibility to change 
entity citizenship, but this is to be solved in the coming time’, revealed the OHR 
Legal advisor Damir Gnjidić in the interview carried in June 2009 (Gnjidić in 
interview with the Author, 30.06.2009).  
 
At the meeting in Brussels on 15 June 1999, the Steering Board of the Peace 
Implementation Council again expressed concerns about the lack of progress in 
the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Madrid Conclusions 
of 1998 (PIC 1998), specifically concerning:  
 
¾ inadequate functioning of the common institutions and parallel institutions  
¾ lack of functioning of the institutions in the Federation 
¾ security conditions 
¾ ethnic chains of command within the Federation institutions (whose existence 
after  five years of reconstruction was seen as embarrassing)  
¾ shortcomings in economic reforms in the Federation and the extent of 
corruption 
 
The dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the peace implementation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became a central issue of the Declaration that the PIC issued 
following the meeting in Brussels in May 2000 (PIC 2000). Obstructionist 
political parties and their allies, narrow nationalistic and sectarian political interest 
were identified as the factors that impeded the reconstruction process in general.  
 
The 2001 and 2002 Reports to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU 
Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, reveal that PIC identified 
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several strategic areas for the acceleration of peace implementation. These  were 
the consolidation of the State institutions, economic reform, and refugee return 
(OHR/EUSR 2001) and the establishment of the rule of law, with a focus on a 
wide array of activities, including judicial reform and the fight against corruption, 
the speeding up of the Stabilisation and Association process and the constitutional 
reform in both entities (OHR/EUSR 2002a). During the discussed period, the 
major success of Bosnia and Herzegovina was that it joined the Council of 
Europe.  
 
Slightly different appears the situation from 2003 onwards. With Lord Paddy 
Ashdown replacing Wolfgang Petritsch as High Representative and EUSR for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nature of the OHR role changed together with the 
approach to the reconstruction activities. The goal of strengthening the central 
institutions and of establishing a strong and functioning central state became a 
priority in the agenda of the High Representative Paddy Ashdown (May 2002 and 
January 2006). According to his strategy, the transfer of monopoly of force and 
control of taxation167 was expected to undermine the role of the Entities as sub-
sovereign political units of the country and to build Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
state with a central government (Parish 2007). 
 
In 2003, the OHR began work on a comprehensive Mission Implementation Plan 
to define the core tasks that needed to ‘be completed if Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
to become a peaceful, viable state on course to European integration, allowing the 
OHR to phase out its activities’ (OHR/EUSR 2002a). As stated in the same report, 
the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) was intended to enable the better 
management of the shrinking resources available to the country, pursuing the goal 
of making peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina truly self-sustaining. Although 
reasonable, this was an interesting justification – apparently over the previous 
eight years, the sufficiency of resources substituted for the need to elaborate a 
strategic and detailed action plan for the reconstruction.  
 
The first Mission Implementation Plan of 2003 (OHR 2003) outlined 21 
programmes grouped within six ‘core tasks’ for the OHR . If strategically planned 
and pursued, any of the MIP programmes could contribute to social capital 
rebuilding. Apart from the two programmes that nominally can be regarded as 
directly corresponding to the problem of social capital reconstruction, Programme 
4.4 - BiH State management of identity documents, and Programme 6.2 - 
Sustainability of returns, reconstruction of social capital does not appear in focus 
within the OHR Mission Implementation Plan (OHR 2003). 
 
While the identity documents programme has been reported as successfully 
completed, ‘despite the politically motivated attempts to undermine it’ 
(OHR/EUSR 2004a), there is no detailed information about whether and how 
exactly the sustainability of returns has been achieved. The Human Rights and the 
Reconstruction and Return Task Force Departments within OHR, responsible for 
implementing and managing the refugee-related issues, ‘successfully closed down 
in 2002-2003’. No overall report or final assessment of their work and 
achievements was published, as confirmed by Mr Damir Gnjidić during the 
                                                 
167 The reforms he focused hence were on the judiciary, the army, the police and the taxation 
(Parish 2007:17) 
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interview carried out in June 2009 (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 
30.06.2009). 
 
As the OHR/EUSR Report for the period July-December 2004 (OHR/EUSR 
2004b) reveals, the 2004 MIP contained four core tasks, made up of 26 
programmes. Of the 26 programmes, 4 were completed in full: Reinforcement of 
the Rule of Law by Dislodging Obstructionist Networks from Key Institutions; 
BiH State Management of Identity Documents; BiH Parliamentary Oversight over 
the Armed Forces; and BiH Security Policy. Approximately 50% of all items 
contained in the 26 programmes were completed at the end of 2004, within the set 
deadlines. Within the subsequent OHR Mission Implementation Plans – of 2005 
and of 2006-2007, the programmes that appear connected to the social capital 
rebuilding are 3.6 Programme (2005) - Reform of Mostar, and 3.9 Programme 
(2005, 2006-2007) - Reform of the Public Broadcasting System.  
 
From both the OHR/EUSR Reports and the PIC Steering Committee’s meetings 
until 2007, it becomes obvious that the international community had not identified 
social capital rebuilding as a core issue and it had not been the focus of the 
reconstruction activities. The reform of the Public Broadcasting System certainly 
has been important for the accumulation of new social capital of the state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this in a way has stood alone, not being supported by 
other complementary activities within the different reconstruction sectors.  
 
The reform of the city of Mostar (MIP Programme 3.9 of 2005, OHR 2005) 
appeared the only comprehensive activity of OHR, albeit on a small scale. In the 
context of the unification of Mostar, it has addressed the problem of social capital 
rebuilding and the process of joining ethnically divided institutions. On 23 July 
2004, Mostar’s Stari Most, or Old Bridge – a symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
multi-ethnic society that was destroyed during the war - was re-opened after it had 
been rebuilt using the same methods and materials employed nearly 500 years 
ago. A degree of co-operation between the moderate-leaning majorities of the 
main political parties was achieved as a result (OHR/EUSR 2004b).  
 
The aims of the Mostar programme was the (re-)building of the core of a 
genuinely multi-ethnic professional city administration (OHR/EUSR 2005), to 
engage in the rebuilding of public and commercial sites, to improve the transport 
infrastructure and to provide accommodation for returning displaced persons, 
were met with varying degrees of success. Despite the previous reports indicating 
that significant progress had been made, in 2006 the PIC Steering Board 
recognised the slowdown of the unification of the Mostar city administration. This 
resulted from a political intransigence (PIC 2006) and welcomed the decision of 
the City Council to invite arbitration on some of the disputed issues and to refer 
the issues to the High Representative, if needed.  
 
Another measure taken by the OHR with a direct impact on social capital 
reconstruction (although not clearly identified as such) concerned the education 
system. In its 2005 Sarajevo Communiqué, the PIC Steering Board expressed its 
concerns with the attempts to divide schools along ethnic lines and ‘strongly and 
unconditionally opposed segregation and discrimination in schools in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’ as ‘a retrograde step…harmful to the citizens of BiH and BiH's 
future (PIC 2005b). Here it is interesting to note that this statement was made 
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three years after the official launch of the OSCE educational reform programme, 
aiming at overcoming the disintegration and the discrimination in the field of 
education and at eliminating the ‘two schools under one roof’ phenomenon. The 
responsible Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities were called to ‘urgently establish 
an effective co-ordination mechanism at the state level in order to properly 
coordinate education reform priorities and activities as pledged in 2002, and 
honour BiH's international commitments’, the important step in which direction 
was the establishment of the state-level education agency (PIC 2005b).
 
The OHR structure, whose activities could be related to the social capital 
reconstruction work, was the Human Rights/Rule of Law Department. It was 
closed down in 2002 and its responsibilities were transferred to the OSCE as a 
part of the streamlining process. It is clear that by 2002 the Department168 did not 
complete the goals that had underlain its establishment in the first place, namely 
the implementation of the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP) and 
the establishment of a lasting and just peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
challenges the adequacy of the general OHR policy.  
 
The Department was active in a wide range of areas within the field of Human 
Rights. ‘It supported and coordinated international and local institutions in 
Bosnia, worked for the establishment of legislative frameworks, was engaged in 
the ensuring of equal access to employment and social benefits, as well as in the 
enabling of sustainable minority and majority returns’, indicated Mr Harland, 
Head of Department in 2000-2002 (Harland in interview with the Author, 
03.08.2009). In most of the sectors, social capital reconstruction was not 
addressed directly, but the focus of activities can be seen as corresponding to the 
macro-structural framework of social capital. Attention to the micro-level of 
social capital could be observed in the fields of ‘Education’ and ‘Economic and 
Social rights’, where the priorities had been defined in terms of promoting and 
achieving tolerance, reconciliation, and sustainable minority return.  
 
In conclusion, although the OHR and the PIC Steering Board ‘agreed that the 
priorities now must be overcoming residual inter-ethnic prejudices in favour of a 
Bosnia and Herzegovina which is home to all its citizens’ (PIC 2005a), a 
comprehensive strategy, or even a clear view of how exactly to achieve this goal 
were missing. In other words, for the 12 years of reconstruction the OHR (as a 
consolidated player and a representative of the international community) has not 
contributed in accordance with its capacities to the (re)construction of the national 
Bosnia-and-Herzegovina social capital.  
 
Assessing the OHR work through the four-dimensional model of social capital 
(presented in Figure 8), it appears that the focus of the organisation was placed 
mainly on the re-construction of the macro- and micro-levels of structural social 
capital, while the cognitive dimension (with some exceptions) was in a way left to 
                                                 
168 Until 2002 the Department was active on a wide range of Human Rights Issues, including 
Human Rights Coordination Centre, Rule of Law Unit and the Independent Judicial Commission, 
Support for Human Rights Institutions, Civil Society and NGOs, Education, Economic and Social 
Rights, Gender Equality, Property Rights/ Right to Return, Domestic War Crimes and 
Exhumations. Further information about the activities of the Department can be obtained from the 
official website of the OHR, at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/more.asp   
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self-generate from the structural adjustments. The lack of indicators for any 
efforts in the direction to ensure the development of a national macro-cognitive 
framework, as well as micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels social capital, 
also appears problematic.   
 
1.2 The World Bank 
 
The second group of international players which have been involved in the 
reconstruction activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1996 and the present 
is the group of the ‘dispersed’ players. Governmental, non-governmental, and 
multinational agencies of different scales and structures have been developing 
programmes and projects, addressing a number of issues and focusing on the 
local, regional, or even national level. Working independently of each other, these 
international actors have tended to develop and implement overlapping instead of 
complementary activities. The explanation of this lies in the lack of co-ordination 
among the reconstruction agents and of a general and comprehensive strategy for 
rebuilding the country.  
 
Attempting to outline the ‘major players’ of the reconstruction process in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the research encountered certain conceptual problems. The 
initial assumption was that ‘key players’ should be considered those countries, 
agencies and/or organisations that had donated the highest amounts of money/aid 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that have been among the most active in the field. 
The information needed for performing this analysis was respectively statistical 
data showing the contributions over the years of reconstruction (1996-2008) and 
data, revealing how many of the programmes and projects run by the identified 
international players, had been focused on the rebuilding of state-level social 
capital or of some of its elements. Four different (comprehensive) sources of 
information, presenting statistical information about the financial contributions to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, were found, as follows:  
 
1) Financial Tracking Service of the Relief Web database - UN Office 
for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/);  
2) AIDA database - Accessible Information on Development Activities, 
Development Gateway (http://aida.developmentgateway.org);  
3) Venancio, Moises (2004) ‘International Assistance to BiH 1996-2002: 
A Tentative Analysis of Who is Doing What, Where’, UNDP Report 2004; 
4) OECD.StatExtracts, databases included in Source OECD Statistics; 
Dataset: Creditor Reporting System (http://stats.oecd.org/).  
 
The detailed description of the sources of information used for setting up the 
databases, suggests that each one can be viewed as reliable on its own. In the 
same time, comparing the data considerable discrepancies emerge among the 
entries in the lists, which impedes the objective identification of the main donors 
and reconstruction players in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 1996 - 2008. 
Apart from differences in the ranking of the key donors, the amounts that the 
particular country or organisation had contributed to the reconstruction of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are in mismatch (see Appendix 5). Identifying the focus of the 
completed projects is also a challenging task. First, public information shown in 
the cited databases, as well as by donors, often covers only the title, the field of 
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action or the targeted sector. Second, some of the entries in the examined 
databases cover not only projects implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but 
whole programmes, a part of which concerned activities carried out in the country. 
Third, there was no publicly available detailed information about the projects and 
the approached organisations did not appear willing to assist in providing details 
about activities performed many years ago. 
 
Having established that the publicly available information cannot provide the 
necessary grounds for identifying objectively the major players in the 
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an alternative approach was chosen. 
As two of the lists indicated that the International Development Agency (IDA), 
which is a part of the World Bank (WB) group, was among the leading donors to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The World Bank, on the other hand, is an organisation 
that encompasses policies and views of its members (national states), which in the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also present among the top donors. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the policies and strategies applied by the WB 
were implicitly those of the member states. Being a part of the UN system, this 
‘specialised agency’ appeared as a mechanism, integrating the views and policies 
of the 184 member countries, as well as an embodiment of the international 
community per se. The multiple partners, with whom the World Bank cooperated 
and received support from,169  have been an additional factor that justified its 
legitimacy as an important player in the international scene. 
 
Furthermore, over the years, the World Bank has evolved into an organisation 
directly engaged with the issues and the problems of post-conflict reconstruction 
in the context of the ‘peace through development agenda’. Being the largest 
provider of development assistance in the world (in the form of loans, aid, 
technical assistance and other commitments amounting to tens of billions of 
dollars per year), offering also policy advise, the World Bank has an important 
indirect effect on local developments and ethnic relations within states (van 
Houten 2008:97). All the above makes the examination of the World Bank donor 
policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina representative of the trends within the 
international community concerning their involvement in the reconstruction 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Operating since 1945, the World Bank traditionally was engaged in promoting 
economic development and poverty reduction170. In the 1990s, in the context of 
the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the World Bank shifted its 
attention to ethno-political and civil conflicts, developing policies for conflict-
                                                 
169 The WB in Bosnia has been cooperating with institutions such as the European Union (EU) and 
in particular the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), bilateral donors, such as USAID and the 
development agencies and departments of other countries 
170 The World Bank was established in 1944 as a part of the Bretton Woods agreement, and 
opened in 1945 under the official name of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD). Apart from IBRD, still one of its components, the World Bank Group added four more: 
the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association (IDA), the 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA). The term ‘World Bank’ here refers to the organisation as a whole, but it is important to 
take into account the differences between its components - IBRD and IDA, for example, interact 
with states, while the OED played a role in shaping the World Bank’s post-conflict policies (van 
Houten 2007:98) 
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affected societies (van Houten 2008:110). This change of perspective affected its 
policies, programmes, and research activities. In the Operational Policy (OP) 8.5 
that replaced the Operational Directive in 1995, the definition of emergency 
expanded to cover ‘an extraordinary event of limited duration such as a war, civil 
disturbance, or natural disaster’ (WB-OED 1998:5). 
 
Recognising the need to move away from addressing the special post-conflict 
requirements in an ad hoc manner, and in order to guide work in post-conflict 
countries, in 1997 ‘A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-conflict 
Reconstruction’ was endorsed and subsequently the Post-conflict Unit (PCU) was 
created171. The World Bank evaluation, performed in the late 1990s on its work 
(WB-OED 1998), showed that it has been progressively increasing its 
involvement in countries engaged in or recently emerged from civil conflicts. It 
also indicated the ‘areas of comparative advantages’ for the Bank and those that 
needed improvement, especially with respect to efforts to rebuild social and 
human capital. The 2001 Operational Policy on Development Co-operation and 
Conflict outlined the World Bank actions and strategies in the various stages of 
conflicts (van Houten 2008:99). Acknowledging that priorities in development 
policies may have to be distinct for post-conflict countries, the World Bank began 
developing case-specific Transition Support Strategies followed by a Country 
Assistance Strategy (WB 2003). Established in 1997, the focus of the Post-
Conflict Fund became the development of Central and Eastern Europe, and in 
particular of the Balkans. Between 2002 and 2005, 13.4 million US dollars were 
awarded to the region in the form of grants172 (WB 2005b).  
 
The World Bank became involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as early as October 1995, establishing a representation in Sarajevo 
and taking part in drafting the economic management articles of the Dayton 
agreement (van Houten 2008:110). After a series of ‘emergency’ reconstruction 
programmes and projects, covering some of the most urgent recovery and 
reconstruction needs of a country coming out of a devastating civil war, it focused 
on a wider range of issues. The strengthening of the Bosnian institutions of 
governance, economic policy reforms, tax system, and financial sector reforms, 
and the improvement of social services and social welfare provision were among 
the objectives of these programmes.173
 
Throughout the years, the WB country partnership strategy for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has evolved to reach its current organisation around two pillars. 
During the already mentioned interview, Mr Goran Tinjić, Senior Operations 
Officer at the WB office in Sarajevo, explained that, apart from the traditional 
                                                 
171 In addition, the Bank provided $8 million to fund a Post-conflict Programme to support and 
impart lessons from the Bank's consultative and technical work in the early, preparatory stages of 
post-conflict reconstruction (OED 1998) 
172 With the exception of the grant to Georgia, all these grants are related to conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia: the war in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 to 1995, the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and 
the ethnic riots in Kosovo in 2004. Several grants are for projects focused on refugees, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), and their host communities. Recipients of the grants vary widely, 
including governments, UNICEF, non-governmental organisations (e.g., the Bosnian refugee 
programme in Tuzla), think tanks (the policy study in Bosnia, the consensus-building programme 
in Serbia), and the Harvard Programme for Refugee Trauma (the mental health programmes in 
Bosnia) (van Houten 2008:106). 
173 For further descriptions of these programmes, see OED, 2004: Chapter 2 
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interest of the Bank in strengthening public services, the issue in focus now is 
support for the EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This includes 
improvement of the infrastructure, general development, but also support for the 
enhancement of the institutional capacity in areas that relevant for EU integration. 
To overcome the effects of the global economic crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the WB revised its programme and envisaged an additional budget support (up to 
185 million Euros) over the next two years. The identified primary objective was 
to help the country develop an equitable, efficient safety system and social safety 
net. In an attempt to address challenges related to creating an enabling 
environment for private sector growth and development, a small and medium 
enterprises line of credit – about 90 million US dollars – was envisaged.  
 
The World Bank policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina have endured various 
criticisms with regard to the poor co-ordination between donors in different task 
forces and specific projects (WB-OED 2000). The Bank’s economic policies 
(Donais 2005) and achievements in the privatisation process (WB-OED 2004), the 
limited success in creating an effective regulatory environment and the 
disregarding of some specific Bosnian circumstances and problems also incurred 
disapproval (Pugh 2005, WB 2005d). On the other hand, the Operations and 
Evaluations Department (OED) 2004 report acknowledged the positive role of the 
World Bank in the economic transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its financial 
sector, tax harmonisation, and the restoration of health and education services 
(WB-OED 2004). Although the World Bank evaluates its involvement in the post-
conflict reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as rather successful – as a 
‘model’ for the development of its general (post-) conflict policies (WB-OED 
2004; van Houten 2008:110) –, it is interesting to approach critically the statement 
from another point of view. Prior to examining the activities of the World Bank 
through the prism of the social capital reconstruction, it is important to outline its 
approach to ethnic conflicts in general.  
 
Even though A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (WB 1997) acknowledged the connection between ethnic/regional 
conflicts and state erosion, their effect is seen as ambiguous and the ethnic issues 
as political and secondary to the economic factors. For a number of years the 
failure of economic development was considered the underlying issue, because in 
its absence ‘neither good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious 
homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant defences against 
large-scale violence’ (WB 2003:53). This approach to conflict has influenced the 
World Bank’s policies and the focus of its activities on the improvement of 
economic and general institutional conditions and poverty reduction (WB 2003). 
 
Examining the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF), developed by the World 
Bank’s Social Development Department to enhance conflict sensitivity and 
conflict prevention potential, it appears that ethnic issues have been included in 
the nine risk screening indicators (No 6 – Ethnic dominance) and in the six 
conflict categories (No 1 - Social and ethnic relations). A brief summary of the 
CAF structure, as presented in the Special report 197 of the USIP, is given in the 
Appendix 6. 
 
As early as in 1998, the OED acknowledged that despite the expanded support for 
demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants, and the policy support for 
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re-establishing institutions of governance and trust, and participation by civil 
society, restoring human and social capital had not been a priority in the post-
conflict programmes of the Bank (WB-OED 1998). A serious study on local level 
institutions and social capital revealed the low levels of trust among people and 
institutions throughout the country (Bougarel 2002). Nevertheless, this piece of 
analytic work did not lead directly to any (large-scale) operation, as confirmed by 
Mr Tinjić, a Senior Officer in the WB in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tinjić in 
interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). He also explained: 
 
‘We do not think that by having a project that is particularly tailored to address 
reconciliation and issues of trust you will achieve the right objective. If you want 
to have trust, it is better to build it around issues that are of common concern and 
that are of everybody’s interest, on issues about how to build up a sustainable 
economy, how to care for the most vulnerable, how to attract foreign investments 
and have a dialogue about that. We promoted this dialogue and it worked 
perfectly well. When we have this dialogue, representatives from different 
political affiliations do not have any problems cooperating and working in close 
partnership that you will find in any other country. But when it reaches the high 
political agenda, then there is a problem. That’s why we are addressing these 
issues on a specific and perhaps on a more limited level’ (Tinjić in interview with 
the Author, 03.07.2009). 
 
 Nevertheless, in the 1990s the World Bank began undertaking systematic 
measures in this direction such as introducing corruption-related conditions for 
continued lending174, supporting pilot projects to instil key components of good 
governance and civil society involvement, making specific operational efforts to 
address the particular needs of women, and examining their role in rebuilding 
social capital. In the views of Goran Tinjić, the approach adopted by the WB to 
social capital reconstruction is strategically integrated in the operations and the 
various programmes of the organisation. ‘Do we have a programme called 
‘Reconciliation’ or ‘Reintegration’? No! But everything we do has this implicit 
target’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). 
 
An example for the World Bank activities in this direction is the ‘Youth voices 
group’, which gathers 18 people from throughout the country, from different 
ethnic groups, regions, type of settlements (both rural and urban). Discussing 
issues of concern to youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, these boys and girls help 
the WB to formulate their country partnership strategy and find the most 
appropriate ways of integrating the youth agenda into the programmes and 
implementation plans.  As Goran Tinjić stated (in interview with the Author, 
03.07.2009), ‘And basically without calling it ‘reconciliation’, we have achieved 
that objective. They would organise presentations in different cities, go all 
together, start discussing issues that are bread and butter issues for youth. And as 
a result we are now about to support a national youth strategy and we have 
                                                 
174 Initially reluctant, on several occasions the World Bank has used conditionality to achieve its 
objectives and support the peace process. Early in the reconstruction process, the World Bank has 
undermined EU attempts to use the reconstruction of the electricity grid in Mostar to improve the 
integration of the Bosniak and Croat communities in the city (Boyce 2002, Mallaby 2004), but 
later, in cooperation with other organisations and states, it has been declaring the intention to 
withhold assistance from the Serb Republic until they were willing to politically participate in the 
state (Boyce, 2002). 
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secured Italian funding in terms of a grant – trust fund. This is the way we would 
like to continue work without waving flags of ‘reintegration’, ‘reconciliation’, 
‘building trust’ – we are doing it on a more technical level ’.  
 
Since 2001, the Bank has been running community driven development (CDD) 
projects in the poorest municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unable to invest 
in their own physical and social infrastructure (Cliffe., Guggenheim & Kostner 
2003). Co-financed by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this project 
aimed at empowering the public through participation in the decision-making 
processes and supporting the reconstruction efforts in the country. Apart from 
deciding upon their development priorities, citizens were encouraged to take part 
in the implementation of the project, usually by providing direct labour. CDD 
operations aim to strengthen local governance, local service delivery, and social 
capital. The success of the pilot programme motivated the World Bank to apply 
the approach in other conflict-affected countries and by 2005 it had 86 active 
CDD projects in areas impacted by armed conflict (Owen, Bannon, Kuehnast, de 
Berry & Ahmed 2006). 
 
Equality is another problematic issue that the WB recognises and addresses as a 
part of its developmental policy, but also as a part of the social capital 
reconstruction agenda. As revealed by the OED report of 2000 (WB-OED 
2000:61) the World Bank programme for Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the 
early and balanced inclusion of social sectors in the social projects175. As Mr 
Tinjić revealed, a survey undertaken by the WB has shown that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is among the highest spenders on social benefits in Europe. It spends 
about 4% of its GDP – and yet less than 80% of poor people receive such benefits 
(Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). These social expenditures 
apparently were not well targeted.  
 
In the views of the WB officer, the current system is very unaffordable. It is a 
huge burden on the economy; it has led to a budget deficit in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also it creates negative incentives on the labour 
market, and has a negative impact on capital investment. The well targeting of 
social expenditures and the development of adequate programmes for people, who 
are really in need, are areas that the WB envisages to concentrate their efforts in 
the near future. As Goran Tinjić explained (Interview with the Author, 
03.07.2009), ‘At the moment society is differentiated and polarised between 
different groups. On one hand, you have a lobby of demobilised soldiers and 
veterans who were promised benefits and who do not tend to work much and earn 
for living. On the other hand, there are the others that are essentially paying this 
bill and are increasingly nervous about it. This does not contribute to building 
really a strong social capital in the country’.  
 
The WB has also identified the investments in human capital (education, health, 
community services, etc.) as an important component of its post-conflict work 
(WB-OED 2004, WB-OED 2000). The first to be disrupted by a conflict, these 
                                                 
175 Out of 16 emergency projects one provided support for the social fund, 2 ‘social projects’ 
focused on  education and war-victim rehabilitation; 4 could be classified as having a primarily 
social emphasis (war victims, education, hospital services, and demobilisation and reintegration) 
and with including the employment generation, microcredit, and housing repair projects could be 
included, the number would increase to 7 (WB-OED 2000:61) 
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sectors could have extremely negative effects on a society. Understanding the 
interrelation between these issues and the aimed economic progress, the WB has 
set up a large portfolio for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the Emergency 
Recovery Project176 and the Emergency Education Reconstruction Programme177 
did not bring the expected results. In the year 2000, the Emergency Recovery 
Project was evaluated as having been too widely dispersed and not sufficiently 
means-tested (WB-OED 2000:61). Despite the education reconstruction 
programme having some positive results in rebuilding the educational 
infrastructure, the OED report revealed that promising initiatives in reconciliation 
and tolerance education by 2000 were isolated cases – there were continuing 
sensitivities on the language issue, resistance from the authorities resulting in a 
policy vacuum, etc (WB-OED 2000:61). In April 2009, during his presentation at 
the Director’s Forum at Woodrow Wilson Centre, the Prime Minister of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Nikola Špirić confirmed that the educational reform in the 
Federation was still an issue (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 
24.04.2009). 
 
Another approach for assessing the WB policy towards social capital 
reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina is through the financial support 
allocated to this sector. According to the WB project database for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina), since 
1996, the Bank has committed more than 1,644,059,224 of USD in the form of 
loans, credits and grants178. The tables in Appendix 7 indicate that although the 
money flows to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the ‘post-reconstruction period’ 
(2000-2009) has diminished, it has been as substantial as during the reconstruction 
period (1996-2000)179. The 2004 OED Report revealed that assistance in these 
first years was committed to the rebuilding of the country and the sectors, 
identified as vital for its future development (OED 2004, Table A4b); the overall 
performance of the projects closed by the end of December 2003 is seen as 
satisfactory (WB-OED 2004:8). The Bank’s emergency reconstruction projects in 
the period 1996-2000 involved rehabilitation of industries, infrastructure, housing, 
schools, and hospitals; establishment of micro-credit institutions; landmine 
                                                 
176 Emergency Social Fund focused on providing the necessary social infrastructure and services 
177 Loss of teachers, destruction of schools (about 70 percent were damaged, destroyed, or 
requisitioned for military use), and the lack of safe access during the hostilities were among the 
factors that affected severely the education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore these 
issues have underlie the Emergency Education Reconstruction Programme(WB-OED 2000:61) 
178 58 projects were completed between 1996 and 2009; and 15 more are envisaged to end in the 
upcoming years - until 2014 (WB Country Lending Summaries - Bosnia and Herzegovina). The 
$150 million Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina (TFBH) was established in early 1996 to 
enable loans and grants for emergency projects to be made prior to the in the Bank. In addition to 
establishing the $150 million TFBH, the Bank made an exceptional IDA allocation to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of $400 million for the period financial year (FY) 96–99. In 2000, Bank management 
proposed continuing exceptional IDA support of $300 million for FY00–02, approximately three 
times the norm, no longer justified for reconstruction, but by the need to continue Bank leadership 
on policy reform. In 2002, the Bank allocated IDA support of SDR 128 million for the financial 
years (FY) 03–05 and subsequently the management affirmed IDA allocation of SDR 25 million 
yearly in FY05 (WB-OED 2004:65) 
179 It should be noted that considering the WB support to Bosnia and Herzegovina using the AIDA 
database the number of projects entries and the respective amounts and totals differ from the 
entries in the WB database. Since the evaluation and the analysis of the discrepancies can be the 
object of analysis of a separate study, this research has focused on the WB database as an 
immediate source of information and reference.  
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clearance; and support for war victims and demobilised combatants; as well as the 
establishment of Project Management Units (PMUs)180 for every project. The 
underlying idea was that the PMU’s would compensate for weaknesses in 
government structures and staffing.  
 
Since 1996, the WB has launched more than 70 projects in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but only few have been identified as directly targeting social capital 
reconstruction. As Mr Tinjić outlined, the philosophy of the WB efforts in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was to address the issues of integration and reconciliation 
through different mechanisms and within various developmental projects. The 
description of the project sectors and themes, as presented in the WB project 
database (see Appendix 7) implicitly confirms the suggestion about the ‘added 
value’ of social capital, and on the other hand indicates that there is no clear 
platform or practical framework for monitoring and assessing the projects’ 
achievements through this perspective.  
 
The break down of the WB financial assistance by sectors also does not indicate 
the volume of resources allocated directly to social capital reconstruction. This 
lack of estimates is an indicator that social capital rebuilding has not been 
considered an area per se. During the interview in 2009, a question was posed to 
the WB in Sarajevo Senior Operations Officer Mr Tinjić concerning the existence 
of any official data on the amount/percentage of assistance provided for the 
rebuilding of social capital rebuilding. Having accepted the question as a direct 
attack on the institution, Mr Tinjić suggested that ‘the official break down of WB 
support to Bosnia and Herzegovina by sectors is available from our website. Of 
course you can always challenge that we have not done much in respect to social 
capital rebuilding but we are convinced that it has been a lot’  (Tinjić in interview 
with the Author, 03.07.2009).  
 
Since the WB project database does not provide units or mechanisms for 
measuring this additional aspect of the project performance, the evaluations of the 
levels of success and the programme achievements could vary depending on the 
point of view for their interpretation. According to the WB officer, with its 
dedicated work, the organisation has contributed to the reconciliation and 
reintegration of the country. ‘We wanted to provide assistance to build the 
economy, to build a single economic space that will allow for free movement of 
goods, people, and capital. We have helped achieve this objective in many 
different ways – through supporting financial sector development, commercial 
banking reform and by adopting a harmonised set of legislation in the two 
Entities’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).   
 
After overcoming the reconstruction challenges of the first post-war years, the 
main objectives of the World Bank and the international community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have become the strengthening of central state and the creation of a 
strong and unified economy and governance through reforms in the public 
administration, financial sector and the social provisions (van Houten 2008: 110). 
                                                 
180 While the Bank attempted to persuade other donors providing parallel funding for IDA projects 
to operate through the same PMU, this effort was not always successful. Some projects have been 
managed by two or more PMUs, and a number of issues have arisen over time regarding PMUs 
(WB-OED 2004:8) 
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Accepting the view that a well-established and healthy business environment does 
not recognise inter-Entity boundary lines and political differences, the World 
Bank has invested in supporting the business, enabling in this way the 
establishment of a single economic space that would support the interaction 
among people and the development of a community feeling ‘without even getting 
into high politics. That worked relatively well’ stated Mr Tinjić (in interview with 
the Author, 03.07.2009). 
 
In this particular case, both the approach and the results could be challenged. In 
April 2009, giving a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Bosnian Prime 
Minister, Nikola Špirić pointed out that not only that a single economic space in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was missing, but also that the economic development of 
the Entities has been unequal. This created tensions within society, but most 
importantly between the Entities (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 
24.04.2009). The specific situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina required that 
initiatives be supported not only by the central state, but also at Entity level. 
Considering the model of the establishment of European Union, it becomes 
evident that success in conflict prevention can be achieved when political and 
economic agenda are integrated and not separated.  
 
In the interview, the WB official maintained that the ‘strength of the WB is not in 
the political arena, but we believe that by helping the country sustain its economy, 
sustain the needs of the most vulnerable, there would be less incentives for high 
political agenda and more incentives for addressing current issues’ (Tinjić in 
interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). Certainly, economic reforms that reach 
the most vulnerable can play an important role for re-integration and 
reconciliation in the country; they can hardly inspire trust among people. Single 
currency and single vehicle plates are also components of a community building 
process uniting people regardless of their ethnicity, of their social status or 
anything else and still they could not change attitudes or overcome prejudices. 
While pointing out the success achieved by the World Bank in these directions, 
Goran Tinjić confirmed that the constitutional debate in the country has been still 
running; still there have been tensions between different political (ethnic) groups, 
affecting to certain degree the WB operations, but not stopping them from moving 
forward.  
 
The WB in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been regarding the ‘conflictual political 
environment’ and the ‘lack of trust, which shows on many levels’ as serious 
challenges to its involvement. Problems were encounter not exactly at the level of 
planning, but predominantly at the level of the programme implementation. As Mr 
Tinjić stated, ‘No matter that we are proposing and the government agrees to 
these sound measures, when it comes to the actual implementation, there are all 
sorts of problems’ (Tinjić in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009). 
   
This lack of trust comes into play also when a process requires simultaneous but 
independent involvement of different (ethnic) groups. Mr Tinjić pointed at the 
Croat and Bosnian components within the Federation and at the two armies 
organised around these two ethnic groups. Despite at present enjoying the same 
level of benefits, the mistrust blocks the reforms, because people from each group 
are reluctant to give up receiving particular benefits, because they are not 
convinced that the other side would do the same. The approach of the World Bank 
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in such cases is to identify the most rational and objective approach, to set up 
common assessment criteria and to implement the procedures in the most 
transparent way. Creating a database, integrating it in an information system and 
performing an independent medical assessment for identifying the beneficiaries, 
are among the mechanisms that are expected to convince the groups that there will 
be a fair and objective allocation of resources.  
 
In the year 2000, the World Bank acknowledged that despite recognising the 
severity of the problem with the destruction of social capital, neither the Bank nor 
any other international donor had a comparative advantage in this area (WB-OED 
2000:8). Regardless of positive donor and societal initiatives181 and the close 
contacts maintained with NGOs and agencies,182, rebuilding a pluralist civil 
society remained problematic. In 2009, Mr Tinjić concluded that ‘it was relatively 
easy to build road, bridges, hospitals, schools right after the war. It is much more 
difficult to implement structural reforms that touch upon these issues of trust, 
reconciliation, constitutional framework and of the very transition from one 
economic system to another, from central planning to a market economy’ (Tinjić 
in interview with the Author, 03.07.2009).  
 
Analysing the World Bank social capital rebuilding activities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, several conclusions have been reached. Social capital reconstruction 
has been included as an ‘added value’ to the different projects and programmes of 
the WB portfolio for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, this could have a 
positive impact because of the potential simultaneous approach to social capital 
reconstruction in many different fields. The lack of a clear strategy to social 
capital (re-)emergence however, has impeded the achievement of any envisaged 
levels of success. The support for the common (shared) interests of the groups 
could contribute to social capital emergence and accumulation. Beyond common 
practical interests, however, are the symbolic and emotional affiliations, which are 
highly sensitive to political agendas; ignoring politics in this respect would not 
help the process. Removing the material incentives for a political agenda is both a 
time- and resource-consuming task, which has an ‘ongoing potential’ since 
incentives change with society. Furthermore, changes in politics come from 
people’s votes and control over politicians. This in turn requires an active 
citizenship, which cannot be formed only based on shared economic interests.  
 
Enabling formal affiliations with the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
overcome ethnic divides requires a clear policy. Such in fact is missing in the 
reconstruction programmes of the World Bank and of the international community 
in general. Integrated as an ‘added value’, the social capital element remains in 
the shadow of the priority programmes and activities of the World Bank. The 
research on social capital performed as early as in 2001 (Bougarel 2002) remained 
underexploited, i.e. not becoming programme documents for subsequent activities 
                                                 
181 The Office of Transition Initiatives in USAID is perhaps the largest supporter of media efforts 
to promote democracy. 
182 The Soros Society had a ‘Civil Society Education Programme;’ the EU - a democracy 
programme(WB-OED 2000:62); Other areas that in which Bank-supported efforts expanded in the 
1990s were the activities related to the demobilisation, reinsertion, and reintegration of ex-
combatants into the civilian economy and society, as well as to the support of women as the 
productive basis for restarting the economy and have potential as strong community leaders who 
can facilitate the rebuilding of social capital 
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and programmes in the field. This fact, confirmed by Mr Tinjić during the 
interview conducted in 2009, can be explained exactly with the lack of a strategic 
policy towards the rebuilding of social capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Counter-arguments to statements about successful reconstruction achievements 
are the (recognised) mistrust, the missing single economic space, the political 
tensions, and the existing divisions along ethnic lines.  
 
Projecting the WB programmes through the prism of the social capital model (see 
Figure 8) it appears that the most of the activities identified as contributing to the 
(re-)construction of social capital have addressed the macro- and micro-structural 
levels. In contrast to the OHR however, the Bank has focused more efforts in the 
dimension of cognitive social capital but again positive result were expected to 
derive from the other developmental efforts.  
 
The analysis of documents and the personal testimonies revealed that social 
capital reconstruction was not targeted in pursuit of a particular plan and hence no 
specific programme was developed. The community driven development projects 
could be seen as contributing to both micro-structural and micro-cognitive levels. 
The fact that within their frameworks the accumulation of social capital was 
considered an ‘added value’ did not lead to the elaboration of measurement tools. 
Hence, success and achievements of these projects with respect to the social 
capital reconstruction can be evaluated only implicitly.  
 
Another problem stems from the lack of co-ordination between the programmes 
focused on the reconstruction of elements at the macro- and micro-levels. The 
lack of an overall strategy and of a synchronised approach to the different sectors 
is a possible reason for performance results remaining away from the expected. A 
prove for this discrepancy is the difference between the estimated cost of the 
reconstruction process and the real expenditures (still running), or between the 
timeframes set and those needed in reality for achieving certain results.  
 
As the theoretical chapters suggested, to avoid distortion of social capital a 
reconstruction policy should address all the macro- and micro-, structural and 
cognitive levels simultaneously and should aim at building a coherent overall 
structure. Social capital needs to be fed at the lowest level, but the macro- 
framework cannot be bypassed. In the case of the complex environment in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a clear understanding of the problem can help mobilise the 
grass-root level and the international community to combine efforts for 
influencing upon the divisive political level.  
 
The assessment of the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 
respect to social capital reconstruction revealed that the OHR and the World Bank 
have implemented a number of initiatives with ‘added social capital value’. 
Nevertheless, the two of the most prominent and active organisations failed to 
develop and implement a coherent and consistent policy in the field of social 
capital rebuilding and the overcoming of the ethnically divisive politics and 
structures. The fieldwork and other interviews carried out with representatives 
from the field did not indicate the existence of any large donor that has been 
addressing strategically these issues. Even if there were such, a programme that 
has remained unpopular or unknown to the representatives of the local 
organisations certainly would not be of the scope and quality needed for achieving 
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essential positive changes. A broader policy framework for social capital 
reconstruction has not been identified.  
 
1.3 Mozaik Foundation  
 
In contrast to the large-scale and all-encompassing programmes implemented by 
the above-presented organisations, a small Bosnian NGO called ‘Mozaik’183 
(formerly known as ‘NGO Development Foundation’) has focused its efforts on 
the social capital (re-)building throughout various communities in the country. 
The philosophy pursued by this organisation proves the validity of the theoretical 
conclusions reached by the research. The sole fact that the NGO representatives 
recognised issues related to the reconstruction of social capital in the post-ethnic-
conflict environment as crucial, supports the focus adopted in this work.  
 
Several reasons justified the selection of Mozaik Foundation for a case study. 
First, as it was mentioned above, a serious problem that the fieldwork faced was 
the reluctance on the part of both national and international organisations to 
discuss their work and achievements. Then, as emerged from the interviews, the 
actors involved in the field had no detailed information about what the other 
organisations were doing. Asked about programmes focused on social capital 
reconstruction, the representatives of the institutions addressed were able to make 
one or two suggestions but also indicated that these were rather tentative 
guesswork on their part. On the other hand, as it was shown above, projects and 
initiatives on social capital existed, but mostly within the frameworks of other 
programmes and agendas. Mozaik Foundation was identified as an organisation 
dedicated to social capital reconstruction and building civil society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It has also been and still is supported by a number of international 
organisations and foreign donors, which affirms the Foundation as an 
internationally recognised local actor.184
 
The initial information about Mozaik Foundation and its work was gathered in 
2003, through a series of interviews with Mr Zoran Puljić, Director of the 
organisation known at the time as NGO Development Foundation, Ms Ivana Goić 
and Mr Muhamed Durmić – Programme Coordinators. In 2008, additional 
information about the work of the foundation over the period between 2003 and 
2008 was obtained again from Mr Zoran Puljić and Ms Eni Kurtović, Mozaik's 
Development Manager.  
 
This indigenous non-governmental organisation was first established outside 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000) and only later (2002) was registered in the 
country. Mr Puljić explained that the organisation was initiated inspired by a 
research called ‘Service Delivery or Civil Society’ (done by a Canadian 
                                                 
183 ‘Mozaik’ is the Bosnian word for ‘mosaic’. The Bosnian name has been used throughout the 
text to prevent any confusion with other organisations bearing the name ‘Mosaic’, as for example 
the American ‘Mosaic Foundation’, a charitable and educational organisation dedicated to 
improving the lives of women and children with focus on the Arab world. 
184 Among the main international donors of Mozaik Foundation are: the World Bank, King 
Baudouin Foundation, Open Society Fund, Dutch Government through CARE Intl., CARE 
International, C.S. Mott Foundation 
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researcher Ian Smillie185), questioning whether, in the complex environment of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the focus of support should fall on delivering social 
services or on building civil society. Taking into account the recommendations 
made in the research, one of which was that there should be an indigenous body to 
support the local NGO sector after the international community leaves, the 
Canadian government promised to allocate funds. Establishing the organisation, 
the management of the NGO Development Foundation – the official name of 
Mozaik at the time – continued negotiating and waiting for the financial support 
for the two years between 2000 and 2002, instead of attempting to secure other 
funds. This made the boards of the foundation change the management as soon as 
the money arrived and the real work could start. As Mr Puljić stated, ‘Therefore 
we say that as an idea, the organisation has existed for the last four years, but it 
was over the last two years when we actually started working’ (Puljić in interview 
with the Author, 11.06.2003). 
 
The Director explained also that the goal of the foundation was to perform 
activities throughout the country – i.e. both in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Republica Srpska. ‘However, before the changes of 
legislation in 2002, this was not possible. An NGO registered in one of the 
Entities was allowed to work only within the respective territorial boundaries. The 
removal of the legislative constraints in October 2002 enabled us to obtain a 
state-level registration’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003).  
 
Mozaik Foundation has dedicated its efforts and work to the general improvement 
of different small communities throughout the territory of the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. As explained by the Programme Coordinator Ivana Goić (in 
interview with the Author, 12.06.2003), ‘the communities are completely divided 
along different lines - if we can call them such when there is no community sense 
at all – which prevents people from undertaking common activities’. As Muhamed 
Durmić revealed further, the Foundation supported various projects, 
infrastructural improvements, and repair of local roads, village water-supply 
systems, streetlights or building of access ramps and organising creative 
workshops for enabling the inclusion of disabled population (Durmić in interview 
with the Author, 25.06.2003). Among the primary objectives of Mozaik remain 
the facilitation of democratic processes and the participatory development of local 
communities based on shared interests and preservation of historical and cultural 
heritage.  
 
Recognising that social capital is a very broad term, Zoran Puljić pointed out that 
through their projects as well as functioning as a re-granting organisation, the 
Foundation tries to stimulate local contribution, local involvement, local 
responsibility sharing, local governments, business, media, and citizens. ‘We work 
through local NGOs and what we try to make them do is to talk to each other, 
define problems that they think they could actually solve; prioritise those 
problems and then eventually with our assistants, but also with lots of community 
involvement, deal with the problem’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 
11.06.2003). 
 
                                                 
185 The research mentioned is: Smillie, I. 1996, Service Delivery or Civil Society: Non-
Governmental Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CARE Canada: Zagreb  
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Explaining the community-driven development approach that the organisation 
adopted in its work with community members, Mr Puljić revealed the philosophy 
of Mozaik activities. ‘We think that the right way is to give people we work with 
concrete purpose or goal, to make them our partners in the project. From our 
part, we focus on the process, on all the synergies that can be created within the 
local community. And the money we give is only in addition to what they should 
be doing anyway. So, this is kind of a kick-start - to put the existing local energy 
in motion’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003). Therefore, the 
Foundation did not prescribe which types of projects communities ought to work 
on, but instead it worked with their representatives to define community priorities, 
devise and support local solutions to community problems, and implement 
projects that benefit the community at large. It aimed at motivating the 
community members to identify and mobilise locally available human, financial 
and material resources.  
 
Commenting about the field, the Programme Coordinator Ivana Goić said that the 
situation was bad. ‘We mainly work in cities with a population of up to 35 000. 
There is a collapse of all kind of state services; it is getting more and more 
difficult for people to provide for their living, which reflects on their minds. They 
have this large sense of apathy and there is a general feeling of hopelessness. This 
can also explain the little initiative for action, because people believe they can not 
change anything. The governments are not responsive very much to the local 
citizens, sometimes because they do not know about their problems, sometimes 
because they do not want to, and sometimes because they do not have the money 
for this’ (Goić in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003). In the views of the 
members of the organisation, most of the funds that the complicated government 
systems operated with have been allocated to institutional structures, military and 
police, but not to the citizens.   
 
Working on a grass-roots level, Mozaik first would identify the areas where they 
would perform their activities. ‘Then we go there and talk to the different 
stakeholders. We try to identify the levels of energy and potential of these 
communities to do something. Based on that we organise meetings with 
representatives from local communities – as many as there are willing to attend 
our discussions – and the local community decides which NGOs they would like to 
work with. The principle we follow very strictly is that the community must 
identify their problems’ pointed out Mr Durmić (in interview with the Author, 
25.06.2003). As a result, communities would build relationships (the intangible 
aspect of our work) and would mobilise to solve specific local problems (tangible 
aspect), increase the quality of life and obtain ‘control’ over community life. 
 
Among the tools used by the Foundation to promote and facilitate local change, 
were grant making and advisory support. The achievement of concrete and 
tangible results was seen as a perfect basis for improving relations among 
community members at large. Building cohesive communities through facilitation 
of social cohesion and developing people’s abilities to mobilise local resources 
and to meet local needs; lessening the effects of the 1992-1995 war; building trust 
and confidence, and supporting reconciliation and nation-building processes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, were identified by Mozaik as the key elements of its 
mission. Their main goal (as officially stated on the foundation’s website) has 
been to contribute to the development of healthy and productive communities, 
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whose members share common values and goals and participate in the activities, 
which increase the common good, and in this way also increase social cohesion 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The words of Zoran Puljić also confirmed 
this:  
  
‘We are trying to focus not on problems but on solutions. When you adopt such an 
approach, it is easy to work with the different ethnic groups. For example if there 
is a road in a horrible condition and the community recognises this as a problem 
for all of its members (no matter whether Serbs, Bosniaks or Croats), we grant 
money for improving the infrastructure, but by participating in the works and 
doing this together we believe that we enable the (re-)building of social capital. 
People might not like the fact that they have to work together, but they recognise 
the fact that they have to join because of this common problem. And this is the 
first step’ (Puljić in interview with the Author, 11.06.2003). 
 
Presenting the programmes that the Foundation was managing at the time, Ms 
Goić emphasised that the four programmes (and each of the 10 projects in total) 
were targeting the same goals, as explained above. Apart from the ‘Small 
community mobilisation fund’ and the ‘Community development’, in Central 
Bosnia and Herzegovina they were running the Living heritage programme and in 
several cities of Republica Srpska (Srebrenica, Bratunac, Jajce, and MrKonjić 
Grad) together with CARE International they were supporting the integration of 
the returnees.  
 
In these programme areas, Mozaik has been applying the community-driven 
development methodology developed for pursuing the goals of the Foundation. 
Living Heritage and Tourism (3-year programme with total value of 570,000 
Euros) was launched in 2002 to support preservation and active use of living 
heritage resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently transformed into a 
Programme Called Bosnian Kingdom Trail, the initiative supported community 
actions of 10 medieval Bosnian cities. In addition to the upgrading of local 
infrastructure and preparing it for tourist visits, Mozaik has assisted the 
communities in providing links to potential tourist markets. Furthermore, it has 
been providing support for resolving problems in the course of the project 
implementation.   
 
‘The problems that local communities face depend on the particular work they 
have undertaken’ explained Ms Goić. ‘The Living Heritage programme is more or 
less anything that could promote local identity building. It could involve 
development of natural, historical, religious, whatever kind of resources that they 
have and make the local community proud of. Whatever they think is a priority for 
that community this is what we will provide support for - as long as the people 
meet and discuss, prioritise problems, and identify available or needed resources’ 
(Goić in interview with the Author, 12.06.2003).  
 
As regards the challenges that Mozaik Foundation itself faced, Mr Puljić revealed 
that sometimes the most difficult thing was to bring people together to discuss 
their common problems. The lack of initiative and the lack of willingness to 
cooperate were additional problems. ‘We do not work with communities where 
people wait for us to suggest an activity, or where people do not want to do 
anything for themselves. If they cannot recognise their interest and put some effort 
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to pursue it, it is likely that they are interested in our presence only because of the 
possible financial benefits. And we do not want to support such trends’ (Puljić in 
interview with the Author, 11.06.2003). In general, in the view of Mozaik 
representatives, the type of work they performed had started too late. These 
conclusions were reached while observing the situation of returnees, who going 
back to their pre-war ‘home’-communities, were suffering isolation and exclusion 
in various aspects of life, and this constituted a big social gab.  
 
In 2004, the Foundation began awarding grants to any community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that was willing to mobilise its own existing resources to solve local 
problems. For Active Communities programme awarded 35 grants of up to 
10.000 Euro to communities all across Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Civic 
Advocacy Partnership Programme, the communities received support for 
activities to involve citizens in initiatives of common interest. By strengthening 
the (inter-ethnic) communities, the intention was to develop capabilities for joint 
decision making and participatory planning of local development, as well as 
capacities for mobilisation of local resources and lobbying for the interests of 
rural communities at local government.  
 
Larger grants (up to 20,000 Euros) were awarded to three multiethnic 
communities for solving infrastructural problems in ethnically divided 
communities and thereby helping reconciliation186. Through working together on 
issues of infrastructure and increasing public readiness in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the aim was to support the development of returning communities; 
contribute towards dialogue and mutual respect; solve infrastructural issues; 
improve the quality of life and to promote these activities as examples of good 
practices for the community development. 
 
Apart from the Inclusion of Disabled Population and Philanthropy Promotion 
(corporate social responsibility award competition and bi-annual fundraising 
workshop), Mozaik has run also a programme called Youth Bank, which aimed to 
increase the participation of young people in the developmental processes of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s rural communities. Youth Bank created opportunities 
for youth-led groups to meet the needs of their communities – working on projects 
(cultural, sports etc.), participating as active citizens in their communities and 
developing professional governance and management skills through capacity 
building exercises and practical experience in operating a small grants programme 
that directly supports young people in rural areas. 
 
As an intermediary Foundation, Mozaik faced challenges such as how effectively 
to translate the complex donor language into a language that can be understood in 
rural communities. The policy of Mozaik as a multi-ethnic organisation operating 
in the whole country, irrespective of political or administrative divisions, was to 
fund initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were not intended against other 
people, while mobilising community action and contribution.  
 
                                                 
186 Integrating Rural Returning Communities was developed and implemented in partnership with 
CDD Network members, ‘DON’ (Prijedor), ‘Nature’ (Bratunac) and ‘Under the same sun’ 
(Jablanica)  
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The approach and nature of the activities performed by the Foundation, were 
considered to be representative for what this research views as a basic 
requirement, when or if reconstruction aims at building stability in a post-conflict 
environment of activated ethnic, religious, cultural or other non-negotiable lines 
of separation. This has been based on the assumption that if people are motivated 
to think rationally of their future and presented with opportunities to do something 
for themselves that would bring direct benefits and would improve their living 
conditions, they could eventually overcome the ‘senti-mental’ walls established 
during or as a result of the experienced conflict. Rebuilding connections and 
relationships of trust within smaller local communities should precede the 
attempts to connect various ‘trust-units’ into a larger network. The top-down 
approach, especially when the very idea of a nation does not exist or the basic unit 
of any civil society – the citizens – has disappeared and been replaced with 
‘ethnic-community members’, could hardly be successful.  
 
Mozaik has undertaken exactly this approach, implementing their programmes on 
a limited and local scale. Defining ‘community’ both geographically – as a group 
of people linked by a specific geographic location (i.e. village or small town) and 
‘by interest’ – as a group of people that have a common interest, irrespective of 
their geographic location (i.e. artists), the Foundation has enabled the creation of a 
(initially virtual) environment, within which the ethnic differences between people 
did not matter. This approach also has been reflected by their understanding of 
social cohesion adopted as both starting and targeted point of their work. 
According to Mozaik ‘Social cohesion is a state of harmonious and productive 
social relations where community members, irrespective of differences in social 
and economic status, share common values and goals, have a sense of mutual 
commitment and belonging to the community, a sense of solidarity, responsibility 
and mutual recognition, and participate in activities for the common good’ 
(http://www.mozaik.ba).  
 
The organisation has been monitoring and assessing several indicators in order to 
evaluate the progress and the levels of success of their work in building social 
cohesion. The first indicator taken into account was whether the respective project 
would be the first activity after the war that the community would undertake while 
applying a participatory approach in planning and implementing community 
development initiatives. Then Mozaik would consider the number and structure of 
people involved in the planning process, the level of community contribution 
(including various sources of funding), the number of volunteers and the number 
of institutions involved in planning and implementing the activities. In addition, 
the local benefits achieved would also be looked at, as they would play the role of 
multiplier for further community initiatives. As for the indirect positive effect on 
communities, this was measured by  the Foundation through the number of 
successful projects in building capacities of NGOs to apply the participatory 
approach (community driven development approach) and in using new techniques 
to inform communities, to plan initiatives and to mobilise local resources.  
 
‘It is really difficult to measure success in the field where we work’, 
acknowledged the Development manager Ms Eni Kurtović, approached in 2008 
for updated information about the performance of Mozaik. ‘There are tangibles 
and intangibles. Tangibles are easy to evaluate. There are meetings, there are 
people coming together, there are a number of partnerships explored; there is so 
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much money coming from the local government, so much money from local 
business - so it's pretty easy. But in terms of building social capital, we have 
decided to evaluate changes within communities over the period of our work 
there. And we were particularly happy to see that there are some initiatives that 
have emerged without being pushed by us – we believe that is something that we 
have contributed to in the first place. However, we are still developing tools for 
better assessing the achievements of our goals’ (Kurtović in interview with the 
Author, 19.11.2008). 
 
The number of initiatives supported has also been accepted as an indicator for 
success in respect to community development. The programmes that the 
Foundation has run over the years have addressed local community needs 
throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, over the period 
2002 – 2005, the ‘Living Heritage’ programme has supported 26 projects in 22 
communities of central and western Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘For active 
communities’ programme has covered 45 actions such as renovation of sport, 
children’s or community playgrounds and parks, planting trees, building water 
reservoir, walls, bus stops, etc., undertaken by 42 organisations. Targeting 
integration of marginalised groups, and especially disabled people, the ‘Small 
grants program’ (2007-2008) has supported 18 projects in 13 different 
municipalities.  
 
The approach to mobilise community members to achieve positive changes, was 
first developed within the frameworks of a programme called ‘Fond of local 
initiatives’ (2003 – 2005). Initially, Mozaik sent letters to 50 different 
communities of 20 municipalities to invite them to submit project proposals to the 
foundation. The primary condition was that each community had to define 
together a problem that it would identify as essential for its members. Forty-nine 
communities replied to this invitation and 16 of the submitted project proposals 
were approved for financing.  
 
It is important to point out that the grants distributed by Mozaik foundation for the 
individual projects within the frameworks of the different programmes were 
relatively small – for example between 250 - 750 USD (Living Heritage 
programme), or between 3500 – 6500 USD (Fond for Local Initiatives). Apart 
from managing to support larger number of communities, this can also be 
evaluated as a mechanism that has the potential to prevent abuse or misuse of 
larger resources, as well as it motivated people to submit concrete and realistic 
project proposals. Another interesting feature of the Mozaik approach was that 
they managed to involve many volunteers at the local level – for example 363 
volunteers have participated in the ‘Small grants program’, covering 7686 
working hours, while in the ‘For active communities’ programme 1463 volunteers 
have covered 18,236 working hours.  
 
The other type of programmes, closely related to social capital rebuilding, that the 
Foundation has been developing involved citizenship and civil society 
development. Particularly interesting in this context was the project ‘101 answers 
of why to vote?’, which goal was to motivate people to participate in the elections. 
The ‘Community organisation for better environment’ focused on providing 
support for local non-governmental organisations (20 projects presented by 20 
NGOs were granted between 1000 and 1700 Euro); and connecting them within a 
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viable network (‘Local NGOs network’ supported 17 NGOs in their efforts to 
promote actions, to deliver training, etc.).  
 
To summarise, the work of Mozaik throughout the years has targeted in a 
comprehensive manner the most critical community needs, identified in terms of 
reconciliation, inter-cultural dialogue, and socio-economic development. To 
achieve these goals, the Foundation has attempted to develop and promote a clear 
mission, vision and values, relying on a highly participatory approach and 
spreading their initiatives and work throughout the whole country of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Of course, the organisation has acknowledged that its dependency 
on foreign support was a serious weakness, as was the attempt to cover with the 
(limited) available resources as much of the country as possible. ‘Nevertheless, we 
do not play a role of a mediator between the local NGOs and the state or the local 
authorities. If there is a problem – like obtaining certain permission for example - 
they should cope with it. The NGO we support financially should deal with the 
local governments and institutions. We are just observing the process. That is how 
we think social capital could be built. We would not be helpful if we say ‘OK, we 
have a friend in OHR, we'll do things faster’. Let it last longer, but let it be done 
by people themselves’, emphasised the Director, Mr Puljić (Puljić in interview 
with the Author, 08.04.2009). 
 
Despite the limited funds Mozaik has been operating with (the total budgets of 
some of the programmes were as follows: ‘Living Heritage’ – 260,583 Euros, ‘For 
active communities’ – 70,000 USD, ‘Small grants program’ – 31,500 USD, and 
‘Fond for local initiatives’ – 162,000 USD), the Foundation has assessed the 
impact of its work using two main indicators. Although rather difficult to measure 
the first indicator – increased social cohesion – the elements that Mozaik has 
been monitoring in order to evaluate their performance were evidences for: 
improved co-operation within local communities, integration contacts, new cross-
community initiatives, improved local image, appreciation of heritage of others, 
networking with other communities, cross-sectoral links, development of shared 
spaces. The second indicator that the Foundation has taken into consideration for 
assessing the impact of their programmes has been the increased community 
participation in community development process. It was measured based on the 
increased awareness and appreciation of local resources, participation in planning, 
implementation and evaluation, replication, continuation and sustainability of 
project ideas, local community contribution. 
 
The performance of the Mozaik Foundation with respect to social capital 
reconstruction can be assessed both subjectively and objectively, accepting that  
individual perceptions would correspond to the fist approach, whereas third party 
evaluation could provide an unbiased assessment. Although subjective, personal 
statements concerning the experienced changes in the surrounding environment as 
a result of the Mozaik activities are in fact evidence of positive achievements. The 
words of Ivana Goić about their personal experience as project implementers 
indicate that the Foundation managed to initiate processes within the communities 
where the organisation was active. ‘The first time we go to a community we try to 
make people (everybody willing to join) gather together in one room and to 
discuss common problem. It is never easy in the beginning. Then we present to 
them the idea of our support – that we will provide them a grant but only if they 
ménage to reach a common decision of what community good this money would 
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go for and how the local population would contribute to the project. One of the 
places we had to visit about three times before people started talking to each 
other, but eventually they came up with the idea to rebuild the main road in the 




Figure 15: 2003 Rating of NGO Development Foundation  
     (Now Mozaik Foundation) 
 
 
Institutional Development BBB 6.1 
Financial Efficiency and Growth BBB 6.1 
Social Impact A+ 7.4 
Transparency & Accountability A 6.9 
Design, Monitoring & Evaluation  BBB 5.9 
Overall BBB+ 6.5 
 
 
Apart from the continued support from its own donors (such as the World Bank, 
or the King Baldwin Foundation), an example for the objective evaluation of the 
Mozaik contribution was the assessment evaluation performed by the Foreign Aid 
Ratings service187. This social-value rating agency for non-profits, companies, and 
governments worldwide has evaluated the work of the NGO based on parameters 
such as institutional development, financial efficiency, social impact, 
transparency, and accountability and monitoring and evaluation scheme. The 
social impact of the Foundation was acknowledged yet in 2003 – the original 
chart is presented below: The NGO Development Foundation was awarded a 
Foreign Aid Rating of BBB+ for small-medium foundations (Foreign Aid Ratings 
LLC (2003) Rating Profile: NGO Development Foundation – Sarajevo, 
http://www.foreignaid.com/ratings2/NGODevFoundation/) 
 
To evaluate their own performance, Mozaik Foundation also developed their own 
system for measurement and evaluation (Kurtović in interview with the Author, 
19.11.2008), using indicators such as:  
¾ participatory approach in planning and implementing community development 
initiatives 
¾ number and structure of people involved in planning process 
¾ level of community contribution (raised from various sources of funding) 
¾ number of volunteers involved  
¾ number of institutions involved in planning and implementing the action 
¾ local benefits achieved (as motivational factor for further community 
initiatives) 
¾ building capacities of NGOs in applying participatory approach (community 
driven development approach) and using new techniques in informing 
community 
¾ planning initiatives and mobilisation of local resources  
                                                 




By monitoring the type of involvement in their projects, the levels of participation 
and interest in the various locations the organisation worked, Mozaik managed to 
contribute to social capital accumulation in the respective communities. A closer 
examination of the evaluation and report documentation maintained by the NGO 
provides the necessary evidence for arguing that this local organisation has 
developed a coherent and evolving strategy and working methods, which enable 
their successful performance and essential contribution for social capital 
rebuilding at a small scale community level.  
 
The table and the charts presented in Appendix 8188, indicate that the Foundation 
has been actively providing guided assistance to communities rather than adopting 
a donor-approach. Now completed, the CoDE A project was a part of the 
Programme “For Active Communities”. The programme was primarily focused on 
building social cohesion in small rural communities (of less than 5 000 
inhabitants), which received support for activities of common interest that actively 
involve citizens in its planning and implementation. The outcomes of the planning 
meetings held in 2006 listed in Appendix 8: Table 2 and Table 3 revealed that the 
Foundation was looking to involve local people in activities that community 
members recognise as priorities and beneficial to the community at large. 
Indicators were the account of people at the beginning of the planning meeting 
and in its end, but mostly - the calculated degree of satisfaction with the project 
idea and the degree of active participation in the project (scores ranging between 
4.00 and the scale-maximum 5.00). The breakdown of the type of community 
representatives that participated in these planning meetings shows that targeted 
was the involvement of as many sectors of society as possible – from pupils, to 
business and media (Table 3). The chart in Figure 16 gives a graphic 
representation of the same statistics.  
 
Figure 16 Mozaik CoDE A Project  

































                                                 
188 The project title CoDE A is abbreviation from “community development” 
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The data concerning the types, sources, and amounts of contribution were also 
indicative of the philosophy of Mozaik and its goal to support social capital 
rebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Out of the total value of 114,447 
convertible marks (KM) for these 20 grants allocated in 2006 within the CoDE A 
frameworks, the Foundation provided only 44% of it. The communities in the 
form of in-cash and in-kind (services) contribution, provided the remaining 56%. 
Contribution came from number of sources, by type: 23 public institutions, 70 
public and private firms, 26 individuals, and 14 community-based organisations 
(CBOs). All of the above data is presented in the pie charts in Figure 17.  
 
Appendix 8: Table 1 lists some of the outputs of the community initiatives (run in 
2006). The detailed description of the grants allocated under the Code A, also 
demonstrated that the respective local communities owned the projects. Apart 
from the raised levels of trust, interaction, and co-operation, the visible material 
outcomes became an additional factor that motivated people to plan for future 
activities. All of these have been signs that projects achieved the goal of social 
capital rebuilding within the respective targeted settlements.  
 
Evidence for the positive results achieved by Mozaik Foundation in their efforts to 
contribute for the accumulation of social capital in smaller local communities 
emerged also from other programmes run by the organisation. Targeting to 
preserve cultural and historic heritage, the Living Heritage Programme had an 
added goal/value focused on enabling the development and increase of levels of 
social capital within the respective communities. An example for how the 
organisation monitored the programme performance and the elements of social 
capital is presented in Appendix 9: Table 1, where some of the supported local 
initiatives are listed. It becomes obvious that the focus of the assessment has 
fallen on evaluation of social capital elements as community involvement and 
(self-) organisation, voluntary work, participation in decision making, plans for 
the future, increased cohesion, interest in and motivation for participation, taking 
of responsibility for the common benefits, etc.  
 
Figure 17 Mozaik Code A Contribution  












Total value (KM)  114,447 
Mozaik (in KM)  49,943 
Community (in KM)  64,504 
In cash   28,887 
In-kind & services 35,617 
23 public institutions 26,531 
70 public & private firms 23,824 
26 individuals   3,083 
14 CBOs  11,066 






















































































Contribution of   23 public institutions
Contribution of   70 public and private companies
Contribution of  26 individuals 
Contribution of  14 CBOs 
sting some of the projects under the programme Fund for Local Initiatives, 
pendix 9: Table 2 presents not only the material results from the common work 
t provide individual incentives for people to contribute to the common benefit, 
t also evaluation of the non-material outputs. ‘Promoting activism and 
lunteerism in communities’ and ‘Affirming NGO’s roots with local 
mmunities’ are the two Community small mobilisation funds (CMFS) 
jectives, which achievement has been assessed and evaluated as poor, fair, good 
 excellent. These objectives indicate the priorities for Mozaik Foundation, but 
ir assessment reveals also the targeted social capital elements, as follows: 
 Interest in voluntary work  
 Grass-root level involved in planning process 
 Inter-ethnic co-operation  
 Common benefits - raised motivation & interest in output 
 Visible results from common work- motivation for future activities 
 Various community sectors and groups involved in project activities  
 Interaction with & impact upon local institutions 
 Activities to meet local needs 
 NGO-community interaction;  
 Mobilisation through personal contacts 
 Raised trust in NGOs 
 Responsibility for own future –influencing decision makers, need for raising 
funds due to limited financial assistance  
 Vision for common future 
 Involvement of various community sectors (public, business, youth, etc) 
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Appendix 9: Table 3 presents a detailed description of the assessment of the 
projects implementation with respect to the CSMF objectives.  
 
An important indicator for the impartiality of the approach that Mozaik 
Foundation has adopted in its work has been the fact that the assessment of project 
achievements has not always been positive. Lack of interest within community, 
lack of skills and capacities of local organisations to mobilise support and 
volunteers, or to run participatory initiatives, problems with budgeting activities, 
or undeveloped community awareness and poor motivation were some of the 
factors that have had a negative impact upon the achievement of the objectives 
set. It is important here to note that the material results from the projects were 
considered incentives for the involvement of local communities. The Foundation 
was mostly concerned with the process of working towards the achievement of the 
defined goals and of completing the initiative launched. Thus the primary goal of 
the Foundation, social capital reconstruction, was vested in the process of working 
for obtaining material benefits for the local people.  
 
Finally, considering the work of Mozaik with regard to the social capital model 
(see Figure 8) it appears that the Foundation has concentrated its efforts in the 
micro-level, both structural and cognitive, with respect to the officially accepted 
macro-level goals. The positive results achieved by Mozaik however remained 
limited in scope to the communities they worked within. This owed to the fact that 
the organisation had no capacity to address the elements of the macro-level or to 
develop national-level programmes. Therefore, the positive changes achieved in 
respect to social capital rebuilding could not affect the overall situation in the 
country.  
 
The conclusion that emerges from the three case studies presented above is that 
positive reconstruction efforts in one or several dimensions of social capital 
cannot bring about an overall change. Only a comprehensive approach enabling 
simultaneous and synchronised actions in all the four dimensions of matching 
scope and complementary elements could contribute to the reconstruction of 
social capital, which is a vital requirement for achieving ‘normalisation’ in a post-
ethnic-conflict environment. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the targeted 
scope of social capital frameworks cannot be other but: 
 
¾ macro-structural level – the (national) state of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
¾ macro-cognitive level – the national institutions of the state 
¾ micro-structural level – cross-cutting civil networks and associations (local 
institutions bridging the local communities with the state-level institutions 
¾ micro-cognitive level – ethnic identities subordinated to national citizenship 
affiliation 
 
It is difficult to evaluate whether this particular gap in the process of building the 
modern Bosnian state is the one that has had the most negative impact on the 
reconstruction of the country. Nevertheless, the lack of state-level social capital, 
the lack of strong and intensive citizenship affiliations and the continuing 
political, institutional, administrative and cultural division along ethnic lines have 
held back the general development of the country. These factors have contributed 
to the status quo and to the perception of and Herzegovina as a failed experiment 
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and as a ‘black hole’ where more than 8 billions of USD have disappeared without 
achieving the expected results. The next section will look at the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina today, which will provide the necessary factual 
indicators for objective evaluation of the success of post-conflict reconstruction 
process in general, aiming at enabling lasting peace, stability, and development.  
 
 
2. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  BY THE END OF 2008 – A SNAPSHOT 
 
The political crisis following the resignation of the Bosnia’s Prime minister 
Nikola Špirić on 1st November 2007,189 in protest against the imposed measures 
to reform the decision-making process in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central 
government and parliament, indicated once again the failure of the internationally-
supervised state-building of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2007:1). After the 
years of internationally led reconstruction, focused on strengthening and 
legitimising the central state institutions, this political crisis (not the first one for 
the period) challenged the very framework of international regulation in the 
country. It brought into question the legitimacy and the authority of the 
international institutions involved in the state building process.  
 
The contradictions between the international powers in the country, and in 
particular the Office of the High Representative, and the need that political 
institutions be developed in accordance with the democratically generated popular 
demands, reached their peak around the issue of the institutional reforms 
(Chandler 2007). In his resignation speech Nikola Špirić highlighted that after all 
the years of reconstruction Bosnia and Herzegovina could hardly be considered a 
sovereign state, when foreigners have exclusive rules over the country and locals 
are not in a position to take over responsibility (AFP 2007). The same was 
implicitly confirmed by Miroslav Lajčák, the current High Representative 
himself, arguing that he was the one having the mandate to interpret the European 
principles and the Dayton agreement, while the role of the local politicians was to 
‘do their jobs, to go to work and fulfil their commitments and obligations’ (Lajčák 
2007) – a view, supported also by the NATO Secretary General (OHR 2007) 
 
For the years of reconstruction (1995-2009), Bosnia and Herzegovina received 
more than eight billions of USD as international financial assistance 
(Developmental Data; www.devdata.worldbank.org). This massive donor funding 
for reconstruction activities made the country look like experiencing an economic 
boom, with the economy growing at an average of 40% annually between 1995 
and 1999. Nevertheless the aid did not lead to a sustainable growth of the 
economy and the labour market (Bodewig 2002:27). With GDP at just 70% of its 
pre-war levels, 30% of unemployment, slow privatisation and 13% of the 
population living below the poverty line, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of 
the poorest countries in the region (USAID 2007). 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement put an ‘official’ end to the hostilities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and marked the beginning of the transition to the normalisation 
                                                 
189 In December 2007 the parliament approved that Nikola Špirić returns as Prime Minister of the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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period. It however did not manage to deal with the distrust remaining among the 
members of all three communities, who continue living in largely ethnically 
homogeneous areas. The country is still a patchwork of three de facto mono-
ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national 
government that exists mostly on paper.  Fourteen years after Dayton it is difficult 
to say that the tensions among the different ethnic groups and the effects of war 
have been overcome and that the country has achieved a remarkable success in the 
stabilisation process.  
 
2.1 Reconstruction achievements  
 
Despite the overall physical rebuilding and the signs of economic growth, the 
development of the country (as of 2009), is still hindered. The signature of the 
cease-fire agreement did not transform the enemies into partners overnight. 
Neither did the international community manage to do so during the subsequent 
years of reconstruction, despite transfer of responsibilities190, roles and 
approaches. Setting up institutions of a modern democratic state and holding 
largely free and fair elections, the process of reconstruction has achieved a certain 
level of peace and reduced inter-ethnic violence. Freedom of movement has been 
restored and many refugees and displaced persons have gone home. The country 
has also opened talks with the EU on stability and association agreement, the first 
step towards membership (Woehrel 2005; Steele 2005).  The success in some 
areas however has not enabled the accomplishment of the overall goal of 
international efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the creation of a stable and 
united state, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate with Euro-Atlantic 
institutions (Woehrel 2005). The progress on reforms continues to require direct 
or indirect foreign intervention because the ‘ownership’ of processes has not been 
transferred to the local institutions and actors (Woehrel 2005). The underlying 
reason for this was not only the resistance of some powerful nationalist players, 
but also the different visions for the future that the three communities have - 
Bosniaks favoured a united Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Serbs and Croats did 
not (Woehrel 2005). Among the reconstruction feats were also the establishment 
of a state-level intelligence service, a unified army, and border and customs 
authorities. Despite the lack of substantial economic gains, the country has 
managed to ensure monetary stability. Many refugees have returned home and the 
overwhelming majority of property issues have been resolved (WWICS 2007). 
 
Supporters of international activism believe that to become self-sustaining, the 
reforms had to reach a critical mass, being moved forward by external agents 
(Woehrel 2005). According to critics, the dominant role in Bosnian affairs played 
by the international community since 1995 has been a type of modern, UN-
sanctioned liberal imperialism, which was replicated later in East Timor and 
Kosovo (Steele 2005). The extensive political authority of the Office of the High 
Representative has also become increasingly controversial (Kim 2005). Although 
it had been necessary as a short-term post-conflict measure, in a long term it 
creates dependency, promotes irresponsibility among local elites, stifles civil 
                                                 
190 Although sixty thousand NATO troops were to supervise its implementation, they proved to be 
a largely ineffective peace-keeping force; in December 2004 the European Union officially took 
over NATO's peace-keeping mission in Bosnia 
 209
society, and produces a highly visible financial apartheid (Steele 2005, Woehrel 
2005). After these years and billions of dollar spent, the international security 
presence and the economic assistance (even if at reduced levels) are still essential 
for the country. 
 
Looking at the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2008, it appears that on the 
sections upon which the survey ranks the country performance, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has not moved significantly ahead since 1997 (see Table 13). One 
could also argue that supporting the flourishing of numerous NGOs, the 
international community in fact has attributed to the high values under the Civil 
Society category. It is however another issue how many of these organisations can 
survive without being financed by the respective donors. Having in mind the 
amounts of financial aid received for the (re-)construction of the state, the lack of 
progress suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a ‘black hole’ rather 
than a showcase of the international ability to lead a country out of war into a 
sustainable economic and social development (Bodewig 2002). The above 
justifies the conclusions that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is more ‘stasis than 
stability’, that the country is still in a semi-colonial status with a significant 
international military and administrative presence (WWICS 2007). The following 
sections will briefly outline the current situation in the country by different sectors 
of reconstruction.  
 
 
Table 13: Freedom House Performance Rating - Bosnia and Herzegovina  






































N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 
Electoral 
Process 
N/A 5.00 5.00 4.75 4.25 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Civil Society N/A 5.00 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 
Independent 
Media 
N/A 4.75 5.00 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 
Local 
Governance 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 
Judicial 
Framework  
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Corruption N/A N/A 6.00 5.75 5.50 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 
Democracy 
Rating 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.18 4.07 4.04 4.11 
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest level of democratic progress 
 
 
2.2 State and institutions  
 
The complex and dysfunctional arrangements of the political structure of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has predetermined weak central government and institutions. 
The Swiss-canton-style Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the unitary 
entity of Republica Srpska have established a political and administrative 
structure called ‘state of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (as presented in Chapter 4, 
Figure 3). With only several narrowly defined spheres of competence and 
subjected to complex power-sharing mechanisms (to ensure that even within those 
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spheres no ethnic group would be outvoted by the others), the central state created 
under the Dayton constitution did not satisfy any of the local communities. It has 
become, and to a great extent still is, the only glue sticking the fragmented units 
and groups of the country, which on its turn can hardly be defined as stable and 
sustainable (Parish 2007). Seeing themselves as the dominating ethnic group, the 
Bosniaks have been defending over the years a political agenda for strengthening  
the central government. The Croats have set up parallel political institutions that 
were integrated into neighbouring Croatia, and the Serbs have continued to 
struggle for their own independent Bosnian Serb state and against the formation of 
a central government (Parish 2007).  
 
Establishing working government and institutions, rebuilding the economy and 
ensuring the returning of refugees and displaced people (estimated at more than 1 
million) were identified among the crucial priorities for post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the progress remained rather poor. Far from being a 
blueprint for a functioning state, Dayton produced a constitution, which enshrined 
ethnic and group rights, created two self-governing Entities, and put an outsider, 
the High Representative, in ultimate charge (Steele 2005). The most complex 
multi-layered government structure of modern times (Mertus 2005) with its 140 
ministries at three levels proved to be largely dysfunctional and expensive to 
support (CIDA 2007). The lack of consensus between the ethnic groups and the 
predisposition of officials and institutions to safe-guard the rights of the various 
ethnic groups (USAID 2007) still impede any efforts for strengthening the 
government at state level191. The indifference in deregulating the economy and in 
carrying out a transparent privatisation, to a certain extent owes to the fact that 
nationalist parties still benefit from many public enterprises. Delayed structural 
reforms and limited investment are also challenges. 
 
The central institutions that have been created to overarch the separate entities192, 
are still largely dysfunctional, because of the obstructions to the reform efforts put 
up by the nationalist parties that controlled Bosnian governments at all levels 
(Woehrel 2005). In its recommendation 202 (of 2006) on local and regional 
democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council of Europe pointed out that 
‘the central state has no rule in the field of the local administration’. The fact that 
the Entities’ governments on many occasions can ignore the central government 
was confirmed by Prime Minister Nikola Špirić (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the 
government’; 24.04.2009). He pointed out that a positive effect from the contrary 
to any expectations, the global financial crisis contributed to a more intensive 
dialogue with the governments of the Entities in attempt to find solutions to 
common problems. Even in a case of dispute, the established a practice would 
make Entities addressing the OHR and not to trying to solve problems in co-
operation. This weakness of institutions provides an environment conducive to 
organised crime activities (Woehrel 2005). Therefore, strengthening the rule of 
law to break down the parallel structures connecting nationalist political parties, 
                                                 
191 Various proposals have been made for simplifying the structure, including eliminating the 
entities to create a unitary state, or a system of cantons within a more conventional federation 
(Woehrel 2005) 
192 Institutions range from a common currency, customs service and tax regime, to the high court 
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certain enterprises and organised crime, has been a key issue of the international 
efforts in Bosnia193.  
 
The establishment of new central law enforcement institutions met with serious 
local resistance194. Evidence can be found even at high political level as for 
example the statement published in 2005 on the official web site of the OHR. 
Counter-arguing some widespread myths connected to the police reform, it aimed 
at assuring the public that undertaking the reform did not imply abolishment of 
Entities. Eventually, under international pressure and including these issues as a 
condition to the EU integration of the country, in the autumn of 2005 the political 
parties signed an agreement to support the police reform and to complete (in 
2010) the process of merging the different police forces into a state level police 
structure under a single state-level Ministry of Interior. A successful step 
preceding the police reform was the abolishment of the Entities’ Armies and their 
transformation into a single state-level Army under the state-level Ministry of 
Defence on 1st January 2006 (fully completed 6 months later). 
 
Despite these positive examples of achieved unification, there are still areas that 
require serious efforts. As it was discussed earlier, education is the sphere, which 
could contribute to integration, overcoming of prejudices, development of tolerant 
attitudes and form the future citizens of the country. In Bosnia and Herzegovina 
today there are 12 Ministries of Education (1 in Republica Srpska, 1 at the level of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 for each of the 10 Cantons) and a 
Department at the level of state. As Mr Špirić revealed during his presentation at 
the Woodrow Wilson Centre, in the Federation there are still examples of the ‘2 
schools under 1 roof’-phenomenon (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 
24.04.2009).  
  
Finally, commenting on the national citizenship issues, Mr Gnjidić from the OHR 
revealed that currently the legal framework implies that in order to be citizens of 
the State, all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are conditionally citizens of one 
of the Entities. In the context of the still existing legal problems concerning the 
possibility to change Entity citizenship, this requirement undermine the 
importance of the state citizenship and establish it as secondary to the affiliation 




Nationalist parties and unreconstructed nationalist forces still play a significant 
role on the political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have often reacted 
passively to reforms and state-building efforts, or even have engaged in overt or 
covert obstructionism, concentrating on political manoeuvring and securing 
resources for political patronage. The ethnic division of territory and powers in 
                                                 
193 Bosnian State Court was created with special panels dealing with organised crime – with both 
Bosnian and international judges and prosecutors 
194 These include a Ministry of Justice, a Ministry of Security, and a State Information and 
Protection Agency (SIPA), charged with dealing with issues such as money laundering and 
organised crime, and terrorism. Among the key issues was also the elimination of the Entity-based 
Interior Ministries in favour of Bosnian central government institutions taking over responsibility 
for all police matters. 
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fact appeals to some Bosnian Serb representatives, concerned about the viability 
of the Republica Srpska (Kim 2005), therefore they oppose any changes that 
would eliminate the Entity-structure enshrined in the Dayton Accord. 
Furthermore, some ethnic Croat parties have even promoted the idea of a third 
Croat Entity.   
 
Employing minority rights conventions, the Dayton model separated 
institutionally the ethnic groups, while attempting to encourage co-operation at 
higher levels of government. This institutional structure has also created 
conditions for ‘abusing’ the traditional minority rights policies. Each one of the 
three ethnic groups claimed and protected as if being a minority within the larger 
state. Interpreting group interests according to their own agendas, ethnic leaders 
have been using the ‘ethnic rights’ platform as a means to preserve power. This in 
its turn excludes the true minorities (Roma, Jews, etc.) and the non-nationalists 
from politics, undermines the state-building project, and creates real threats to 
disrupt the minimal cohesion and stability of the country (WWICS 2007).  
 
The political confrontation along ethnic lines and the impossibility of non-
nationalist parties to come into power was an issue in 2003, as revealed by the 
comments of the people interviewed during the fieldwork. The general elections 
in October 2006 also reflected the ethnic divisions, with the Serb entity 
threatening to seek complete secession if the autonomy of Republica Srpska is 
threatened. In response to political discussions within the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina about the possibility of abolishing the Entities in favour of the 
central state, demonstrations have been taking place in Republica Srpska since 
2007.  
 
Local elections in 2008 indicated once again that the nationalist agendas have not 
been overcome and that the ethnic element is still an important factor in politics 
and society in general. Disappointing for the international community, the 2008 
elections confirmed deep ethnic divisions, with three ethnic nationalist parties 
consolidating power in the respective ethnic-majority territories (Alic 2008). 
Using the nationalist rhetoric in their campains, the three largest nationalist parties 
- the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) 
and Bosnian Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) - have 
‘taken over’ the majority of the country’s 149 municipalities, but only in the areas 
where their ethnic group prevailed. 
 
The campaigns focused on the same ethnically based issues that were addressed 
during the first post-war elections in 1996 (Alic 2008). Only 2% of the public 
statements referred to concrete problems or measures suggested by party-
candidates for improving life of communities, while the focus of the campaign 
(about 74% of the statements) was put on topics that had nothing to do with the 
municipal elections - such as the country's constitution, or the census or European 
integration. These facts indicate that the issues relevant for the first post-war years 
were (and most likely are) still valid after 12 years of reconstruction and that the 
local political agenda is much more involved with the ethnic divides than with the 
daily life within communities.  
 
Seeking transfer of some state powers to the Entities and arguing against the idea 
of the abolishment of the Dayton state, the Prime minister of Republica Srpska 
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Milorad Dodik, activated the secessionist idea and claims. In the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationalist party HDZ-1990 called for further 
carving up of the country into a third, Bosnian Croat-dominated entity and for the 
creation of the public broadcaster in Croatian language. These radical claims 
however did not appeal as much to voters as expected, but still this does not imply 
that the calls appealed only to few supporters. As Alic reported, if this trend 
persists and nationalist parties continue to use their tried-and-tested ethnic-biased 
campaign rhetoric, focusing on the rural and uneducated voters, which in turn will 
lead to a stronger boycott by educated, urban voters, the parliamentary elections in 
2010 will be an ethnic census of the population (Alic 2008).   
 
This political rhetoric and the fact that nationalist parties still attract a number of 
supporters gave grounds for comments that the country is in danger of collapse, as 
expressed by the former High representative Paddy Ashdown (Ashdown & 
Holbrook 2008). The current High representative Valentin Inzko reported before 
the UN Security Council in April 2009 about tensions and secessionist talks 
(UNSC 2009); Bosnian Prime minister Nikola Špirić also confirmed the facts 
(Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).   
 
The statement by Mr Špirić that his goal as a Prime minister was ‘to keep the 
integrity of the country’ indicates that this is considered a serious issue and not 
only political rhetoric (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009), 
yet this sometimes can make citizens go mad (Gnjidić in interview with the 
Author, 30.06.2009). ‘The abolishment of RS is desired in Sarajevo, but this is not 
good for the country… Would people want stronger institutions? Yes, but the 
problem is in the politicians who do not wish to abide the constitution of their own 
country. Political elites must ensure common interest for the future of BiH 
without denying the state and its internal arrangements’ pointed out Mr Špirić 
(Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009).  
 
With the outdated constitution that places emphasis on group rights and in this 
way directly violates the European standards, and under the ‘imperial’ powers of 
the High representative, the broad efforts to advance the country towards the 
establishment of a vivid and functioning democratic system has remained 
controversial (Kim 2005). The frequently exercised executive powers to break 
through political stalemates, push difficult reforms forward, and even remove 
obstructionist leaders, have put the institution of the High Representative under 
serious criticism for allegedly blocking the political development of the Bosnian 
leaders (Kim 2005). As Nikola Špirić commented ‘today there is no political will 
within the country and only from outside; and this is a guarantee for failure. 
Politicians in Bosnia communicate with the OHR, but not with each other. And 
the OHR does not push for improving the situation’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside 
the government’; 24.04.2009). 
 
As the 2008 local elections campaign and results revealed, the attempts of the 
international community to influence the domestic political scene by helping non-
nationalist parties to win elections and form government coalitions, were not very 
successful. In addition, the widespread disillusionment with the political system 
and the general development of the country195 have been found among the causes 
                                                 
195 Revealed through the UNDP/ORI survey published in July 2007 
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making two-thirds of people younger than 30 years willing to leave the country, if 




The collapse of the state-dominated Yugoslav economy and the wartime 
destructions, have ruined most of Bosnia's infrastructure and industry. The levels 
of production plummet by 80% from 1992 to 1995, while these of unemployment 
got and remained extremely high. According to the official rates (as of December 
2004), there were 45.5% unemployed people in the country (CIA 2007). With an 
uneasy peace in place, output rates have been growing slowly for the years of 
reconstruction, but they still cannot reach the pre-war levels. Although almost in 
private hands, agriculture is still scattered to small and inefficient farms. In 
addition to that, an unusual new phenomenon of ‘re-ruralisation’ is observed – 
city people are going back to live in the countryside and to grow food for their 
families (Steele 2005).  
 
Measures to streamline the registration of new businesses and to enable the 
growing of the private sector took effect only recently. In spite of the excessive 
bureaucracy and the many tiers of government, foreign investment is slowly 
increasing, while government spending remains unreasonably high (CIA 2007). 
Confidence in the banking sector and in the national currency is also increasing 
after the acceleration of reforms in 2001 and after pegging the convertible mark to 
the Euro (CIA 2007). The International Monetary Fund (Woehrel 2005) praised  
Bosnia’s efforts in the direction of implementing economic reforms, reducing 
poverty, and establishing of macro-economic stability. But to stimulate the 
economic growth, to provide resources for the government institutions of the 
central Bosnian state, and assist in the integration of the country to the various 
international structures (including to the EU), rationalisation of the tax system and 
accelerated privatisation process are still needed (Woehrel 2005, CIA 2007).  
 
The Bosnian Prime minister made an interesting statement during his talk at the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 
24.04.2009), contradicting the conviction expressed by the World Bank 
representative Mr Goran Tinjić that the organisation has contributed to the 
successful establishment of a single economic space,. Commenting the situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 2009, Mr Špirić pointed out that a serious challenge 
to the development of the country was the lack of a single economic space, which 
in fact has a good potential for becoming an important integrative factor.  
 
Furthermore, while the levels of public spending in Republica Srpska meet the EU 
rates, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina these are still far behind. From 
the words of the Prime minister, it also became apparent that the unequal 
economic development of the two Entities creates additional political tensions 
within the state. This emerged from his comment that ‘Republica Srpska can 
become the engine for the development of the country; it is not a threat to the 





2.5 Security  
 
Moving from the initial plans for withdrawing in 1998, the 60,000 NATO mission 
handed over the mandate to safeguard the security in the country to the European 
forces in 2004. About 7,000 EUFOR troops and a small NATO headquarters 
presence in Sarajevo provide assistance to the Bosnian government in respect to 
counter-terrorism and intelligence operations and missions to detain indicted war 
criminals. In 2003 the EU also took over the U.N. police monitoring and advisory 
mission, deploying about 500 international police officers (Kim 2005). 
 
The need to prolong the missions of the foreign troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has been recognised by the international community, acknowledging the persistent 
internal problems resulting from different political factors. The Defence White 
Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 2005 identify these as follows: 
 
¾ The remnants of political and social animosities as a result of the 1992-1995 
conflict, supported by elements propagating various forms of nationalistic 
extremism 
 
¾ Slow implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords 
 
¾ Problems of political transition that have resulted in the slow development of 
effective and efficient executive, legislative and judicial authorities 
 
¾ Problems of transition to a market economy that have resulted in a low level 
of domestic and foreign investment, the existence of the grey economy and 
black market, slow implementation of privatisation processes, technologically 
obsolete production facilities and uneven reconstruction of damaged 
infrastructure 
 
¾ Porous borders that allow trafficking in narcotics and weapons and human 
trafficking, and that enable the concealment and transit of persons accused for 
war crimes, international criminals and terrorists 
 
¾ Problems of unemployment that have caused a brain drain of highly educated 
and young people and contributed to increased general poverty, social 
differences and instability, particularly among pensioners and other groups 
requiring greater social assistance 
 
¾ Excessive amounts of armaments and ammunition stored in inadequate 
facilities 
 
¾ Large numbers of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance throughout 
the country, posing a physical danger for the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and an obstacle to the development of tourism and foreign 
investment; and 
 
¾ A variety of environmental challenges, including natural and man-made 
disasters, management problems of solid waste and military waste, 
degradation of arable land and forest resources, water and air pollution, and 
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the slow development and implementation of acceptable environmental 
protection standards and conventions 
 
Although security has improved in the last years, return-related incidents still 
occur in various part of the country; and there is still a certain reluctance on behalf 
of the police to investigate these and to bring perpetrators to court. Local 
authorities sometimes contribute to the rise of inter-ethnic tensions, fuelling them 
by allocating private land belonging to minorities to members of the dominant 
ethnicity. Cases of violence against minority returnees or their properties, 
religious buildings, and graves are still being reported (USDoS 2006:7, 14). 
Another important factor for the progress of the security measures, is the shift 
from ethnically based to a centralised police force. The efforts of the central state 
authorities supported by the international community have become a ground for 
serious confrontation between local, national and international powers. As a 
conclusion - if it seems unlikely that a conflict explode again, it is rather due to 
the changes of the geopolitical situation in the region, than to the success of the 
international reconstruction efforts196. Nevertheless, the fact that the international 
community has not withdrawn the military presence from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina suggests that there are considerations that underlie the decision of 
the reconstruction agents.   
 
2.6 Justice and Reconciliation 
 
Contrary to the popular explanations for ancient hatreds underlying the violence 
and the atrocities during the war in Bosnia, the hostile actions of the former 
‘countrymen’ of different ethnic origin are to be viewed as a product of the 
nationalist policies aiming at ethnic separatism or domination of one ethnic group 
over the others. This return of nationalist parties was reported after the general 
elections in October 2002 (ICG 2003). Lippman (2003) saw this as a vengeance of 
ethnic hate, with ethnic crimes on the rise, and ordinary Bosnians waiting without 
much hope for their grim economic situation to improve. At the same time, the 
representatives of the international community tolerated the dishonest operators 
who held most of the political power in the country (Lippman 2003). 
 
Fourteen years after Dayton, war criminals remain at large, living in the ethnically 
cleansed areas, formed during the war and controlled by the respective forces. 
Nationalist political parties connected to ethnic cleansers and nationalist 
extremists are in power even today (such as the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), 
founded by war criminal Radovan Karadžić, which received good support in the 
2008 local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Criticism against these 
processes was expressed also by the European Union, concerned that the ‘rise in 
nationalism in Bosnia could undermine stability’ (EUbusiness 2008) 
 
In the process of reconstruction, after providing the minimum levels of security by 
deploying military and police forces, the international community attempted to 
address the environment of anger, fear, and distrust, used sometimes by the local 
politicians to further their political agendas. As the ultimate goal of peace-
                                                 
196 The war in Bosnia was in part the playing out of the designs of nationalist leaders in Croatia 
and Serbia on Bosnian territory  (Woehrel 2005) 
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keeping, reconciliation occurs when the parties-in-conflict go beyond the past and 
(re-)establish functional relationships in the present based on apology, 
forgiveness, and newly established trust197. A precondition for that is that 
population overcomes the war-trauma, which is a long and difficult process per se. 
In 2000, there were around 173 international and 365 local NGOs working in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, focused on repairing the social and emotional damage 
caused by the war (Malek 2005).  
 
The grave violations of human rights including mass killings, rapes, widespread 
destruction, and displacement of the population, called for justice. In 1993, to 
enable reconciliation, the United Nations Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, 
Netherlands. Since the beginning, the legitimacy of the ICTY has been contested 
but the Tribunal managed to bring in a number of high-ranking suspects. On 
different occasions however, its functioning has been viewed as ineffective 
(Malek 2005). In March 2005, as a joint initiative of the ICTY and the Office of 
the High Representative (OHR), War Crimes Chamber (WCC) was established 
within Bosnia’s State Court. It was envisaged to engage with cases of serious war 
crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina that could not be prosecuted within the 
mandate or timeframe of the ICTY and of cases initiated locally (HRW 2006a). 
Containing a significant international component, but placed within the domestic 
justice system and having strong commitment to take ownership over the 
accountability, makes the WCC more accessible to the local population than the 
ICTY, offering a potential for impacting the rebuilding of the rule of law in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the UNDP/ORI 2007 research reveals, the 
establishment of a Reconciliation Commission may prove a significant formal 
step to address low social trust and cohesion and it may reduce the risk associated 
with constitutional changes. Such a measure would require support from other 
initiatives, which could help reduce the divisions between exclusive identifiers 
and mainstream Bosnian society (UNDP/ORI 2007) 
 
Respect for the rule of law still needs to be enhanced. Furthermore, restoring the 
proper functioning of the judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires 
additional efforts. The loss of skilled professionals and judiciary throughout 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the physical destruction and complexities in the legal 
framework and inappropriate procedural laws, have created additional obstacles 
that need to be overcome (HRW 2006a). Nevertheless, guaranteed stability, let 




Most of the people interviewed during the fieldwork referred to the ex-Yugoslav 
republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of a dynamic multicultural 
society198. . The war turned the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a patchwork of 
three largely mono-ethnic groups, occupying more or less ‘consolidated’ 
                                                 
197 According to John Paul Lederach (1999), this difficult and slow process that aims to bring 
people together, requires that a balance between the four elements- truth, justice, mercy and peace 
– be found since they can often contradict each other.   
198 The problem with the validity of these claims was discussed in Chapter 4. 
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territories. The return of refugees and internally displaced people has been a great 
challenge, not least because of the increased levels of hostility among former 
neighbours from different ethnic groups.  
 
Dedicating its efforts to help refugees and internally displaced people return 
home, the international community achieved a certain degree of success, although 
about 180,200 people remain away from their homes and many returnees live in 
edgy enclaves, not feeling provided with the necessary levels of security. Thus, 
the return policies by themselves are not considered a priority for the displaced 
people (UNDP/ORI 2007). Community re-integration remains in many cases an 
open issue because interethnic reconciliation and a degree of interethnic tolerance 
have been among the key factors determining the success or failure of any 
community-driven development project (Bodewig 2002:20-28). Optimism is 
relatively weak and there is a sense of standstill. Social trust is virtually non-
existent, and the dominant ethnic identity prevails the dual identity (combining the 
ethnic group membership and the state-citizenship affiliation) (UNDP/ORI 2007; 
Appendix 10). The fact pointed out by Mr Gnjidić during the interview taken in 
June 2009 that a Bosnian-state citizenship is conditional upon citizenship of one 
of the two Entities, explains the situation (Gnjidić in interview with the Author, 
30.06.2009)  
 
Although the identity and religious affiliation do not affect the way people feel 
about themselves and about society, they affect the institutional, political, and 
constitutional views (UNDP/ORI 2007). In connection to the rise of nationalist 
parties and politics since 2002, it is important to point out that this rise would 
have been impossible without the support coming from the citizens/voters. 
Despite the NGOs attempts to persuade Bosnian voters to stray from the 
nationalist parties with no economic programme, which could reverse any 
potential progress that the country have made over the years, in 2008 the 
electorate proved once again that it preferred to vote for sure winners (Alic 2008). 
Rejecting the nationalist rhetoric, the better-educated voters largely boycotted the 
poll. The turnout in the four largest cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was 
less than 40 percent, helped the nationalists to win, supported by predominantly 
primary-level educated population of the rural areas (Alic 2008). Despite there  
being no official census since 1991 (as confirmed by Vedrana Rebić from the 
National Statistical Agency of and Herzegovina), the local election results of 2008 
in fact projected the ethnic distribution in the country.  
 
The respondents to the survey of 2007 (UNDP/ORI 2007) indicated that the 
Bosnian people recognise the need for constitutional changes and changes in the 
political structure of the country as long-term goals. Some Croat and Serb 
politicians however continue to support the idea of separation - they oppose the 
efforts for shifting the powers to the central government of and Herzegovina as 
well as for making any amendments to the terms of the Dayton Agreement. 
 
The media also have played and still play a key role for maintaining of the ethnic 
divisions in the country. The international community has recognised the 
development of a pluralistic, independent media as an important long-term 
democratisation objective. Unfortunately, the Dayton Constitution did not place 
the media issues under the jurisdiction of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but of 
the two Entities. The development of independent media was thus impeded by the 
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impossibility to pass regulations that would function with equal standards in the 
whole country. The subsequent interpretation related to telecommunications and 
public radio and television, issued by the High Representative affirmed that a 
countrywide law must regulate this field (Udovičić 2004). This slowed down the 
development of a consistent strategy of utilising frequency resources and 
developing radio and television production and broadcasting as public services. 
The public service concept of one (TV and Radio) state broadcaster and two entity 
broadcasters is too complex and too costly for the limited economic, technical and 
creative resources of and Herzegovina (Udovičić 2004). The situation with the 
printed media is to a great extend alike – national and unbiased press is still to 
come.   
 
Remnants of propaganda journalism, attempts by ruling political structures to put 
pressure on the media, and the ethnic division of the country that poses obstacles 
to the freedom of flow of information, determines the complexity of the media 
landscape of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, ears of dependency on foreign 
donations and the lack of serious interest of local and foreign capital for investing 
in this underdeveloped also have been among the negative effects on the 
development of the sector. As Prime Minister Špirić emphasised, ‘the 
international presence has produced parasitism’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the 
government’; 24.04.2009). 
 
Finally, the words of Prime Minister of Republica Srpska Milorad Dodik before 
the New York Times journalist Dan Bilefsky that ‘Bosnia is a divided country… 
There is not a single event or holiday, except for New Year’s or the First of May 
that we celebrate together’ speak for themselves (Bilefsky 2008) 
 
 
3. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE  
  
Among the positive facts that the UNDP/ORI survey of 2007 revealed was that 
more than eight in ten respondents would identify themselves as citizens of the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless 14% still have exclusive identities 
that may pose a potential risk to future changes, like the EU membership for 
example.  
   
It is arguable whether this shift towards national citizenship identification and the 
interest in the future prospective derive from the reconstruction activities 
implemented by the international community. Such doubts are based on the facts, 
revealed by the UNDP/ORI 2007 survey, that international institutions were not 
trusted in general; people know little about them and do not distinguish between 
the different structures. Although a small majority supports a continued UN 
presence, broadly its involvement in politics, education, and positive 
discrimination for disadvantaged groups is not wanted.  
 
In general, the lure of EU membership is a powerful incentive for countries to 
change their ways (Kim 2005); it could also function as a engine for progress, 
especially when coincides with the long-term vision for and Herzegovina, 
recognised as such by its citizens (UNDP/ORI 2007). In 2003, the EU committed 
itself to integrate all of the countries of the western Balkans and created new 
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instruments, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Kim 2005). 
Among the indicators that the EU membership can function as a change-
motivating factor are the reforms agreed by the Entities with regard to the police 
forces, defence and security, as well as the agreements reached on intelligence, 
information services, state prosecution offices, justice ministry, and border and 
customs services (Kim 2005).  
 
According to the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the future of the 
ethnic reconciliation of Bosnia and Herzegovina  today lies in putting the goals of 
the constitutional reform with focus on the EU and NATO integration  (Špirić, ‘A 
view from inside the government’; 24.04.2009). An active internal dialogue 
among different political and social levels needs to replace the separate dialogues 
running nowadays. In his view the key for successful reforms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is building trust and confidence, because ‘where there has been 
trust, the reforms were successful’ (Špirić, ‘A view from inside the government’; 
24.04.2009)! 
 
The assessment of the work of the agents of the reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – the international community in general and the selected 
representative organisations (the OHR and the World Bank), showed that 
although the importance of social capital (re-) building was recognised, the 
consistent efforts put in this direction were not sufficient and sometimes were 
even missing. The lack of clear strategies and planned actions aiming at 
promoting integration across the closed ethnic communities placed various 
obstacles to the development of the state in general. The large amounts of 
financial, material and human resources invested in the country or granted in the 
form of aid did not manage to enable it. More than fourteen years after the end of 
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is rather difficult to evaluate the situation 
within the country as one of achieved stable peace and advancing development.  
 
Positive examples however exist. The focused approach of the local Bosnian 
NGO Mozaik Foundation proves that there exists an understanding that the issues 
of social capital reconstruction must be included in the post-conflict development 
agenda. Addressing the social cohesion at local community level but also at the 
macro-level of the state is an undertaking that requires many resources, time, and 
investments. Most of all, it requires an understanding of the situation, 
identification of the problematic areas, clear vision for future and the accurate and 
comprehensive strategic planning.  
 
Combining the local expertise with the international capacities is the only formula 
that can effectively contribute to the achievement of positive results, especially in 
areas where culture, attitudes, and specific mentalities matter. Social capital 
rebuilding falls within this category, but in fact, it has the potential to affect the 
general development of a society and of a country. If the ultimate goal of the 
reconstruction process is indeed achieving lasting peace and sustainable 
development, then a post-conflict reconstruction cannot afford to neglect the 









A comprehensive approach to enable success in post-ethnic conflict societies 
 
Considering that over the last decade there have been on average two new post-
conflict cases per year (Barton 2004), that some conflicts are still running and the 
high number of prolonged and reoccurring conflicts, it is not difficult to conclude 
that the number of countries requiring reconstruction will not decrease in the 
nearest future. Analysing the strengths and weaknesses of reconstruction 
programmes and efforts in general should therefore aim at identifying best 
practices, developing a model-strategy for adequately addressing the needs of the 
war-affected societies and implementing frameworks that have the potential to 
contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace and stability.  
 
Crucial issues in the context of post-conflict reconstruction are those of the 
political and economic factors that can produce it, of the mechanisms to promote 
dialogue and tolerance, equality and stability, fair living standards and good social 
administration (Nikitin 2000). As a complex web of positive relations within and 
between societies, peace is indivisible. Promoting equity and social justice, 
cultivating moral and ethical attitudes in international and local affairs, are only a 
few milestones on the road towards eliminating some of the major causes of war 
(Hillen 1994). However, post-conflict reconstruction needs to move towards a 
more pragmatic interest in conflict management, focusing on constructive peace-
building approaches and on bringing opposing sides together in a co-operative 
process (Harris & Reilly 1998).  
 
As the research revealed, the situation after a conflict is rather complex and even 
more problematic in cases of ethnically-divided societies, when the initial conflict 
causes are likely to be intensified by generated grievances (Collier 2000:8). The 
donors and other reconstruction agents themselves create additional complications 
sometimes. Donor preferences for programmes, sectors, types of expenditure, or 
geographic areas, could lead to fragmentation of assistance. The bureaucratic 
procedures that usually are an inseparable part of the provided support as well as 
the ad-hoc approach and the lack of in-country donor representation and co-
ordination on the ground, contribute to delays in commitment and disbursements 
(WB 1998:21). Negative effects on a reconstruction process in general could have 
also gaps between ideas and actions, poor co-ordination of international assistance 
and relief activities, the impossibility to  find the right balance of external 
assistance with local requirements or needs for control, responsibility (Hampson 
& Tschirgi 1998).  
 
Well coordinated and strategically planned international programmes focused on 
the reform of institutional frameworks, elimination of inefficient pre-war 
structures and establishment of transparent links between state administration and 
various private and political agents, could enable a gradual and controlled process 
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of democratisation, sustainable economic development or in other words – a 
successful reconstruction of a war-affected society. Through assembling 
interagency and interdisciplinary teams in all the key areas, the ad-hoc and 
fragmented response to local problems would be replaced by a comprehensive 
interagency process introducing mechanism for ensuring the best usage of the 
natural, human and financial resources for rebuilding the country; supporting civil 
administration capacity-building (AUSA/CSIS 2002).  
 
Mari Fitzduff (2004) argues that the needs for a more comprehensive 
reconstruction practice could be met by the meta-conflict approach (MCA), which 
can address many facets of a conflict - both structural (political or constitutional 
arrangements, legislation, economic and aid factors, etc.) and psycho-cultural 
(e.g., attitudes, relationships, divided histories). Covering various areas, the MCA 
still needs to identify together with the conflict parties, which are the major 
problems to be addressed first. Although different views and favoured approaches 
might exist 199, the conflict reconstruction practitioners should ensure that they are 
complementary, and not competing. The Meta-Conflict Resolution Contextual 




Figure 18: Meta-Conflict Resolution Contextual Variables Example 








                                                 
199 Those who hold the power favour psycho-cultural approaches, while those who see themselves 
as having been excluded from power (e.g., Palestinians in the Middle East, Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, Albanians in Macedonia, and Tamils in Sri Lanka) prioritise structural approaches that 
deal with the equalisation of power within a territory, or with political secession that will hopefully 
supply a group with its own territory and power (Fitzduff 2004) 
 223
 
Variables will depend upon the conflict context, but there are certain constant 
elements to be considered as well. The structural problems of inequity, of 
deliberate or inadvertent exclusion of particular groups from participation in 
national or regional resources are significant conflict factors, which need to be 
reduced. Security forces (army, police) can play an important role in preventing or 
mitigating conflicts. Therefore, it is vital that they be inclusive of all groups, 
equally serve all sections of society, and be adequately trained to apply non-
violent approaches especially when dealing with community tensions. 
Decentralisation of power is another way to engage groups in central participatory 
and decision-making processes. Cross-cutting incentives and systems that 
integrate power-sharing possibilities have the capacity to defuse political conflict 
by enabling the accommodation of collective identities within a state framework 
and by giving legitimate representation to minorities. All the constructive efforts 
towards developing effective strategies for countering conflict might be hampered 
by constitutions that favour certain sections of society.  
 
Political development, community development and leadership, are also elements 
of the MCA. Political groups that favour particular ethnic, cultural, or religious 
communities might affect agreements and sustainable peace. Therefore, it is 
essential that the emergence of new (inclusionary) politics be assisted. The 
widening of perspectives by the existing parties and the possible adoption of new 
(best practices) approaches, can contribute significantly to bring together differing 
interest groups and hence to the conflict prevention and resolution. Vital to 
ensuring the creation of sustainable peace in divided societies is also the human 
rights work. Enshrining and implementing the principles safeguarding the rights at 
national and institutional levels would not be possible unless there are agreed 
norms. Inclusive community leadership should also be promoted and supported 
(Fitzduff 2004). 
 
The MCA can address adequately different conflict contexts, where there are 
different priority issues and needs for major attention and assistance (e.g. 
environmental issues, natural resource ownership and management, urban 
planning, media work, weapons disposal). Its main goal is to stimulate 
reconstruction experts to facilitate a dialogue with a wider range of actors. This is 
the only way to ensure that the developmental and the conflict resolution 
activities200 are all directed towards bringing about a peaceful society. The 
integration of bridging and conflict resolution mechanisms in all the programmes 
of economic, social and security development is essential for preventing and 
mitigating tensions between communities. Encouraging a complementary and 
comprehensive MCA in the process of resolving a conflict in any society, is likely 
to be more successful and sustainable than many of the current approaches, 
concludes Fitzduff (2004). 
 
Examining the existing literature on post-conflict reconstruction, it becomes 
apparent that most of the studies have been based on field-experience and thus 
they are predominantly descriptive. Although conflicts are highly idiosyncratic, 
                                                 
200 Conflict resolution priorities are often interlinked. Equality between communities is not 
possible without economic development, or promoting trust for security forces without a military 
containment of paramilitaries. (Fitzduff 2004) 
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which pre-determines the appropriate post-conflict as context-specific (Collier 
2000:2) there is still a need for an overall strategic approach – an algorithm of the 
reconstruction management cycle. Such a ‘strategy’ would enable not only the 
planning of comprehensive and coherent programmes, of appropriate activities 
and their successful implementation, but also will provide tools for critical 
assessment and evaluation of the success of the process in general. Adapting the 
general management theory to the needs of the post-conflict reconstruction 
practice, can provide the necessary frameworks for setting up the algorithm for 
managing the process. Combining the two fields, post-conflict reconstruction 
would appear as a process of implementation of a set of mechanisms for 
transforming the vision of stability, development, and democracy into reality and 
everyday practice.  
 
The concept of strategy refers to the basic steps that define the process from the 
identification of goals to their realisation. As an overall plan of action that 
embodies certain principles and objectives, a strategy201 needs to be designed to 
achieve particular long-term aims. It is also a mechanism for identifying and 
applying the most suitable structures for deploying resources in the process of 
pursuing the established goals (Lasher 1999:6). As a systematic approach to 
addressing particular problems by making the best of the resources, while 
minimising the exposure in areas of weakness, strategic management is simply an 
organized way of thinking about situations, developing solutions to long-term 
problems, and implementing those solutions (Lasher 1999:32). The main elements 
of any strategic process are planning, implementation, and control. These 
elements are also the main sectors of activities projected by a strategic framework 
(Lasher 1999, McMahon 2004-05).  
  
After having completed the research and analysed the existing situation, a vision 
for the future (change) needs to be formulated (Lasher 1999:7). The formulation 
of a vision takes into account the 1) identification of the problem that requires 
action and the 2) desired outcomes. The expected changes on the way towards the 
achievement of an ideal situation should be not only identified, but also justified 
as fair and needed – this is the basis for setting up the goals and respectively the 
mission.  
 
The identified goals for future changes serve for setting objectives at different 
levels (Lasher 1999:31). The next strategic step, the elaboration of a plan for 
action, is the conceptual centre of the entire process. It formulates a strategy that 
corresponds simultaneously to the conditions of the existing environment, to the 
possibilities for achieving the desired changes, and to the capabilities of the actors 
involved to bring about these changes. Planning also includes communicating the 
results to the different subjects involved and interested in the process such as 
managers, performers or stakeholders.  
 
With the aim to make the strategy happen through a series of events at, the 
implementation phase is perhaps the most difficult stage of the process. It also 
includes designing the organisational process, selecting key people and 
                                                 
201 Pocket Fowler's Modern English Usage in English Language Reference; The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary in English Dictionaries & Thesauruses; Dictionary of Psychology in Politics & Social 
Sciences 
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institutions, managing competences, budgeting, and strategic support systems 
(Lasher 1999:31). 
 
The final step is control, which entails monitoring the progress against the vision, 
goals. and plan set, and making relevant adjustments if needed. Evaluation and 
control require the establishment of a measurement system (of success) and a 
strategic feedback loop. The feedback and control process are performed on a 
regular basis throughout the entire life cycle of the process.   
 
 
Table 14: The Strategic Process 





Analysis of the Present Situation Strategic Analysis 
(Research, Study, 
Analysis Phase) 










Developing a Strategic Plan for Action; 
Key figures/roles identified 




– most difficult) Evaluation and Control 
Monitoring the efficiency of the strategy Î adjustments 




The table above presents the stages and steps of the strategic process as defined by 
the general management theory. Applied to the post-conflict reconstruction, it 
offers the structure for the strategic planning of the stages in the process. 
Furthermore, this framework provides a tool for assessing the differences between 
the post-conflict and the post-ethnic conflict reconstruction models that should be 
taken into account when planning the respective programmes. Such differences 
were spotted in the fields of ‘Developing a Vision and a Mission’, ‘Setting 
Objectives’, ‘Developing a Strategy’, and ‘Implementing the Strategy’ (as marked 
in Table 15). 
 
Any strategic approach to a problem that needs to be solved should start with an 
analysis of surrounding and underlying factors and aim at the identification of at 
least appropriate (if not the best) mechanisms to address and resolve the situation. 
In the context of both the post-conflict and post-ethnic conflict reconstruction, an 
analysis would determine the conflict causes and history, its dynamics, and 
possibly outcomes and consequences, the specific features of the parties involved 
in the conflict and the post-war situation in general. Studying the process of post-
conflict rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no information about a 
comprehensive analysis of the situation, prepared before the beginning of the 
reconstruction activities, was found. No publicly available programme document 




Table 15: Strategic Planning Algorithm 
 
Management Strategy Reconstruction after a 
conflict 
Reconstruction after ETHNIC 
conflict  
Analysis of the present 
situation 
Analysis of the conflict causes, 
parties, history, dynamics, 
outcomes, consequences, and 
f the post-war situation in 
general  
Analysis of the conflict causes, 
parties, history, dynamics, 
outcomes and of the post-war 
situation in general; focus on the 
ethnic struggles and their 
consequences  





Developing a Vision and a 
Mission: 
Problem: unstable political 
unit, destructions 
Goals: achieving peace, 
stability, development, 
democracy 
Justification: development and 
democracy are preconditions 
for peace, protection of human 
rights 
Developing a Vision and a 
Mission: 
Problem: destroyed political unit / 
disintegration / new structures 
emerging 
Goals: peace, stability, 
development, democracy 
Justification: development and 
democracy are preconditions for 
peace; protection of human rights, 
REGIONAL & NATIONAL 
STABILITY 
Setting Objectives Setting Objectives – achieving 
normalisation of live through … 
Setting Objectives – normalisation 
of live; DE-FRAGMENTATION 
OF ETHNICALLY DIVIDED 
SOCIETY 
Developing a Strategy 
(identification of 
appropriate mechanisms 
and tools with respect to 
the goals set) 
Developing a Strategy: 
Mechanisms & Tools – as a 
result there should be an 
elaborated and detailed Post-
Conflict Reconstruct. (PCR) 
Program 
Developing a Strategy: 
Mechanisms & Tools – What are 
the specific post-ethnic-conflict 
(PEC) needs? (what is ‘ethnic 
conflict’?)  -the elaborated PCR 
program must meet the particular 
needs of  the PEC environment 
Developing a Strategic 
Action Plan; Identification 





Developing a Strategic Action 
Plan; Identification of key 
figures & roles IO – capacities 
– managers, trainers, experts 
Local actors – regional 
managers, stakeholders, 
implementers 
Developing a Strategic Action 
Plan; Identification of key figures 
& roles  
IO – capacities – managers, 
trainers, experts; Local actors – 
regional managers, stakeholders, 
implementers (all the involved 
sides) 
Implementing the 
Strategy: Problems Î 
Actions ÎSolutions Î 
Goals achieved 
Implementing the Strategy: 
Identified needs Î designed 
action plan to meet particular 
problems Î stabilisation 
Implementing the Strategy: 
Specific features and post-conflict 
requirements - destroyed supra-
ethnic social capital (no 
citizenship at state level) 
Evaluation & Control: 
Monitoring efficiency of 
the strategy Î 
adjustments 
Measuring Success 
against the goals Î 
correcting strategy & 
tools if needed 
Evaluation & Control: 
Setting time frames; verifying 
the strategy and adjust if 
necessary 
Measuring Success against 
Goals and Time-frames, 
Critical analysis and 
objectiveness Î adjustments 
if needed 
Evaluation & Control: 
Setting time frames; verifying the 
strategy and adjust if necessary 
Measuring Success against Goals 
and Time-frames, Critical analysis 




A strategic planning of any post-conflict reconstruction activities should then 
develop a vision and define the mission of the assistance in respect to the 
identified problems, goals to be achieved and justification for the selected mission 
and goals. As it was revealed in details in the previous chapters, in addition to the 
war damages that have destabilised the political unit, the post-ethnic-conflict 
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situation might be characterised also by a total destruction of the old political unit 
and formation of a new one, as well as by a multi-level disintegration. 
 
 
The findings from the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Looking at the case of reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the 
prism of the strategic management, as introduced in Table 15, despite the 
ideological claims referring to examples of statehood with historical roots, in fact 
a new country emerged after a devastating war. The previously existing republic 
within the frameworks of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared 
independence, but it took three years, severe destructions of the physical, 
economic and social infrastructure of the territory, many human loses and in-
depth damage of the former multi-cultural society, that came out of the war 
fragmented into three ethnically defined and hostile to each other communities.  
 
Various programme documents of international organisations and donors have 
defined the goals of the post-conflict reconstruction activities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as assisting the restoration of the country infrastructures, to enable 
its faster development, to promote and support democracy and its related systems. 
These were acknowledged as preconditions for the future establishment of lasting 
peace, sustainable progress, respect to the rule of law, protection of human rights 
and ultimately – national and regional stability. The goals and their justification 
coincided with the respective level of the theoretically defined matrix of the post-
conflict and post-ethnic conflict management models.  
 
However, when considering the field of ‘Objectives setting’ (Table 15) the two 
models differ in relation to the need for de-fragmentation of the ethnically divided 
population that have emerged from an ethnic conflict. In this respect, the aim of 
‘achieving normalisation of life’ requires that some different mechanisms are 
applied, especially in the cases of a fragmented societal structure, active hostile 
attitudes, lack of trust and will for co-operation among the members of society 
that have become members of closed ethnic groups. In the case of the 
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such a preliminary ‘setting objectives’ 
agenda was missing, at least with respect to the non-material spheres.  
 
After setting the objectives, the strategic management model requires that an 
overall strategy, with the respective mechanisms and tools for its implementation, 
be developed. In the context of the post-conflict reconstruction, this implies that 
an overall detailed reconstruction programme be designed. The same is valid for 
the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction management model, but here the focus falls 
on the previously identified needs of the environment and the society.  
 
In the post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, the supra-ethnic political identity 
was missing. The country emerged from the devastating intra-state war with no 
citizens, but a population divided along the three ethnic lines of separation. The 
establishment of the OHR was meant to be in favour of the idea of implementing 
coordinated reconstruction activities and programmes. However, the idea was not 
successfully realised in practice and apart from missing an overall strategic plan 
for the reconstruction and the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the social 
capital (re-)building issue was left aside, if not completely ignored. The 
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assessment of the international and some local post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes and practices during these years of intensive development work 
revealed that there were no programmes to promote and enable the creation of an 
overarching national identity.  
 
This lack of co-operation among the various agents of reconstruction, the unclear 
management structure and the parallel activities of the donors and organisations, 
pursuing and implementing their own agendas in the absence of a single and 
comprehensive strategic action plan did not enable the achievement of the initially 
expected results with the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, 
the international actors omitted to take on the role of experts, trainers, and general 
managers of the process and in this way to train the local people in how to run and 
eventually assume ownership of the process, becoming its main stakeholders and 
implementers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the local actors were willing to 
cooperate, but lacking capacities and power to influence, could not made 
themselves heard and thus could not provide their expertise and influence the 
direction of the reconstruction activities. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of 
the ethnic division did not offer good grounds for motivating local actors to take 
over the reconstruction process and promote the integration of the ethnic groups. 
On the contrary, separatist ideas continued to be nourished and further developed.  
 
Since there was no overall reconstruction strategy to address the specific needs of 
the post-conflict environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is meaningless to 
discuss issues relating to implementation. Apart from the lack of a general 
strategic approach to the problem, the reconstruction of the country was also 
characterised by a lack of time-frames (against which success could have been 
monitored and evaluated), slow and difficult adjustment of initially planned 
programmes, as well as lack of sensitivity towards vitally important local issues. 
In this context, it is also difficult to discuss the appropriateness of the mechanisms 
for ‘evaluation and control’ – not of the particular programmes and activities, 
implemented by the different agents of reconstruction, but of the process as a 
whole. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were arguably centralised post-conflict 
reconstruction policies but at the level of implementation, particular agendas were 
pursued. In short, the reconstruction experiment in Bosnia and Herzegovina can 
be evaluated as quite unsuccessful, if the results achieved are compared to the 
invested money, time, and efforts.  
 
If we address the matrix as a theoretical problem to be solved, there are some 
conclusions that can be made based on the comparison between the general 
management strategy, the post- (ethnic-) conflict reconstruction activities, and the 
case of the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the theoretical model 
suggests, the post-conflict reconstruction practices suffer a lack of strategic (long-
term) planning. Instead of introducing proactive solutions, the reconstruction 
activities are mostly reactive and not designed to fit each particular case. 
Reconstruction agents have ‘specialised’ in different fields and they tend to 
approach the various cases based on their levels of expertise and not on the 
particular needs of the environment. In addition to that, lack of co-ordination and 
co-operation among the various donors, their programmes, and objectives in the 
respective fields of action, results in the waste of large amounts of money, time, 
material, and human resources without achieving the expected levels of success. 
 
 229
In the context of the post-ethnic-conflict reconstruction, the strategic management 
model reveals that there are certain issues that that have to be addressed as early 
as possible in order that a successful implementation of the efforts is ensured. The 
key element is the recognition of the fact that after an ethnic conflict the war-
affected unit is most likely to have lost the grounds for an overarching (national) 
identity and that a society has fragmented to ethnically defined and mutually 
hostile communities. Success in the rebuilding of a society depends on factors 
such as the establishment of a vision for common future or the existence of 
grounds for integration. People who have experienced the ethnic-war trauma need 
a motivation in order to co-operate with the ‘others’, to be willing to (re)construct 
a supra-ethnic identity and to become citizens, united by their common respect for 
the rule of law, shared values and norms. Without a grass roots support, without 
the will to take over the ownership of processes and to start working for their own 
future, no reconstruction Programme Can be successful and any foreign assistance 
would be looked at as interventionist politics. Furthermore, by underestimating 
the tensions existing in a society where the cultural, religious, or ethnic 
differences have become politically relevant, reconstruction programmes and 
activities risk contributing to a further deepening of the problems and their 
possible escalation in armed actions, rather than bringing peace and stability to the 
country or the region.  
 
Evaluating the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the strategic 
management algorithm, as presented in Table 15 above, two opposing conclusions 
emerge. The first one is that the goals of the reconstruction process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were different from achieving ‘peace, stability, democracy, and 
development’. The second conclusion would be that despite the problems of the 
process and the failure to achieve the initially envisaged results, the goal of the 
international post-conflict reconstruction activities was indeed the re-construction 
of a functioning, viable, and stable democratic state.  
 
If we assume that the first conclusion is the true one, then the programs and 
activities undertaken within the frameworks of the active international 
involvement in the country have been appropriate and well planned. If however 
the first conclusion is false, while the second one is true, then it becomes obvious 
that the reconstruction strategies, tools, and mechanisms were not appropriate and 
did not contribute to the achievement of the targeted goals. They should be 
adjusted to address the real problems and issues and to enable the establishment of 
a stable multi-ethnic state of Bosnian citizens. This requires, albeit delayed, that 
social capital (re-)construction be taken into account, that local expertise and 
initiatives be considered and integrated into the broader policies, that the 
emergence of political, economic, and social interests based on the recognition of 
a common and overarching political (national) identity be fostered.  
 
 
Re-building social capital 
 
Trust and confidence building are essential not only for the (re-)construction of 
social coherence and for social capital accumulation, but also as elements of any 
development strategy. Reconstruction agents however must be aware of the fact 
that any efforts that have not been recognised as needed at local level are likely to 
fail. This opens a very problematic question of how to motivate the ex-combatants 
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to reconcile and start thinking of a common future. In post-ethnic-conflict settings 
the concept of citizenship, understood in terms of an affiliation with a formal 
social contract at a national level, might have disappeared. In this case, the 
suggestion that by increasing citizen participation in reconstruction processes, 
enforcing government accountability, and fostering creative avenues for peaceful 
change, the development of civil society will be bolstered, appears an 
inappropriate prescription, unless mechanisms of how to fill in the emerging gap 
have been identified .  
 
A solution to this problem begins with the acknowledgement of the need to bring 
people back together as a precondition for a successful rebuilding process. It is 
clear that such initiatives would hardly emerge within the fragmented society and 
therefore they need not only financial resources, but also time, commitment and 
in-depth knowledge of the specific circumstances, and appropriate mechanisms 
for addressing those. This is the area where the international actors can play an 
important role not only as donors, but as direct bearers of positive values, norms, 
attitudes and practices. Of critical importance for developing and implementing 
programmes that could enable the achievement of social cohesion and that can 
eventually help accumulating social capital is an understanding of how conflict 
affects society, what factors increase group integration under unfavourable 
conditions, and which the most critical issues for the specific situation are.  
 
A reconstruction process after an ethnic conflict needs to take into account that 
the social capital at the level of state has been destroyed, that the previously 
existing multi-ethnic society most likely has been fragmented into mono-ethnic 
communities. Without overestimating the factors such as ethnic grievance or 
economic inequality, violence could continue occurring and thrive in post-conflict 
settings, only if the non-negotiable differences, established as politically relevant 
continue to matter (de Soysa 2005). If post-conflict reconstruction does not 
manage to find an integrative platform for developing programmes and policies 
that promote and enable the restoration of citizenship and civicness, the process as 
a whole can be doomed to failure.   
 
Of course, some other aspects can be associated with the preconditions for success 
of any post-conflict reconstruction programme. As Panic (1992:17-18) points out, 
positive effects can be expected only if the recipients’ needs and donors’ interests 
coincide. In this case, the situation is likely to be more beneficial to the donors 
and to solve the recipient’s problems. Only when both sides work together, the 
designed and implemented policies and strategies can bring the expected results. 
If the recipients do not participate in determining objectives and priorities, all the 
activities and efforts might be perceived as imposed from outside and therefore 
interventionist.  
 
The lack of working social capital within the political unit undergoing 
reconstruction can impede the formulation of a common donor-recipient 
assistance strategy. The lack of consent between the local communities, the 
impossibility/ unwillingness to cooperate and to identify common problems, can 
result in unilateral donor’s decisions on where to direct and/or allocate the 
resources, which in turn results more in exacerbating tensions between the hostile 
groups than in helping them overcome the war consequences.  
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On the other hand, the demand-driven assistance would help the international 
organisations avoid wasting time and resources, as well as the ‘risk of failure 
caused by inconsistencies between the objectives and policies, duplication of 
effort and uncoordinated completion of projects’ (Panic 2006, online). The case 
study of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other examples from practice, has 
demonstrated that when such co-ordination is missing, donors pursue their own 
goals, which not always coincide with the real needs of the country and the 
society undergoing the process of reconstruction. Among the serious problems 
that might emerge as a result, is the implementation of discriminatory policies in 
favour of a particular group (supportive of the donor’s agendas), which is contrary 
to the idea of avoiding future conflicts. In addition to that, external donors have to 
be aware that they bear the responsibility to limit their own commercial interests. 
The impossibility of clearly identifying the most active reconstruction agents in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina proved right the assumption that acting independently 
and without a commonly defined strategy and mechanisms for co-ordination, 
donors can waste lots of resources without achieving the initially planned results.  
 
Economic life determines the political discourse and actions, but if not managed 
well, such processes are hardly conducive to the rebuilding of social capital 
necessary for constraining opportunist actors bent on violence (de Soysa 2005). In 
an environment of distrust – either between the people at the grass-root level, 
between majority and minorities, or between local actors and international 
reconstruction agents, the amounts of money spent in the form aid or assistance 
would hardly have the expected positive effects. The success or failure of the 
post-conflict reconstruction depends largely on how collective action is mobilised 
in the desired direction - towards ending the violence or towards building a 
common future. In a situation of a fragmented society, where people perceive ‘the 
other’ as a threat and not as a partner, where the various communities dream of 
independence or at least of not having to deal with the fellow-countrymen, the 
common future is rather an abstract notion and not a goal to be invested in.  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction has been developed upon the donor-driven approach 
to development. The programmes and activities that aim at bringing development 
to people mirror the paternalistic, static policies that might have led to the conflict 
in the first place (de Soysa 2005). A strategically planned reconstruction 
programme should aim at building over the existing resources, at beginning to 
transfer the ownership of processes as early as possible, to engage the local 
population in the activities, and to attract their support being convinced that they 
are contributing to their better future. This however is possible only if there is a 
positive social capital within the unit under reconstruction, which corresponds to 
the macro-frameworks, within which the processes would take and are taking 
place. This is to say that if the macro-framework is defined as ‘a state’, the 
positive social capital that could enable the successful implementation of the 
planned activities should also be present at state level. Where people are not 
rationally interconnected through economic activity, where market linkages are 
weak, or where static economic policies dominate, there is little reason for civic 
engagement, which is the key element for generating a positive social capital (de 
Soysa 2005). 
 
Although sharing certain features with the reconstruction process after a 
‘traditional’ war, the post-ethnic conflict one requires that at a very early stage the 
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attention is drawn upon the issues of societal disruption, division along ethnic (or 
cultural, religious, etc.) lines, increased hatreds and social tensions, and the lack 
of will for co-operation between the former enemies. As it was presented earlier in 
the text, the ethnic conflict destroys any (pre)existing social contract, which had 
been possibly encompassing the members of the pre-conflict (multicultural) 
society, serving as a basis for distribution of the responsibilities and resources. 
Therefore, in order that a reconstruction after an ethnic conflict achieve the 
planned outcomes, its programmes should address not only the problems of 
providing security, establishing appropriate legal and institutional frameworks, of 
recovery (re-) or building of physical and human capital (WB-OED 1998:5) but 
also of the restoration of social capital. The key point is that all efforts should be 
directed towards the development of strategic frameworks (at programme, 
national or regional levels) that promote coherent, coordinated policy and action 
in support of peace-building or conflict reduction goals (Ardon 2002:8). 
 
Developmental policies and practices can have negative or minimal effects if local 
dynamics are neglected. Certainly crucial, taking into account local developments 
remains only the first precondition. For a positive change to occur and to become 
a sustainable and lasting model, it is further necessary that post-conflict 
reconstruction adopt a comprehensive and coordinated approach – not only in 
terms of programme design and implementation, but also as a strategic policy 
accepted by all key players in the field. Only when there are clearly defined 
objectives with a respective implementation plan, when there are agreed, 
coordinated efforts, the transition to normal living conditions would be enabled, 
and time and resources would not be wasted. Alternatively, despite the number of 
local actors with a vision for their future and willingness to work for it, despite the 
international support for the local initiatives, despite the amounts of resources 
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APPENDIX 1: Conflicts Data  
 
TABLE 1: The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts Project Database (2004) 
 
REG START YEAR 
END 






TYPE SEPARAT AGREE TYP
MidE/ NAfr 1945 1947 Iran - Kurds I Iranian GVT Azerbaijani/ Kurds ASSM+EQ      INDP 6 rec DFT Not SPT N
EE/ USSR 1945 1950 USSR - Latvians I Soviet GVT Latvians ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 rec DFT Not SPT N
EE/ USSR 1945 1952 USSR - Lithuanians I Soviet GVT Lithuanians ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 rec DFT Not SPT N
EE/ USSR 1945 1953 USSR - Estonians Soviet GVT Estonians ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 end DFT Not SPT N
EE/ USSR 1945 1954 USSR - Ukrainians Soviet GVT Ukrainians ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 end DFT Not SPT N
Asia 1947 1948 India - Sikhs I Indian GVT Sikhs ASSM+EQ    INDP 6 rec AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Asia 1947 1949 India - Kashmir I Indian GVT Kashmiris  ASSM+EQ      INDP 3 rec CF Not SPT N 
MidE/ NAfr 1947 1949 Israel - Palestinians I Israel Palestinians ASSM+PRJ       INDP 7 rec DFT Not SPT N
Asia 1947 1954 Pakistan - Bengalis I Pakistan GVT Bengalis ASSM+PRJ    CLT ATNM 3 rec AGRM Not SPT CLT ATNM 
Asia 1947 2001 Burma - Karens Burmese GVT Karens CLT ATNM INDP 7     ong none N POL ATNM
Asia 1948 1949 Thailand - Malays I Thailand GVT Malay Muslims CLT ATNM POL ATNM 3    rec DFT Not SPT N 
Adv Dem 1948 1958 Burma - Arakanese I Burmese GVT Arakanese CLT ATNM INDP 6  rec AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Asia 1948 1995 Burma - Mons Burmese GVT Mons CLT ATNM INDP 5    end CF Not SPT N 
Asia 1948 2002+ Burma - Karenni GVT (Myanmar) Karenni, Shan CLT ATNM INDP 7     ong none N N
Asia 1949 1950 Burma - Kachins I Burmese GVT Kachins CLT ATNM INDP 7     rec DFT Not SPT N
Asia 1949 1951 China - Tibet I Chinese GVT Tibetans ASSM+EQ       INDP 6 rec DFT Not SPT ASSM
MidE/ NAfr 1955 1972 Sudan I Muslim-Arabic North Bantu/ Nilotic South ASSM+PRJ    INDP 7 rec AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Asia 1956 1961 China - Tibet II Chinese GVT Tibetans ASSM+EQ      INDP 6 rec DFT Not SPT N 
Asia 1956 2001 India - Nagas Indian GVT Nagas ASSM+EQ       INDP 6 ong none N POL ATNM
Asia 1959 2001 Burma - Shans Burmese GVT Shans ASSM+PRJ      INDP 6 ong none N N 
Asia 1959 2001 Thailand - Malays II Thailand GVT Malay Muslims ASSM+EQ       INDP 6 ong none N N
Black Afr 1960 1963 Zaire - Belgian Congo Zairan/ Congo GVT Katanga Province ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 end AGRM Not SPT ASSM
Asia 1960 2001 Burma - Arakanese II Burmese GVT Arakanese ASSM+PRJ       INDP 4 ong none N N
MidE/ NAfr 1961 1970 Iraq - Kurds I Iraqi GVT Kurds ASSM+EQ    POL ATNM 6 rec AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Asia 1961 1993 Burma - Kachins II Burmese GVT Kachins ASSM+PRJ     INDP 7 end CF Not SPT N 
Black Afr 1962 1982 Uganda I Ugandan GVT Bakonjo ASSM+EQ       INDP 4 rec AGRM Not SPT ASSM
Black Afr 1963 1964 Ethiopia - Eritreans          Ethiopian GVT Somalis ASSM+PRJ INDP 7 end DFT SPT unknown
Adv Dem 1963 1974 Cyprus Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots ASSM+PRJ      INDP 6 end DFT SPT N 





Asia 1963 2001 Indonesia - Papuans Indonesian GVT Papuans - West Irian ASSM+PRJ       INDP 5 ong none N N
MidE/ NAfr 1965 2001 Israel - Palestinians II Israel Palestinians (Arab/PLO) ASSM+PRJ       INDP 6 ong none N POL ATNM
Asia 1966 1970 China - Tibet III Chinese GVT Tibetans ASSM+PRJ      POL ATNM 4 rec DFT Not SPT N 
Asia 1966 1986 India - Mizos Indian GVT Mizos ASSM+EQ   INDP 6 end AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Black Afr 1967 1970 Nigeria - Ibos Nigerian GVT Ibos ASSM+PRJ      INDP 7 end DFT Not SPT N 
Adv Dem 1968 1998 Spain - Basques I Spanish GVT Basques ASSM+EQ       INDP 2 rec CF Not SPT N
Adv Dem 1968 2001 UK - Northern Ireland British GVT N Ireland/IRA ASSM+EQ       ASSM+EQ 6 ong none N POL ATNM
Adv Dem 1968 2002+ Spain - Basques II Spanish GVT Basques ASSM+EQ     INDP 2 ong none N N 
Asia 1969 1971 Pakistan - Bengalis II Pakistan GVT Bengalis ASSM+PRJ       INDP 7 end DFT SPT SPT
MidE/ NAfr 1972 1975 Iraq - Kurds II Iraqi GVT Kurds ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 rec DFT Not SPT N
MidE/ NAfr 1975 1980 Turkey - Kurds I Turkish GVT Kurds ASSM+PRJ       INDP 4 rec DFT Not SPT N
Black Afr 1975 1991 Ethiopia - Oromo Ethiopian GVT Tigrayans ASSM+PRJ       INDP 5 ong none N POL ATNM
MidE/ NAfr 1975 1991 Morocco - Saharawis Moroccan GVT Saharawis ASSM+EQ      INDP 7 end AGRM SPT SPT 
Asia 1975 1999 Indonesia - East Timor Indonesian GVT East Timorese ASSM+PRJ       INDP 7 end AGRM SPT SPT
Asia 1975 2001 Sri Lanka Govn't (Sinhalese) Tamils ASSM+PRJ       INDP 7 ong none N POL ATNM
Asia 1975 2001 Indonesia - Aceh Indonesian GVT Acehenese ASSM+PRJ      INDP 5 ong none N N 
Black Afr 1976 2001 Ethiopia - Tigray Ethiopian GVT Somalis "Ogaden War" ASSM+PRJ    INDP 7 end DFT Not SPT POL ATNM 
Asia 1978 2001 India - Tripuras Indian GVT Tripuras ASSM+PRJ       INDP 6 ong none N CLT ATNM
Asia            1978 2001 Phillipines Phillipine GVT Moros ASSM+EQ INDP 5 ong none N POL ATNM
MidE/ NAfr 1979 2001 Iran - Kurds II Iranian GVT Kurds ASSM+EQ      INDP 6 ong none N N 
MidE/ NAfr 1980 1988 Iraq - Kurds III Iraqi GVT Kurds ASSM+PRJ       INDP 6 rec DFT Not SPT N
L America 1981 1989 Nicaragua - Miskitu Nicaraguan GVT Miskitu ASSM+EQ    POL ATNM 6 end AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Black Afr 1981 1991 Somalia - Issaq Somalian GVT Issaq/ Northerners ASSM+PRJ     INDP 7 end DFT SPT N 
EE/ USSR 1981 2001 Yugoslavia - Albanians Yugoslav GVT Kosovar Albanians ASSM+PRJ       ASSM+PRJ 4 ong none N POL ATNM
Asia 1983 1987 India - Sikhs II Indian GVT Kashmiris ASSM+EQ   INDP 6 end DFT Not SPT POL ATNM 
MidE/ NAfr 1983 2001 Sudan II Muslim-Arabic North Bantu/Nilotic South ASSM+PRJ       POL ATNM 7 ong none N POL ATNM
MidE/ NAfr 1984 2001 Turkey - Kurds II Turkish GVT Kurds ASSM+PRJ     INDP 7 ong none N N 
Asia 1985 2001 India - Kashmir II Indian GVT Assamese ASSM+EQ    POL ATNM 3 rec AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
Black Afr 1986 1988 Uganda II Ugandan GVT Bakonjo ASSM+EQ     INDP 4 end AGRM Not SPT ASSM 
Asia 1987 2001 China - Tibet IV Chinese GVT Tibetans ASSM+PRJ       POL ATNM 2 ong none N N
EE/ USSR 1988 2001 Azerbaijan Azeris Armenians ASSM+PRJ      INDP 7 ong none N N
Asia 1988 2001 Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Bougainvilleans ASSM+EQ       INDP 4 end AGRM SPT POL ATNM
EE/ USSR 1989 1991 USSR - Azeris Soviet GVT Azeris ASSM+EQ      POL ATNM 6 end AGRM SPT SPT 
EE/ USSR 1989 2001 Georgia - S Ossetia Georgian GVT South Ossetians ASSM+EQ      INDP 6 ong none N POL ATNM
EE/ USSR 1990 1991 USSR - Armenia Soviet GVT Armenians ASSM+EQ      POL ATNM 6 end AGRM SPT SPT 
EE/ USSR 1990 1991 USSR - Latvians II Soviet GVT Latvians ASSM+EQ      INDP 3 end AGRM SPT SPT






EE/ USSR 1990 1991 Yugoslavia - Slovenians Yugoslav GVT Slovenians ASSM+PRJ       INDP 5 end AGRM SPT SPT
Black Afr 1990 1995 Niger - Tuareg Nigerian GVT Tuareg ASSM+EQ    POL ATNM 5 end AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
EE/ USSR 1990 2001 Moldova GVT (Romanians) Russians ASSM+EQ      INDP 5 ong none N Un known
Black Afr 1990 1995 Mali - Tuareg Mali GVT Tuareg/ Sonhrai ASSM+EQ    POL ATNM 6 end AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
MidE/ NAfr 1991 1992 Iraq - Kurds IV Iraqi GVT Kurds ASSM+PRJ     INDP 7 rec INACT SPT N 
EE/ USSR 1991 1994 Yugoslavia - Croatians Yugoslav GVT Croats ASSM+PRJ       INDP 7 end AGRM SPT SPT
EE/ USSR 1991 1995 Croatia Croatia Serbs ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 end DFT Not SPT ASSM
EE/ USSR 1991 1996 Russia - Chechnya I Russian GVT Chechens ASSM+EQ       INDP 7 end AGRM SPT POL ATNM
Asia 1991 2002+ India - Assam Indian GVT Hindu v Muslims ASSM+EQ      INDP 4 ong none N N 
EE/ USSR 1992 1995 Bosnia Bosnian Musl GVT Croats/ Serbs ASSM+EQ       Min GNCD 7 end AGRM SPT POL ATNM
MidE/ NAfr 1995 1996 Iraq - Kurds V Iraqi GVT Kurds ASSM+EQ     INDP 7 end INACT SPT N 
Asia 1999 2000 Solomon Islands Solomon GVT Guadacanal ASSM+EQ    INDP 4 end AGRM Not SPT POL ATNM 
EE/ USSR 1999 2002+ Russia - Chechnya II Russian GVT Chechens ASSM+PRJ      INDP 6 ong none N N 
EE/ USSR 2001 2001 Macedonia - Albanians Macedonia Albanians ASSM+PRJ    ASSM+EQ 4 end AGRM Not SPT CLT ATNM 
Black Afr 1961 1991 Ethiopia - Somali II Ethiopian GVT Eritreans ASSM+PRJ     INDP 7 ong none N N 
Asia 1981  1993 India - Kashmir III Indian GVT Sikhs ASSM+EQ       INDP 5 ong none N N
EE/ USSR 1998 2001* Georgia - Abkhazia          Georgian GVT Abkhazians ASSM+EQ INDP 7 ong none N N
 
Table Codes 
• Region where the conflict occurred: Advanced Industrial Democracies (AdvDem), Eastern Europe and the (former) USSR (EE/USSR), Asia, Middle East and North Africa 
(MidE/Nafr),Black Africa (Black Afr), Latin America (L America) 
• Staryear / Endyear:   Year conflict episode started / Year conflict episode ended 
• Name: Case name (indicating state and, usually, nationalist opposition); Actor1, Actor2, Actor3: Groups involved in conflict (government GVT) 
• Bargain1/2/3:  Initial Demands of Actor 1/2/3 at start of conflict episode: 1/ Genocide of Minority/Nationalist Group; 2/ Assimilation with Prejudice (ASSM+PRJ); 3/ 
Assimilation with Equality (ASSM+EQ); 4/ Cultural Autonomy (CLT ATNM); 5/ Political Autonomy (POL ATNM); 6/ Independence (INDP); 7/ Genocide of Majority/Non-Nation 
Group/Opposing Group (Min GNC) 
• Rebelx:  Highest level of violence reached during conflict episode: 0/ No violence reported; 1/ Political Banditry; 2/ Campaigns of Terrorism; 3/ Local Rebellion; 4/ Small-Scale 
Guerilla Activity; 5/ Intermediate Guerilla Activity; 6/ Large-Scale Guerilla Activity; 7/ Protracted Civil War 
• Ongoing: - as of Dec. 1996 - whether episode is ongoing (ong) or not (end); or whether conflict recurs between same actors (rec) 
• Endtype: Type of ending of conflict: Inaction (INACT); Defeat (DFT); CFire (CF); Agreement (AGRM); None 
• Separat:  Outcome of Episode Ending: 1/Parties not separated (Not SPT) 2/Parties separated (SPT) - where “separated” refers to a situation where individuals in either 
group are not subject to attack with impunity by members of the other group 
• Agreetyp: Type of Agreement reached: Assimilation (ASSM), Cultural Autonomy (CLT ATNM), Political Autonomy (POL ATNM), Separation (SPT), Unknown 
 
Source:  VINC Database: The Violent Intrastate Nationalist Conflicts project database (2004), W.Ayres, University of Indianapolis (http://facstaff.uindy.edu/~bayres/vinc.htm )
  
VINC Table Summary 
 
Conflicts occurred during the Cold War     61 cases 
Conflicts occurred in the Post-cold War period   22 cases 
N of conflicts ended (by 2004)     32 cases 
N of ongoing conflicts (by 2004)     28 cases 
N of recurrent conflicts      23 cases 
N of conflicts ended with separation     17 cases 
N of conflicts ended with NO separation    38 cases 
N/A        28 cases 
Implementation of agreement started    35 cases 
N of completed implementation      30 cases 
N of continued implementation     30 cases 
Implement not started      53 cases 
Initial demands Actor 1:  Assimilation + Equality  43 cases 
    Assimilation + Prejudice 32 cases 
Cultural Autonomy  6 cases 
Initial demands Actor 2:  Independence   65 cases 
Political Autonomy  11 cases 
Cultural Autonomy  1 cases 
Assimilation + Equality  2 cases 
Assimilation + Prejudice 1 cases 
Genocide of Minorities  1 cases 
Agreement Reached:  Agreement   26 cases 
Cease-fire   5 cases 
Defeat    22 cases 
Inaction    2 cases 





TABLE 2: ‘Peace & Conflict 2007’ Trends in Global Conflict, 1946-2005 
 
 
Conflicts INTERNAL wars Internationalized internal wars 
Year Total N 
ACTIVE  
Total N 
NEW  TOTAL N  New  Total N  New  




1946 9 9 8 8 0   8 
1947 12 4 10 3 0   10 
1948 18 10 12 5 1 1 13 
1949 12 1 7 0 1 0 8 
1950 12 2 6 1 1 0 7 
1951 8 0 4 0 0   4 
1952 8 1 4 1 0   4 
1953 9 1 4 1 0   4 
1954 8 1 4 1 0   4 
1955 7 1 4 1 0   4 
1956 10 2 5 0 0   5 
1957 6 0 4 0 0   4 
1958 10 1 8 1 0   8 
1959 9 1 8 1 0   8 
1960 7 0 5 0 1 0 6 
1961 13 5 9 3 2 1 11 
1962 11 2 7 0 2 1 9 
1963 10 2 7 1 3 1 10 
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1964 13 1 9 1 3 0 12 
1965 15 3 9 1 3 1 12 
1966 16 0 9 0 3 0 12 
1967 25 9 14 5 3 0 17 
1968 21 0 14 0 3 0 17 
1969 22 2 13 1 3 0 16 
1970 21 1 12 0 4 1 16 
1971 19 2 11 2 3 0 14 
1972 17 0 10 0 3 0 13 
1973 18 0 9 0 3 0 12 
1974 17 3 11 2 2 0 13 
1975 19 4 13 1 5 3 18 
1976 21 1 17 1 4 0 21 
1977 23 1 18 1 5 0 23 
1978 25 3 19 2 6 1 25 
1979 27 2 18 0 8 2 26 
1980 27 2 19 1 6 0 25 
1981 33 3 25 3 6 0 31 
1982 34 1 26 0 6 0 32 
1983 31 1 23 1 6 0 29 
1984 31 0 23 0 5 0 28 
1985 30 0 23 0 6 0 29 
1986 33 1 25 1 6 0 31 
1987 39 1 28 0 6 0 34 
1988 36 0 28 0 6 0 34 
1989 33 3 28 3 4 0 32 
1990 35 3 32 3 2 0 34 
1991 35 2 33 2 0   33 
1992 32 5 29 3 2 2 31 
1993 31 1 27 0 4 1 31 
1994 30 1 29 1 1 0 30 
1995 25 0 24 0 1 0 25 
1996 25 3 22 2 2 1 24 
1997 26 1 23 1 2 0 25 
1998 30 4 25 1 3 2 28 
1999 31 0 24 0 5 0 29 
2000 29 1 24 1 3 0 27 
2001 29 2 24 1 4 1 28 
2002 25 0 21 0 3 0 24 
2003 22 2 18 0 2 1 20 
2004 19 1 15 0 4 1 19 
2005 25 2 19 2 6 0 25 
 
Source: 
Hewitt, J.J., Wilkenfeld, J. & Gurr, T.R., 2007, Peace and Conflict 2008 (Chapter 3): Trends in Global 
Conflict, 1946-2005; Replication Data Set – Variable Description; Centre for International Development 
and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, Boulder, CO: Published by Paradigm Pub, 2007; 




 APPENDIX 2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process  
 
TABLE 1: Pillars, Sectors, and Areas of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process 
(adapted from AUSA/CSIS (2002) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework) 
 
 
Pillars Areas Sectors (Goals) 
A. Security  
Ceasefire 
Enforcement of Peace Agreement  
Disarmament 
Demobilisation 
Control of Belligerents 
Reintegration 
Border and Boundary Control 
Movement 
Territorial Security 
Points of Entry 
Non-combatants 
Public Order 
Protection of Populace 
Clearance of Unexploded Ordinance  
Private Institutions and Individuals 
Critical Infrastructure 
Military Infrastructure 
Protection of Key Individuals, 
Infrastructure, and Institutions 
Public Institutions 
National Armed Forces Local Security Institutions Reform 
Non-military Security Forces 
1. Security 
Regional Security Regional Security Arrangements 
B. Justice & Reconciliation 
Transitional Justice  
International Police 
Indigenous Police 





Judicial System  
Citizen Access 
Code and Statutory Reform  Laws  
Participation 
Capacity Building  
Monitoring  
Human Rights  
Security Force Reform 




Establishment of Courts and Tribunals  
Investigation and Arrest  
1. Justice 
 
International Courts and Tribunals  
Citizen Outreach 
Organization  
Citizen Education  
Truth Commissions  
Reparations 
Confidence Building 





Individual Healing and 
Empowerment  Individual Empowerment 
C. Social & Economic Well-Being 
Prevention of Displacement  
Management of Refugees  
Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons  
Management of IDP  
Emergency Distribution  
Market Mechanisms  
Food Security  
Agricultural Development  
Water and Waste Management  
Medical Capacity  
1. Social  
Well-Being 
Public Health  
Prevention of Epidemics  
 292
 
Health Education  
Construction  Shelter  
Adjudication of Property Disputes  
Human Resources  
Infrastructure  
Curriculum  
Educational System  
Literacy Campaign  
Pension System  Social Safety Net   
Social Security 
Strategy  
International Financial Assistance  




Physical Infrastructure  
Telecommunication & IT  
Public Works  Employment Generation   
Micro-Enterprise  
Markets Market Reconstitution 
Property Rights  
Business  
Legal and Regulatory Reform   
Labour  
Enabling Environment  International Trade  




Investment   
Natural Resources and Environment 
Central Banking Authority  
Banking Regulations and Oversight  
2. Economic  
Well-Being 
Banking and Finance 
Capital Markets 
D. Governance & Participation 
National Dialogue  National Constituting Processes 
Constitution  
International Transitional Administration Transitional Governance 
National Transitional Administration  
Public Sector  
Civil Service  
Revenue Generation  
Recruitment and Training  




Citizen Access  
Legislative Strengthening   
Technical Assistance  




Traditional Representation  
Anti-Corruption  
1. Governance 
Transparency and Anti-Corruption  
Watchdogs  
Planning and Execution  
Monitoring  
Elections  
Citizen Outreach  
Formation  Political Parties 
Training  
Development  Civil Society   
Enabling Environment  










 APPENDIX 3: Fieldwork Contacts 
 





People Interviewed  
 
 
1. Armakolas, Ioannis – Officer at the USAID, Sarajevo 
2. Arnautović, Negra – International Youth Organisation ‘Bosporus Network’  
3. Balta, Kleljia – EU-QIF Head Office, Sarajevo 
4. Barbalić, Ivan – ‘Alumni’ Organisation Representative, Faculty of Law, 
University of Sarajevo  
5. Batinić, Hrvoje – Program Director OSF, Sarajevo  
6. Bishop, Jo-Anne – OSCE Education Department, Sarajevo  
7. Bojrović, Reuf – Taxi-driver, Sarajevo  
8. Brkić, Snejana – Assistant, Faculty of Economic, University of Sarajevo  
9. Dedović, Melissa – Media Plan Centre, Sarajevo  
10. Deljkić, Dzenana – State Ombudsman, Sarajevo  
11. Durmić, Muhamed – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo  
12. Gnidić, Damir – Legal Advisor, OHR, Sarajevo  
13. Goić, Ivana – Program Coordinator, Mozaik Foundation, Sarajevo  
14. Grebo, Zdravko – Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo  
15. Harland, Christopher – Head of Human Rights Department (2000-2002), OHR  
16. Imamović, Armin – Human Rights Chamber, Sarajevo  
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1. CARE International BH office Sarajevo 
2. Centre for promotion of civil society, Sarajevo 
3. Danish Refugee Council BH office Sarajevo 
4. Department for EU Integration, Co 
5. ESI – European Stability Initiative office Sarajevo 
6. EU Integration office, Sarajevo 
7. Institute for Strengthening Democracy in BiH, Konjic 
8. ICVA International Council of voluntary agencies Sarajevo 
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11. Media Plan Centre Sarajevo 
12. Mozaik Foundation (NVO Fondazia), Sarajevo 
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16. OSF, Soros Foundation Open Society Fund BiH, Sarajevo  
17. UNDP - United Nations Development Programme BH office Sarajevo 
18. UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees BH office Sarajevo  
19. University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Law 
20. University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Economics 
21. WB, The World Bank Resident Mission Sarajevo  



























 APPENDIX 4: Development Assistance to BiH 
 
NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR THE 
PERIOD 1995 – 2006 AS REPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK 
 
 






Aid (% gross 
capital) 








1995 *** 57 248 *** 270 924520000,00 
1996 *** 33 73 *** 245 836579968,00 
1997 *** 25 56 *** 247 861449984,00 
1998 *** 18 58 22 250 905200000,00 
1999 *** 19 79 23 277 1040329984,00 
2000 *** 13 69 17 192 736849984,00 
2001 *** 11 61 14 164 638920000,00 
2002 *** 8 46 12 144 563440000,00 
2003 18 7 34 9 138 540289984,00 
2004 20 7 39 9 175 683630016,00 
2005 15 5 29 7 140 546080000,00 
2006 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Total 53 203 792 113 2242 8 277 289 920 
 
 
Series: Official development assistance and official aid (current US$)   
    
 
Net official development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of 
the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral 
institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare 
in countries and territories in part I of the DAC list of recipients. It includes loans with a 
grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net 
official aid refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries and 
territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced 
developing countries and territories. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions 
similar to those for ODA. Data are in current U.S. dollars.   
 
Source of information: www.worldbank.org (Projects & Operations) 
Information obtained: August 2008 
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 APPENDIX 5: International Assistance to BiH (1996-2006) 
 
Comparing the data of the examined databases it becomes obvious that the information 
they present differs in figures, sectors and areas in focus, years analysed, etc. The tables 
below present the synthesised information from the databases and the discrepancies 
between the entries. The mismatch and the relative equality in terms of objectiveness 
each source could claim, impeded the prioritisation of a database before the others and 
hence, the unambiguous identification of the key ‘agents’ of the reconstruction process 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
 
FTS Database (2000-2006) 
Financial Tracking Service of the Relief Web database - UN Office for the 
















Germany 2000 2006 
De-mining, health, reintegration 
/rehabilitation, humanitarian assistance, 
supply of wood, food, reconstruction of 
houses 
31110374,00 108 
USA 2000 2002 
Coordination & support services (CSS), 
Economic recovery & infrastructure (ERI), 
multi-sector, shelter & non-food 
10726632,00 8 
Netherlands 2000 2006 Multi-sector, health, de-mining 3044748,00 9 
Italy 2002 2006 Multi-sector, de-mining, CSS 2726376,00 5 
Switzerland 2000 2005 CSS, ERI, multi-sector, de-mining 2589872,00 10 
Ireland 2000 n/a ERI, human rights, health, agriculture, CSS 1711997,00 8 
Japan 2002 n/a Multi-sector 1500000,00 1 
Finland 2000 2004 Health, De-mining 1268127,00 4 
Sweden 2000 2006 Multi-sector 1026673,00 7 
Austria 2000 2006 De-mining, refugees, health 724985,00 5 
Total  2000 2006  5285 9424 184 
 
 
Venancio Database (1996 – 2002) 
 
Venancio, Moises (2004) ‘International Assistance to BiH 1996-2002: A Tentative 
Analysis of Who is Doing What, Where’, UNDP Report 2004 (Available online from 
http://unjobs.org/authors/moises-venancio)  
 
External assistance at the State level 





European Union*  12 334 500 0 12 334 500 
Multilateral Fund - Montreal Protocol  110 000 0 110 000 
Netherlands  393 260 0 393 260 
UNDP  2 345 732 0 2 345 732 
UNDP and Japan  3 133 900 0 3 133 900 
UNDP and UK 1 447 000 0 1 447 000 
UNHCR 292 071 0 292 071 
World Bank  0 4 000 000 4 000 000 




External assistance at the State level 
Donor/ 



















EU *  
1 000 000       24 500   9 480 000   1 830 000 
Montreal 
Protocol ** 
        110 000         
Netherlands              393 260     
UNDP  
      275 
422 
  100 
000 
1 376 000 594 31   
UNDP & 
Japan  




            
UNDP & UK 
        1 447 
000 
        
UNHCR             292 071     
World Bank              4 000 000     
TOTAL  












594 31 1 830 000 
          
The amount indicated is the amount contracted - figures in Euros have been converted to US$ (1:1) 
* Data used is from the EC Report - EC Assistance to BiH Technical Progress Report 1 July/Sept 2002 





Accessible Information on Development Activities (AiDA) at the Development Gateway 
(Available online at http://aida.developmentgateway.org/aida/) 
 
Donor Breakdown for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Donors 
(ranked)  Contribution (in USD)  




IDA 3091151583,00  Switzerland 236 
Austria 391794415,00  Spain 186 
Netherlands 275201204,00  Italy  163 
Sweden 217176770,00  Germany 147 
Switzerland 144628965,00  USA 142 
World Bank 88000000,00  Japan  129 
Canada 41491258,00  UNDP 121 
Finland 31962105,00  France 94 
Spain 31895612,00  EU Development Fund 68 





Germany 23654485,00    
Greece 17375234,00    
United States 4256000,00    
Belgium 2231308,00    







Sector (ranked by amount of aid allocated) Aid N of projects per sector 
Multiple 2612195733 n/a 
Emergency assistance 287712576 26 
Energy 271012562 20 
Social Services 252002834 230 
Water Supply & Sanitation 131427881 33 
Government Admin 121283671 94 
Debt relief 112156324 1 
CSD 109420394 330 
Education 93750632 171 
Banking 85673044 32 
Peace Building 79797795 154 
Housing 70600000 1 
Health 35954644 69 
Multi-sector 27413889 140 
Agriculture 26491134 52 
Unspecified 20723398 38 
General Programme Assistance 20416570 3 
Communications 10570286 16 
Industry 9110521 33 
Business 8181681 60 
Transport 5053690 41 
Environment 3185391 57 
Rural Development 2577780 10 
Trade Policy and Regulations 2367313 15 
Urban development 802530 4 
Sector Group not found 430012 n/a 
Food Aid  406102 11 
Fishing 175192 1 
Population and Reproductive Health 99827 44 
NGO Support 64422 30 
Forestry 59203 6 
Construction 28985  
Information and Communication Technology n/a 5 
Mineral Resources and Mining n/a 5 
Tourism n/a 15 
 
 
OECD.STATEXTRACTS (1996 – 2006) 
 
Databases included in the OECD Statistics; Dataset: Creditor Reporting System; 
(Available online at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW) 
 
Sectors Top 10 Donors  Amounts (in mln USD) 
1. EC 1162,67875 
2. US 1048,30108 
3. IDA 1007,3 
4. Netherlands 606,032725 
5. Austria 420,783601 
6. Germany 371,852541 
7. Sweden 342,391111 
8. Spain 305,425577 
9. Japan 292,420973 
All sectors 1996-2006 
10. Switzerland 236,41206 
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EC 16,417638 297,151881 0 313,569519 
United States 0,675 289,881123 0,02 290,576123 
IDA 38,4 111,2 0 149,6 
Austria 91,329235 51,069053 0,000473 142,398761 
Spain 4,268874 106,212644 4,798138 115,279656 
Netherlands 1,147673 105,025615 0,023561 106,196849 
Germany 53,620149 28,257137 0,018208 81,895494 
Norway 3,241147 72,435628 0 75,676775 
Sweden 2,269919 69,563381 0,04039 71,87369 
Canada 4,637902 53,56418 1,850666 60,052748 
Japan 18,395529 33,747477 2,555637 54,698643 
Italy 40,554483 8,671133 1,888119 51,113735 
United Kingdom 0,411674 32,37619 0 32,787864 
Switzerland 7,111657 22,909254 0 30,020911 
Finland 4,547629 21,296906 0 25,844535 
Greece 0,72247 23,970116 0 24,692586 
Portugal 0,002143 14,729639 0 14,731782 
France 8,839255 0,676697 0,065651 9,581603 
Belgium 0 7,031301 0 7,031301 
Ireland 0,586928 5,00764 0 5,594568 
UNICEF 0,82316 0,652774 0 1,475934 
UNDP 0,072269 0,824203 0 0,896472 






APPENDIX 6: WB Conflict Analysis Framework 
 
The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)* is designed to help World Bank (WB) teams 
identify factors that affect a conflict and enable them to see how they can be best 
addressed through WB programs and policies. The analysis is designed to ensure that 
development interventions do not incite, exacerbate, or revive conflict. The CAF has 
four major components. 
 
Process phases  Relevant steps 
Risk Screening Process:  
The screening process comprises a 
review of nine indicators. In 
general, the more indicators 
assessed as positive, the more 
need there is for conflict analysis. 
Nine Risk Screening Indicators 
1. Violent conflict in the past ten years 
2. Low per capita GNI 
3. High capacity on primary commodities exports 
4. Political instability 
5. Militarization 
6. Ethnic dominance 
7. Active regional conflicts 
8. High youth unemployment 
9. Restricted civil and political rights 
Conflict Analysis:  
The conflict analysis is based on a 
framework of six categories, each 
of which has a number of variables. 
Using the framework, WB teams 
are able to identify the key factors 
that affect conflict. 
Six Conflict Categories 
1. Social and ethnic relations 
2. Governance and political institutions 
3. Human rights and security 
4. Economic structures and performance (including infrastructure) 
5. Environmental and natural resources 
6. External factors 
1. Conduct a desk study of available information 
2. Conduct workshops with country specialists and subject matter 
experts to cover all six categories 
3. Conduct follow-up studies on issues identified in the workshops 
4. Conduct country consultations with stakeholder groups 
5. Hold concluding workshops to integrate findings and 
incorporate within country strategies 
Methodology:  
Five-step process for teams to 






Analysis: As part of the analysis of 
each category, the approach 
suggests focusing on seven 
aspects for each category:  
 
1. Its history and how it developed over time 
2. Its dynamic and trends and what is determining the future path 
3. Public perceptions and biases of the issue 
4. How the issue has been politicized 
5. Extent to which the issue has led to organized interests 
6. How it contributes to conflict and intensity 
7. How it contributes to poverty 
 
* The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) in available online from the website of the 






APPENDIX 7: WB Support to BiH (1996-2006) 
 
WB Country Aggregated Report - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Summary Statement of Loans/Credits/Grants (1996-2006)l  
(Source: The World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/TZV1IXZHW0) 
 
TABLE 1: WB Projects over the period 1996-2006 (summary) 
 








TOTAL for 1996-2006 48 1 373 309 889 100% 
Reconstruction / Development projects 39 1252827167,61 91% 
Related to social capital rebuilding 7 78699817,00 6 % 
Related to social capital rebuilding 
(P045310 & P045311) 2 41782904 3% 
 
 
TABLE 2: WB Projects over the period 1996-2006 (details) 
 
“Reconstruction” period 1996-2000  Post-reconstruction period 2000-2006 
Project Amount Start Date 
End 





P044033 90234491,7 1996 1996  P069058 20000000 2001 2001 
P044389 131121530,9 1996 1998  P044522 21277216 1996 2002 
P044393 21147657,38 1996 1998  P048461 65000000 1999 2002 
P044395 50724473 1996 1998  P055432 101928600,8 1999 2002 
P044524 10000000 1996 1998  P067153 450000 1999 2002 
P044390 76623260 1996 1999  P045820 23421263,5 1996 2003 
P044392 49000000 1996 1999  P045134 11494760 1998 2003 
P044394 47306542 1996 1999  P071107 292490 2000 2003 
P044424 13290744 1996 1999  P071845 400000 2000 2003 
P044459 20867912 1996 1999  P044523 10964400 1999 2004 
P044521 8175000 1996 1999  P059763 10559200 1999 2004 
P044391 19700000 1997 1999  P062936 12000000 1999 2004 
P045546 85204760 1998 1999  P058512 11995617 2000 2004 
IDA 20000000 na 1999  P070146 17970000 2000 2004 
TF 20000000 na 1999  P070650 3785886 2000 2004 
P045310 25921053 1996 2000  P056192 16285000 1999 2005 
P045311 15861850,75 1996 2000  P057951 12367800 2000 2005 
P045313 12500000 1997 2000  P066169 20000000 2001 2005 
P045484 51125000 1997 2000  P070079 11200000 2001 2005 
P050892 9088868,28 1998 2000  P070243 10000000 2002 2005 
P048462 27952652,38 1997 2001  P070917 19800000 2001 2006 
P045483 27550000 1998 2001  P070992 51000000 2004 2006 
P044047 20000000 1997 Na  P071039 34000000 2004 2006 
P058052 13721860 1999 Na  P070995 20000000 2001 2008 
Total 24 projects 867117 655,4  Total 24 projects 506 192 233,3 




















30-Jul-96 / 30-Sep-99 375000.00 
no detailed information available 
5000000.00 P044524: Emergency 
Education Reconstruction 
28-Jun-96 / 30-Sep-98 5000000.00 
no detailed information available 
P045310: Emergency 
Public Works & 
Employment 
30-Jul-96 / 30-Jun-00 
25921053 
8 projects (primarily in health & social services) – it appears 
that the program has not targeted the social capital 
reconstruction, despite the potential for that  
P045311: Local Initiatives  
13-Dec-96 / 30-Jun-00 15861851 
7 projects (micro crediting) - it appears that the program has 
not targeted the social capital reconstruction, despite the 
potential for that 
11000000.00P045313: Education 
Reconstruction 
13-Dec-96 / 30-Jun-00 1500000.00 





18-May-00 / 31-Dec-04 
166617.00 
The project aims at improving teaching, and learning 
processes in BiH, and promotes equitable use, and 
coordination of public resources to build a professional basis 
for the education system (with focus on the improvement of 









Heritage Pilot  
28-Jun-99 / 31-Dec-04 
490000.00 
The Project development objective is to improve the climate 
for reconciliation among the peoples in the country 
through recognition and rehabilitation of their common 
cultural heritage in the city of Mostar (by 1/ reconstruction 
of the Old Bridge above the Neretva River; 2/ restoration of 
selected monuments in the historic district of Mostar; and 3/ 
preservation of the Old Town's historic character through a 
series of neighbourhood initiatives and the adoption of 
architectural guidelines supported by adequate incentives) 
15000000.00
1210000.00 
P070146: Pilot Emergency 
Labour Redeployment 
Project 
20-Jun-00 / 30-Sep-04 
1760000.00 
The project aims to provide ex-soldiers with the means for 
self-reliant existence, with a focus on supporting the ex-
soldiers in their ability to find employment and to create 
sustainable jobs and businesses, redeploying them within the 
economically active population. The two project components 
are: 1) Counselling, employment, and training component; 2) 
The PIU is responsible for the project implementation…, 
supervision of executing agencies and consultants, and 
cooperation across entities. 
P070995: Community 
Development  
26-Jun-01 / 31-Aug-08 
(considered because most 
of the project period falls 




The project improves basic services and facilities for low-
income and poor communities. Among the key components is 
the institutional capacity building support, through 
increased partnerships with communities in identifying, 
implementing, and maintaining non-revenue generating 
investments, as a means of strengthening social capital, 
and governance 
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(All)   






ID Description  Principal  Disbursed      
P044033 Transition Assistance Credit 90234491,7 90347350,6 05-09-96 31-12-96
P044047 Financial & Technical Assistance 20000000 20000000 31-12-97 NA 
P044389 Emergency Recovery 131121530,9 101231011 01-03-96  30-06-98
P044390 Emergency Transport Reconstruction 76623260 36991745 29-03-96 30-06-99
P044391 Emergency Natural Gas System Rehab 19700000 14717318 23-12-97 31-07-99
P044392 Emergency District Heating Rehab 49000000 28747815 14-05-96 31-03-99
P044393 Emergency Landmine Clearance 21147657,38 16456006,38 30-07-96 31-12-98
P044394 Emergency Farm Reconstruction 47306542 27154479,3 28-03-96 30-06-98
P044395 Emergency Electric Power Reconstr 50724473 45329121 30-07-96 31-12-98
P044424 War Victims 13290744 12888297 28-06-96 31-12-99
IDA 38950 20000000 20000000 NA 31-12-99
TF 24032 20000000 0 NA 31-12-99
P044459 Emergency Housing Repair  20867912 18742009 30-07-96 30-06-98
P044521 Emergency Demobilisation & Reintergtn  8175000 7774434,8 30-07-96 30-09-99
P044522 Essential Hospital Services  21277216 20344707,3 13-12-96 30-06-02
P044523 Basic Health 10964400 10813559,6 04-05-99 30-06-04
P044524 Emergency Education Reconstruction 10000000 9893618 28-06-96 30-09-98
P045134 Forestry 11494760 10732787 02-06-98 31-03-03
P045310 Emergency Public Works & Employment 
(health & social services) 
25921053 25474444 30-07-96 30-06-00
P045311 Local Initiatives (micro credits) 15861850,75 15615293,1 13-12-96 30-06-00
P045313 Education Reconstruction 12500000 12041269 28-08-97 30-06-00
P045483 Electric Power Reconstruction 27550000 26486348 19-05-98 31-12-01
P045484 Emergency Transport Reconstruction 51125000 48139123,7 28-08-97 30-06-00
P045546 Public Finance Structural Adjustment 
Credit (SAC) 
85204760 85574464 04-06-98 30-06-99
P045820 Emergency industry restart 23421263,5 16453003 13-12-96 31-12-03
P048461 Enterprise & Banking Privatisation 65000000 64235960 24-06-99 31-05-02
P048462 Reconstruction assistance (Rep Srpska) 27952652,38 25548956,4 23-12-97 31-03-01
P050892 Emergency pilot credit (Rep Srpska) 9088868,28 9097391,7 19-05-98 30-06-00
P055432 Public Finance SAC  101928600,8 101198398 24-06-99 31-12-02
P056192 Local Development 16285000 17113840,2 13-04-99 31-05-05
P057951 Mostar Water Supply & Sanitation 12367800 12972958 30-06-00 30-06-05
P058052 Small Farm Reconstr/ Development 13721860 4013271 17-06-99 NA 
P058512 Education 11995617 12531334,5 18-05-00 31-12-04
P059763 Cultural Heritage Pilot  10559200 10436086,24 28-06-99 31-12-04
P062936 Enterprise Export Facility 12000000 11684804 24-06-99 31-12-04
P066169 Local Initiatives (Microfinance) 20000000 21612564 26-06-01 30-06-05
P067153 Development of Statistical Systems 450000 450000 16-04-99 22-07-02
P069058 Social Sector Adjustment Credit  20000000 19142288 15-02-01 30-08-01
P070079 Trade & Transport Facilitation in 
Southeast Europe 
11200000 12376879 22-02-01 30-09-05
P070146 Emergency Labour Redeployment Pilot  17970000 19260156 20-06-00 30-09-04
P070243 Private Sector Credit  10000000 11404245 28-02-02 30-06-05
P070650 Social Sector Technical Assistance 
Credit Project 
3785886 3510037,2 07-12-00 30-06-04
P070917 Privatization Technical Assistance 19800000 4102154 26-06-01 31-08-06
P070992 Social Sector Adjustment Credit 51000000 0 15-06-04 30-06-06
P070995 Community Development  20000000 17836456,1 26-06-01 31-08-08
P071039 Economic Management SAC 34000000 10552852 15-06-04 31-12-06
P071107 Environment Capacity Building  292490 291414,9 02-03-00 08-03-03
P071845 Treasury IDF 400000 0 29-12-00 17-12-03





TABLE 5: WB in AIDA (summary) 
                 (Source: AIDA Database (http://aida.developmentgateway.org/aida/)
 
WB Projects by sector 
1996 - 2006 
Number of 
projects Amount 
Money distribution  by 
sector  (in %) 
Banking and Financial Services 20 69344793 2,18 % 
Business Services 8 1206790 0,03 % 
Energy 2 239500000 7,53 % 
Government Administration 2 100300000 3,15% 
Housing 1 70600000 2,22 % 
Multiple 33 2602820000 81,87 % 
Water Supply and Sanitation 2 95380000 3 % 
Total for the period 1996 - 2006 68 3179151583 100 % 
    
Projects possibly (potentially) 
related to social capital  6 173830000 
6% out of sector “Multiple” / 
5% out of total 
 
 
TABLE 6: WB ‘Multiple’ sector projects in AIDA - potential social capital impact 
 









IDA IDA Emergency Demobilization  Reintegration 1996 1999 27500000 
IDA IDA Emergency Education Reconstruction 1996 1998 37800000 
IDA IDA Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction 1996 1998 231900000 
IDA IDA Emergency Farm Reconstruction 1996 1998 50400000 
IDA IDA Emergency Public Works  Employment 1996 2000 55000000 
IDA IDA Emergency Reconstruction Transport 1996 1999 163000000 
IDA IDA Emergency Recovery Project 1996 1998 160000000 
IDA IDA Essential Hospital Services Project 1996 2002 48500000 
IDA IDA Local Initiatives Project 1996 2000 25000000 
IDA IDA Transition Assistance Credit 1996 1996 200000000 
IDA IDA War Victims Rehabilitation Project 1996 1999 35000000 
IDA IDA Emergency Education Reconstruction 1997 2000 22500000 
IDA IDA Emergency Natural Gas System Reconstruction  1997 1999 51500000 
IDA IDA Emergency Transport Reconstruction  1997 2000 223000000 
IDA IDA Republika Srpska Reconstruction Assistance 1997 2001 82000000 
IDA IDA Emergency Pilot Credit Project 1998 2000 45000000 
IDA IDA Forestry Project 1998 2003 27200000 
IDA IDA Public Finance Structural Adjustment Credit  1998 1999 126000000 
IDA IDA Basic Health Project 1999 2004 22000000 
IDA IDA Local Development Pilot Project 1999 2004 33500000 
IDA IDA Enterprise And Bank Privatization Adjustment Credit Project 1999 2002 150000000 
IDA IDA Enterprise Export Facility Project 1999 2004 34000000 
IDA IDA Public Finance Structural Adjustment Credit 1999 2002 144000000 
IDA IDA Education Development Project 2000 2004 25200000 
IDA IDA Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment 2000 2004 32510000 
IDA IDA Social Sector Technical Assistance 2000 2004 7430000 
IDA IDA Community Development Project 2001 2005 32630000 
IDA IDA Electric Power Reconstruction Project 2001 2005 266100000 
IDA IDA Local Initiatives Microfinance Project 2001 2005 47060000 
IDA IDA Privatization Technical Assistance 2001 2004 43090000 
IDA IDA Social Sector Adjustment Credit 2001 2001 40000000 
WB IBRD Business Environment Adjustment Credit Project 2002 2004 88000000 
IDA IDA Private Sector Credit Project 2002 2005 26000000 
 
 APPENDIX 8: Mozaik Foundation Programme Support 
 
TABLE 1: Completed Programme „For Active Communities“(CoDE A) 
 
Place Local partner Project Title Outputs   Ownership Sustainability
Čapljina Ecological society  
“Lijepa naša” 
Decoration of the beach Jaz 400 m2 cultivated area: recreation & 
sanitation facilities installed 
Workgroup in charge of 
maintaining the space 
Plans for future 
initiatives developed 
Prijedor  Ecological society
“Kozara” 
Decoration of the excursion site 
Pašinac 
3000 m2 cultivated area: installed 
recreation & sanitation facilities, 
information signs; playgrounds constructed 
Utility firms, police, & an 
elementary school placed in 
charge of the maintenance 
Plans for future 
initiatives developed 
Teslić,  UG Eco-oaza
Podgredine 
Bathing area for youth of three 
local communities 
A dam & a swimming pool constructed; 
road to the excursion site repaired 
CBO is responsible for space 
maintenance 




 Decoration of excursion site at 
the bank of river Sava – Poloj 
1000 m2 cultivated area; recreation & 
sanitation facilities installed 
The utility firm & workgroup placed 
in charge of maintaining the space 
Plans for future 
initiatives developed 
Ključ UG “Ključ 
budućnosti” 
Decoration of the city beach 
«Alina Luka 2006» 
Beach construction plans; 2 km river banks 
cleaned & cultivated; facilities constructed 
Municipality assembly has decided 
that the site should be maintained 
by a youth organization involved 
since the beginning of the project  
municipality allocated 
funds; plans for future 
initiatives developed 
Olovo Hiking club 
“Smolin”
Decoration of the excursion site 
“Zeleni vir”
Illegal landfill in the Bioštice canyon 
cleaned; illegal garbage disposal was 
stopped 
 No further funds – 
community did not 
deliver proper 
documentation 
Kalesija UG “Eko zeleni 
Kalesija” 
Decoration of the green areas Cultivation of an area in the central park; 
garbage disposal facilities installed ; two 
ecology workshops for  elementary school 
group; a line of trees planted along the 
main street 
The disposal service has agreed 
to maintain the park; trees - 
maintained by the citizens of the 
local community 
 
Zavidovići  Sadnice Mira
“Peace Trees” 
Eco park  
“Đurića gaj” 
30800 m2 of park area cleaned & cultivated  
cleaned; constructed circular educational 
space with the “Peace Pillar” (with a 
peace-message in 8 languages) 
Facilities became target of young 
vandals who have almost 
completely destroyed the installed 
equipment 
Workgroup started an 
initiative with the local 
police & activities to 
protect this area  
Bosanski 
Petrovac 
UG “Gracija” Building of sport and recreation 
park for youth and adults 
The park constructed is the only one in the 
city 
The sanitation service and home 
for children without parents were 
assigned to take care of the space 





“Dar prirode” Decoration of the park in local 
community  Mlakva 
1000 m2 of park cleaned & decorated; 
access roads repaired; recreation facilities 
& sewage drainage constructed  
The home for children without 
parents has agreed to maintain 
the space  
Plans for further 
decoration of the 
space  
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 Derventa “Forum NVO” Decoration of esplanade at the 
left side of river Ukrina 
400 m of river bank cleaned and cultivated 
 
The workgroup is now in charge of 
maintaining the space 
Plans for future 
initiatives developed 
Breza UG “20 mart 1990” “Clean town, healthy future” Installed 35 trash bins in the city centre  The sanitation service  
Jablanica EKO Neretva Cleaned depot– better conditions 
for living in community 
D.Jablanica 
landfill cleaned from hard waste; container 
installed; trees planted along the 100m 
access path  
Jablanica sanitation service; 
citizens have taken the duty of 
paying for the communal bills 
 
Trebinje UG  „OAZA” For more purposeful and more 
beautiful school yard 
Solved problems of accumulation of rain 
water; cleaned courtyard, cultivated lawn 
The space is managed by ecology 
class of the elementary school 
 
Vitez “Kremenik” Decoration of the orchard, 
botanical garden and sport 
playground
Plants & botanic garden in a school yard – 
pupils participated in planting; sport & 
events  facilities constructed  
The space is regularly maintained 





Mulahmetovića brook & school 
yard – ecological decoration 
Cleaned and cultivated creek-area nearby 
a local school; sport facilities repaired 
The space is maintained by the 
school and the eco-class 
 
Tuzla UG “Centar urbanih 
ideja” 
Super Super-quart Municipal authorities subject to lobbying, to 
determine a one-way traffic flow, to 
maintain properly the parking lot, and to 
determine a pedestrian zone; 7 green 
surfaces decorated 
Citizens, the local communities 
apartment owners, sanitation 
service 
 
Kostajnica  UG “Pounje
Kostajnica” 
Our Yard Drainage opening for connection to city 
sewers built; decoration of green surfaces  
Space maintained by the tenants’ 
assembly  
Plans for future 
initiatives developed  
Zavidovići, UG “Atom” Repair of depot of carcinogenic 
dross and turning the area into 
the park 
In residential unit courtyard - 110 m3 of 
cancerogenic waste was gathered, and 
moved to the city landfill, drainage 
installation constructed, trees planted 
  
Mostar HO “Izvor” The positive example In residential block - sewage & drainage 
systems constructed; sidewalks built; yard 
cleaned, cultivated; children’s playground 
constructed 








Total value (KM) Mozaik(in KM) Community (in KM) In cash In-kind & services 23 public institutions 70 public & private firms 26 individuals 14 CBOs  


















Contribution in-kind and in services














Contribution of   23 public institutions
Contribution of   70 public and private companies
Contribution of  26 individuals 
















TABLE 2: Code A: Statistics of Community Planning Meetings (February-March 2006) 
 














Breza 15    15 UG ‘20 mart 1990’, Clean town, healthy future 4,6 4,6
Zavidovići 24    20 ‘Sadnice Mira – Peace Trees’, Eco park ‘Đurića gaj’ 4,9 4,4
Zavidovići 10    10 UG ‘Atom’, Repair of depot of carcinogenic dross & transforming the area into park 5 4,7
B.Petrovac 34    25 UG ‘Gracija’,  Building of sport & recreation park for youth & adults 4,8 4
Derventa 14    12 ‘Forum NVO’, Decoration of esplanade at the left side of river Ukrina 4,7 3,6
Ključ 21    12 UG ‘ključ budućnosti’, Decoration of the city beach ‘Alina Luka 2006’ 5 4,6
Teslić 23    21 UG ‘Eco-oaza Podgredine“, Bathing area for youth of three local communities 4,9 4,3
Vitez 27    19 “Kremenik’, Decoration of the orchard, botanical garden and sport playground 4,9 4,3
Čapljina 9    9 Society  ‘Lijepa naša’, Decoration of the beach Jaz 4,6 3,8
Jablanica 14    12 ‘EKO Neretva’, Cleaned depot– better ecological conditions for living in local community D.Jablanica 5 4,7
Mostar 19    14 HO “Izvor’, The positive example 4,9 4,8
Trebinje 13    11 UG  ‘OAZA“, For more purposeful and more beautiful school yard 4,8 4,2
Novi Grad 13    12 ‘Dar prirode’, Decoration of the park in local community  Mlakva 4,8 4,5
Gradiška 21    19 Forum Gradiščanaca’, Decoration of excursion site at the bank of river Sava – Poloj 4,8 4
Kostajnica 10    10 UG ‘Pounje Kostajnica’, Our Yard 4,6 4,7
Prijedor 19    19 Ecological society ‘Kozara’, Decoration of the excursion site Pašinac 4,7 4,1
Kalesija 29    18 UG ‘Eko zeleni Kalesija’, Decoration of the green areas 4,9 4,5
Olovo 12    9 Hiking club ‘Smolin’, Decoration of the excursion site “Zeleni vir’ 4,9 4,7
Srebrenik 14 9 Eco-Green Srebrenik, Ecological decoration of Mulahmetovića brook and school yard 4,7 4,3 






TABLE 3: CoDE A Statistics of involvement in planning process 
 
 
  Involvement in planning process - Community planning meetings 






ess NGOs MZ  Media 
Total 
CODEA Breza 2     3   10     15 
CODEA Novi Grad 1     5   2 4 1 13 
CODEA B.Petrovac 19 4   4   3 4   34 
CODEA Čapljina 4 2   1   1 1   9 
CODEA Derventa 10         3   1 14 
CODEA Gradiška   2 2 7 1 2 5 2 21 
CODEA Jablanica 11   2       1   14 
CODEA Kalesija 7   4 10   4 2 2 29 
CODEA Ključ 4 3 1 2   8   3 21 
CODEA Kostajnica 6   1 2   1     10 
CODEA Mostar     1 5   11   2 19 
CODEA Olovo 5   2     2 2 1 12 
CODEA Prijedor   8 2 5     4   19 
CODEA Srebrenik 3   2 4   4   1 14 
CODEA Teslić 6 8 2 1 1 3 2   23 
CODEA Trebinje 3   3 2   4 1   13 
CODEA Tuzla 13   1       4   18 
CODEA Vitez 13   1 6 1 3 3   27 





  1   2   6 1   10 




















































APPENDIX 9: Mozaik Foundation Support to Social Capital Reconstruction  
 
TABLE 1: Living Heritage Programme 
 
PROJECT NAME / 
LOCATION 
MOSAIK ASSESSMENT of achievements 
 
Reconstruction of the old 
shool in Rankovići  (village 
near by Novi Travnik) -  a 
100 years old school and 
1500 years old oak tree in 
the yard –   both neglected 
and devastated 
The project was implemented by NGOs not based in the village of Rankovići, following their particular interests and not being accessible to the people 
in village. This caused problems. Community members were not involved in planning processes and mobilized to take active role in the project 
although activities were managed in participatory manner (joint decision-making, delegation of responsibilities). Intensive media coverage did not 
reach/inform people from local community - people did not have a feeling that this was “their” project. Registration of a local association to manage the 
school was delayed. Completed in 2005 it enabled the achievement of positive results and change of the way of running the project „Living Heritage 
School“. Additional problems in connection to further reconstruction works needed impeded the opening of the school. Big potential for local benefits 
for various groups (people from Rankovići, NGOs from Novi Travnik, and youth from this area).  
Manifestation in Small 
street in Kakanj  (a town of  
52 000 citizens. In the 1960 
the tradition of the Small 
street has been established 
- to ‘host’ the cultural, social, 
etc. happenings) 
The project influenced on increasing the readiness of community, especially local government, to preserve local heritage, and had positive impact on 
raising community awareness of own tradition. NGO administrator of the project partially managed to mobilize the community and to re-establish the 
symbol of traditional cultural event. Yong people, pensioners and local institutions became involved, but no full participation of the community (limited 
contribution from private sector and individuals); Need to increase transparency of the work and wider community participation. A local organisation - 
"Days of trade and culture" - was created with the launch of the project. The project achieved to organise the street as a pedestrian zone used for 
traditional celebrations. Viability of project can be ensured by NGOs engaged with organizing further cultural and sporting events or by new programs 
(as building a children's playground by the municipality) 
Opening ethno house in 
Jablanica (a town on 
Neretva river, 10 000 
citizens)    
Wide participation of various institutions and people in activities resulted in increase of awareness of cultural heritage and improving cultural life of 
Jablanica.  Still, the involvement of people in creative activities not as expected. In  the process of setting up the ethno house in Jablanica, a 
successful local partnership achieved, as well as other community contacts (with historical section of Bradina and Šćit, museum in Mostar and the 
National Museum of Sarajevo) . Sustainability ensured through taking responsibility for the maintenance of the museum space.  Necessary to carry out 
education of interested groups, to promote the old trade & travel deals, to continue organizing events  
Renovation of space for 
folklore group in Guča 
Gora (400 inhabitants, - 
Croats, returnees from the 
surrounding 7 Bošnjaks and 
Croats villages; the work of 
the folklore group was 
interrupted during the war)   
The positive impact on social cohesion was indicated by increased contacts among individuals and groups, increased awareness of local tradition and 
capacities of community members in planning and conducting various activities for local good. The folklore group was revived (re-registered NGO; 
active membership is involved in preservation of local heritage).  Activities managed in participatory manner (locals involved in planning and decision 
making, which influenced on their readiness to work as volunteers). Besides, the space is used by Local Community Office that covers 7 villages and a 
football club (members from all surrounding Bošnjak and Croat villages).  Local benefit for various groups is a visible motivational factor for future 
activities. Through replication of similar participatory approach in planning and implementing community actions the Local Community Office has 
already cleaned playground, graveyard and park, installed benches and reconstructed two local roads. The project have increased community 
cohesion and motivated further actions (first participatory activities since 1996). The positive results acknowledged by community members: “Those 
who came with money didn’t do anything, and these without big money did everything”. 
Renovation of old Clock 
Tower in Donji Vakuf  
The project influenced on preservation of local heritage and had positive impact on raising community awareness of own tradition. Community is 
successfully mobilized to work on protection of local heritage. The biggest strength of this project is dedicated working group that have had clear vision 
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 about the project goal and was ready to work on a voluntary basis to achieve it. Working group succeeded to mobilize local resources and to involve 
institutions and business to support the project.  Additionally, made efforts in lobbying and influenced decision makers to come with decisions to protect 
local heritage. The group is still active and have plans for future initiatives to ensure sustainability of the project idea and to replicate the participatory 
approach.  The renovated space provides opportunities for creative expressions of local amateurs (folklore club, singers, there was poetry contest, etc. 
The project confirms that it is easier for volunteer support in smaller towns, while the financial support is more easily implemented in places with 
greater concentration of companies and government institutions. 
Workshop for old 
techniques of making 
traditional clothes in Ćatići 
There was a positive impact on raising community awareness of own tradition and increasing readiness of community members to work on protection 
of local heritage. Various groups participated in the project (concerning gender, age, nationality) and community was mobilized (indicated by the high 
level of voluntary support in various activities implemented through the project). Limited financial support, especially form institutions. Need to develop 
better partnerships and fundraising skills. Working group established contacts with other communities who participated in the organised display. Plans 
for new events; the group is involved in the third cycle of the Living Heritage project (handicrafts production) - no doubts about the sustainability of the 
project idea.  
The Centre of Living 
Heritage in Bugojno (town 
of about 40 000 citizens)  
There is NO impact on social cohesion achieved through this project – low level of mobilization of community members, no replication of the 
participatory model of community development.  Working group did not succeed to ensure continuation of the activities of The Centre of Living 
Heritage, what was the project goal, neither had they implemented all activities planed (setting table, the more volunteer action). Activities started in a 
participatory manner, but the poor organisation and lack of leader had a negative impact on project. Lacking a clear vision and effective coordination, 
the group did not succeed to get financial support from community, nor were volunteers engaged. Consequently, the renovated through the project 
space was used for just few activities. The group produced lot of promotional materials (brochures, posters, calendars, TV reportages), but these did 
not contribute for mobilizing citizens of Bugojno. However, the materials increased awareness of citizens about the values of local cultural heritage (the 









PROJECT TITLE, MATERIAL 
OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED, 
BENEFICIARIES 
(EVALUATION) DESCRIPTION OF CSMF OBJECTIVES 
1. PROMOTING ACTIVISM & VOLUNTEERISM IN COMMUNITIES 
2. AFFIRMING NGOS’ ROOTS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
1. Teslić , 
NGO “Futura 
Plus”  
Ambulance in Village of 
Kamenica: Ensured basic 
conditions for health protection for 
citizen of Kamenica and 2 
surrounding villages (about 2000  
people)  
1. Excellent: Voluntary work since 1991 but no full involvement in planning process; 3 institutions and groups involved in 
planning & implementation (total of 15 people involved in activities: 7 members of working group;  young, men and women, 
including Serbs from neighbourhood village). High number of volunteers (22 people/721 hours); Plans for new community 
initiatives 
2. Excellent: NGO informed citizens on regularly basis and involve them in planning process. Visible results and local 
benefit increased trust toward NGO. Based on needs assessment they develop plans for new activities in this community. 
They used only personal contacts for volunteers’ mobilization and for fundraising. Success in influencing decision makers 
(Municipality decided to ensure sustainable work of the ambulance). 
2. Petrovo,  
NGO “Ideja” 
Reconstruction of infrastructure 
in Kakmuž: Reconstructed street 
light in main street - enabled safety 
movement (2370 citizens), better 
conditions for activities of sport 
associations (2 sport clubs with 64 
members; 350 school children) 
1. Good: Local authorities - practice to support community initiatives, people used to voluntary actions; thus no significant 
improvement in applying CDD approach. 4 institutions, 4 NGOs and groups (young, men and women) involved in planning 
and implementation (4 members of working group, 20 others); High number of volunteers (18 people/500 hours); Significant 
amount of money raised from 3 sources (individuals, government institutions, business). Community benefits (lights on 
streets, space for 2 sport clubs, etc.) - visible motivation for future activities 
2. Good: For the first time, NGO involved citizens in planning process and reported to them regularly. Successful 
partnerships established. New methods used for mobilization of local resources and for mobilization and management of 
volunteers. Plans for 5 new initiatives developed, but no concrete actions undertaken. 
3. Maglaj, 
NGO “RVI” 
Removing of Architectonic 
Barriers in Maglaj: Renovated 2 
streets (total of 1,5 km) with 
pathways for disabled - enabled 
inclusion & access to public 
institutions (about 260 citizens) 
1. Fair: Common benefit and involvement of different stakeholders in planning process (3 from institutions, 20 from 
community, 7 from working group) recognised as factors of success, but community did not succeed to mobilize volunteers. 
Citizens satisfied with participatory decision making; no interest in involvement with voluntary work (2 volunteers / 10 days). 
High level of local financial contribution, but only from two sources (municipality and NGO own resources). Plans for future 
activities to involve community members. 
2. Fair: Success in mobilisation of local government but still a need for use of wider set of info/promo methods in order to 
get community support. No new methods of fundraising applied. NGO succeed to make influence on local government to 
incorporate invalids’ needs in the urban plans. NGO members understand the need for applying participatory approach in 
their work, but no new plans developed in this direction/ 
4. Petrovo, 
NGO “RVI”  
Road reparation in Petrovo: 
Economic development of local 
community, created better 
conditions for agriculture through 
improvement of infrastructure 
(about 3500 citizens from  Petrovo 
& Kakmuž ) 
1. Excellent: First application of CDD approach in community since 1996. Citizens emphasized importance of involvement 
in the planning process – increased willingness to participate (4 institutions involved in planning and implementation, 15 
citizens on planning meeting, 5 in working group, 2 additional public meetings during implementation). All groups involved 
recognised benefits for themselves. Significant number of volunteers (81 volunteer/1020 hours); Funds raised from 
numerous sources (citizens, two government institutions, 5 private companies). Plans to reconstruct 4 additional roads; 
reconstruction of a bridge over river Jadrina started 
2. Excellent: NGO applied new methods for informing citizens, for their involvement in planning process and for volunteers’ 
mobilization and fundraising. Well organized management of volunteers; Successful partnership; The model is replicated in 
plans for 6 additional actions, developed based on the needs expressed by community 
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 5. Breza, NGO 
“20 mart 1990” 
Promotion of ecological 
awareness in Breza: Ecological 
awareness raised; facilities for 
children installed (beneficiaries: 
about 1000 pupils & young people; 
place for creative educational 
activities for another 400 pre-
school children) 
1. Excellent: Community previously conducted participatory activities. Mostly involved in project was youth, with significant  
participation of institutions Significant number of volunteers (510 volunteer/3811 hours, engaged in community actions and 
in organizing various events). Four types of sources (citizens, government institutions, private companies, and NGO). Model 
replicated through campaign against using plastic bags.  
2. Excellent: NGO applied 6 various methods for informing citizens; Financial and narrative reports announced; Significant 
efforts to involve stakeholders in decision making process (7 public meetings, 8 meetings for membership);  Applied 5 
methods for volunteers mobilization applied  (2 new methods); well organized management of volunteers;  Successful 




Arranging the city park in 
Derventa: Renovated City park in 
Derventa. Organized cultural and 
sport activities. Cultural, sport and 
community value of the project 
(Beneficiareis: av. 50 persons 
daily) 
1. Good: First implementation of CDD process with involvement in planning process – variety of stakeholders: 
representatives of 3 NGOs, 1 sport club, 2 government institutions, pensioner and one youth in working group; Significant 
support: 180 volunteers worked 900 hours on cleaning, Financial support raised from two sources (municipality & private 
sector); Community – not fully supportive to the initiative (the park was subsequently ruined) 
2. Fair: NGO improved capabilities for work in partnership with other NGOs and government institutions. No new methods 
for volunteers and local resources mobilization applied. Although NGO informed public about initiative, (7 announcements 
there were no efforts to involve stakeholders in decision-making process (no public meetings). Questionable quality of 
results (street chessboard not completed, the park is ruined again, presented incorrect info on leaflets (pictures from other 
places). Model not replicated. 
7. Derventa, 
“Forum NVO”  
Building and equipping first aid 
centre in Mala Sočanica: Ensured 
basic conditions for health 
protection for citizen of Mala 
Sočanica and surrounding villages 
(900 inhabitants) 
1. Excellent: 12 people participated in planning process, working group (citizens, local community office, NGO, media) had 
5 meetings; Visible local benefit motivated community to support initiative (25 volunteers worked 164 hours on 
reconstruction and cleaning, with involvement of women, men, young and middle age people; 50 people involved in  
preparation of opening event, including preparing the lunch);  Local contribution from 3 sources: individuals, 2 institutions, 
and NGOs; Sustainability ensured – local community office is responsible for maintaining the space, hospital Derventa 
provided medical staff; Model replicated - repaired 2 km of local road 
2. Excellent: NGO gained knowledge and experiences in conducting projects with community involvement; readiness to 
apply the CDD approach. Various informing methods were used (printed and electronic media, posters that presented 
financial and narrative reports). New methods for mobilization and managing volunteers work; gained experience in 
fundraising from individuals; Established effective partnerships with concrete technical and financial support from 




Sustainable rural development in 
Bosanski Lužani: Enabled  
sustainable rural development; 
improved access to properties for 
100 people; 37 of them  - 
knowledge of eductaional activities; 
removing waste disposal has 
improved the quality of life for 
community residents 
1. Good: Elderly people were surprising active and mobilized community. Sustainable results; 10 people participated in the 
planning process; the working group (NGO members, citizens) had 7 meetings. Local benefit motivated people (22 
volunteers worked 659 hours on road and bridge reconstruction and cleaning, with involvement of women, men, young and 
older people);  Local contribution from 2 sources: institutions & business.  
2. Good: Project contributed to the NGO development. NGO informed community through 3 articles in local newspaper 
(that included narrative and financial report), but more direct contacts with community members are still needed. NGO 
improved its own image in community – raised trust (few citizens approached to the NGO as new members). NGO 
improved experience in working in partnership (local government and business), in networking (contacts with agricultural 
associations from other villages), in managing volunteers work. New activities in the village planned 
9. Petrovo, 
NGO “Soz”  
Building a bus station in 
Petrovo: Created better conditions 
for transport of passengers; 
1. Fair: Community had previously experience with CDD approach – no improvement achieved. 10 people involved in 
planning process, 5 members of working group (representatives of 2 NGOs, citizens) had 10 meetings; 30 volunteers 
worked 488 hours on building the bus station; Local contribution from 2 sources: Institution & Business; The visible local 
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 Beneficiaries: about 2000 people 
(20% locals using the bus service)  
benefit couldn’t bring about a strong community involvement in activities.  
2. Good: Organization did not have skills and experiences to run participatory initiatives. Supported by  the working group 
this project had impact on  their organizational development – improved skills in working in partnership (support from local 
government), in informing community (article in local newspaper, meetings with community members, narrative and 
financial report sent to local government, poll conducted), new techniques in volunteers management  (lists of volunteers). 




Opening IT educational resource 
centre: Created conditions for 
socializing and education youth of 
Mramor (15 young people trained; 
3 more groups of 10 people to be 
trained; internet users) 
1. Good: 3 members of working group had regular meetings; 10 volunteers worked 150 hours to prepare the space. Due to 
the type of beneficiary group (only youth), there was less involvement of other citizens in voluntary actions. 2 institutions 
supported the activities (Municipality and local community office) and one private company. The project increased readiness 
of community to adopt participatory development approach; local benefits for youth are a motivational factor for conducting 
similar activities in the future. 
 2. Good: The youth organization had no experience and this project contributed to its organizational development – 
improved skills in working in partnership, volunteers’ mobilization, and fundraising. NGO still needs to develop practices for 
successful community mobilization (transparency, participatory planning, volunteers mobilization and management, etc). 





Manifestation summer on Drina 
river: Picnic place on Drina river 
renovated and equipped also for 
cultural and sport events; improved 
ecological awareness and ensured 
place for recreation, socializing, 
sport and cultural activities (about 
30% of Bratunac citizens visit the 
picnic space (5100 people) 
1. Excellent: Significant community involvement and support: Around 40 community members (representatives of 8 public 
institutions and 6 NGOs) involved in planning and coordination of the activities; 27 meetings held. 87 volunteers completed 
1487 hours on project activities. Financial support from 4 sources: 3 individuals, public institutions, 13 private companies, 
and NGOs. Municipality offered a partial support for the manifestation for the next summer. Working group established a 
city committee for environmental protection – committee developed plan for future activities, partially financed by 
Municipality.  
2. Excellent: Although newly established and inexperienced, NGO showed high level of dedication and professionalism. 
NGO used 5 methods to inform and mobilize citizens (meetings, media, letters, posters, direct contact) and collected 
recommendations for next manifestation. Improved experience in working with many partners, with clear delegation of 
responsibilities. NGO members improved skills in fundraising, project proposal writing, etc. 
12. Kozarac, 
NGO  “DON – 
field office 
Teledom”  
Cleaning the banks and trough 
of Starenica river: Cleaned 2 km 
of the Starenica river banks; 
increased awareness about the 
need for environmental protection - 
no further pollution of the cleared 
section of the river. (300 people 
living near to the river banks) 
1. Fair: 21 people involved in 4 planning meetings; working group (8 members –NGO, LC office, citizens) had 13 meetings. 
There was significant financial support from community (from business, individuals, and institutions), plans for further 
environmental activities and fundraising were developed. Awareness about the need for environmental protection rose. 
Participatory development model was adopted only partially – limited voluntary support from community (11 volunteers 
worked 980 hours). Working group succeed to achieve some unplanned results, but some planned activities were not 
implemented 
2. Good: NGOs have gained considerable experience in applying new methods of raising funds and monitoring the work of 
volunteers, which will help them in future activities. Further initiatives needed to maintain the area clean. The majority of 
activities conducted by NGOs (need to improve work in partnership and mobilization of volunteers) 
13. 
Dragotinja, 
NGO  “DON” in 
partnership 
with LC office 
of Dragotinja 
Manifestation “Dragotinja 
evenings” Improved quality of 
"Dragotinja evenings" 
manifestation. Beneficiaries: 700 
citizens from Dragotinje and all 
people participating in the 
1. Good: 25 people involved in planning process. Significant financial support from 3 sources (2 institutions, 3 business, 1 
individual). 27 volunteers from community - worked 428 hours to prepare the manifestation. Results encouraged community 
to initiate new activities 
2. Good: LC office gained experience in participatory projects planning (conducted poll about level of satisfaction, 




manifestation. Playground also 
used by the local football club. 
Space for exhibition of paintings, 
social & sporting activities  
14. Odžak, 
NGO CGSA 
Sanation of dropping dump in 
Odžak: Cleaned landfill. Prohibition 
of throwing waste. Maintenance of 
cleaned places. Enhanced 
ecological conditions of life (about 
2000 of citizens of Odžak) 
1. Good: Two government institutions, 4 NGOs & 10 community members involved in project planning and implementation 
(3 meetings plus working group meetings);  75 volunteers (members of ecological NGOs: all ages, man and women) 
worked 974 hours on project implementation. Project financially supported by government institutions (2), by business (1) 
and by NGO; Local government was influenced - installed lights on the streets around the park. Model replicated in 2 
neighboured villages; in Odžak - partnership with Municipality; New eco-initiatives planned; Questionable sustainability of 
results 
2. Good: NGO used 4 methods to inform and mobilize citizens - 3 meetings, media (national & local electronic and printed 
media), leaflets, and posters. Improved skills in working in partnership (with 3 NGOs and 2 local institutions) and in 





Building sport field in Kraševo: 
Provided conditions for the start of 
project implementation: interviews 
with relevant representatives of the 
community, provided support for 
project services and work; 
conditions for sports & cultural 
events  (100 school children) 
1. Good: 15 people (community members, NGO members, representatives of 2 institutions) involved in planning process (7 
meetings). 12 volunteers worked 584 hours; Participation of various groups – man and women, different ages, 
representatives of two nations. There was significant financial support from community (in-kind & in-cash, from 2 
businesses, local government; individuals). Plans for new community initiatives, but no financial support ensured. 
2. Good: Citizens are informed and mobilized through local radio station, meetings, and direct contact. No new methods for 
mobilization/ management of volunteers applied. Various fundraising methods applied, especially toward individuals. No 
influence on decision makers 
16. 
Zavidovići,  
NGO  Centar 
za mlade 
Reconstruction of Central Park 
with Monument: Space for 
gathering and cultural activities of 
citizens.  Monument area used for 
gathering of citizens, for young 
people and their cultural and social 
activities (1,000 users) 
1. Fair: 16 people (community members, members of 3 NGO, representative of 1 institution) involved in planning process (3 
meetings). 16 volunteers worked 70 hours; There was significant financial support to the project, but only from one source 
(local government); The group developed plans for new community initiatives, but no financial support ensured. 
2. Fair: Citizens are informed and mobilized through media (local TV station, Radio Free Europe, newspaper articles), 






 APPENDIX 10: BiH Visions for the Future 
 
The following charts are taken from the study of the UNDP & Oxford Research 
International (2007) The Silent Majority Speaks: Snapshots of Today and Visions of 
the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (www.undp.ba). They have been produced 
based on the data from the National Survey of BiH 2007 (valid N of respondents 3580).  
 
The charts presented below visualise the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007) 
related to the self-identification of people, social trust and vision for the future.  
 
As the first charts reveal, the self-identification of the population differs on ethno-
religious basis. While most of the Bosniacs-Muslim identify themselves as citizens of 
BiH (about 65%), or as having a dual - BiH and ethno-religious identity (around 32 %), 
the Serb-Orthdox population that recognises the BiH (national) identity totals 60 %, of 
which only 15% recognises the citizenship as their primary identity. It emerges that the 
dominant identity for more than 50% of the population is their ethno-religious 
background; another 25% of the people do not recognise their Bosnian citizenship at all. 
 
The “Social Trust” pie chart on its turn reveals the disturbing fact that the level of trust 
between the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than low – only 7% of the 
people that have taken part in the national survey of 2007 would trust most of the 
members of the society. 
 
The opinions on the constitutional organisation of the country and its future also differ 
along the ethnic lines. The three graphs (Graph 1, 2 and 3) reveal that most satisfied 
with the current political structure and organisation of the country is the Serb-Orthodox 
population. Bosniacs-Muslim appear to have developed the strongest affiliations with 
the state and thus they stand behind the idea of the establishment of a strong 
centralised state, while the Serb-Orthodox population would rather preserve the status-
quo.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note what do the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina consider 
policy priorities. The fact that “Growing BiH into one country” takes the second place in 
the rank list is rather positive with respect to the social capital recovery process. 
Nevertheless, it is concerning that despite all the support and financial, administrative 
and technical aid offered to the country, a policy priority number one is “Providing basis 
for decent living”. 
 
In summary, in 2007 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still divided in three. 
On most of the issues the Serb-Orthodox and the Bosniacs-Muslim communities find 
themselves on the two extreme opinion (or even attitude) poles, while the position of the 
Croats-Catholic appears to be in the middle. The data from the survey reveals that the 
citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still divided along ethnic lines and that the 

























Q: Which of the following best 



































 318 mThis charts illustrate the breakdown by 
religion of Primary (BiH), Dual (BiH & 
ethno-religious) and Exclusive (ethno-
religious) identities Q: Can ost of people be 
trusted or not? Q: As well as thinking of yourself as [Bosniak, 
Croat, Serb] do you also think of yourself as 
being a citizen of the whole of the BiH?



























































































Q: Which should be the policy priorities for the 
next 12 months? 
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